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Abstract 
This thesis is a study of the émergence and diachronic development of Greek-Cypriot 
nationalism, and its relation to nation, state, and national identities. The broad 
perspective of historical sociology is used, and the more specific neo-Weberian analytic 
framework of cultural transformation and social closure, as developed by A. Wimmer, 
to demonstrate how nationalism, as the 'axial principle' along which modem societies 
structure inclusion and exclusion, did not lead to the development of a Cypriot nation-
state, but to a bi-ethnic national state instead; this was mainly because closure took 
place along ethnie and not national lines, for socio-historical reasons which the study 
examines. 
The study first explores the hotly debated issue 'when is the nation', of whether there 
was a Greek nation in antiquity, of which Greek-Cypriots were a part, or whether the 
nation's roots are traceable in Medieval times. Next, the development of national 
consciousness and nationalism is considered, under three différent types of regime: 
Düring Ottoman rule, a religious community was gradually transformed into an ethnie 
community; toward the end of this period, Ottoman reforms did not manage to forge a 
common new (Ottomanist) identity, for social closure had already progressed along 
ethnie Unes. In early British colonial years, ethnicity was politieized and ethnie 
consciousness gradually turned into a nationalist mass movement for enosis; despite 
the overall unity of the movement, two variants of nationalism developed, a more 
traditional ethnie version, characterizing the Right, and another version, imbued with 
territorial/civic éléments (derived from the Internationalist outlook of the communist 
party), characterizing the Left The anti-colonial struggle for enosis was led by the 
Right, and excluded the Left and the Turkish-Cypriots. 
The fragile consociational regime established at independence collapsed after a brief 
period of cohabitation between the Greeks and Turks of the island in the bi-ethnic / bi-
communal Republic of Cyprus - the study analyses the causes leading to the 
breakdown. Between 1964 and 67, the Greek-Cypriots turned to enosis again, but 
after realizing the difficulties and dangers involved in its pursuanœ, Makarios sought to 
strengthen independence instead, while limiting the powers of Turkish-Cypriots - in 
effect, aiming for a majoritarian regime with minority rights for the latter. The clash 
between pro-independence and pro-enosis versions of nationalism was to characterize 
this period, leading to the coup and invasion of 1974. 
With the death of enosis \n 1974, Heilenocentric nationalism would give more emphasis 
to Greek culture and identity, whereas Cyprocentric nationalism would stress the 
priority of Cyprus, the state, and of rapprochement with the Turkish-Cypriots. The 
study utilizes data from two surveys coordinated by the author, to analyze in more 
depth the attitudes and discourses of Greek-Cypriots as regards their relations to the 
Greek nation and the Cypriot state. The graduai strengthening of Cypriot identity is 
seen to be connected with a new social compromise, which seems to have prevailed 
within the Greek-Cypriot community, stressing the importance of the Greek-Cypriot 
state, and which seems to be the primary explanation of why the Greek-Cypriots 
rejected the federai solution suggested by the UN sponsored Annan Plan, in 2004. In 
the same year, Cyprus became a member of the European Union, and the study 
considers some of the implications of this development for the future of nationalism in 
Cyprus. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
Objectives, issues, methods, overview 
This thesis is an analysis of the genesis and growth of Greek-Cypriot nationalism and 
its relation to nation, state and national identities.1 The informed reader will 
immediately recognize how difficult and complex this aim is, considering that each of 
thèse terms is variedly interpreted by a voluminous and contradictory literature. The 
term nationalism, for instance, has been used to refer to ideas, discourses, idéologies 
and ideological movements, collective sentiments, and forms of behaviour or action. 
Obviously, each emphasis would lead to différent implications for the study of 
nationalism - for instance, a stress on ideas, discourses and narratives would lead to a 
focus on nationalist texts, whereas a stress on movement would focus on analysis of 
politicai action, power and conflict. Similar problems arise with the rest of the terms 
and phenomena the study intends to examine.2 Following Wimmer, the présent 
analysis views nationalism as the central "cultural compromise" of modem society, and 
national states as forms of "social closure" resulting from this compromise.3 Closure 
along ethnie (rather than national) lines results in tensions or even the complete break-
down of national states, which is what has happened in Cyprus. These concepts will 
be explained more fully further below, in the section on approaches and théories. 
Greek-Cypriot nationalism présents an interesting case which considerably contrasts 
with other, well researched types of nationalism, especially as regards its peculiar 
relation to nation and state. Most types of nationalism can be classified as either 
state-led (the state fostering the création of nation) or state-seeking (the nation aiming 
to form its own state). To thèse, Oommen4 adds "state-renouncing" natîonalisms, to 
refer to nations which ended up existing within the confines of a larger national entity 
(Scotland and Wales within the United Kingdom, Catatonia and the Basque country 
within Spain, Quebec within Canada). The end resuit is a complex field comprised of: 
Nation-states or state-nations (Germany, Italy, Greece, as regards the former case, 
France, the United States, as regards the second); nations without states (Scotland, 
Catatonia); pluri-national states (the UK, Spain, Belgium); uni-natîonal states (Japan); 
shared-nation states (South and North Korea); nations sharing states (Swedes in 
Sweden and Finland, Kurds in Turkey and Iran); and states without nations (Singapore, 
Taiwan).5 
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In Cyprus, an earlier irredentist form of Greek-Cypriot nationalism {enosis) aimed to 
unite Cyprus with a 'motherland' state (Greece), while the possibility of the création of 
a Cypriot state was hardly considered. The stimulation of Turkish-Cypriot nationalism 
which opposed enosis, advocating partition or double union (to Greece and Turkey 
respectively), and British colonialisme use of the ensuing antagonism, led to the 
formation of a "Reluctant Republic"6- a bi-communal, bi-national Cypriot state. After a 
brief period of co-habitation, the consociational Cyprus Republic collapsed, Turkish-
Cypriots withdrew from government into homogeneous enclaves, and Greek-Cypriots 
swiftly returned to the enosis ideal. Soon realizing that the latter was almost impossible 
to achieve, the majority half-heartedly embraced the idea of a unitary state where the 
Turkish-Cypriots would enjoy a protected minority status; a smaller fraction clung 
obstinately to the enosis dream, turning violent in its pursued ends and, with help from 
the "national centre" (more specifically, the Greek military junta in power at the time), 
undermined the Cypriot state with a coup; this was promptly followed by Turkey's 
invasion and the partition of the island in 1974. After this stage two new variants of 
nationalism emerged, each characterized by a différent attitude towards nation and 
state. Even though after 74 the Greek-Cypriots kept pressing for the création of a 
fédération, which would have re-unified the country, in 2004, the vast majority voted 
against a UN sponsored plan aiming at a federai solution. Meanwhile Cyprus has 
entered the European Union, which seems to be offering new challenges and 
opportunities to the Greek-Cypriot controlied national state. 
The study of nationalism in Cyprus has been, until recently, the almost exclusive 
preserve of historians and politicai scientists. But most mainstream historians have 
analyzed Cypriot nationalism by using its own catégories - that is, by viewing it as a 
phenomenon associated with the nation, which itself is seen to be traceable three 
thousand years back, at the time of the coming of Greek settlers on the island. 
Henceforth Cyprus is seen as having been a part of the Greek nation, and various 
events (such as King Evagoras' conflict with the Persians in the 3 r t Century B.C.) as 
manifestations of local nationalist feeling. Yet most contemporary social science 
approaches consider nations as modem phenomena (Gellner), or at most concede a 
persisting 'cultural core' (Smith) in pre-modern times. Whichever approach is used the 
questions remain as to what were the governing principles of pre-modern societies, 
and what were the specific ways in which the pre-modern or pre-nation characteristics 
of a society were transformed, in order to constitute the modem imagined community 
of the nation; what, furthermore, were the social forces within pre-nation society that 
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gave birth to the new ideology of nationalisme None of thèse questions have been 
addressed by nationalist historians, and it is only recently that new approaches have 
emerged which attempt to schematically (Kitromilides), or partially - for a specific 
historic period - (Katsiaounis) do so. What is still lacking is a diachronic analysis of 
nation and nationalism which would buîld on thèse récent approaches but extend them 
to a more full-fledged socio-historical interprétation of the genesis and development of 
Greek-Cypriot nationalism. 
Politicai scientists or international relations scholars have been the second conspicuous 
group which have touched on aspects of Cypriot nationalism, mostly in the context of 
an analysis of how 'external' factors (that is, the interests and power politics of other 
states) have impinged on 'internai' factors to create and perpetuate the 'Cyprus 
Problem' - that is, the conflict between the Greek- and Turkish- Cypriot communities. 
This perspective has certainly produced interesting insights, but its mostly 'external' 
focus has added little to the fuller understanding of nationalism as a social 
phenomenon. The présent study will reverse the emphasis and 'bracket away' such 
external considérations, and refer to them only to the extent that they illuminate a 
particular aspect of the topics of investigation. 
Few socïologists have studied Cypriot nationalism extensively. One of the major works 
which does so, by Attalides, is an exemplary piece bridging the domains of sociology 
and international relations, yet its coverage of pre-modern times and of the origins of 
Greek-Cypriot nationalism is brief and sketchy. Markides similarly pays little attention 
to the "historical antécédents" of Greek-Cypriot nationalism and seems to assume that 
the cultural core (Greek language and the Orthodox religion) quite naturally, and in an 
unproblematic way, gave rise to nationalist consciousness, the main carrier of which 
was the Orthodox Church (an assumption shared by the nationalists but contested by 
recent historical research). Such approaches under-emphasize the ideological labour 
requìred in constructing the new imagined community of the nation, and the rôle of 
the modern state and its ideological apparatuses (mainly mass éducation and 
communication) in cultivating nationalist ideas and feelings. 
Early works by social anthropologists (mainly Loizos, and to a lesser extent Sant Cassia 
and Argyrou), made small, though significant contributions, shifting the emphasis of 
their analysis to the relationship between social change and nationalism. More recent 
studies have made aspects or periods of nationalism their specific subject of 
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investigation: Papadakis has focused on the construction of nationalist identities, 
narratives and commémorations, whereas Bryant's work in historical anthropology has 
examined the impact of British colonialism and modernity on the local cultures of 
nationalism. 
Since the main objective of this thesis is to study the genesis and development of 
Greek-Cypriot nationalism, and its relation with nation and state, the bulk of the 
analysis is based on historical sociology; once the analysis arrives at the current 
historical juncture, then additional methods are used, such as surveys and discourse 
analysis, to supplément and extend the historical approach. 
In récent décades, developments within the disciplines of sociology and history have 
brought the two much nearer than before. Modem sociology was born in nineteenth 
Century Europe as an attempt to understand and explain the great historical social 
transformations of the times - the transition from traditional to modem societies, with 
the accompanying processes of industrialization, urbanization, ascendancy of new 
social classes, émergence of new states and nations, as well as the accompanying 
social problems. Yet the founding fathers of sociology (including Compte, Spencer, 
Tonnies) resorted to uses of history which were far from exemplary, since often 
universal 'laws of history' were stipulated a priori and historical évidence hand-picked 
so as to fit their proposed grand schemes. There were of course exceptions, as those 
of Marx and especially Weber, who produced landmark contributions in historical 
sociology (such as WebeKs analysis of the rise of capitalism in the West). American 
sociology, which was to dominate the field since the turn of the Century, showed no 
great interest in historical sociology and concentrated instead on concrete, empirical 
social phenomena and problems, running the risk of becoming 'ultra-empirica!' or, as 
Mannheim pointed out, of being "split into a séries of discrete technical problems of 
social readjustment".8 Nationalism was too abstract and complex to attract attention -
and besides, it was considered a phenomenon doomed to fade away with 
modernization. Structural functionalism, which was the dominant paradigm between 
1940-1970, had an "ahistorical bias". As Sztompka puts it, if the field's héritage of the 
early European origins was "a sociology above history" the héritage of the second 
American origins was a "sociology without history".9 
Yet again, the historical perspective did not disappear altogether, as witnessed by 
major works like Eisenstadt's on the politicai system of Empires (1963), and Lipsefs 
11 
genealogy of "the first new nation" - America (1967); but its "full renaissance" was to 
come after the 1970s, with the rise of 'new historism' or 'historical sociology' as a 
distinct theoretical and methodological perspective on the social world. Norbert Elias 
was one of the first historical sociologists to mount a sustained attack on "the retreat 
of sociologists into the present", and on the uncritical fact-flnding of much empirical 
research. Elias stressed that to understand a sociéty is to understand its history since 
"every present society has grown out of earlier societies and points beyond itself to a 
diversity of possible futures".10 More recently, Philip Abrams has argued for a complete 
integration of sociology and history since "in terms of their fundamental preoccupation 
history and sociology are the same thing. Both seek to understand the puzzle of 
human agency and both seek to do so in terms of the process of social structuring".11 
Abrams underlines that "society must be understood as a process constructed 
historically by individuáis who are constructed historically by society";12 the central 
concern of social analysis is this "continuous process of construction" of individuáis and 
society. Charles Tilly, another prominent historical sociologist, or social historian, 
similarly argües that sociology should become "historically grounded", so as to study 
societies "comparatively over substantial blocks of space and time, in order to see 
whence we have come, where we are going, and what real alternatives to our present 
condition exist".13 
The move of sociology towards history has been reciprocated by a corresponding move 
of history towards sociology. History is no longer a chronological record of the 
achievements of kings and other rulers: Its domain has expanded with new 
perspectives such as social history, history from below, and subaltern history. In this 
convergence the two disciplines seem to have followed Carr's admonition: "The more 
sociológica! history becomes, and the more historical sociology becomes, the better for 
both. Let the frontier between them be kept wide open for two-way traffic".14 
The perspective of historical sociology has been fruitfully applied to the study of 
nations and nationalism, especially since the mid-sixties, with the works of Ernest 
Gellner, Benedict Anderson, John Armstrong, Walker Connor, Anthony Smith, John 
Breuilly, Andreas Wimmer and others. Despite the wide divergences between these 
scholars, there is also an emerging área of convergence, the basis of which is an effort 
to "sitúate the complex phenomena within the overall context of social change in 
keeping with the tradition of the [sociological] discipline".15 As Aloysius puts it: "This 
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internal approach to the study of nationalism as a specific form of social change is the 
most important contribution of the new sociologica! approach".16 
It is precisely this "internal" approach, focusîng on nationalism and social dynamics 
over time, with a view of considering the impact of significant social changes (such as 
those relating to the politicai regime and economic mode of production, the 
ascendancy of new classes, and so on), and which sees présent day Cypriot society as 
borne of earlier forms of society, which differentiates this thesis from previous works 
on Greek-Cypriot nationalism. 
This first part of the thesis is based on both primary and secondar/ sources which have 
been interpreted or re-interpreted, respectively, using a constructivist framework 
(presented further on), which allows a new reading of Greek-Cypriot nationalism and 
national identity. Secondar/ sources include historical studies and records on Cypriot 
society, economy and culture, memoire of individuals (such as politicai leaders, 
nationalist activists, but also ordinary Citizens), and travelers' accounts. Primary 
sources include newspapers, which were especially useful in cases where other 
materials were scant or seemed to give insufficient or biased coverage of a subject 
(such as the early rise and ideology of the communist party in Cyprus, and the 
formative period of 'Cyprocentrism' just after the 1974 events), censuses, officiai 
reports (of the government, politicai parties and of other organizations), and Statistical 
data on various socio-economic trends. 
The final part of the thesis, which deals with the contemporary period, is based on 
primary sources and incorporâtes the findings of additional data drawn from two large-
scale surveys coordinated by the author, in 2000 and 2006. The first survey covered a 
représentative, stratified sample of 1,073 individuals and used a closed questionnaire 
delivered to ail participants, as well as an open questionnaire completed by a sub-
sample of 150 individuals; the second survey covered 900 individuals, stratified 
according to the same characteristics, and the questionnaire contained some new but 
also some of the same questions as the 2000 survey, so as to facilitate diachronic 
comparisons. The combination of quantitative and qualitative methods afforded an 
opportunity to enrich our analysis with data generated specifically for the needs of the 
thesis - relating to Greek-Cypriot national identifications, attitudes towards significant 
national others, loyalty to state or nation, and so on. More détails on the surveys are 
provided in Appendix 1. 
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The next section deals with the various approaches and théories of nations and 
nationalism, providing the opportunity to highlight the main controversies in the fìeld, 
and to présent the theoretical perspective guiding the thesis. 
Chapter two addresses the question "when is the nation?", which has been a subject of 
lively recent debate in the social sciences; it goes back to the pre-modern history of 
Cyprus, starting with antiquity and the question of whether Cyprus constituted a part 
of the Greek nation - a central doctrine of Greek-Cypriot nationalism. After reviewing 
the growth of the Orthodox Church, as the most central Cypriot institution, from 
Byzantine to European feudal rule, it considère the extent to which there was a first 
appearance of Greek nationalism in Medieval times (many théories locate the roots of 
this to a number of nationalisms in thèse times). 
Chapter three traces the changes introduced by Ottoman rule and especially the 
reinstatement of the Orthodox Church and the consolidation of religious îdentities 
under the millet system. It then considère the rise of new social classes, which were to 
become the carriers of early ethnie consiousness and ideas; the latter were to acquire 
increasing prominence towards late Ottoman rule with the empire's decline and the 
introduction of the Tanzimat reforms. 
Chapter four studies British rule and the impact of modem principles and institutions 
on the communally based local society. After looking at how national awareness 
turned into a full-blown nationalist movement, it focuses on the counter-hegemonial 
project of the working class movement, and its own transition from internationalism to 
an alternative variant of nationalism. The intra-ethnic contest between Left and Right 
and the inter-ethnic conflict between the two communities are then considered in 
relation to the anti-colonial struggle. 
Chapter five Covers the 1960-1974 period of Independence - the formation and 
character of the consociational bi-communal state and the reasons for its collapse in 
1963; the acquirement of the Cyprus Republic by the Greek-Cypriots and the 
résurgence of enosis; Makarios' turn to the policy of the feasible and the ensuing 
conflict between a militant ethnie nationalism and an ineipient state nationalism; and 
the crisis of identity and loyalties leading to the 1974 debacle. 
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Chapter six covers the post-1974 period, in which there was an initial rise of 
Cyprocentrism (a new wave of state patriotism) followed by the return of 
Hellenocentrism, reinvigorated by neo-nationalism. After considering the ensuing 
collective identities (politicai and ethno-national), the chapter examines the 
convergence to a Greek-Cypriot version of nationalism, and the associated 
identification with the Greek-Cypriot state, which is seen to be the main reason 
explaining the rejection of the UN sponsored Annan Plan for a new federai regime in 
2004. 
Chapter seven, the conclusion, attempts to bring together the main threads of the 
argument and to make some overall évaluations on Greek-Cypriot nationalism and 
national identity. 
In order to proceed to a full-fledged analysis of our topic, it is necessary to outline the 
main theoretical issues involved, as well as the major approaches to the field, and 
situate the présent study's own proposed perspective and course of analysis. We may 
take as a point of departure Ozkirimli's observation17 that the main issues around 
which contemporary theoretical debate revolves, Cluster around three basic questions: 
a) what is the nation and nationalism; b) what are the origins of nations and 
nationalism (are they ancïent or modem phenomena); c) what are the différent 
varieties and types of nationalism. Each of thèse questions is answered differently by 
the three main approaches and relevant théories which have crystallized out of the 
tierce contemporary debates on thèse matters. We will now turn to consider thèse 
three paradigms, concentrating on those aspects which will be most useful in 
subsequently examining the case of Cyprus. It should be noted that with the 
continuous prolifération of related studies, what we will be considering is not so much 
three discrete perspectives with associated théories, but a range or continuum of 
relevant positions.18 
Approaches and théories 
Primordialism and Perennialism 
Primordialism is the earliest approach to nations and nationalism, and may be traced 
back to politicai romanticism - which, as we will see further on, constituted an 
important influence on Greek and Greek-Cypriot nationalism. Its central tenet is that 
15 
the world consiste of "naturai" nations in the twin sensé of organic and immémorial; 
nations are seen to be the main actors on the stage of world history, each 
differentiated by a unique culture and spirit. As collective actors, nations have their 
own unique consciousness or identity, which may be lost or deformed in periods of 
serfdom or fall, so it becomes the duty of nationaliste to seek to liberate, restore or to 
reawaken the nation, into freedom and new glories.19 This perspective is stili upheld 
by nationalist historians and nationaliste at large, but is also a prédominant feature of 
contemporary 'common sense' views of history and nations. 
In ite more contemporary phase, the primordialist approach has been of two types: 
Firstly, a socio-biologica! version which advocates that "nations, ethnie groups and 
races can be traced to the underlying genetic reproductive drive of individuate".20 In 
the social sciences this approach is exemplified in the work of Pierre van den Berghe;21 
his basic thesis is that "ethnie and racial sentiments are [an] extension of kinship 
sentiments. Ethnocentrism and racism are thus extended forms of nepotism - the 
propensity to favour kin over non-kin".22 This propensity he attributes to a "general 
behavioural prédisposition", among humans and other species, "to react favourably 
toward other organisms to the extent that thèse organisms are biologically related to 
the actor. The doser the relationship is, the stronger the preferential behaviour".23 
For van den Berghe ethnie groups were in-breeding superfamilies for most of history; 
nations are similarly real or imputed descent groups. States were, throughout history, 
primarily organized around a single ethny, the main différence is that, in the past, 
states were either larger (as in empires) or smaller (as in city states) than modem 
national states. Since a nation is no more than a politieized ethny, states which are 
based on more than one ethny are bound to fail, for the simple reason that when 
ethnie demands and tension escalate, the state will have only two choices: either to 
repress such demands by force (thereby sacrificing ite démocratie principles or façade), 
or to yield to the demands (thereby risking further escalation or "another step toward 
the dissolution of the multinational state")-24 Indeed, on the face of it, such an account 
offers a simple and seemingly powerful explanation of why ethnie co-habitation in the 
bi-communal Cyprus Republic of 1960-63 did not work - that is, it failed precisely 
because the state was based on more than one ethny. But such simplicity may be 
deceptive, for, as we will see further on, it was not the mere co-habitation of the two 
ethnies which caused the 1963 collapse, but a host of other socio-historical factors. 
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The second primordialist variant proposes that ethnie groups and nations are formed 
on the basis of cultural givens which lie behind the diversity of social existence. The 
origins of this approach and related debates have been traced back to Edward Shils 
and Clifford Geertz. Towards the end of the 1950's, while addressing the issue of how 
modem societies are integrated or maintain solidarity, Shils suggested that in thèse 
societies two forms of ties co-exist: One relates to more abstract civil norms, and the 
other to "personal attachments, moral obligations [and] primordial affinities"25 - mostly 
relating to kin and other primary or small groups, which act as the real glue of modem 
societies. 
In the early 1970's, Geertz was tackling a similar question on what intégrâtes new 
states (such as Cyprus) in the post-colonial era. He observed that in thèse states, 
people's primary attachments were to those they viewed to be of the same religion, 
race, culture or other primary affiliation: "Multi-ethnic [...] populations of the new 
states tend to regard the immediate, concrete and to them inherently meaningful 
sorting implicit in such 'natural' diversity as the substantial content of their 
individuality".26 Primordial attachments often came in conflict with civil sentiments, 
necessary for nation-building in new states. But what exactly were thèse primary 
affiliations, and where did their strength derive from? In a much quoted passage, 
Geertz responded as follows: 
By a primordial attachment is meant one that stems from the 'givens' - or more 
precisely, as culture is inevitably involved in such matters, the assumed 'givens' 
of social existence: immediate contiguity and kin connection mainly, but beyond 
them the givenness that stems from being born into a particular religious 
community, speaking a particular language or even a dialect of a language, and 
following particular practices. These congruities of bloqd, speech, custom, and 
so on are seen to have an ineffable, and at times overpowering, coerciveness in 
and of themselves [...] by virtue of some unaccountable absolute import 
attributed to the very tie itself.27 
Other attachments, such as to class or politicai party, could lead to loyalties in 
compétition with civil loyalties, but this was not such a problem since the former were 
not "candidates for nationhood" and did not threaten to undermîne the nation itself. 
But primordial attachments and loyalties were of the "same general order" and could 
serve as alternative bases of nation formation and, thus, lead to a new state's collapse: 
"Economie or class or intellectual disaffection threatens revolution, but disaffection 
based on race, language, or culture threatens partition, irredentism, or merger, a 
redrawing of the very limits of the state, a new définition of its domain".28 Indeed, as 
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we will see in chapter four, the class/ideological struggle between the Left and Right in 
Cyprus was initially more intense than the conflict between the two ethnic communities 
- but it was the latter which was to prove more devastating and long-lasting, shaking 
the very foundations of the Cypriot state. 
Based on a mis-reading of Shils and Geertz, their accounts have acquired the status of 
straw men standing for "fixity, essentialism and naturalism".29 Thus Geertz, for 
instance, is criticized for supporting the view that the various social "congruities" 
impact on human behaviour in themselves - whereas his stress was obviously on 
people's perceptions about social reality. Furthermore, Geertz clearly emphasized that 
it was not the mere existence of primordial ties which was the problem in new state 
formation, but the politicization of these differences: The very creation of new states 
introduced a "valuable new prize" over which people could fight (as well as a 
"frightening new force" which could be used in ensuing conflicts), and this roused or 
heightened primordial feelings. That is why Geertz underlined that if new states were 
to maintain their cohesion, and not split apart along ethnic lines, an "integrative 
revolution" was necessary for the "containment of diverse primordial communities 
under a single sovereignty" - or, put differently, for the "political normalization of 
primordial discontent". Those conclusions are in line with the analysis of the present 
thesis, which will argue that such an integrative revolution was absent in the case of 
Cyprus - although, as we hope to demonstrate, it is not the primordial attachments of 
the two communities that created the tensions in co-habitation, but the earlier 
politicization of such attachments, and the 'social closure' of the two communities 
along ethno-national lines, which made integration difficult. 
Smith makes a useful differentiation between primordialism and perennialism. The 
latter views the nations as perennial or immemorial, but at the same time as social 
and/or historical constructs rather than as organic or natural; furthermore unlike 
primordialism, perennialism does accept that nationalism, or some versions of it, is a 
modern phenomenon. Perennialism was the dominant paradigm as to how nations 
should be viewed, from the nineteenth to the mid-twentieth centuries; this 
predominance related to a number of factors: For instance, the wide acceptance of 
ideas of social Darwinism, stressing the gradual ascent of collective entities, leading to 
cultural cumulation and progress (a focus which linked perennialists to organic 
primordialists). Another important factor had to do with the great advances made in 
national folklore studies, archaeology and historiography, which provided 'objective', 
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'material' and 'tangible' data on past cultures, seen to constitute proofs of ancient 
links; such data were important tools in nationalist daims, but the scientists involved in 
thèse disciplines often tacitly shared similar basic assumptions.30 
After World War II finally discredited racist ideology and social evolutionism, 
perennialism's premises were severely undermined. Similarly, anti-colonial nationalism 
in the developing world, and the active pursual of nation-building by each country's 
national élite, provided solid proof that many nations were, after ail, brand new human 
constructions associated with socio-historical change and the spread of modernity. 
Such developments were, thereby, responsible for the démise of perennialism and the 
rise of the modernist paradigm, which we will consider below. 
The various versions of primordialism and perennialism, and theîr daims, are a matter 
of considérable debate among académies. What is certain is that many of the 
associated ideas are still widespread among nationalist scholars and the gênerai public 
- and this applies in the case of Cyprus. As we will see in the last part of our study, 
many of our respondents in the relevant surveys narrated views stressing the ancient 
roots of the Greek nation in Cyprus, the golden âge of Greek civilization on the island 
(at a time when the West was still in a "condition of savagery"), and the difficult long 
centuries of serfdom and Cyprus' long march to freedom, culminating in the glorious 
anti-colonial struggle in 1955. The narratives stress the 3,000 years of unbroken 
continuity of Greek présence on the island and the close links with the Greek 
motherland or nation. A few individuals made référence to a "continuity of gènes" with 
their Cypriot ancestors, or cited "scientific évidence" to argue for or against a 
relationship between the Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots on the island.31 Of course, as we 
will see, such accounts of ethnie descent do often contain "a kernel of factual truth", 
but, as Smith points out, "they typically elaborate, exaggerate and idéalise that kernel 
in a one-sided fashion".32 
Primordialism and perennialism have been heavily critieized from various quarters. 
Eller and Coughan propose that primordialism rests on three main ideas: a) that 
priomordial attachments are 'given' a priori, underived and prior to ail expérience; b) 
that they are ineffable (incapable of being expressed in words), overpowering and 
coercive; and c) that they primarily relate to émotion and affect.33 Thèse features place 
primordial attachments and sentiments outside the realm of the social and mystify 
them, rendering them unexplainable - or, at best, explained by référence to "a 
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biologica! imperative", which is what socio-biological accounts resort to. 3 4 As a result, 
Eller and Coughan set out to "demystify" priomordialist concepts by demonstrating 
through empirica! findings of studies on ethnicity, the variable and constructed nature 
of ethnie bonds. 
Another type of criticism cornes from instrumentants, such as Brass, who propose that 
it is not primordial attachments as such which explain the strength of ethnie or national 
feelings, but the médiation of élites, who select from a range of Symbols of ethnie 
groups those that best serve their interests in uniting their communities and mobilizing 
them for various politicai ends. It is the compétition between élites which leads to 
politieization of a culture and to changes in the self-perception of an ethnie group 
turning into a nation.35 
Important as thèse criticai correctives are, they lose their usefulness when taken to the 
extreme. For it is true that extreme primordialism may lead to cultural determinism, 
which sees ethnicity and nationalism as based on unchanging or given essences. But 
extreme instrumentalism may end up at the opposite pole, of viewing thèse 
phenomena as infinitely malléable or as readily available resources for the élites to use 
in any way they choose in furthering their own private ends.36 
One may adopt a more balanced view which recognizes primordialism's contribution in 
"[drawing] our attention to the powerful perceptions, beliefs and émotions that can 
inspire and excite human beings, and rouse them to collective action and self-
sacrifice"37 - what Smith calls "participants primordialism". Furthermore, as Brass 
concèdes, the priomordialist perspective is especially "relevant to our understanding of 
ethnie groups with long and rich cultural héritages"38 - such as those found in Cyprus. 
But, if taken "too seriously, the concept of primordialism precludes the need for a 
historical sociology of ethnicity or nationalism".39 
Modernism 
Modernismi views nations and national identities as récent phenomena of the last two 
centuries, the basic thrust being given by the French Revolution and the birth of 
France as a nation. A new era was inaugurated when the Déclaration ofthe Rights of 
Man and the Citizen underlined that "the source of ali sovereignty résides essentially in 
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the Nation" and equated the nation with the people. Smith proposes that the 
modernist paradigm in its classical form can be regarded as the "polar opposite" of 
primordialist or perennialist assumptions, so that "ideal-type dichotomies" lead to two 
completely différent pictures of the nation:41 On the one hand, perennialism views the 
nation as an ethno-cultural community which is immémorial, Yooted' in place and time 
(in a historic homeland), popular (as the community of the people), an integrated 
whole, and based on the principles of ancestral ties and authentic culture. On the 
other, modernism sees the nation as a politicai (territorial or civic) community of equal 
citizens, modem (in the sense of both recent and novel), a human création of the 
spécifie socio-hîstorical conditions of modernity (such as industry, bureaucracy, 
urbanization and secularism), primarily a construction of élites, divided into sub-wholes 
(for example, by class, gender, religion) but, yet, integrated via citizenship and social 
communication.42 This classification is obviously a simplified scheme which magnifies 
similarities within each paradigm and différences across them, so as to highlight their 
underlying assumptions. In practice, many théories combine éléments from both 
paradigms. Modernist théories in particular, are quite numerous, each
 t stressing 
différent factors - yet every approach or theory gives more emphasis or weight to 
some factors and less to others (which legitimizes the various studies' attempts at 
classification). For our purposes, I wish to briefìy consider the main éléments of two 
theoretical approaches within the modernist paradigm, highlighting what seems of 
relevance to the case of Cyprus. After introducing the ethno-symbolism approach, 
further below, I will end by presenting a third modernist approach, which overcomes 
many of the limitations of other modernist théories, and which may be modified so as 
to incorporate insights from the ethno-symbolic approach. 
Industrialization and modernity 
Ernest Gellner's theory was perhaps the earliest and most originai attempt to 
comprehend nations and nationalism from a modernist perspective. For Gellner, 
modernization and more specifìcally industrialization, with its various concomitants, 
was responsible for the radical transformation of human societies. In 'agro-literate' 
societies people were bound together by the structure of ascribed roles and traditional 
social institutions (primarily kinship). Literacy was confined to the ruling class, which 
used culture to differentiate itself from the mass of agricultural producers; whereas 
communication in the small locai communities was 'contextual', the literate groups 
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benefited from 'context free' communication - whereby a gulf was created between a 
low and high culture and an "incongruity" between power and culture. Cultural 
heterogeneity constituted the main obstacle to the formation of nations. 
On the contrary, industriai societies require high social mobility, roles are no longer 
ascribed and the system relies on meritocracy and equalitarianism. With an 
increasingly complex division of labour the occupational structure requires context-free 
communication and a high level of cultural standardization. Culture thus replaces 
structure. Indeed "the culture in which one has been taught to communicate becomes 
the core of one's identity".43 Education becomes crucial not only for purposes of 
employability, but also for underpinning the dignity, security and self-respect of 
individuals. The need for mass éducation and a uniform communications system makes 
the state imperative, linking power and culture in unprecedented ways. 
Nations thus emerge "when general social conditions make for standardized, 
homogeneous, centrally sustained high cultures, pervading entire populations and not 
just elite minorities".44 Similarly, "nationalism is, essentially, the general imposition of 
a high culture on society, where previously low cultures had taken up the lives of the 
[...] population. It is the establishment of an anonymous, impersonal society, with 
mutually substitutable atomized individuals, held together above ali by a shared culture 
of this kind."45 Linking the two phenomena together, Gellner concludes that "it is 
nationalism which engenders nations, and not the other way round."*6 Therefore, 
"nationalism is not the awakening of an old, latent, dormant, force though that is how 
it does indeed présent itself. It is in reality the conséquence of a new form of social 
organization, based on deeply internalized, education-dependent high cultures, each 
protected by its own state".47 
In the case of Cyprus, Gellner's main thesis doesn't seem to hold. As Loizos puts it, his 
"theory looks more convincing when tackling the nationalism of modem industriai 
societies" - but not the nationalism of countries at a pre-industrial stage of 
development.48 As we will see further on, national consciousness in Cyprus first 
appeared in the last years of Ottoman rule (late nineteenth century), and the early 
stirrings of nationalism in the first décades of British colonialism, when industrialization 
was in its complete infancy.49 Furthermore, the theory cannot explain the second wave 
of reactionary ethno-nationalism (1968-74), neither the more cultural, néo-nationalist 
third variant (1988 onwards). Mass éducation did certainly develop hand-in-hand with 
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the spread of national ideas in Cyprus and the subséquent growth of the nationalist 
movement: But the line of causality seems to have been the reverse to that proposed 
by Gellner - that is, mass éducation seems to have been the product, not the cause of 
nationalist awareness (although mass éducation contributed thereafter to the spread of 
national ideas and the strengthening of the nationalist movement). Furthermore, and 
relatedly, éducation in Cyprus seems to have had little to do with industry and its 
needs: Interestingly, in both Greece and Cyprus, éducation was seen mostly as a 
mechanism for avoiding joining the prolétariat;50 instead, it was perceived as a means 
of "becoming a person", which entailed mastering "a body of knowledge that had come 
to represent the traditions of the community" (it was "in this way that the 'high culture' 
of schooling could be converted into nationalism"); in any case, éducation was 
certainly not intended for mastering techniques appropriate to industry.51 
Finally, one may observe that Gellner's linking of nationalism to industrialism limits 
from start the explanatory power of the proposed theory. At most, it can explain why 
nationalism "in general" can have a certain affinity with modern industrialism, or 
modernity more widely. But it certainly cannot explain différent forms or variants of 
nationalism appearing diachronically or synchronically in the same country - as in the 
case of Cyprus. 
Social construction: the nation as imagination and discourse 
Benedict Andersons Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of 
Nationalism (1983) was a milestone in the development of modernist théories. 
Anderson set out to investigate why post-World War II national forms of thought and 
discourse have become so dominant and taken for granted, but also why they arouse 
such deep sentiments in people. Proposing that nations do not so much belong to the 
category of ideological constructs but are rather similar to kinship or religion, he 
defìned the nation as "an imagined politicai community - and imagined as both 
inherently limited and sovereign". Imagined'in the sensé that members of nations do 
not and will not know most fellow-nationals, "yet in the minds of each lives the image 
of their communion". The nation is a community because, "regardless of the actual 
inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as 
a deep, horizontal comradeship"; it is this solidarity which explains why so many are 
Willing to lay down their lives for their nation. Nations are imagined as limited because 
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they have boundaries which separate them from other nations. Lastly, they are 
imagined as sovereign because they are the children of the age of Enlightment and 
Revolution, when divinely ordained dynastie realms gave way to self-governed 
régimes. 
What are the conditions which gave rise to nations and nationalism? The demise of 
the "large cultural Systems" that preceded them, such as the "great religiously 
imagined communities" and the "dynastie realms/' "out of which - as well against 
which" they "came into being". Thus, with the waning of religion, which provided a 
hope against the arbitrariness of fatality through the promise of continuity of life after 
death, nationalism provided a secular alternative through its vision of the nation as 
descending from the immemorial past and into the limitless future.52 Parallel to the 
demise of sacred religious and dynastie communities, was the more fundamental 
transformation in the modes of apprehending the world. The earlier Christian 
conception of time, based on the idea of simultaneity (events in the présent, past and 
future merging as in divine cosmology), gave way to a new view which saw time as 
linear and homogeneous. Events could now be measured by clock and calendar, and 
new forms of imagining made possible the novel and the newspaper. One can envision 
members of the nation going through the daily ritual of reading their newspaper in 
privacy, yet each knowing that the ceremony performed "is being replicated 
simultaneously by thousands (or millions) of others of whose existence he is confident, 
yet of whose identity he has not the slightest notion" - in this way, creating an 
anonymous bond, "which is the hallmark of modem nations".53 
The development of print-capitalism greatly facilitated these new trends. Book­
publishing, which initially served a small elite who read Latin, expanded to cater for the 
new market of pre-Christian works of antiquity (Greek and Roman), fostered by the 
Humanists; it also served Protestant believers who were eager to have personal access 
to the Bible and other religious texts. Cheap éditions in the vernacular languages 
contributed towards the embedding of national consciousness through creating "unified 
fields of exchange and communication below Latin and above the spoken 
vernaculars".54 These developments fostered the rise of linguistic nationalism in 
Europe. From the late eighteenth Century, the comparative study of language led to 
the production of dictionaries and grammar books, which set the older sacred 
languages on an equa! footing with the now revived vernaculars (bilingual dictionaries 
being perhaps the best such example). The general growth in industry, commerce and 
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Communications, along with the graduai increase in literacy rates, led to further 
linguistic homogenization, and the parallel strengthening of nationalism and nations 
which, in becoming entrenched, provided ideal models to be imitated by élites or 
intelligentsias in other parts of the world, after adjustments to local realities as 
necessary (and as if they were "modular").55 To recapitulate, the new "imagined 
communities" were the products of "a half-fortuitous, but explosive, interaction 
between a system of production and productive relations (capitalism), a technology of 
Communications (print), and the fatality of human diversity".56 
Anderson introduces a number of ideas which will be useful to our study. The centrai 
idea of nation as an imagined community captures vary closely the Greek-Cypriots 
understanding of themselves as a part of the Hellenic nation, leading to their drive for 
union (enosis) with Greece, as the national centre of Hellenism. We will also see how 
the reconstructed conception of Greeks as a nation was greatly aided by print 
capitalism and the "lexicographie revolution" in Europe. Yet some other éléments of 
his theory do not "fit the faets". As Kellas points out,57 nationalism did not always 
replace religion, and in Cyprus the two mostly reinforced each other, as was the case 
in Ireland, Poland, Armenia, Israel, Iran and others. In Cyprus, despite an initial 
contest between the more traditional ecumenic view of the world and the new 
nationalist one, the latter was soon to prevail and, henceforth, religion was to become 
a part of the national identity. 
Another important criticism cornes from Chatterjee, and regards Andersons thesis that 
nationalism was born in Europe and the Americas - which renders the rest of the world 
as simply importers of the "modular" forms already made available to them by the 
West. So "what do [the rest] have left to imagine?" asks Chatterjee: 
History, it would seem, has decreed that we in the postcolonial world shall only 
be perpetuai consumers of modernity. Europe and the Americas, the only true 
subjects of history, have thought out on our behalf not only the script of colonial 
enlightment and exploitation, but also that of our anti-colonial résistance and 
postcolonial misery. Even our imaginations must remain forever colonized.58 
Chatterjee proposes instead that "nationalist imaginations in the Third World" are 
posited not on an identity but rather on a différence with the modular forms of the 
national society propagated by the modem West".59 To withstand western dominance, 
anti-colonial nationalism divided the world into two domains - one material (the 
economy, science and technology), where the Wesfs superiority was acknowledged, 
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and the other spiritual (the nation's éléments of cultural identity), which nationalism 
declared its own "sovereign territory", refusing to allow the colonial power to intervene 
in that domain.60 Up to this point, the analysis fits the Cyprus case fairly well. But 
whereas in the "East" (Asia and Africa) nationalisme créative contribution was "to 
fashion a 'modem' national culture that is nevertheless not Western",61 in Cyprus 
nationalism assumed from the beginning that the island was part of the West, through 
being part of wider Hellenism, the culture of which constituted the very foundation of 
European and Western civilization. 
Ethno-symbolism 
The third paradigm, historical ethno-symbolism,62 takes a middle ground position 
between perennialism and modernism: Whereas the former views both nations and 
nationalism as immémorial, and the latter as both modem, ethno-symbolism concèdes 
that nationalism is modem but advances the precept that nations have much older 
roots, traceable to ethnie communities in medieval times, and sometimes in antiquity.63 
Anthony Smith, the most well-known exponent of this approach, underlines the 
importance of studying social and cultural patterns in the long-run (la longue durée), 
so that "the analysis of the rise of nations and nationalism is placed within a 
framework of earlier collective cultural identities, and especially of ethnie communities" 
(for the latter he prefers the French term ethnies). Nations and etf?/7/ës"belong to the 
same family of phenomena (collective cultural identities)",64 so the différences between 
them are a matter of degree rather than kind, as can be gauged from the following 
table (Table 1.1) comparing the attributes of the two: 
Ethnie Nation 
Proper name Proper name 
Common myths of ancestry, etc Common myths 
Shared memories Shared memories and history (a 
codified, standardized, national history) 
Cultural differentia(e) Common (mass) public culture 
Association with a homeland Occupation of a homeland 
Some (elite) solidarity 
Table 1.1: Attributes of ethniesanô nations 
Common (legal) rights and duties 
Single economy 
Over-arching common identity 
Single political entity or aspiration to (a 
degree of) self-determination/autonomy 
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The combinée! items in each case provide a "working définition" of ethnie and nation 
respectively.65 A number of attibutes are common to both - namely, a collective name, 
common myths and shared memories; what differs is that, in the ideal types, unlike 
nations, ethnies do not have a public culture (that is, shared mass communication and 
éducation) but only some common cultural éléments (such as "language, religion, 
customs or shared institutions"); they also do not have a "codified, standard national 
history", like nations do. 6 6 
Although ethnies are precursore of nations, they are not primordial: It is not 
"objective" physical kinship bonds that define the structure of ethnie communities, but 
"the sensé of cultural affinities" embodied in myths (including a myth of descent), 
shared historical memories, values, traditions and ethnie symbols.67 As most of the 
attributes of ethnies are subjective, they may weaken under certain historical 
circumstances, negatively affecting the conciousness and cohésion of the community -
yet again disconfirming primordialism.68 Once formed, ethnies tend to be very durable, 
although their strength may be affected by several radical changes (negatively, by 
factors such as wars, conquest, enslavement, and religious conversion; positively, by 
military mobilization, state-making, and organized religion).69 
This distinction between ethnies and nations allows Smith to differentiate himself from 
primordialists and nationalists, who believe that nations and nationalism were there 
since antiquity, and that history is nothing but a record of their march towards triumph 
in modern times, with the formation of nation-states. For Smith: "It is ethnie rather 
than nations, ethnicity rather than nationality, and ethnicism rather than nationalism, 
that pervades the social and cultural life of antiquity and the early Middle Ages in 
Europe and the Middle East".70 Nationalism is mostly a modern phenomenon of late 
Medieval times: Nationalists used the cultural materials provided by the various 
ethnies, to build or construet nations; hence, most nations may be modern, but they 
do have deep ancient roots (or 'navels', as Gellner playfully interjects). 
How do nations emerge out of ethnies? Smith proposes two main routes to nation-
formation, corresponding to two types of ethnie community - the 'lateral' (aristocratie) 
and the 'vertical' (demotic).71 The case of lateral ethnies relates mostly to Western 
Europe, where nations were formed through "bureaucratie incorporation": The 
dominant aristocratie ethnie was able to incorporate the middle strata and peripheral 
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régions into the dominant ethnie culture, primarily through the agency of the 
bureaucratie state.72 Assimilation and cultural fusion laid the basis for relatively 
homogeneous nations. State activities, such as "taxation, conscription and 
administration", fostered the nations by creating a sensé of "corporate identity and 
civic loyalty" among the population. Parallel "external" processes, which Smith calls the 
"Western révolutions", such as the economie revolution of "movement to a market 
economy", and the "cultural and educational" révolutions, added extra force in the 
same direction, leading to the graduai consolidation of "secular", "mass", "strong" 
nations.73 
The second case of vertical (demotic) ethnies relates to Central and Eastern Europe, 
the Middle and Far East, and parts of Africa - and is thus more pertinent to Greece and 
Cyprus. Because vertical ethnies were usually subject communities (Cyprus almost 
always was), the most important influence was not the bureaucratie state but 
organized religion - in the case of Greece and Cyprus, the Orthodox Church. The 
influence and prestige of the clergy, the myths of chosen people, the liturgy and 
rituals, as well as the sacred texts and scripts, ensured the survival of communal 
traditions.74 Through time, religious culture and loyalty was identifiée! with ethnie 
culture. In the âge of nationalism, thèse communities began seeing themselves as 
already constituted nations but without a politicai roof. Since there was "no internai 
coercive agency, no bureaucratie state, to shatter the mould", it was up to the secular 
intelligentsia to find ways of differentiating the "community of the faithful" from the 
"community of historié culture"75. Smith identifies three alternative orientations 
adopted by the intellectuals and their followers in this pursuit: A modernizing return to 
tradition ("traditionalism"), a messianic desire to assimilate to Western modernity 
("modernism" or "assimilation"), and a more defensive attempt, utilized in Cyprus, to 
synthesize éléments of tradition with aspects of Western modernity - "hence to revive 
a pristine community modelled on a former golden âge" ("reformist revivalism"). The 
différent orientations reflect"fundamentally différent directions in the transformation of 
demotic ethnies into politicai nations".76 In ail cases "lies the imperative of a moral and 
politicai revolution", which requires the people to be purified from the accretîons of 
centuries "which led to the embedding of ethnie communities so that they can be 
emancipated into a politicai community of equal Citizens" or re-educated into "national 
values, memories and myths".77 
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To achieve the above, a "twofold strategy" was required, first of "furnishing 'maps' of 
the community, its history, its destiny and its place among the nations" and second of 
"providing 'moralities' for the regenerated community" as a source of inspiration for 
présent générations. In turn, maps and moralities could be constructed efther through 
an emphasis on a "return to 'nature' and its 'poetic spaces' (that is, the historic 
homeland, so that natural features would be related to national symbols) or "the use of 
history and especially the cult of golden âges": As we will see further on, in Cyprus, the 
second focus was chosen, emphasizing Cyprus' link with the ancient Greek world. 
On the basis of the above analysis, Smith proposes that the fundamental, defining 
features of national identity relate to those of nation, that is, a "historic territory or 
homeland, common myths and historical memories, a common public culture, common 
legal rights and duties for ail members, and a common economy with territorial 
mobility for members";78 furthermore, he defìnes nationalism as "an ideological 
movement for attaining and maintaining autonomy, unity and identity on behalf of a 
population deemed by some of its members to constitute an actual or potential 
'nation".79 In the case of Cyprus, for instance, Greek-Cypriots imagined themselves to 
be part of the Hellenic nation, so an ideological movement was formed for shedding 
foreign rule and uniting with 'motherland' Greece (this was the irredentist enosis 
movement which we will consider in chapter four). 
Finally, Smith differentiates between two types of nationalism. Basing his analysis on 
"Kohn's philosophical distinction between a more rational and a more organic version 
of nationalist ideology", he offers a "provisionai typology" of "territorial" and "ethnie" 
nationalisms,80 which I présent here as a summary table (Table 1.2): 
Territorial nationalisms Ethnie nationalisms 
Pre-Independence Anti-colonial nationalism 
(Aims to eject colonial rule and 
create new state-nation) 
Sécession nationalism 
(Aims to secede from a 
politicai unit and create a 
new ethno-nation) 
PostIndependence Integration nationalism 
(Aims to join ethnically diverse 
populations to create new 
territorial state) 
Irredentist nationalism 
(Aims to join ethnie 
kinsmen outside the 
présent boundaries of the 
ethno-nation). 
Table 1.2: Territorial and ethnie variants of nationalism 
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Anthony Smith's ethno-symbolist approach to nations and nationalism provides fruitful 
insights for the study of the Cyprus case. Its emphasis on the longue durée is certainly 
useful in accounting for a people who view themselves as having a history which goes 
back 3,000 years. The underscoring of the existence of ethnies in ancient times, and 
of the importance of cultural raw materials in the construction of ethnicity and, 
subsequently, of nationalism, has added valuable insights to the field. Yet, despite its 
apparent sophistication, ethno-symbolism has attracted considérable criticism, mainly 
from the various proponents of the dominant modernist paradigm. A major criticism 
concerns the relation between ethnie communities and nations: Smith appears to 
consider nations as ethnieswrït large; critics point out that the différences between the 
two are not only quantitative but qualitative, so that the one is not simply an 
evolutionary outeome of the other.81 For an ethnie group to become a nation, it must 
undergo significant transformations in both structure and outlook; and in undergoing 
this transformation process, 'alien' éléments and influences from other cultures are 
absorbed, so that there is never a one-to-one correspondence, as in biological 
reproduction. 
Furthermore, as Smith himself admits, ethnies simply provide the cultural materials 
(such as myths or Symbols), which nationalists subsequently use in nation-building. 
But as Breuilly points out, what is important is not the raw materials as such, but the 
creative intervention of the nationalist agents - who select, mould and re-mould them, 
to serve their purposes. Thus, some myths may be chosen whereas others are not; a 
component of a myth may be adapted, a new part invented, or an altogether new 
emphasis giyen, to fit particular uses; and often there may be conflicting 
interprétations of myths, symbols or other cultural éléments, serving antagonistic 
nationalist discourses.82 
The last theory that we turn to consider tries to address the issue of the importance of 
human agency and of struggles arising from conflicting material or ideal interests in 
determining nationalist constructions. 
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An attempt at synthesis: Social closure and cultural transformation 
Andreas Wimmer offers a synthetic explanatory account which creatively extends 
Weber's original formulations on ethnicity and social closure, and utilizes a number of 
the concepts we have reviewed from the modernist paradigm, to build a theory on 
nation formation and nationalism.83 Below I briefly review the theory, which will 
subsequently be used as a framework of analysis for the Cyprus case. 
Wimmer starts his analysis by defining culture "as an open and unstable process of the 
negotiation of meanings" [a] involving "cognitïvely compétent individuals, of differing 
interests and aims", [b] in searches of "finding accepted compromises" [c] the end 
resuit leading to "social closure and corresponding cultural boundary-marking".84 
More specifìcally, individuai social actors are seen to live in unequally structured 
societies and to internalize their positions in their "life-worlds" through learning 
processes; following Bourdieu, actors are seen to gradually develop a habitus tailored 
to their position85 - in other words, a system of "durable, transposable dispositions" 
that "determine action, perception and interprétation", made up of "a répertoire of 
stratégies for action and cognitive patterns that have become routinised",86 which lead 
to différent classifications and world views. 
In relating to each other, social actors enter into negotiations of meaning. Besides 
reaching agreements at an inter-personal level, "on the collective and symbolic level, 
notions about the set-up and workings of society, on what is just and unjust, sacred 
and profane, are negotiated" - and here compromise is achieved if ail actors "can 
formulate aspects of their long-term interests in a shared symbolic language". Finally, 
certain cultural markers serve the purpose of distinguishing insiders from outsiders, 
"between those partaking in the basic compromise and those remaining on the 
margins".87 A cultural compromise is a shared perspective of the world which "limits 
the horizon of possibilities within which individuals can argue in their search for power 
and récognition": But which éléments of the cultural compromise actors will choose, 
and how thèse will be "reformulated and transformed",88 dépends on the position of 
actors in the social structure. When individuals change positions in the power or wealth 
hiérarchies, they may develop new perceptions. Habituai schemes tend to change 
quite slowly, providing a certain stabilîty and continuity; but if new variations 
generateti differ substantially from established modes of thinking, then the existing 
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cultural compromise may "dissolve into a range of variations and counter-discourses. 
When a new balance of power has been achieved, new cultural compromises may 
eventually emerge".89 
Building on the above "theory of cultural transformation" Wimmer proceeds to analyse 
"nationalism as the main cultural compromise of modem society, and the formation of 
nation states as a process of social closure resulting from, and interacting with, the 
consolidation and general acceptance of this compromise". Thus nationalism is more 
than an idea, an ideology, a sentiment, or a discourse - it is the axial principle90 
according to which modem societies structure inclusion and exclusion in all domains of 
social life. Wimmer adopts Anderson's concept of the nation as an "imagined 
community", as modernity's primary form of cultural closure. Accordingly, the "new 
principles of boundary making" have two corollaries: First, that the nation is regarded 
as "an all-encompassing social totality" (that is, as a simultaneously social, economie, 
politicai and cultural unit), not differentiated by any divisions of a fundamental nature; 
second, that this totality is imagined as a territorial unit with clearly defined borders, 
separating the homogeneous domestic realm from the heterogeneous externa! one. 
There are two types of nationalism - one based on common descent (the 'ethnie' 
variant), and one on politicai solidarity (the 'republican' or 'civic' variant). We will use 
the 'ethnie' variant (which more closely resembles the Greek-Cypriot type), to 
exemplify how the remaining forms of nationalist closure come about. 
Ethnie nationalism considère the nation primarily as a cultural phenomenon. The 
national culture expresses the collective spirit (or "genius of a people"), which imbues 
the traditions and folklore of the peasants, seen to be the guardians of the nation's 
authentic héritage. "Three isomorphisms" (between society, polity and economy) act 
as the governing principles of nations: Society is comprised of the individuate belonging 
to the cultural nation, who are considered equal membere of a single family, and as 
thereby related by ties of mutuai obligation and solidarity. The polity relies on national 
self-determination to guarantee that "a community of [cultural] likes can be a 
community of [politicai] equals"; a nation must have its own state to guarantee its 
membere from outside interférence. The economy must be unifìed, without duties or 
tariffs creating artificial barriere; the country must be physically connected through a 
communication network. 
32 
The "three isomorphìsms" give rise to the second characteristic of nationalst thinking, 
the territorialisation of its social imagination - unlike empires, where the polity was 
broader than society; for instance, in both the Byzantine and Ottoman empires the 
social world was made up of multiple semi-autonomous/corporate religious, ethnie and 
occupational communities, whereas the polity potentially included ali Christian or 
Muslim believers, respectively. In nationalist thinking, the borders of the polity must 
clearly demarcate and differentiate between the national community and the outside 
world (the "aliens"). Within the national borders nationalist egalitarianism demands 
that there is horizontal unity, with no strong boundaries between the différent groups 
constituting the nation; social borders can only be vertical, distinguishing between 
entities with similar internai structures (e.g. classes). This is unlike pre-modern 
empires where social groups were horizontally differentiated, separating the various 
castes or estâtes, the conquerors and conquered, and so on: "Nationalists thus make a 
fetish of national borders, in the same way that pre-modern empires made a cult of 
the cultural borders in separating the social estâtes".91 That is why borders are 
carefully guarded and crossing a national border has acquired the signifìcance of a rite 
de passage. 
The nationalist self-image and the corresponding politicai institution of the nation-state 
are to be seen as the outeome of a successful cultural compromise, which manages to 
balance the interests between différent social groups. This mainly involves "an 
exchange of the guarantee of politicai loyalty for the promise of participation and 
security". On the one hand, the elite can "enlarge their power domain in the name of 
the nation and the well-being of the citizen".92 On the other, the population can 
appeal to the now common values of equality and solidarity and push their daims for 
politicai participation, free éducation and other welfare state benefits. 
The fact that a vast number of différent groups have to be satisfìed by the overall 
cultural compromise, explains why "nationalism has to remain ideologically fuzzy and 
poorly defined". Rather than constituting a problem, this in fact is a strength of 
nationalism, for its "polysémie character" allows people to make sensé of their situation 
from varied points of view. Thus, endless variation is possible and eternai ideological 
controversies over the proper interprétation of nationalist doctrines abound: 
Bourgeois republicans, battiing against royalists or left-wing internationaiïsts, 
emphasize the politicai dimension of the national community. Conservative 
ideologists défend the cultural interests of the nation but minimize the 
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importance of national egalitarianism. Nationalist labour movements in turn 
highlight the egaiitarian aspects of the national principle and therefore demand 
state intervention in their favour. Depending on the power structure and the 
historical conditions, différent forms of closure corne to re-organize ail aspects of 
life along national principles, so that the nationalist représentation of the world 
cornes to acquire monolithic prominence, making the nation - a cultural création 
- appear as nature.93 
Wimmer next focuses on four additional types of closure. First, a légal closure: 
Whereas the légal Systems of pre-modern empires codified the inequalities of the 
various constituent groups, thereby reinforcing horizontal divisions, modem states are 
based on the principle that ail are equal before the law - despite social class, gender, 
religion or other characteristics. Whereas in earlier stages of nation formation political 
participation was restricted to the wealthy and educated upper classes, gradually, 
universal suffrage was established. As the new principle of equality before the law was 
Consolidated, a parallel form of exclusion was introduced, separating national citizens 
from aliens. Although in the early nineteenth century, the concept of citizenship was 
based on territorial criteria (so that ail inhabitants, irrespective of ethnie origin were 
considered subjects), this was later replaced by ethnie définitions, so that citizenship 
and natïonality became synonymous. 
Second, political closure: In empires, the ruler was God's appointée on earth, elevated 
over and above the people, whereas modem states are ruled through the "principle of 
national representativity", which entails that state power must be exercîsed by equals 
who are nationals. Once the idea of national-détermination was introduced by Wilson, 
it spread around the world and has become the "ideological, jurïdical and political 
backbone of the world order of states". In fact, the very idéal of democracy was 
closely linked to that of national self-determination, until the middle of the twentieth 
century. Thereupon, because of the dévastations caused by nationalist excesses, a 
distinction was attempted - initially in the form of separating a good Western 
nationalism, which was compatible with democracy, and a bad Eastern nationalism, 
which was authoritarian and violent. By contemporary times, the officiai disconnection 
between nationalism and democracy has been completed - only because modem 
democracy has been nationalized, and nationalism has imbued people's minds through 
its embededness in the surrounding social reality.94 
Third, mifitary closure: In pre-modern empires, the troops often included mercenaries 
from other countries and the army was a governing tool in the hands of the ruler -
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"who could legitimately wield it both against the armies of other rulers and against 
rebellious subjects".95 In modern states, since the people are now equal and free, they 
are expected to defend "themselves" against outside intruders. Foreign rule is to be 
resisted at all costs since it violates the core principles of nation. Put differently, loyalty 
to country and sacrifice of life are expected as the natural trade-offs for all the benefits 
bestowed on citizens (freedom, equality and so on). Furthermore, mercenaries no 
longer have a place, since they do not share in nationality and can thus not be 
expected to have the required loyalty and readiness for sacrifice as co-nationals do. 
Fourth, welfare closure: Modern states have increasingly accepted the idea of providing 
for their citizens, since this logically follows the principles of equality and, especially, 
solidarity. Although in earlier stages of industrialization, more laissez-faire principles 
were espoused, as regards the economy, which left the lower ranks exposed to the 
vagaries of the market (leading to intra-national conflicts stirred by the excluded), 
gradually, the state accepted responsibility for various welfare provisions 
(unemployment, illness, poverty, and old age benefits), thereby more fully 
incorporating the labour movement into the national order of things: "The welfare 
state transformed the nation into a real, not just an imagined, community of solidarity, 
a hyper-extended family where everyone cares for the well-being of everybody else".9 6 
Again, this new form of closure was paralleled by a new mode of exclusion, since the 
rules on who could enter and settle in a country (and thereby enjoy the respective 
welfare benefits), became much stricter, separating citizens as members of the 
community of solitarity, from immigrants, whose status thereby deteriorated: "The 
process of domestic social integration and closure therefore reaches its zenith with the 
emergence of welfare institutions and of state control over migration". 
Wimmer illustrates his model of closure and exclusion through figure 1.3: 
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Culture and identity 
Ethnie and religious 
minorities 
Rg. 1.3: Five dimensions of ciosure 
The above description refers to the general direction of developments under 
modernity. But Wimmer carries on to argue that this is not a teleologica! model, which 
advocates that all national states have to take the same route of development. Having 
presented the "structural perspective" he shifts his emphasis to "an analysis of 
process", to demonstrate that specific outeomes in each case dépend on "the strategie 
interplay of groups of actors endowed with differing bargaining power". Social ciosure 
now has to be described as the resuit of a "specific constellation of actors and their 
perceived interests".97 This provision of allowing for the indeterminacy of outeomes 
and the role of social action, helps the theory to avoid the determinism implied in 
functionalist explanations (such as Gellner's), which consider nationalism and the 
nation-state as effeets, conséquences or correlates of industriaiization. 
But how does social ciosure result from the overlap of interests between différent 
actors? Through the process of cultural compromise, proposes Wimmer, which makes 
the formation of the national state an attractive option for all. For the elite, reaching 
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a national compromise makes sense, as it allows them to "expand further their realms 
of power". This is achieved as a consequence of the unparalleled legitimation the 
democratic process bestows to modern states (decisions are made to benefit the 
people), as compared to pre-modern governments acting according to "God's will". In 
return, democracy allows governments to increasingly influence all domains of life, in 
seeking to improve or control people's lives (deciding on who gets to pay which taxes, 
who goes to war, and so forth).98 For the population, the national compromise process 
entails claiming for increased political participation, equality before the law, more jobs, 
and more welfare benefits. Pre-modern states cared for few such benefits for their 
citizens. Besides tangible benefits, modern states provide the people with valuable 
"symbolic capital", such as a sense of dignity and even prestige as citizens, which 
"commoners, peasants and artisans would not even dream of in hierarchically 
legitimized empires".99 
Having presented the mechanisms of national closure, Wimmer proceeds to explain 
why the nation(al) state has become such a dominant political form in modern times. 
Briefly put, he distinguishes between two stages: First, the appearance of nation-states 
out of absolutism in Western Europe; and second, the globalisation of the model 
through the break-up of empires (for instance, the Habsburg and Ottoman multi­
national empires) and the subsequent reordering of polities along national-state lines 
(through borrowing, the "domino effects', and the influence of the international system 
itself, with its emphasis on the national determination principle).100 
Having outlined Wimmer's "theory of cultural transformation", some critical comments 
are pertinent. Firstly, a terminological issue: Wimmer seems to often confuse or 
conflate nation, nation-state and national state; in fact, he uses the first two terms 
interchangeably, so, for instance, in figure 2, he uses the term nation (which I have 
maintained, to stress the point), whereas in his explanatory account, he switches from 
nation to nation-state - an obvious inconsistency. Neither of the two are appropriate 
terms, for what he is obviously referring to is the national-state, which is a more 
generic term than nation-state (the latter being a particular type or case of a national 
state, different from multi-national states - such as Switzerland, Belgium, Canada, and 
including the bi-national Cyprus Republic). 
The second point concerns the standing of Wimmer's "theory of cultural transfo 
rmation": As has been pointed out by several students of nationalism, it would be too 
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ambitious to daim that a single, grand theory can explain the many forms and faces of 
nationalïsm as a social phenomenon. As Calhoun rightly points out, issues such as why 
nationalism cornes to dominate in the instances where it does, and not in others, why 
particular versions prevali, and why certain groups of people choose one or another 
variant, "are questions that by and large can be answered only within spécifie contexts, 
with knowledge of local history, or the nature of the state (and other elite) power, and 
of what other potential and actual movements competed for alliance".101 It would thus 
seem préférable to view Wimmer's "theory" as an "approach" or "perspective" to 
analysing spécifie aspects of nations and nationalism. More specifically, Wimmer's 
analytical framework may be especially useful in explaining not nationalism in general, 
but national-state formation and consolidation: In fact, it is precisely for this reason 
that the insights from this approach can be especially useful in the case of Cyprus, 
providing the Connecting thread to the diachronic processes of transformation leading 
to the contemporary national-state. 
Thirdly, we could agrée with Ozkirimli that nationalism is not a single, unitary 
phenomenon, but that "a number of, at times quite divergent, idéologies and 
movements compete to capture the allegiance of the 'nationals'." 1 0 2 What unités thèse 
diverse forms of nationalism is nationalist discourse, a common rhetoric or way of 
looking and talking about the world, whiçh has three important features:103 First, it 
advocates that the national interest(s) and values of the nation override ail other 
interests and values; second, it regards the nation as the primary (if not the only) 
source of legitimacy; and thirdly, it opérâtes through binary divisions, continuously 
dividing the world into *us' and them', 'friends' and 'enemies', 'civilized' and 
'barbarians', 'good' and 'bad'. 
Thèse observations should not lead us to the other extrême, of considering discourses 
as reified entities with all-pervasive powers, which appear in extra-social ways and take 
charge of social actors (as post-modernist approaches often seem to sugest). Within 
the context of the cultural transformation framework, individuals who are differentially 
situated in the hiérarchies of wealth, power and knowledge, and are therefore imbued 
with differing habitualised dispositions, engage in discursive practices and in an 
ongoing, open and unstable process of negotiating meaning, through which they may 
reach accepted cultural compromises - which lead to social closure and corresponding 
"cultural boundary-making". Cultural compromises "limit the horizon of possibilities" of 
social actors, but are not monolithic or absolute, since individuai or collective actors 
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may vary in their interprétation of particular éléments of the cultural compromise, and 
sub-cultural groups can develop sub-cultural heterodoxy or counter discourses which 
may lead to adjustments or changes of the prevailing cultural compromise. 
Nationalism is thus a particular discourse (albeit the dominant one in modernity), which 
effects social closure, fostering (national) identity and différence, on the basis of the 
primacy of national interests and values. Building on such an approach to discourse, 
we could improve on Wimmer's conclusions by pointing out that there can be more 
than one variant of the nationalist discourse, each version supported by différent social 
actors (individuate, groups or other collectivities): Rather than simply an 'ethnie' or 
'civil' variant, characterizing différent countries, we may thus have différent variants of 
each type within particular countries - as we will see further on, in the case of Cyprus. 
A final point relates to the unnecessarily restrictive use of the central concepts of the 
'theory', such as 'social closure', to the modem period. Adopting a modernist position 
does not mean earlier periods should not, or could not, be properly studied through 
using a particular approach. Indeed, the power of any perspective could be judged by 
the criterion of how useful or fruitful it proves to be in explaining diverse cases. 
Interestingly, Jonathan Hall does attempt to account for the construction of ethnie 
identity in Greek antiquity through the very concept of 'social closure', which is the 
central pillar of Wimmer's approach - but which he does not even attempt to apply to 
pre-modern times.104 It is precisely to the pre-modern era that we next turn, to 
consider whether, and the extent to which, Cyprus was a part of the Greek nation in 
antiquity and in medieval times. 
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Chapter 2 Early Bases of Ethnie Community and Identity 
A thesis on nation and nationalism adopting a modernist approach would select as a 
point of departure modem times, referring to approximately the last two hundred years 
- going back to the American and French révolutions, and the création of modern 
nation-states. Adopting a long-term perspective, which goes back to ancient times, is 
associated with a nationalist or primordialist perspective or, at best, with historic 
ethno-symbolism. Yet to start with the modern world in the case of Cyprus is to 
completely ignore the self-understandings of Greek-Cypriots, who seem to take it for 
granted that Cyprus has been a part of the Greek nation since ancient times, and that 
they share a Greek identity, the roots of which go back 3,000 years, to the Coming of 
the Greeks to Cyprus, and the so-called Hellenization of the island.1 
Two separate assumptions are in fact conflated in the above view: First, that ever 
since the coming of the Greeks, Cyprus' culture has been Greek, or a part of Greek 
culture; second, that Cyprus ever since has become, and remains, a part of the Greek 
world and (what is considered to be similar) of the Greek nation. From these 
assumptions follows an interpretative grid which tries to explain every event or 
behaviour in the island's history ever since, as connected to the need of Cyprus to 
maintain its autonomy from the various conquerors, or other influences, so as to 
Protect its Greek identity and its underlying unity with Greece. If we bring to mind 
Smith's définition of nationalism, as the ideological movement which aims at "attaining 
and maintaining autonomy, unity and identity on behalf of a population deemed by 
some of its members to constitute an actual or potential nation",2 what we are 
considering here is a belief in a long-term nationalist movement, with roots traceable in 
antiquity, aiming at Cyprus' unity with Greece; this movement may have changed faces 
during Cyprus' various historical phases, but it is fostered by the same underlying 
spirit, which is itself an expression of a common underlying Greek essence. Put 
differently (to use Gelleps terminology), assuming Cyprus "is Greek", there should be 
congruence between culture and politics so that Cyprus' movement through history 
must be viewed as the effort to bring the two together - of the difficulties involved, the 
frustrations, the betrayals, the set backs, and the lingering hopes. Such beliefs are not 
restricted to ordinary individuals, but have imbued the presuppositions of most 
mainstream historical narratives to the extent that, in most cases, it is diffìcult to 
disentangle "facts"from nationalist interprétations. 
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What I wish to propose is that the two assumptions need not be conflated, and that, 
though the first may be largeiy true, the second does not follow - more specifically, 
although Greek culture has of long been hégémonie on the island, Cyprus was not a 
part of the Greek nation in antiquity, for the simple reason that there was no Greek 
nation in pre-modern times (at least in the sensé that we understand nation today). 
There were of course a number of Greek ethnie communities, or ethnies ÒS Smith calls 
them, and Cyprus was closely connected with thèse. But the intensity of this 
connection varied with time and there was no certainty or inevitability that this link 
would have drawn thèse communities into ever doser union, if it had not been for 
various historical developments, which we will be considering further on. 
Besides Greek culture, the second "ingrédient" of Greek-Cypriot identity is seen to be 
the (Greek) Orthodox religion. It is again assumed that once Cyprus became a part of 
the Byzantine world, Greek culture combined with Christianity (Greek Orthodoxy) so 
that Cyprus was henceforth even more securely (ethnically) Greek - and this 
Greekness it managed to maintain under the various conquerors that followed (Franks, 
Venetians, Ottomans and British). In brief, the assumption is that the Greek national 
identity of Cyprus was maintained, despite centuries of enslavement, through Greek 
culture and Orthodoxy. How accurate thèse assumptions are we will be considering 
below. 
Cyprus in antiquity: a part ofthe Greek nation? 
The first traces of human life in Cyprus date as far back as the ninth millennium BC.3 
By the seventh millennium, there were well organized, small-scale communities 
engaged in hunting, farming and perhaps herdîng, thus with some degree of 
permanence of habitation.4 With time, Settlements became more stable, multiplying 
and growing in size, constituting an insular, self-contained indigenous civilization, 
largeiy independent and having little contact with the outside world.5 The picture 
started changing in the third millennium, when Cypriots began utilizing copper, found 
locally in abundance, both for their own uses but also for trading it with neighbouring 
countries such as eastern Anatolia, Syria, Palestine and Egypt; Settlements at this 
stage concentrated in the eastern part of the island, and there appeared the first 
shrines and fortification works. This was an era of substantial economie development, 
which brought the island wealth and fame. It was also a time when Cypriots broke out 
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of the isolation of neolithic times, opening out to outside influences and incorporating 
new knowledge and expériences into a robust culture, with a distinct Middle Eastern 
character.6 
In the second millennium, Cyprus started having contacts with the Near East, Egypt 
and with the Aegean - the Greek world. In the latter case, links were mostly with 
Crete, whose civilization in this period was flourishing;7 initial, sparse contacts were 
made by Minoan ships, coming to Cyprus to seek copper, or using the island as a 
transit stop to the bustling ports of Syria. TTie development of trade was rendering the 
art of writing increasingly necessary, and Cypriots adopted a linear script from the 
Cretans, adjusting it to their own realities - known as the Cypro-Minoan script, the use 
of which became widespread on the island.8 
Meanwhile, Cretan civilization was influencing mainland Greece, the Aegean islands, 
and the surrounding areas of the Mediterranean. The Mycenaeans, among the 
beneficiaries from contacts with Crete, eventually overwhelmed the latter, 
incorporating it within their own "politicai and cultural realm".9 Furthermore, they took 
over the Cretans' trade with the East, and consequently the links with Cyprus. After 
the destruction of the Mycenaean cities of Peloponnesus (by an earthquake and/or 
raiders),10 at around 1200 BC, there was a massive exodus of refugees from these 
areas to countries considered friendly: Cyprus attracted continuous waves of these 
newcomers, in a complex process which took a Century to complete.11 What was 
significant is that, whereas earlier Greek settlers had arrived as individuals who 
gradually merged with the indigenous Cypriots, the new arrivais, fleeing en masse, 
proceeded to form colonies of their own in the host land, which were to "thrive for 
seven centuries and play a leading role in the politicai and cultural life of Cyprus".12 
This massive influx of Greek settlers was to have a wide-ranging and lasting impact on 
the island. The Greek présence and influence was everywhere, affecting language, 
religion, politics, town-planning, architecture, art and ali aspects of life - so much so 
that many historians see it as amounting to the complete "Hellenization " of Cyprus.13 
As Karageorghis14 points out, the fact that this acculturation was not the resuit of 
violent imposition but of a graduai, long-term and peaceful process, opening up new 
horizons for the locals, goes a long way to explain why it acquired deep roots. From a 
différent point of view, the Mycenaean aristocracy seems to have managed to gain 
hegemony - to dominate the local population both politically and culturally, through 
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winning its consent. This does not mean the impact was only one way, for the new 
aristocracy was itself influenced by the local culture. There were also influences from 
other incomers - such as thè Syro-Palestinians, with whom Cyprus came into contact 
through trade, but also through the arrivai on the island of refugees, displaced from 
thèse lands by the 'Peoples of the Seas'.15 In fact, this admixture of natives, 'western' 
Achaeans, and 'eastern' Syro-Palestinians seems to have led to a new vitality of 
cultural production - as reflected in the art of the times, and especially ceramics.16 
In the ninth Century BC, the Phoenicians, formidable merchants, sea farers, explorers 
and colonizers, succeeded the Mycenaean Greeks as the main trading power in the 
Mediterranean.17 In commencing their westward expansion, they made Cyprus their 
first outpost They engaged actively in business and commerce and, through achîeving 
control of the island's mines, they managed to dominate the economy. Much like the 
Greeks, the Phoenicians established their own colonies through which they exercised 
signifìcant politicai and cultural influence. 
In 709 BC, Cyprus was conquered by the Assyrians, who allowed a certain autonomy 
to the Cypriot kings, so long as they paid the imposed tribute. After a brief period of 
submission to Egypt (560-545 BC), the locai kings had to accept domination by Persia, 
the new great power in the East, whose rule lasted for two whole centuries. Foreign 
rule did not appear to block development, and it seems that in this "Archaic" era 
Cyprus "fully shared [in] the prosperity and culture of the Middle East".18 The Cypriot 
city-kingdoms rose to prominence, becoming centres of politics and culture; they were 
ruled by local despotic dynasties, some of which enjoyed considérable religious status 
and power.19 There were between seven to eleven such kingdoms, at différent times, 
most of which were controlied by Greeks and the rest by the Phoenicians; even though 
under foreign domination, they seemed to enjoy considérable local autonomy. Düring 
this period, Phoenician economie and politicai influence seems to have increased, but 
in culture and religion, the "Hellenization process" reached a new peak.20 Within the 
Persian Empire, Cyprus became an important trading centre and its economy was 
thriving. Apparently, Cyprus had increased contacts with the Greek cities of Ionia, on 
the east coast of Anatolia:21 In approximately 500 BC, when the disgruntled Ionian 
city states rose up against the Persians, Onesilos, king of Salamis in Cyprus, rallied ali 
Cypriot city kingdoms together (except for Amathus), to proclaim independence from 
Persian rule; although successful in the initial stages, the rébellion was crushed after a 
year from its inception. 
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In the subséquent years, the Greek city-states engaged in large-scale war against 
Persia. In 490 BC, the Greeks unexpectedly won an epic victory at the battle of 
Marathon. In 480 BC, they completely destroyed the Persian navy at the battle of 
Salamis: Interestingly, Cyprus, still under Persian rule, contributed 150 warships to the 
Persian fleet - but, according to Herodotus' reports, the Cypriots did not distinguish 
themselves in battle.22 As has been often noted, those Greek victories were of trans-
historical significance, as their conséquences were important not only for Greece itself, 
but for the survival and later impact of classical Greek culture on western civilization. 
At that time, thèse unexpected successes emboldened the Greek cities to stage a 
counter-offensive against Persia, lasting approximately three décades. Since Cyprus 
was an important outpost for the control of Persian territories in the eastern 
Mediterranean (such as south-east Anatolia, Syria and Egypt), the island became the 
subject of continuous contests and kept changing hands between the two rival 
powers23 (in 470 and 449, for instance, Athenian General Kimon captured the island 
from the Persians, but control quickly reverted back to the Persians). In 449 BC, an 
Athens exhausted by the long conflict with Sparta, was pushed to sign the Peace of 
Kallias, which left Cyprus under Persian rule. 
The next move to question Persian supremacy was to come from within Cyprus. In 
411 BC, Evagoras outsted the usurper Phoenician king of Salamis, restoring the throne 
to the Greek Teucrid dynasty, of which he was a member. Once in power, he proved 
compétent in his economie policies and managed to build city fortifications and a 
strong fleet. While himself a vassal of Persia, he managed to get the latter to 
collaborate with Athens in her struggle against Sparta, in the final phase of the 
Peloponnesian War. In récognition of his assistance, the victorious Athens bestowed 
great honours on Evagoras and relationships between Salamis and Athens drew ever 
closer. He subsequently managed to build a triple coalition between Cyprus, Athens 
and Egypt, with which he acquired more leverage in pushing most cities of the island 
to unite under his rule and, subsequently, to assert a growing independence from 
Persia. Evagoras' efforts were short-circuited when, in 386 BC, Athens and Sparta, 
exhausted by war, concluded the Peace of Antalkides with Persia, which again left 
Cyprus exposed. Even though Evagoras managed, using exceptional politicai and 
military skill, to resist the Persians for a few more years, he eventually had to accept 
honourable capitulation - to retain his throne at Salamis, provided he paid tribute to 
Persia. Evagoras was to stay in history as the king who attempted the unification of 
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the Cypriote, while also strengthening links with Athens:24 He introduced the Greek 
alphabet locally, was the first Cypriot ruler to use Greek lettere and symbols in new 
coinage he cut, and hosted renowned artiste, musicians and literary figures from 
Athens in his court at Salamis. 
It was left to Alexander to lead the Greeks, united under Macedonia by his father 
(Philip II), into defeating the Persians. When, on his way to capturing Egypt, he laid 
siège of Tyre, the Cypriot kings sent 120 ships to his assistance; the Cypriote 
supported Alexander's further campaigns in various ways, and many accompanied him 
in his conquest of India.25 The victorious Alexander turned the island into a province of 
his empire, making it a part of the Hellenistic world, while allowing the cities to retain 
autonomy in running their affaire. 
The Ptolemies, Alexander's successore (during the Hellenistic Period, 325-30 BC), were 
to put a permanent end to Cyprus' politicai organization into autonomous city-
kingdoms: The island became part of the Hellenistic kingdom of Egypt and was 
centrally governed by an absolute monarchy, locai power resting with a governor-
general (strategos), into whose hands passed ali military and politicai power. New 
institutions, characteristic of Ptolemaic rule, were introduced - such as a vouli 
(parliament), a demos and public schools (gymnasiums), although these did not 
amount to a more démocratie regime.26 What is certain is that relations with 
'mainland' Greece became even doser, as evidenced by the fact that Cypriot athlètes 
participated in the Olympic and Panathenian conteste, and Cypriote were received as 
proxeno/ at the Delphi. 
* * * 
In the account above, an effort was made to go over the bare basics of Cyprus' early 
history. Most mainstream historical narratives27 would go much further than this and 
présent Cyprus, once Hellenized, as effectively a part of the wider Greek nation, and 
Cypriote as, henceforth, imbued with the respective national consciousness or Greek 
identity - what we may cali the strong version of the "Hellenization" thesis. Following 
from this, Cyprus is seen as increasingly disengaging iteelf from any originai links with 
the Orient and gradually consolidating ite position as part of the Occident, via ite link 
with Greece. Caught from early times in the ongoing conflict between East and West, 
Cyprus is seen as constantly seeking Greece's help in maintaining ite freedom and 
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national sovereignty. Onesilos and Evagoras are treated as exemplary heroes in the 
service of the national cause; Phoenicians as ethnie others who were ready to 
collaborate with the enemy (Persians), precisely because they lacked in ethnie 
solidarity with the Greeks of Cyprus; Kimon, as the great liberator, implementor of the 
Greek résolve to keep Hellenie Cyprus free; and so on. 
The problem with such aecounts is that they impose modern concepts of nationhood 
and national identity upon the past. Before considering whether Cyprus was part of 
the Greek nation, we should determine whether there were nations in antiquity - and, 
if so, whether Greece was a nation. We have seen that scholars agree that most 
nations are produets of modem times, some going back to the Middle Ages, and very 
few having their early start in antiquity. As regards ancìent Greece, it certainly cannot 
be deemed a nation in the modem sense of the word.2 8 It is well established that the 
dominant politicai Organization in Greek antiquity was the city (polis), and this 
commanded the primary loyalty of people throughout the Archaic and Classical 
periods.29 At the same time, there were broader, supra-regional loyalties (created as a 
resuit of increasing contacts between the various communities), related to ethno-
linguistic groups such as the Ionians, Dorians, Aeolians, and Achaens, each of which 
was characterized by its own unique culture (style of art and architecture, customs, 
and religion), each had its own fictive lineage, and on the basis of these differential 
features, they cultivated separate networks of alliance.30 So strong were these two 
types of sub- or intra-Hellenic identity that they led to constant antagonism and 
conflict between cities or between supra-regional alliances, at the détriment of a 
collective "Hellenie" identity. The long and devastating Peloponnesian War, for 
instance, was fought between the Ionian and Dorian camps, led by Athens and Sparta 
respectively. The opponents proved capable of using any tactic, including siding with 
enemîes, in order to win over their rivais.31 
Overall, the primaey of allegiance to particular city-states than to Hellas, was the main 
reason why Classical Greece never managed to unite politically and to build a Greek 
nation. Again, this must not be seen through the modern lenses of nationhood, as a 
sort of 'failure' of ancient Greeks, since they never coneeived of an imagined 
community wider than the city-state, as either "possible or désirable".32 Of course, 
Alexander was to achieve unity, later on, but only through force, and only as a first 
step towards building a multinational empire - something altogether différent to 
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building a Greek nation as the "sole source of politicai power" and as the "basis of 
world order".33 
Given that Greece in antiquity was no nation, as it was not united into a single politicai 
entity and did not have an over-arching national identity, the question becomes - what 
was it then? For, although initially absent, some sort of a "Hellenie consciousness" did 
seem to develop over time. Jonathan Hall proposes that sub-hellenic unity provided 
the building blocks for such a wider Hellenie construction.34 By the time of the Olympic 
Games in the 6* Century, only "Hellènes" were allowed to participate.35 And by the 
time of the Persian Wars in the 5* century, suffìcient unity was achieved to resîst the 
enemy.36 
Here is where Anthony Smith's concept of 'ethnie' cornes handy.37 Greece at the time 
may not have been a nation, but it had enough unity to classify as an ethnie. The 
main features of this emergïng sensé of unity included: A common name (Hellas); 
attachment to a Greek homeland around the Aegean; myths of common origin of the 
Greeks and their main sub-groups; a common Olympian religion, with its pantheon of 
gods and goddesses; common sacred sites (especially at Delphi, Dodona and Didyma) 
and associated rites; a family of closely related dialects (for instance, Ionian, Dorian), 
each with its own myths of lineage and ancestral heroes (for instance, Héraclès for the 
Dorians); historie memories fostered by a common literary héritage, such as the 
Homeric epics, "celebrating an earlier, Mycenaean civilization and its war against Troy"; 
various festivals and games (for instance, the Olympian and Pythian); and the various 
colonies created from the eighth century onwards, dotting the Mediterranean.38 
These common features formed the shared héritage of the Greeks and served to bind 
them together, despite the centrifugai tendencies of the other two sets of identities 
already noted. The end resuit was an "uneven" Greek consciousness, "cross-cut" by 
city and supra-regional loyalties. Hence, city-states would often fait to unite despite 
external threats. Yet, when the threat was grave enough, as in the case of the Persian 
invasion, an alliance did become possible, even if temporarily and imperfecta so, so 
that a "latent Hellenie ethnocentrism" was converted into an "overt politico-cultural 
movement".39 Unexpected victory against the Persians led to a new wave of "pan-
Hellenic consciousness", which in turn led to rivalry between the main city-states for 
leadership of the united front against Persia - which, itself, further galvanized in-group 
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ethnie feelings towards superior, civilized, freedom-loving Hellènes, as against the 
inferior, barbarian, servitude-imposing, and illiterate Persians.40 
Let us now return to the case of Cyprus. It must be obvious by now that if we cannot 
talk of a Greek nation in antiquity, there is no support for the strong version of the 
Hellenization thesis (more on this below). So let us consider the more attenuated 
version of the thesis to begin with. Undoubtedly, the Greek settlers introduced into 
Cyprus their language, institutions, cuits, arts, and names of places and people; it also 
also seems established that Greek culture quickly became hegemonie on the island. 
The innumerous ancient material artefacts (statues, pottery and so on) constitute 
visible documents of the strong cultural connections with Greece since early times. 
Furthermore, the idea of strong links between the Greeks and Cyprus is embedded in 
its foundation myths, which found expression in various early works of epic poetry and 
chronicles. Indeed, a number of Homeric Greek heroes of the Trojan War have been 
credited with the foundation of Greek cities on the island: Teucros41 is said to be the 
founder of Salamis, Kepheus the founder of Kerynia,42 Agapenor of New Paphos, 
Chalkanor of Idalion, Akamas of Soloi,43 and so on. In actual fact, the cities these 
Greek heroes supposedly set up were already thriving for a long time since, but the 
foundation myths themselves underline the great impact left by the arrivai of the Greek 
settlers on the island and its people.44 These epic aecounts seem to also reflect 
changes that were linked to Greek colonization, whereupon politicai life, tili then 
apparently organized into a more unifìed monarchie regime,45 was now reorganized 
into city-kingdoms - in most of which the Greek settlers dominated (either through 
their sheer numbers, or because Greek élites managed to secure hegemonie 
supremacy). 
Epic poetry flourished more generally in Cyprus. Indeed, the island boasts its own epic 
poet in Stasinos, allegedly author of the Cyprian which forms part of the Homeric 
Cycle of Epics along with the well known Iliad and Odyssey. The Cypria is seen by 
many scholars as a long introduction to the Iliad, and served as a source for many 
tragédies, written by the great Greek dramatists, Aeschylos, Sofoklis and Evripides. 
Some historians speculate that such epic and other poems were probably "recited by 
rhapsodes at the festivals in the temples of Aphrodite-Astarte at Kition, Salamis and 
Paphos" or "during festivals [in Cypriot and Greek] courts of the rulers",47 creating 
répertoires of common struggles, glories and heroes, thereby helping to hammer-out 
some sort of common consciousness and establishing an "underlying unity among the 
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Greeks": As Smith points out, such epic productions were "more effective in shaping 
subséquent générations of ethnically conscious families than the events themselves, a 
more potent agent of solidarity than victories and defeats".49 
Obviously, there are good grounds for accepting the weaker version of the 
Hellenization thesis. Yet close cultural affìnity and underlying unity are not to be seen 
as indicators of nationhood and national identity - but only of a more rudimentär/, 
ethnie awareness.50 Yet, as already noted, Cyprus' historiography is replète with 
examples of imposition of modem notions of nation and nationality on the past - the 
stronger version of the Hellenization thesis. A good such example is provided by Franz 
Georg Maier, in his penetrating article Factoids in Ancient History: the case of fifth-
century Cyprus.51 For Maier, Yactoids' are mere hypothèses or conjectures which have 
been repeated so often that they attain the status of established "hard facts'.52 The 
particular case he examines relates to the fifth Century conflict of king Evagoras with 
Persia,53 and the assumptions of most authors covering the surrounding events, that 
the conflict was the resuit of national motivations. The Cypriot conflict is almost 
always treated as an instance of the more general clash between Greece and Persia 
(or, even more widely, of the clash between the West and the East); Evagoras is 
treated as inspired by the national ideals of uniting the Cypriots in pursuing 
independence from Persia and/or doser union with Greece; and the Phoenicians of 
Cyprus as the ethnie others who were "pro-Persian" and acted as "a fifth column at the 
expense of the Greek-Cypriot majority".54 
After critically examining the available historical records, Maier condudes that there is 
no évidence of ethnie enmity between ancient Cypriots and Phoenicians: Rather the 
opposite, for there are indications of peaceful co-existence, mutuai cultural exchange 
and even intermarriage between the two groups. Divisions were not vertical 
(ethnie/national) but horizontal (subjects against rulers). As regards Evagoras' 
motivations, thèse appear to relate more to power politics and dynastie ambitions (to 
expand his kingdom's power and gain hegemony over Cyprus), rather than to ethnie or 
national ideals.55 Maier undertakes a more meticulous scrutiny of ancient sources and 
convincingly argues for a non-nationalist reading of the unfolding of events: Evagoras 
harboured no anti-Persian schemes or plans of liberating Cyprus during the first 
décades of his rule; his anti-Persian turn came after his assault on the other Cypriot 
cities, and Persia's décision to support the latter, at theîr request for help; during the 
process Evagoras indiscriminately attacked and annexed both Greek and Phoenicïan 
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kingdoms (if national values were his guidance, attacking co-nationals would have 
been out of the question).56 Evagoras may have had "philhellenic leanings", attracting 
Greek artists and writers to Salamis, and this may have furthered the (cultural) 
Hellenization process - but this was probably not so much the expression of his "Greek 
national consciousness", as the vaunting of "pretensions similar to those of the Great 
[Persian] King and many of his vassal rulers", who similarly appreciated and imitated 
Greek culture and courted Greek artists, without demonstrating thereby an 
identification with Greece, or a desire for Persia to unite with Greece.57 
Evagoras' case is thus a good example of a posteriori attributions of nationalist 
motivations to historical actors. One could add many more examples, to the ones used 
by Maier, to demonstrate the argument. Let us consider two such cases, through a re-
reading of ancïent sources. The first case relates to the Cypriots' participation in the 
naval battle of Salamis (480 BC): Mainstream historians almost always attribute the 
Cypriots' bad performance to national reasons; Kyrris, for instance, allèges that the 
Cypriots "willingly behaved unheroically";58 Tim Boatswain similarly reasons that 
"[p]erhaps unsurprisingly the Cypriots, no doubt conscious of their Greek héritage, 
apparently did not fight well for their Persian masters"59 - implying, obviously, that 
they allowed themselves to be butchered so as not to cause harm to Greece. But if we 
turn to Herodotus' original account, we simply learn that the performance of the 
Cypriots was poor - as was that of the Egyptian, Cilician, Pamphylian and other allies 
of Xerxes - causing Queen Artemisia's comment that they were "no good". There is 
nothing to justify the inference that the Cypriote poor performance had to do with 
national sentiments. And if one was to assume the latter, then the question would 
remain as to why the Egyptians and other non-Cypriots did not fight well either, since 
they had no connection with the Hellenic cause. 
Another example is how General Kimon's expéditions to Cyprus (470, 449 BC) are 
portrayed - namely, as Greek mainland efforts to free the island from foreign Persian 
domination. Yet, paradoxically, Kimon (much like Pausanias before him), freed Cyprus 
and then immediately left, so the Persians re-conquered the island soon after; one 
would have expected the Greeks to have left behind some forces to protect the island 
if indeed libération was their main target. Another intriguing fact is that the Cypriots 
themselves seemed not to actively join thèse efforts towards their libération (indeed, in 
some cases, the Cypriot kings resistèd their liberator - why would that be so remains 
impossible to explain using the nationalist framework). A more convincing explanation 
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is in fact provided by an unlikely source, Piutarch, who, interestïngly, gives three very 
instrumentalist reasons for Kimon's expéditions: First, Kimon wanted to keep the 
Athenians busy with externat wars so they would not end up fighting other Greeks in 
civil wars; second, the Athenians needed to constantly train themselves in war against 
the barbarians (at that stage, the Persians); and third (and perhaps more importantly), 
if they were successful in battle they would have enriched themselves with the spoils 
of war. No référence whatsoever is made to nationalist values or motivations.60 In 
fact, Plutarch's account immediately explains the paradox of the Greek's departure 
soon after winning over the Persians (they had their exercise and booty - so they 
carried on), as well as the Cypriots' passivity. Almost no historical work on Cyprus 
cites Piutarch and his interprétations of the Greek expéditions - so that the 
mainstream account of Kimon's résolve to liberate his Cypriot brothers prevails as the 
only "naturai" explanation.61 
Interestingly, Zannettos, the first author to attempt a complete modem history of 
Cyprus from a nationalist perspective, in the early twentieth century (1910), is one of 
the few who did note Plutarch's explanations. Zannettos wrote his history in the early 
Cypriot nationalist era, so he faced the great challenge of re-interpreting ail historical 
stages by using the grand narrative of nation and the unfolding of the national spirit 
since ancient times. Unable to accept Plutarch's instrumentalist explanations, 
Zannettos found it necessary to add that "obviously [Kimon's] expédition served also 
the panhellenic idea"6 2 - that is, of joining city-states together in the all-embracing 
union of the nation. For Zannettos, irrespective of other instrumentalist 
considérations, there must also have been, even if only implicitly so, the nationalist 
vision - lurking at the back, hidden from view, but surely there. Furthermore, to the 
extent that the national idea was not as developed as it should have been, Zannettos 
tried to place his argument withïn an evolutionary perspective, which would have 
allowed him to explain the more "selfish" behaviour of Greeks and Cypriots at that tîme 
(that is, their motivation by "individuai interest",63 as against the wïder ideal of 
"national solidarity implied by the pan-hellenic idea").64 He was thus able to conclude 
that the "fragmentation of Hellenism into numerous small citîes was politically and 
nationally wrong" - and the only justification he could accept was that such an 
outcome simply constituted an earlier stage in the "ascent of [the Greeks'] national life 
to a higher stage of civilization",65 which was to be reached a little later, when 
Alexander would unite the Greeks into a larger whole. 
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One may simply strip Zanettos' account of the teleology implicit in his evolutionist 
perspective, and stay with the more convincing conclusion that the imagined 
community which commanded the loyalties of the ancient Greeks and Cypriots was the 
city-state, and not any other wider entity. As there was only a rudimentary sensé of 
Greece or Hellas, there was equally a very weak sensé of "Cyprus". The salient 
identifications were not with Greece or Cyprus, but with Athens and Sparta, Salamis 
and Amathus. City-states were worlds unto their own: Salamis would develop close 
links with Athens, but other Cypriot cities could make entirely différent choices, one 
aligning with Sparta (Athens enemy), and another with Persia. So when Evagoras tried 
to dominate the other Cypriot cities, it is not surprising that Amathus, Soloi and Kiti 
sought Persia's help to protect them against their "co-national".66 And when Kimon left 
Cyprus, after his victories over the Persians, he was primarily concerned about Athens' 
other interests and no so much with his status as a Greek liberator of an enslaved 
Greek island.67 
Similar conclusions are reached by Michael Given in his study of ancient Cyprus 
between the seventh and third centuries BC. 6 8 After studying the ancient Cypriot 
cultural system, Given proposes that: 
The most significant cultural unit was the city kïngdom, each one central within 
the landscape it constructed and each with its own characteristic sanctuaries and 
cemeteries and local deities, providing a cohérent and compréhensible entity [...] 
with which people could identify. This identification was made above ail through 
the king, who was a unified and unambiguous symbol - indeed the only unified 
and unambiguous symbol - not only of the city-kingdom but of the meaningfully 
constructed world.69 
Based on thèse conclusions, Given pronounces that ethnicity is an "irrelevant concept" 
as regards ancient Cyprus.70 Yet he qualifies this by allowing that from approximately 
the fourth century onwards there are increasing signs of change and a graduai passage 
from the old to a new cultural system, based on ethnicity: This he attributes to a 
"revolution in thought" impacting on the prevailing "world view", so that by the end of 
the fourth century, the pre-ethnic cultural system was no longer in existence.71 Given 
does not analyze in depth the causes of thèse changes, whose origin he links to 
"similar trends in the ancient world, especially Athens"72, from which they were 
imported to Cyprus. But they amounted to a growing emphasis on foundation myths 
linked to Greek heroes, and the adoption of divine figures from the "anthropocentric 
Greek pantheon" by the Cypriot kings and peoples. 
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Jonathan Hall argues that ethnie démarcations in ancient Greece started becoming 
particularly sharp "as a resuit of the processes of 'social closure' which forged a new 
définition of the community of politai, or 'Citizens'."73 Hall provides a link between 
Wimmer and Anthony Smith, between modernist and ethno-symbolic approaches, for 
the latter can be seen as attempts to delineate pre-modern processes of social closure, 
which culminated in rendering ethnicity as a central principle according to which pre-
modern societies structured inclusion and exclusion in social life. Hall admits that it 
would be difficult to speli out the exact nature of the mechanisms determinîng 
inclusion or exclusion from the polis, but he suggests that "the recitation of ethnie 
myths, invoking daims and counterclaims to territory and ancestral rights, must have 
played some part in accession to, or exclusion from, citizen status". Henceforth, there 
would be fluctuations in the salience of ethnicity, cohésion increasing with the 
appearance of external enemies. But, as we have already seen, enhanced ethnie 
consciousness would certainly not lead to the close cohésion required of a modem 
nation. It is true that all this was to change after Alexander would forcibly unite the 
Greeks together, but the outeome was a multi-national empire, and certainly not a 
nation-state or a nation.74 
The Orthodox Church: From Byzantine to European feudal rule 
The Roman Period (30 BC-330 AD) was in many ways marked by contînuity with the 
previous, Hellenistic era. As with most multi-ethnic empires, the new rulers showed 
"little interest in Romanising Cyprus".75 Thus, Greek remained the officiai language 
and hellenic culture, along with the arts and the sciences, continued to thrive.76 This, 
in fact, was a period in which the Hellenization process, which began long ago, was 
Consolidated - "although as in other eastern provinces, the oriental tradition lay below 
the Hellenistic veneer".77 More generally, Roman administration proved to be efficient 
and libéral: The peace and security enjoyed within a political System which united the 
Mediterranean world, the enhanced rôle of Cyprus as a link in the trade between east 
(Indîa, Arabia) and west (especially Italy), and improvements in the roads and ports of 
the island, ail contributed to a rise in the prosperity and well-being of the Cypriots. 
But the most important development, which was to have a lasting impact on the island, 
was the introduction of Christianity. In 46 AD, St. Paul, together with the Cypriot St. 
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Barnabas, went around Cyprus preaching the new religion. Initialïy, Christianity did 
not seem to fall on fertile ground; in fact, in the first three centuries, the new religion 
made little progress, and paganism continued to be strong. This is not surprising, 
considering that in those years of Roman rule in Cyprus, the Christians were stili 
persecuted - indeed, the only recorded Cypriot Christian martyrs met with death in this 
period. 
It was during the long period of Byzantine rule (330-1191 AD) on the island that the 
new Christian religion and its Church were to grow deep roots. Constantine the Great, 
who established Constantinople (the 'New Rome*) as the new capital of the Empire, on 
the site of the old Byzantium, was the initiator of this second phase of Roman rule. The 
establishment of the new capital heralds the séparation of the Latin dominated West, 
from the Greek-speaking East part of the Roman empire (later to be known as the 
Byzantium), which was to evolve unique features of its own and to dominate the East 
Mediterranean for the next thousand years. Constantine allowed freedom of worship 
to the Christians and, most significantly, put the new religion under his personal 
patronage. Subséquent emperors,78 after his death, continued his legacy, making 
Christianity the officiai religion of the Empire, while being hostile to idolatry and 
paganism: This explains the graduai phasing out of the latter in Cyprus, over the 5* 
and 6^ centuries, and the "triumph" of the Christian religion.79 
The Cypriot Church gained in prestige as a conséquence of boasting a number of locai 
saints,80 but also from the alleged passing through Cyprus of St. Helena (Great 
Constantine's mother), after her visit to Jérusalem and her discovery of the site and 
relies of Christs Passion: Presumably, St. Helena established churches and monasteries 
in Cyprus, and left some of the relies she had brought from the holy lands - thus 
Cyprus would henceforth add to its famę and establish itself as a centre of 
pilgrimage.81 More importantly, the Church was expanding and consolidating its 
organizational structure, and spreading its network of bishops and priests throughout 
the island.82 Through these, it managed to stay in dose touch with the people and 
theîr problems, offering them protection against "overbearing officiais".83 
Within only a century of Byzantine rule, the locai Church had grown powerful and 
confident enough of itself to resist subservience to the strong Patriarchate of Antioch,84 
which claimed the right to appoint the bishops of Cyprus. The confliet between the 
two churches lasted for almost a century. The matter was first raised in the 3 r t 
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Ecumenic Synod of Ephesus (431 AD) which confirmed the "autocephalous" 
(independent) status of the Church of Cyprus. Some time, later (478 AD), the 
Patriarch of Antioch raised the issue again with emperor Zeno. This time, the Cypriot 
Archbishop, who claimed he had just discovered the tomb of St. Barnabas and the 
hand-written gospel of St. Matthew, presented the fìnding to the emperor, in 
Constantïnople; the latter, not only re-confìrmed the independence of the Cypriot 
Church, but gave a number of privilèges to the Cypriot Archbishop.85 The successful 
waging of the Church's struggle for independence was to form the basis for the 
prominence the Church was to enjoy henceforth, as a parallel power to the secular 
authorities, symbolizing Cyprus' autonomy. 
Byzantine rule had on the whole benefîciary effects on the people. Some of the 
harsher Roman laws (such as the death penalty) were abolished; what was not 
ameliorated were the laws which tied tenant farmers to the land on which they were 
born, and town artisans to the work and guilds they were compulsorily organized into. 
Thus, in practice, a "small ruling class composed of land owners, senior officiais and 
the clergy" enjoyed ali economie and politicai power. But, overall, the economy was 
doing well, although it never reached the prosperity levels of late Roman rule - until 
further development was arrested by the Arab invasions, which started in the mid^* 
Century and lasted for over two centuries. 
In 653/4 AD, after one of their many raids the Arabs decided to leave behind a 
garrison of 12,000 Muslims, while subsequently encouraging more Muslims to settle on 
the island: This was the first time that the new religion was to acquire an organized 
présence in Cyprus, although the numbers of those who stayed behind permanente 
must have been small,86 until the period of Ottoman rule, during which the Muslim 
community was to become more numerous. Cyprus was important as a naval base for 
both Byzantines and Arabs alike, and proved to be a bone of contention for centuries. 
In 688 AD, the two powers agreed on neutralizing the island and on establishing a 
condominium-like regime: During the life of this arrangement, which lasted nearly 
three hundred years, there was relative peace and stability, and Christian and Muslim 
villages were reported to live "harmoniously" "side-by-side".87 When the Muslim world 
began to fragment in the tenth Century, the Byzantines reconquered part of their lost 
territories from the Arabs, and Cyprus was once again brought under the empire's 
control (965 AD).8 8 
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The next two centuries were marked by increasing prosperity and a 'cultural 
renaissance', in what became known as the 'second golden age' of the Byzantine 
empire:89 Agriculture and trade revived, the island became an important centre of 
textile production, cities came to life, churches and monasteries were built, and great 
mountain fortresses erected. In this new era of Byzantine rule, imperiai forces were 
stationed on the island and governors enjoyed more autonomy than previously in 
running island affaire. This provided more security, but it also created problems - for 
instance, taxes were now more efficiently collected, and some areas of autonomy were 
lost. Most importantly, the church leadership, which during the previous centuries had 
been rendered the only religious but also politicai leader of the locai Christians, was 
now expected to share power with the Byzantine governors, and this led to tension 
between religious and secular powere. Furthermore, the governors of the island, who 
were now commanding their own military forces, were at times tempted to challenge 
their emperor, seeking increased power for themselves. 
By the twelfth Century, the Byzantine empire was once again thrown into problems and 
decline.90 Internally, it was suffering from the conséquences of the feudalization 
process, and the growing economie and politicai power of the military aristocracy and 
the church (which had by now become a large landowner), with the parallel 
disappearance of a free peasantry. The ìnability of the emperor and centrai 
administration to reverse developments led to the désolation of the countryside and a 
weakness in organizing résistance against the rising Ottoman threat.. External 
challenges were also Coming from a résurgent West: Tension with the West had been 
building up over the centuries, politicai reasons intermingling with religious ones (for 
instance, whereas the West was moving towards the development of independent 
states, in the East, the Byzantine empire was still struggling to maintain a more 
universal politicai culture); but the biggest cleavage was to come as a result of the 
religious schism of 1054. Without any help from the West, the Byzantines were 
yielding to the increasing attacks of the Ottomans - the destruction of the imperiai 
army at the battle of Manzikert, in 1071 AD, being a date of symbólic significance, 
since it storm-opened Byzantium's gâtes to waves of Muslim bands in the Eastern 
borders of Anatolia. 
The confliet with the West was to escalate in the yeare to come, at the time of the 
Crusades.91 The First Crusade (1095-9) provided the cause for western European 
expansion to the lands of the eastern Mediterranean. After capturing the Holy Lands 
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and the adjacent areas of Syria, the Latins, as the occidentals were known at the time, 
Consolidated their hold on the conquered lands with the stationing of troops but also 
with the arrivai of settlers from Europe, leading to the création of the eastern Latin 
states. As a conséquence, trade in the area increased substantially, and Cyprus 
started benefiting from its location, linking the west to the east. Between 1174-1187, 
the Muslims re-captured most of the areas controlied by the west, which gave cause 
for the Third Crusade to be organized. It was in the context of this new Crusade that 
Richard the Lionheart conquered Cyprus (1191), on his way to the Holy Lands. Even 
though the capture was almost accidentai, Cyprus proved very useful in serving the 
needs of the crusading forces, by providing a base for their opérations in the area for 
the next hundred years. In fact, the island was to remain under European rule for 
almost four centuries (1191-1571). It is important to underline that Cyprus was, at the 
time, a Byzantine province with a Christian population and, thus, its capture effectively 
marked a new phase in western expansionism - which was to be repeated in a few 
years' time with the capture of Constantinople by the army of the Fourth Crusade 
(1204).92 After changing hands from Richard to the Templar Knights, and back to 
Richard, the latter finally sold Cyprus (1192) to Guy de Lusignan, ex-king of the Holy 
Lands/Jerusalem. 
* * * 
Fearing that the more numerous locals could rebel, and perhaps cause the Byzantine 
Emperor to come to their support (whereas assistance from more distant France 
couldn not be relied on), Guy proceeded to create a local power-base of settlers with 
"a vested interest in preserving the new regime".93 He thus invited "masses of 
'unemployed' knights and other crusaders,94 widows and orphans of men killed in 
battle, technicians, masons, Clerks [who] flocked to the island", creating "strong Latin 
Settlements".95 The most distinguished settlers received fiefs and the rest were given 
assignments in public posts, or assistance in setting up businesses. Over the years, 
the numbers of settlers from Latin states in the area, but also from Western Europe, 
kept increasing,96 constituting a new ruling class which controlied the economy and 
administration of the island. They shared the same Latin religion and culture, and 
tended to form a community apart from the subject population, which remained 
predominantly Greek-speaking and Christian Orthodox by religious affiliation.97 
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Through time, the power of the Lusignan regime was Consolidated into a hierarchical 
state, strong enough to last for nearly three centuries.98 The new regime was a typical 
Western European feudal system.99 All land was owned by the new rulers, who 
displaced the Greek landowning class (the archontes), and was divided as fiefs (which 
often comprised whole villages) between the king, the knights and the Latin church. 
The knights had to swear loyalty to the king, as his vassals, and to provide services to 
him, especially militar/ ones, as necessary. 
The entire local population was reduced to the state of tenant farmers or serfs. 
Peasant cultivators along with their families were bound to the fief-holders, who had 
the authority as to which land to allocate for cultivation, what products to produce, 
when and how. The natives were divided into three classes: The vast majority 
belonged to the lower class (the paroikoi or serfs), who had to provide their own 
means of production, pay one third of their produce to their landlord, plus a poll-tax, 
and also had to work for two days per week without pay on the landlord's lands. The 
laws allowed the feudal lords almost total power over their serfs and their families -
they could buy or seil them along with the land, exchange them for other serfs or even 
for animais,100 work them to exhaustion, dismiss or punish them. The only things they 
were not allowed to do were to wound them without reason, or kill them! "To ali 
intents and purposes they were the property of the landlord".101 The second class, the 
perpyarfo/,102 were free on the condition that they paid a special annual tax; they could 
not be sold or exchanged like the serfs - but were similarly obliged to pay a third of 
their produce, plus to work for two days per week on the landlord's estate. Finally, the 
freedmen (lefteroì) were emancipated locals, who usually received their freedom after 
paying a substantial fee to theirs lords. They could own land but had to pay tribute 
(from 1/5 to 1/10 of their produce) to their lord; they were no longer the property of 
their lord but of the king, to whom they had to pay taxes. 
AH the surplus labour expended by the locals was thus appropriated by the foreign 
ruling class - the king and his court, the nobles, the knights and the clergy. Another 
important section of the upper classes were the foreign merchants, mostly Venetians 
and Genoese.103 Using Cyprus as a base, these merchants managed to control the 
Eastern trade, previously monopolized by the Byzantine Empire, which was now in 
decline. Up to those times, Syria used to be the main trading centre of the area, but 
with its fall to the Arabs, Cyprus took its place as the commercial link between East 
and West. 1 0 4 These developments brought immense riches to the foreign merchants 
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on the island, and had multiplying effects on the local economy, benefiting the whole 
upper class, which lived in luxury and splendour. Foreign travelers of the period were 
dazzled with what they saw. Ludolf von Sudheim, a priest from Westphalia, opined 
that: "The princes, the nobles and the knights of Cyprus, are the richest in 
Christendom".105 Yet we should not forget that this was only a part of the picture, since 
"the brilliant surface presented by the Lusignan Court or the rieh merchantry of 
Famagusta covered a core of poverty and oppression".106 Not only that, but Cypriots 
were under strong pressures as regards their religious beliefs and practices. 
Early on in their rule, the Lusignans had sought to establish a Latin church in Cyprus to 
serve their various needs.107 The pope concurred to the idea of a local Latin church, 
perhaps hoping that, beside serving the settler community, the locals could also be 
won over to Catholicism. In those times, the Catholics considered the Orthodox as 
"faithful gone astray", who needed to be recalled to Roman obédience (the Cypriots 
especially, who were Chalcedonians, and not Monophysites, like other Christian 
churches in the East, were considered "nearer" the true faith). The Latin Church in 
Cyprus was accordingly established in 1196. 
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For the Orthodox Church, the new regime brought a great loss of power, wealth änd 
status, challenging its previous prominence and, to a certain extent, its very survival. 
The Latin conquest had meant the flight of the Byzantine aristocrats who used to be its 
traditional source of patronage. It also lost a considérable part of its properties, which 
were taken over by the Lusignan crown and nobility for the création of royal estâtes 
and noble fiefs; some land and monasteries were handed by the crown to the Latin 
Church.108 
The latter aided the cohésion of the local Latin community, which had to face the 
resentment of the native Orthodox population and the encircling threat of Muslim 
forces contesting the Western crusader présence in the area. In the initial stages, 
there was a strong présence of catholic military orders (such as Templars, Hospitallers, 
and Teutonic knights), whose objective was precisely that of enhancing security 
against possible internai uprisings by disaffected Cypriots, as well as against Muslim or 
Byzantine attacks. To thèse were added several religious orders (such as Franciscans 
and Dominicians), who were noted for their higher éducation, and could better 
contribute to the proselytization mission. But the numbers of the Latin clergy were still 
relatively small, as most of them were recruited from France, and Italy. They tended 
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to concentrate in the towns, where most of the Latin community lived, thereby 
neglecting the countryside and the mass of Cypriot peasants. The natives, and 
especialiy the peasants, grew increasingly hostile towards the Latin Church because its 
rites and language were alien to them, its doctrines contradicted the received truth of 
their own church, its wealth and power reminded them of the poverty and 
powerlessness of their own church - and its priorities seemed to focus on the needs of 
the Latin urban population and aristocrats. 
Matters became worse after the fall of Constantinople to the Latins (1204), which 
encouraged Pope Innocent III to seek the parallel imposition of the Latin creed on the 
defeated Orthodox. In 1213, he sent Cardinal Pelagius to secure the compliance of the 
Orthodox church in the Eastern lands; in Cyprus, the Pope's delegate convened two 
Ecclesiastical Councils (1220, 1222) which came up with a number of measures 
towards the subordination of the Orthodox Church.1 0 9 The locai Church's hierarchy 
sought counsel from the Patriarch of Constantinople: In the midst of the criticai 
Situation in Cyprus, and of the weakness of the Byzantines themselves, Patriarch 
Germanos initially advised modération - to yield to the fìnancial demands of the Latins, 
but to insist on the autonomy of the Church. A little later (1229), he sent a new letter 
to the Cypriots,110 advocating a more assertive stand against the Latins: "The Roman 
Church was castigated, those who had fallen under its influence were condemned and 
the people were urged not to go to churches in which converts officiated but to 
worship in their own homes."111 
Despite the Latins' résolve for ensuring the local Church's subservience,112 the latter 
put up a strong résistance - the resuit of its long-standing autonomy and its lingering 
attachment to Byzantium (of which Cypriots were a part "withîn living memory").113 
The bishops exiled themselves from the island (1240), and ordered those who stayed 
behind not to submit to the Latins on threat of excommunication. Faced with such 
défiance, the new pope, Innocent IV, assumed a more moderate approach, whereupon 
the Orthodox prelates returned from exile and elected a new archbishop. But the next 
pope, Alexander IV, reverted to the older policies (now made even strider)114 codified 
in his Bulla Cypria (1260), which, among other measures, dictated that in future there 
would only be one archbishop on the island, the Latin one, to whom Orthodox clergy 
would swear obédience. The recently elected Germanos was to keep his position until 
his death, after which the post and title would be abolished.115 Indeed, after 
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Germanos' death, the Orthodox church of Cyprus remained headless for 300 years, till 
the end of Latin rule. 
In practice, it seems that the implementation of the Bulla "generated unexpected 
unrest and resistance" both by the clergy but mostly by the laíty (who marginalized 
any clergy abiding by the new provisions).116 This spirit of defiance was probably 
strengthened by news of the recapture of Constantinople from the Latins (1261), by 
the Nicaea Byzantines. Worried with the many enemies encircling the weakend 
Byzantium, the new emperor - Michael Paleólogos - tried to mend relations with the 
West, so he conceeded to a unión of the Orthodox and Latin Churches (2 n d Council of 
Lyons), under the supremacy of Rome. But Paleólogos acted against the wishes of a 
vocal anti-unionist front, composed of a section of the clergy, plus the majority of the 
laymen, so the deal was never practically implemented; a few years later (1281), the 
Pope excommunicated Paleólogos as a "promoter of schismatics" - after which, the rift 
between the two churches grew bigger: The Orthodox were henceforth considered not 
only as schismatics but also as heretics. 
These developments naturally had negative repercussions in Cyprus, where animosities 
escalated. In 1359, the Pope sent a delégate117 to the island to impose Rome's will. 
As the local chronicler, Leontios Machairas, put it, "he wanted to make the Romioi 
Latins, he wanted to confirm them [to Catholicism] and there was a great scandal 
between the Romioi and the Latins".118 In one incident, the papal delégate arranged a 
confirmation of some priests in Santa Sophia, but when laymen received news of the 
matter they tried to break into the church and put fire to its doors, chanting "death to 
the Latins"; peace was only restored after the intervention of forces sent by the king. 
"And those whom he had confirmed, threw away the cotton and spat upon it" 
(denouncing their confirmation), Machairas underlines.119 
Sheer forcé was not the only weapon of the Latins in accomplishing their purposes; 
they also utilized their resources to build Catholic cathedrals and schools, and to 
promote the general well-being of their community, which acted as attractions for 
voluntan/ conversión, particularly once the locáis considered "the ease [...] with which 
a [converted] Catholic could become a freedman, a public employee, a merchant or 
secure some lucrative employment since he was now by religious profession a member 
of the ruling caste".1 2 0 
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Such efforts did not remain uncontested. The local Cypriot Orthodox elite, which was 
gradually recovering in strength, responded by building Orthodox Churches that tried 
to match in splendour the Latin ones. 1 2 1 The Cypriot elite maintained contact with 
influential Byzantine personalities and rallied their local church, helping it persevere in 
these harsh times. Furthermore, because local Orthodox schools were both few and of 
a low standard,122 some sought a better education in Byzantine lands: A characteristic 
case was that of George the Cypriot, born in 1240, who after leaving a local Greek 
school because of its poor quality, went on to a Latin school where he had difficulty 
with the Latin language of instruction and was disappointed with the rudimentary 
Aristotelian logic taught - whereby he transferred to Nicaea, to complete his education, 
ending up as a Patriarch of Constantinople later on in his life. 
Greek 'nationalism ' in Medieval times? 
From the eleventh century onwards, while Cyprus was under Latin rule, Byzantium was 
facing increasing attacks on almost all its borders and kept losing lands and shrinking 
in size. The last blow was the loss of its capital to the Latins in 1204. The remaining 
parts of the empire (Nicaea, Trebizond, the despotat of Morea, and the despotat of 
Epirus)123 shared two characteristics: They were mostly Greek-speaking, since the 
lands lost contained most of the remaining ethno-cultural communities of the empire 
(such as the Serbs and the Bulgarians); and they now remained as smaller territorial 
political units looking for a future. Naturally, the main aim of all these units was how 
to regain Constantinople and reconstitute the empire. But another emerging vision 
was that of reconstituting themselves along the lines of ancient Greek city-states, with 
a Hellenic identity. 
Up to that stage, the Byzantines had grown to see themselves as Roman citizens and 
Christians, members of the Eastern Roman Empire, which was God's earthly kingdom 
in the divine scheme of things. Their universalist perspective meant that they did not 
see themselves as part of any nation - in fact, the terms 'ethnos' and 'ethnikos' had 
the derogatory meaning of barbarians or heretics; neither did they consider themselves 
Hellenes since this term was associated with ancient Greece's polytheism or paganism; 
similarly, the philosophy and moral teachings of classical Greece were considered 
suspect. The highly educated Court and administration were versed in Latin through 
which links were maintained with the West, but Greek was permitted in the lower 
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bureaucracy. Gradually, relations with the West grew more distant and Greek became 
the language of the state and of the elite more generally.124 A classical éducation and 
knowledge of ancient Greek became important for advancing to the higher offices of 
the empire. Yet the emphasis of such an éducation was on the form of language (the 
grammar, the structure, the syntax) and the rhetoric of the classics, and did not entail 
an identification with the ancient Greeks as the biologica! or cultural forefathers with 
whom there was any sort of continuity through time. It was only now, under the new 
circumstances, that the connection with ancient Greece was reconceptualized. As 
Campbell and Sherrard put it, the Byzantines were now threatened with a "double 
loss": 1 2 5 As regards the military domain, they had lost their superiority and their 
territories had been overtaken by ali kinds of enemies, including the infidel Ottomans; 
and as regards the cultural domain they recognized the advances made by the Latin 
West, which was also successfully pressing the Orthodox to accept their supremacy in 
doctrinal matters. Laying claim to their hellinistic héritage was something that neither 
the Latins nor the Ottomans could emulate. The fact that most of the remaining free 
parts of the Byzantium were concentrated in territories earlier associated with ancient 
Greece, and were areas where Greek-speakere predominated, made the connection 
with Hellas more convincing. The contemporary inhabitants of mainland southern 
Greece were now seen to be the direct descendants of the ancient Greeks. Greek 
philosophers (and especially Plato, whose ideas were considered anathema by the 
Orthodox Church) were re-instated, to the extent that George Gemistos Pletho 
advocated a new polity based on Plato's ideal city, and which in many ways entailed 
features of modem nation-states.126 The culture and ideas of the Hellenic Greek 
ancestors were becoming the basis for the regeneration of the Byzantines. 
This turn to the classical past was best expressed by Pletho in a now famous memo to 
Emperor Manuel II, in which he reminds him that the people he rules over "are 
Hellènes by race, as both our language and ancestral éducation testify". The "proper" 
land for the Hellènes is that of "the Péloponnèse, together with the neighbouring part 
of Europe and the islands that lie near to it". And why was that? Because "it appears 
that this land has always been inhabited by the same Hellènes, as far as the memory 
of man reaches back."127 Nevertheless, as Runciman notes, the Byzantines did not feel 
comfortable using the term "Hellène" as a self-description before the mid-fourteenth 
century. When they started using the term, it initially had a "cultural" meaning, and 
sometimes a racial meaning, to refer to the Greek genos. Thus, Athanasios 
Lepenthrenus [Lependrinos], a Cypriot man of lettere (logios), in a letter written in 
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1355, refers to the sad state of the "Hellènes living in Cyprus" ("Ellinon ton en Kypro"), 
under the Latins.128 By the fifteenth Century, it was quite common to identify the 
Byzantium with "Hellas", so that many would talk of the libération of Hellas, and some 
would refer to the Byzantine king as the "king of Greece".129 Yet some, and especially 
the prelates, were hésitant in completely identifying themselves as Hellènes; when 
George Scholarios, future Patriarch of Constantinople after its fall to the Ottomans, was 
asked to classify his racial origins, he replied that he was "Hellene as regards his 
language", but did not "hold the beliefs that the Hellènes once held"; as to how he 
identified himself, he clearly responded "Christian", showing that he still considered 
Hellene and Christian as antithetical.130 Despite this, since it was the turn to ancient 
Greece which gave birth to this "last Byzantine renaissance", amîdst the wars and the 
myriad problems facing the ailing empire, Runciman calls the phenomenon a "Hellenic 
renaissance".131 
Would we be justified in considering this vision of a new polity and of a new self-
identity as an early form of nationalism - as mainstream Greek historiographers have? 
Xydis investigates the issue by considering whether the various characteristics of 
nationalism seem to have existed at this later stage of Byzantium's history. His 
conclusion is negative and he proposes to rather view the phenomenon as a case of 
neo-Hellenic "proto-nationalism", which shares some features with modem 
nationalism, but differs with it in other important respects.132 More specifically, he 
proposes that Greek-Byzantine proto-nationalism shares with nationalism its mostly 
secular character, and its sensé of pride for ancestral roots (viz. the ideas of ancient 
Greece and of the Greek philosophers, as against the attachment to the Orthodox 
religion in those times). But there is a crucial différence: Greek-Byzantine proto-
nationalism was mostly an elite phenomenon, whereas modem nationalism captures 
the imagination of the masses, leading to the identification of the nation with people, 
which is the.main driving force for the émergence of modem national states.133 
Hobsbawm develops further the concept of proto-nationalism, which he defines as 
referring to "certain variants of feelings of collective belonging" which evolved in the 
past under various conditions, and which may be available for national movements to 
mobilize in constructing modem nations.134 Hobsbawm differentiates between two 
types of proto-national bonds: First, the politicai attachments and vocabularies of 
"select groups more directly linked to states and institutions" - such as the ones 
emphasized by Runciman and Xydis; and second, the "supra-local forms of populär 
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identification", which go beyond attachments to the immediate living spaces of 
ordinary people. Did the latter type of bond develop in late Byzantine times? In our 
brief historical review of the Byzantium, we have underlined the ¡mportance of religión, 
and Orthodoxy, did certainly serve as a supra-local identification establishing bonds 
between unrelated people. But Orthodoxy, at that stage, was underpinned by an 
ecumenic philosophy and not a national one, and it still united a diverse range of 
ethno-linguistic groups residing in Byzantine lands (even if, as we have seen, the 
contraction of the Byzantium reduced the number and ¡mportance of such groups, 
allowing the gradual dominance - over the next centuries - of the Greeks). Language 
is another candidate for serving as a proto-national bond: But the Greek of the élite 
was very different from the Greek of ordinary people, so again it could not have served 
as a basis of vertical unity, between élite and masses, or for horizontal unity between 
the various ethno-linguistic groups. We may then conclude that, at this late Byzantine 
period, the visión of a new polity may have served as a bond uniting segmens of the 
élite, but it certainly did not provide a basis for their unity with the masses; moreover, 
any bonds linking the ordinary people with each other were quite weak, and could 
easily lead to tensión and disunity rather than cohesión. 
Let us now return to Cyprus, to review the application of these observations to the 
respective historical period. As we noted earlier on, the Cypriots did maintain contacts 
with the Byzantium, even after Latin rule was imposed on the island. Was proto-
nationalism 'exported' to the Cypriots through these contacts? We saw how George the 
Cypriot left for Nicaea during this period of the Byzantium's Hellenic renaissance, to 
seek a better education which included the classics, ending up as Patriarch Gregorios 
(1283-1289). In a later autobiographical text, written after his ordination as Patriarch 
of Constantinople, he refers to the barbarían Latins who put the (Cypriot) Hellenes 
under their yoke, demonstrating a persisting concern over Cyprus and an awareness 
that Cypriots were not ruled by their "likes" - mostly seen in religious terms.135 
In the previous section, we have seen how the conflict over religión had acquired 
primary significance as a central principie around which social inclusión and exclusión 
were structured. By the thirteenth century, there had developed a very high "degree 
of polarization", between the mass of the population and their rulers, along religio-
ethnic, economic and social lines, "unequalled before or since".1 3 6 Yet this did not apply 
to the higher classes, the members of which were in many ways co-opted by the 
Frankish rulers. Stavrianos notes that it was common policy of European feudal 
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powers to treat the local upper classes in the conquered lands generously, permitting 
them to retain their wealth and titles: "The latter responded by identifying themselves 
with their foreign masters rather than with their own countrymen".137 In Cyprus, there 
was a gradual expansión of the Cypriot free men as a consequence of the liberation of 
the serfs (perpyarioi); this happened when, on a few occasions, such as Peter I's need 
to finance his overseas expeditions, these groups were given the opportunity to buy 
their freedom, after paying a specific amount to the state treasury. Those freed in this 
way, augmented the ranks of the Cypriots free by birth. A number of the free Cypriots 
were involved in trade and shipping, and others in various services related to the 
Lusignan regime. A good example of the latter group was Leontios Machairas (1360-
1432), author of the Chronicle ofthe Sweet Land of Cyprus, who was a diplomat at the 
service of the Lusignans. On the one hand, Machairas betrays the identification of the 
Cypriot upper classes with the Frankish regime, when, in describing a local peasant 
uprising (driven by a famine), he writes with contempt about his compatriot rebels 
(those "wolves" the villagers) and their "wicked doings" and seems to be relieved at 
the defeat and cruel death of the insubordínate "cursed villagers"; at the same time, 
he expresses himself with sympathy towards the feudal regime and especially the king, 
and shows relief at the return of King Janus from captivity.138 On the other hand, we 
have already noted Machairas' reporting of the strong religious feelings of the local 
Orthodox, resisting Catholic pressures for conversión (to "make the Romioi Latins"); he 
similarly demonstrates his concern for local culture, when he comments on the effect 
of Latín rule on the language ofthe natives. Since the conquest, he observes: 
[The Cypriots] began to learn French, and their Greek became barbarous 
(varvarísan ta roma/ka), just as it is to-day, when we write both French and 
Greek in such a way that no one in the world knows what we are talking about 
(is ton kosmon den ixevroun inda sintichanomen).139 
The above observations lead to the conclusión that the class position and loyalties of 
the Cypriots were stronger than feelings of common ethnicity; yet there was a strong 
attachment to the Orthodox religión and a concern with culture and language. But it 
does seem obvious that there was no sense of nation and no nationalist feelings at the 
time. 
In 1441, the Latín King of Cyprus, John II, married the Greek Helena Paleólogos, 
daughter of TTieodore Paleólogos, ruler of Morea, and grand-daughter of Manuel II, 
past emperor of the Byzantium (1391-1425).140 Queen Helena was apparently very 
dynamic, next to a "passive and pleasure seeking" king, and was soon recognized by 
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the Haute Cour as a Regent of the Kingdom; using her influence, she appointed a 
number of Orthodox in the administration (she even tried to appoint an Orthodox as 
Latin Archbishop - but the Pope was not amused) and attempted to improve the 
fortunes of the locai Orthodox people. After the fall of Constantinople, she gave refuge 
to a number of monks and learned Byzantines, which enhanced the strength of Greek 
culture on the island. It is apparently in this period that the Greek language (its locai 
variant, the Cypriot dialect) became one of the officiai languages of the administration, 
along with French. Many Latins did not like Helena's initiatives and saw her as "adept 
in Greek treachery, hostile to the Latin religion and an enemy of the Roman church"1 4 1 
- obviously, Greekness was still associated with the Orthodox religion. 
The paradox was that, despite efforts to turn the locals to Catholicism, it was the Latin 
regime which was gradually "Hellenized", to some extent, under the influence of Greek 
culture and the appointment of Orthodox Greek-speakers in the administrative 
machinery of the Latins. We have already noted Machairas' identification with the 
Frankish regime: Yet despite the fact that Machairas had studied in a French school, he 
chose to write his Chronicle in the locai Greek Cypriot dialect.142 Interestingly, though 
a high offìcer and a friend of the Latin regime, Machairas still feit somehow connected 
to the Byzantine Orthodox, for he still paid homage to the "King of Constantinople", 
and shared in the queen's dismay at the fall of Constantinople.143 At the same time, 
the Orthodox religion seemed to be making inroads into the Catholic domain in various 
ways. Already from the 1401 Century the Pope was complaining that Catholic laymen 
were often attending Orthodox churches. The union of the churches after the Council 
of Florence made matters worse, leading to various forms of "religious hybridity" - so 
that, for instance, "the same priest [would] serve both the Latin and the Greek 
church", or some churches would have two aisles, the "one-domed Byzantine aisle was 
used by the Orthodox Greek branches and the Western one by the Latinizing or 
Catholic branches of mixed families"...144 At the same time, inter-marriages between 
upper class families of Latin and Orthodox origin resulted in offspring who often had 
différent attachments and loyalties than those of "pure" Latin descent - and many 
social and politicai distinctions were often made on that basis. As early as 1350, the 
Latin archbishop of Cyprus attempted to impose measures against mixed marriages, 
apparently to forestali further assimilation of the Latins. But, despite reactions, such 
phenomena continued right through to the end of Venetian rule.145 
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These then were some of the ways in which the locals resisted or infìuenced the 
dominant Latin regime.146 Culture and religion were their main means - but not the 
only ones. On certain occasions, the Cypriots rose up to protest what they perceived 
as extreme impositions by the Latins on their Church and the clergy, or the locai 
people at large. But such risings were certainly not guided by nationalist motives. It 
might be worth examining the case of James Diassorinos or Didascalos, considered by 
mainstream historians as an early nationally inspired rebel: Born in Rhodes, he went 
for higher studies in Europe and, in 1560, ended up in Nicosia where he founded a 
school; there he taught the Greek language but also "stirred the enthusiasm of the 
Cypriots [...] by recalling the glories of ancient Greece".147 He also seems to have 
stirred passions against the Venetians and the Catholic Church, and had secret 
contacts with the Ottomans, presumably seeking their intervention to liberate the 
island from the hated Venetians: The "conspiracy" was betrayed and Diassorinos was 
arrested, upon which 8,000 natives crowded the capital to demand his release - yet 
without success, and in August 1562 he was executed. Kyrris interprets the "violent 
démonstrations" as "évidence of the wide influence of the national ideology taught by 
the Didaskalos amongst the Greek community" (italics inserted).148 But certainly this is 
far fetched and no shred of évidence seems to support it. It rather seems the case 
that Diassorinos picked his enthusiasm for ancient Greece during his studies in Europe 
(he was teaching the Greek language, and we have seen the use of the classics in 
language classes at the time). The dire economie conditions towards the end of 
Venetian mie, the neglect of the island, and the continuing subservience of the 
Orthodox Church and religion, seem to better explain the possible appeal of 
Diassorinos with the locals - but there are no indications for the existence of a 
"national ideology"; besides, Diassorinos was not advocating the rule of equals by their 
likes, nor was he calling on the locals to assert themselves against foreign rule: He 
(like many other Orthodox Cypriots) seemed to simply detest Latin rule, which was 
why he was ready to welcome Ottoman Muslim rule, as a lesser evil. 
68 
Chaoter 3 Ottoman Rule and Plural Society 
The ethnie cleavage is the oldest and deepest division in Cyprus, its origins tracing back 
to the three hundred years of Ottoman rule of the island (1571-1878). Most mainstream 
accounts portray a picture of this period of Cyprus' history as entailing some or most of 
the following éléments: That the uninvited barbarian Turks captured the island, after 
untold violence against its Christian defenders (the united forces of Venetians and 
Cypriots); that Ottoman rule plunged Cyprus into an era of Eastern backwardness 
and darkness, where oppression and exploitation prevailed, thèse being reflections of the 
very nature of the Turks and their regime; during their rule, the Ottomans put ail kinds of 
pressure on the locáis to abandon botti their Christian faith and their Greek identity — so as to 
convert to Islam and be "Turkidzed", but the Greek-Cypriots managed to preserve their 
identity thanks mostly to the national role of the Orthodox Church; behind the clash 
between rulers and ruled lurked a deep-seated, primordial enmity between Turks and 
Greeks, Muslims and Christians, East and West. Revisionist post-74 accounts often go to 
the other extreme of emphasizing traditional "peaceful co-existence" between the two 
religious communities, until the time nationalem was imported from Greece, and passed 
on to the largely unaware Cypriots, after which the two communities started drifting 
apart. 
This chapter will attempt an alternative analysis of Ottoman rule of Cyprus, to 
demónstrate how ethnicity was not an important factor in determining the course of events 
and that national identities were fostered only towards the end of this period, out of pre-
existing religious identities. Starting with a brief survey of the Ottoman regime, its 
prindples of govemance and how they were applied in Cyprus, and focusing especially on 
the importance of religion, as against ethnicity, we will turn to consider the impact of the 
Ottoman dedine, of the rise of new social classes, and of the importation of nationalist 
ideas from the West - of which, however, Cypriots were already active parts. 
Before proceeding, it would be pertinent to consider an important distinction historians make 
between two radicaliy différent periods in the development of the Ottoman Empire,1 which 
will be useful in our analysis. The first period, the "Age of Ottoman Ascendane/', relates to 
the long march of nomadic Turkish tribes from the eighth Century onwards, out of their earty 
homelands in central Asia and into the Near- and Middle-East; by the earty fifteenth Century, 
the Ottomans had emerged as a-signifiant force, overpowering the Islamic and Byzantine 
empires then dominant in that part of the world. The fifteenth Century was a period of 
69 
further, rapid territorial expansion, including the capture of Constantinople (1453) and the 
remaining Byzantine lands, as well as most of the Balkans. The 100-year period between 
the mid-fifteenth and the mid-sixteenth centuries is considered the "Golden Age" of the 
triumphant empire, Pax Ottomanica, which by now sprawled over three continents 
(Europe, Asia and Africa), had a population of approximately 50 million (induding 33 
ethnicities, speaking 40 languages), a strong central govemment, and robust militar/, 
politicai, economie and religious institutions.2 Indeed, historians seem to agree that "unti 
the mid sixteenth century the Ottoman Empire was at least abreast of the Christian 
European countries in terms of economie conditions and relations".3 As a conséquence, 
the economie burdens imposed by the Ottomans on their conquered lands (mostly peasant 
societies), were lighter than those imposed by European feudal lords. Furthermore, 
the Ottoman mode of government allowed a considérable degree of autonomy and self-
government to their subjects, enabling the peaceful cohabitation of diverse peoples in a vast 
multi-cultural, mulo-linguai and multì-religious Empire. No wonder that, at the peak of its 
might and glory, the Ottoman Empire presented a ray of hope for the oppressed 
peoples in its areas of influence and expansion; its rule certainly seemed to be much lighter 
than the feudal rule of Europeans in their various conquered lands. 
The second period, the "Age of Ottoman Decline" (late sixteenth to early nineteenth 
century), involved a long process of retrenchment, resulting from both extemal constraints 
(such as a number of important military defeats, and the growing economie and military 
power of a rejuvenated West), as well as internal problems (such as a static economy, the 
increased corruption of the administration, and the disintegration of the classical forms 
of military Organization). After this period, there followed the era of nationalism and the 
Staging of a number of successful national uprisings, which accentuated the pace of 
dedine and led to abortive efforts at refbrm (1839-1852), and to the eventual collapse of the 
Empire.4 
Interestingly, the Ottoman conquest of Cyprus came right at the juncture of the two 
periods. This seems to be an important factor explaining the discrepancy between the 
original high hopes of the common people from the new regime, and the stark real'rties they 
had to confront once the new regime was established. As Inalcik notes, the "conquest of 
Cyprus in 1570-71 was the last substantial military success of the Ottomans";5 only a few 
months after the diffìcult and costly capture of Cyprus, the Ottomans suffered a serious 
naval defeat at the battle of Lepanto, after which "they were not anymore in a position of 
maintaining their dominance in the Mediterranearî'.6 New European naval powers were on 
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the rise7, which were to displace the Ottomans from the seas and from the associateti 
lucrative sea trade. Meanwhile, their advancement in centrai Europe came to a halt 
so that gradually "the military balance shifted away from the Ottomans".8 After the sixteenth 
Century, a fundamental contradiction would face the Empire: "It was organized for conquest 
and expansion but it now entered a period of defeat and contraction. The result was 
internal tension and dislocation. This increased the disparity between the empire and the 
West which in turn led to more defeats [and] more contraction".9 
To return to Cyprus, the increasing problems of the Empire as it started dedining, should 
not obsure the radical changes Ottoman rule brought to the island: The end of feudal rule, the 
libération of the serfs, and the restoration of the Orthodox Church. Another important 
change had to do with the création of a Moslem community on the island, which was later 
to develop into the Turkish Cypriot community. 
Ottoman conquest and social revolution' 
Prior to the Ottoman conquest, the Cypriots, and espedally those of the lower classes, had 
grown deeply resentful of European feudal rule: On the one hand, the conditions of 
serfdom and severe economie exploitation, and on the other, the suppression of the 
Orthodox Church, the most important of their communal institutions, were driving them to 
their limits. At the same time, the comparatively better fate of other Orthodox Christians 
in the Ottoman occupied lands of Asia Minor and the Balkans seem to have made the 
prospects of a change of rule appealing; it is thus not surprising that délégations from 
lower dass Cypriots are recorded to have paid Visits10 to the Porte in Constantinople, to 
plead the case for the Ottoman takeover of the island. 
The Ottomans obviously had many reasons of their own to wish to take control of 
Cyprus, primarily strategie. But once they decided on the venture they tried to 
differentiate between the Latin masters and their native subjects. In February 
1570, just prior to the attack, the Sultan (Selim II) sent a firman to the 
offìcers of his troops, remìnding them of the need to win the hearts of the masses"; 
he further stressed that once the island was captured, he wanted the locals to 
know of his promise not to molest them, nor harm their families and properties. 
Inalcik reminds us that thèse instructions were given in the spirit of istimalèt, the 
Ottoman policy of showing goodwill to the native population so as to facilitate 
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conquest through consent, rather than violence. To what extent this approach did 
produce results is not easy to judge, but évidence indicates that the natives "were 
reluctant to fight on the side of their former masters against the Ottomans" and 
that they even "offered them provisions and gave the füllest information as to the 
position of affairs and the condition of the island".11 
Unfortunately for the Cypriots, the ensuing battles were followed by great 
destruction and manslaughter. After Nicosia feil (September 1570), three days of 
merciless pillage, plunder and killing ensued - on the first day alone, 20,000 dead 
were reported.12 Violence and brutality also accompanied the siege and capture of 
Famagusta, after its heroic résistance lasting more than a year.13 Without belittling the 
scale of violence and destruction, the point must be made that these extremities had little 
to do with the expression of primordial ethnie hatreds between Turks and Greeks, for such 
brutal practices were common in older times. To mention only two examples: Back in 1365, 
King Peter the Rrst of Cyprus, had captured through a surprise attack, "lightiy defended" 
Alexandria, after which three days of "looting, slaughtering and destruction went on with 
unrestrained animal ferocity";14 and the Latin Crusaders' sack of Constantinople in 1204 
was probably just as destructive, if not worse.15 In the case of the Ottomans, restreint was 
usually shown when dties surrendered without putting up a fight (as actually was the case with 
the remaining towns of Cyprus), but the three-day plunder of Nicosia seems to have been 
"in accord with the precepts of Islam for a city that had resisted to the end".16 
Less than a year after the conquest of Cyprus, the Sultan sent a new firman to the Ottoman 
high officiais now in charge of the island, reminding them that as fonce had to be used for its 
capture, the condition of the reayas had "somewhat deteriorated" - thus urging their 
treatment with care and justice, according to the provisions of the holy law (the Sharia), 
avoiding violence and heavy taxation "so that the country may thus revert to its former 
prosperous state". Above ali, the reaya was to be given due protection: 
Thus I order that you must be careful in grving the reaya who are a trust from God to 
us, as much protection and mercy as you can, abstaining from such actions as may 
lead to their dispersion.17 
As Halil Inalcïk reminds us, the firman expressed "basic principles" of the Ottoman regime: 
Since the finances and well-being of the state depended on the prosperity of the country, 
the tax-paying population had to be protected and treated fairly so as to yîeld the 
expected surplus, which assured the system's longevity.18 Ottoman officiais carried out a 
census/survey of the population and sources of revenue (tahrir), in order to enumerate all 
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taxable resources.19 Accordlng to Islamic précepte, ali land belonged to Allah and his 
représentative on earth, the Sultan. Within the Ottoman patrimonial system of power,20 
the position of the ruler was absolute but; at the same time, protective and caring towards his 
people: The Sultan was the shepherd and his subjects were the flock (reaya).21 The 
relationship was not supposed to be one-sided, for a "circle of justice" was involved: The 
subjects were to submit to the master, and produce the goods and services required by him 
or the state; the ruler, in tum, was to provide the protection and justice necessary for the 
well-being of his subjects.22 
The basic driving-force of the Ottoman system was imperial expansion, through militar/ 
conquest. Ottoman cosmology saw the world as dfvtded into two great sphères - the 
House of Islam, comprised of all Muslim believers, and the House of War, comprised of 
the rest of the world, of non-believers, who had to be conquered and brought to submit 
to the Prophet. In this scheme of things, ethnicity played no rôle, the only différences were 
those between believers and non-believers. Once unbelievers were conquered, plunder 
was legitimate, but subsequentiy, once they tumed into subjects, they acquired a protected 
status as "dimmis" (or "zimmis").23 
These principles had far-reaching implications: Since all landed property was a prerogative 
of the Sultan, there could be no hereditary land-owning dass or nobility - as in feudal Europe. 
This "absence of private property in land"24 was, as Marx was to note, the basic material 
différence between the two Systems. In the eariy period of "Ottoman Ascendancy", land 
cultivation was organized under the timar-system of landholding.25 This entailed the 
allocation, by the Sultan, of landed estâtes or timars to the mostly Muslim military Stratum 
of cavalry warriors (s/pah/s).26 The latter had to provide administrative and military 
services to the Porte, in return for exacting revenues in rent (in kind or money) from the 
peasante working on their land. The cavalrymen were, at the time, the backbone of the 
Ottoman military forces; they were expected to fìght during the war season and then return 
to administer their estâtes. The timars and timar-holders represented the "nearest 
analogy" to European feudal fiefs and feudal lords (or a knighte' class), respectively.27 But 
only an analogy, for "the timar estâtes were in no sensé genuine fiefs" and the sipahis 
were no genuine knights, since "they exercised no feudal lordship or seigniorial 
Jurisdiction over the peasante who worked on the timars".28 In fact, the timariots were not 
at ail involved in rural production - they were essentially extemalto the agrarian economy 
itself. Nor did they have hereditary security of tenure over their timars: To ensure that 
they would not become attached to their estâtes, they were systematically reshuffled to 
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différent timars.29 They had no right to eject peasants by force, nor to prevent them from 
shirting residence.30 Indeed, the whole system was organized in such a way as not to allow 
"the création of a strong landed aristocracy which might have presented a challenge to the 
absolute authority of the Sultan."31 
The corollary of the various limitations to the power and prérogatives of the timariots, were 
respective benefìts to the cultivators. The peasants enjoyed hereditär/ tenure to the plots 
they tilled and this assured stability in production and in conséquent yields for the s/pahianó 
the Sultan. The feudal services which peasant cultivators would have to offer their masters 
under Western feudalism were, thereby, significantly reduced under the Ottoman system.32 
The timar system of production exhibited significant regional variations. In Cyprus, all 
agricultural land which under European feudal rule was owned by the state and the nobility 
(rather than the peasant cultivators), passed now under state proprietorship, as public 
(min) land; thereafter, timars were apportioned, mostly to Muslim cavalrymen -
although some Christians did become sipahis, and some janissaries did receive 
timars. In practice, "a regime of perpetual léase, securing for the peasant the perpetual 
usufruct of the land" was established, allowing peasants to practically own the land they 
cultivated and to bequeath it to their male offspring "as a héritage without indemnity" - in 
exchange, obviously, for paying the state and the timariot the expected dues.33 
A further firman (October 1572) eliminated forced labour. Noting that the lower classes 
(parvikoi) serveó their former feudal "lords and knights two days a week", the firman dedared 
the dedsion of the Sultan to show "great mercy" to the reayas of Cyprus, redudng such 
servitude to one day per week, for tasks related to the Porte (for example, work in the 
govemment sugar milis): In practice, it seems that even this was never actually 
enforced,34so the peasants were effectively completely free. Reayas also enjoyed relative 
"freedom to move from place to place and from the countryside to the towns and live there.35 
Other important improvements related to taxes which became overall lighter than under 
European feudal rule. 3 6 In effect, as Braudel underlines, the Turkish conquest unleashed a 
"social revolution", since a huge 'slave' dass,. almost exdusively Greek Orthodox in faith, 
became free village landholders.37 
Furthermore, peasant cultivators of timars came to enjoy a range of legal rights, so that 
they could complain in court about abuses by timar-holders (such as excessive charges 
and oppressive behaviour).38 It is noteworthy that the lot of Christian and Muslim reayas was 
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not much different: Islamic law did not distinguish between ethnicities - "The law knows no 
Turk, Arab, or Kurd" - but only between believers (Muslims) and non-believers (zimmis).39 
Thus, in court, Ottoman kadis had to "apply the same standard of justice for both zimmi and 
Muslim". All were "entitled to protection of their lives and property and the right to practice 
their own religion.40 Again, it must be stressed that religion and not ethnicity was the only 
criterion of differentiation: "In the court [of Nicosia] the name Greek Orthodox (Rum) was 
never used; that group were always called zimmis. Although other zimmis - the minorities -
were often identified as Armenian (Ermeni), Maronite (Suryani), or Jew (Yahudi), those 
distinctions had no significance in regard to legal rights, only for administrative 
organization".41 
It is worth remembering that under the European Frankish and Venetian regimes, very 
few Orthodox Christians enjoyed full legal rights. In Ottoman courts, the only handicap of 
non-Muslims was in testifying against Muslims: In such cases, the testimony of the latter 
was considered more valid, since the law presumed Muslims to be more honest and 
truthful than non-Muslims.42 Other than that, Christians could lodge complaints in court 
against anyone, including Muslims (in which case they had to use the testimony of other 
Muslims) and government officiais. They could similarly summon to court anyone they 
wished, including Muslims - and in such a case the latter were obliged to respond to the 
summons and the charges, as they would in the case of another Muslim.43 
Historical data show that Christians and Muslims used the Sharia courts with almost equal 
frequency and for all kinds of purposes - whether business (such as setting up estates 
and transferring land or houses within a community or, more often, between 
communities) but also personal (such as marriage and divorce matters, intra-family feuds and 
quarrels, and so on), despite the fact that much of the latter could have been dealt with 
intra-communally. Jennings sums up the merits of early Ottoman rule, as compared to 
the previous Venitian regime, as follows: 
The Ottoman system simply was not organized to permit such exploitation [as 
that of the Venetians]. Law and society were not elitist Coercion of the poor and 
weak was despised. Legal rights and obligations applied to everyone. 
Ottoman law did not permit landowners to force villagers to cultivate what they 
wanted, when they wanted, or how they wanted. The taxes that spahis could collect 
were limited by law [...]. An exploitive class was eliminated, wealth was better 
distributed, and the villagers were liberated from onerous serfdom.44 
Jennings' picture may sound quite idealistic and tends to downplay many of the 
problems of early Ottoman rule - as, for instance, the disorder accompanying the 
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great ¡nflation of the 1580's, with the money shortages and delays in payment of the 
janissaries, leading to the latter's risings and the killings of two governors; the frequent 
use of violence by local officials; the many instances of theft - and so on. Yet we could accept 
that overall the new system did initially improve the lot of the peasants, as comparecí to 
the previous feudal regime. But even Jennings concedes that the system was later to 
become "corrupt, or ¡neffecrjve, leaving the villagers vulnerable to a new exploitation".45 
Religious communities and the Orthodox Church as quasi-state 
After the Ottomans captured Constantinople, in 1453, the Sultán (Mohammed II, the 
conqueror) granted the Orthodox Patriarch of Constantinople an ordinance 
(berat) spelling out a new status for the Church, which in many ways rendered it 
more privileged than it had been under the Byzantium itself. The Patriarch in 
Constantinople was to be the all-powerful ecclesiastical head, irremovable from his 
post. Together with his synod, they were to be in full charge of all doctrinal 
matters, the discipline of all church members, and the management of church 
property. Not only was the church to be exempt from taxation, but it could levy its 
own dues on both clergy and laymen alike. The Patriarch was to be the head of the 
Orthodox community (millet),^ as a whole, vested with considerable civil authority. 
Ecclesiastical tribunals were to have full jurisdiction on matters pertaining to family 
law (marriage, divorce and inheritance), and this gradually extended to all civil law. 
Finally, the Patriarch was to be a "recognized Ottoman official, holding the rank of 
vizir, and serving as intermediary between the Orthodox Christians and the imperial 
government11.47 As regards the Orthodox Christians more generally, the berat 
granted them freedom of religious faith and worship. 
The reasons why Mohammed II proceeded to these arrangements must have related 
to both political strategy and religión. For one, he wanted to prevent a possible 
Orthodox-Latin reapproachment. The schism back in 1054 had created a rift within 
Christendom, and the fourth Crusade attacks on the Byzantium and the sack of 
Constantinople by the Latins in 1204 had driven the wedge further. The "superficial 
reunión" of the churches, under papal supremacy, promoted by Michael Paleólogos, 
had deeply divided the Byzantines, the majority of whom adopted an anti-unionist 
stand, leading to the deal's collapse before it was hardly implemented. But mounting 
Ottoman pressure had forced the Byzantines to grudgingly conceed to a unión (1439) 
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- and yet the Latins did not provide the expected military assistance. All these bitter 
experiences had rendered the Catholics more hated than the Muslims. When the 
Ottomans conquered Constantinople, they sought to build on this rift and render it 
improbable for the Orthodox to seek collaboration with the Catholics in future - henee, 
the granting of extensive autonomy to the Orthodox Church; for the same reasons, the 
Sultán promoted to the Patriarchal seat Gennadios Scholarios, an eminent clergyman 
who was fiercely anti- Catholic and anti-Westem.48 
The religious basis of the Ottoman millet system was the Islamic principie, found in the 
Koran, recognizing monotheistic believers (Christians and Jews) as being, like the Muslims, 
"People of the Book", who should be tolerated and protected so long as they paid a spetial 
tax.49 Since Islam was "both a religious and civil code", it operated on the assumprjon that 
other religious communities could similarly govem themselves, their religión providing the 
guiding principies for organizing their members1 lives, under their ecelesiastieal 
leaders. The organization of the Ottoman Empire, on the basis of autonomous, self-
governing religious communities, developed into an elabórate system of indirect rule, 
whereby the Ottomans could control the diverse mixture of peoples living in their vast 
multicultural empire. 
Subsequent to the Orthodox millet, the Ottomans established the Armenian millet, with its 
own patriarchate, and later on the Jewish millet50 The Orthodox Christians were the more 
privileged and most numerous group, combining people from different ethno-linguistic 
backgrounds - such as Greeks, Bulgarians, Serbs, Vlachs, Syrians and others. They 
were collectively known as the 'Rum' (Román) millet, since in Byzantine times they used to 
consíder themselves, and to be considered by others in the East, as members of the 
Eastern Román Empire (even though the Latins, refusing them the association 
with Rome, used the designation 'Graeci' instead, from which evolved the terms 'Greeks' 
and 'Greece', still used by the West as the ñames of contemporary 'Helias' and the 
'Hellenes').51 
The important point to note is how ethno-cultural differences were not significant to 
the Ottomans, since their focus was on religión instead. Smilarly, the Orthodox 
Patriarchs, in trying to fbster un'rty among their diverse constitueney during the long centuries of 
Ottoman rule, had to emphasize the universality of the Christian faith and to underplay any 
divisive elements. Thus, they saw it as their "duty to enforce uniformity of rituals, 
liturgy, organization, and language in the church".52 The official languageof the Church 
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and of the liturgy was Greek and this favoured Greek-speakers in rising to the high ranks of 
the Church's hierarchy. But this was inadvertentiy so, since the choice was made fbr religious 
and not fbr ethnie or national reasons: Greek was used to serve the unity of the faith and 
not of the nation. 
Despite the above, ethnie différences did survive at another level - that of the locai 
communities, in the villages and in town quarters.53 At this local level, families and the 
community more generally, acquired primary importance in the transmission and 
reproduction of religious beliefs and practices, as well as of social customs and the use of 
the mother language or dialect. Local communities had their own local leaders, namely 
the kocabasi (village head) and cordasi (town head). Both the Ottoman government and 
the Patriarch relied on the local leaders who, along with the locai clergy, could best 
communicate with people in their communities, since they better understood their ways of 
thinking and spoke their own language (both literally and metaphorically); furthermore, their 
high status elicited the respect and déférence of the locai people. So important did the 
community become under the millet system that Karpat goes as far as to propose that 
"the idea of community as a form of Organization superseding the individuai and as a 
source of identity, personality and behaviour was founded and implemented by the 
Ottomans".54 It was precisely "this sense of community and profòund solidarity and 
attachment to the group" which, Karpat feels, "laid the psychological foundations 
that [subsequently] nurtured the national consciousness of the Balkans and the Middle 
East and gave their nationalism a distinctive communal characteristic".55 The end 
result was a unique combination of the particular with the universal, which made possible 
the multi-culturalism of the Ottoman Empire.56 
Thus, while the basic millet was universal and national, the smali community had 
distinctive local, ethnie and linguistic peculiarities. The millet system therefore 
produced simultaneously [a] religious universality and [b] locai [ethno-cultural] 
parochialism. 
It must be noted that the Moslems themselves constituted a separate millet, no 
différent to the Christian millets, under the head muftì (seyhulislam), the highest 
religious ofRce-holder among the ulema, appointed by the Sultan.57 The ruling elite 
within the Moslem millet was not comprised of a particular ethnie, linguistic or racial 
group, since conversion was open to all; in fact, both the administration and armed 
forces utilized solely converts, to the exclusion of free-born Muslems. Arnakis estimâtes 
that between 1453 to 1632, when the Ottoman Empire was at its prime, out of the 
fourty-nine Grand Vezirs, only five were of Turkish origin, whereas eleven were 
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Albanians, another eleven Slavs, six were Greeks, and sixteen others were Christians of various 
persuasions.58 That is why Gibb and Bowen exclaim that, as far as holding public office 
was concerned, it was actually an advantage not to be originally a Moslem! "In fact the 
non-ethnic character of the state became a mark of the state itself"59 and this 
paradoxically was one of the factors which assured the survival of the various ethnic groups 
comprising the Empire, since the individual subject could have a double loyalty or identity - the 
one religious, attaching one to his sodocultural community and its leaders, and the other 
(much weaker) political, attaching him to the Ottoman government or the Sultan himself 
(experienced, at that stage, as a distant benevolent ruler). 
Before turning to the case of Cyprus, to examine how Ottoman rule affected its communal 
structures and principles, it is necessary to introduce a recent debate on the nature and 
significance of the millets. In this debate, "revisionist" approaches charge the more 
"traditional" views as over-stressing the corporate nature of the millets. The new approaches 
point out that the very term "millet", in reference to non-Muslim religious communities, was a 
product of the late Ottoman era, in the mid-nineteenth century of reforms - thus, its use 
for describing realities in earlier periods constitutes an undue projection.60 Findley 
criticizes the traditional approaches as having "overestimated the elaboration of communal 
structures, the scope of communal privilege, and the formalization of relations that existed 
between non-Muslim religious leaders and Ottoman officials."61 For the revisionists, it 
is wrong to view the millets as a "system" or even an "institution", but rather as a "set of 
arrangements, largely social, with considerable variation over time and place." 6 2 
We will take a middle ground, following Grillo, who proposes that one may distinguish 
between two levels of society and differential perceptions: At the top level, the Ottoman 
central bureaucracy did seem to view non-Muslim religious communities as real quite 
early on , 6 3 and since they treated ecclesiastical leaders accordingly, the latter also 
adopted this perspective - the "millet mentality",64 as Itzkowitz calls it. At the level of the 
ordinary people, in the towns and villages, however, the "degree of institutionalization" 
and the perceived reality of the millets varied considerably, both through place and time. In 
Cyprus, as we will see, the millet mentality was prevalent from the early stages of 
Ottoman rule, but the strength of the communal institutions and especially of the Orthodox 
Church varied, increasing through time. Similarly, the differentiation of communal 
structures increased diachronically. 
One of the most important conséquences of Ottoman rule in Cyprus had to do with the 
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restoration of the power and privilèges of the Orthodox Church. Let us remember that the 
Latins had abolished the autocephafy of the Orthodox Church, making it subordinate to the 
Catholic Church; they had interrupted the appointment of a Greek Archbishop and had 
reduced the number of bishops (whom they placed under the Jurisdiction of Latin 
bishops); they had also confiscated most of the lands and property of the Orthodox Church 
while richly endowing the Catholic Church. In fact, since the 1260 Bulla Cypria, the Greek 
Orthodox of Cyprus were considered "Greek-rite Catholics", forming the majority of a 
"theoretically 'Roman Catholic' population".65 Resenting this state of affairs, the Greek 
Orthodox clergy of Cyprus had tried to convince the Patriarchate of Constantinople that 
"their union with the Latin Church was the resuit of coerción and that they wanted to 
be in secret communion with the Orthodox while maintaining an outward show of 
obédience towards the Latin Church",66 but an Orthodox Council in Constantinople 
(1412) had rejected this possibility. 
Archimandrite Kyprianos, in his History of Cyprus, written two hundred years into Ottoman 
rule, Stresses how the Romaioi (Romans, that is Eastern Orthodox Cypriots) preferred to be 
"under the Turks" than under the Catholic Latins, because the Patriarch of Constantinople and 
other Orthodox clergy in general, considered the "Cypriot Orthodox clergy and flock as 
Latins, and for this they would not accept them into the Church's union", as if they were 
"excommunicated Latins". 6 7 Henee, the common people ("kolnos laos Romalos") 
"cultivated a deep hatred in their souls against the Latins, and could not wait for the 
time they would be liberateti from their rule".68 Once the Ottomans conquered Cyprus, 
Kyprianos admits that "the Romans, who to a certain extent preferred to be subjects to the 
Ottoman rather than to the Latin power, were even glad in their wretchedness because, so 
far as concemed their rites and customs, they escaped the tyranny of the Latins".69 
Indeed, soon after the Ottoman conquest, the Patriarch of Constantinople 
summoned a Synod (1572) which restored ecclesiastical union between the Church of 
Cyprus and the Ecumenic Patriarchate, and consecrated the first Archbishop of Cyprus. 
From early on (autumn 1571), the Ottomans granted a number of favourable concessions to 
the Orthodox Cypriots, whereby their community was to enjoy "préférence and precedence" 
over ali other Christian communities on the island: They would freely enjoy their religion; 
they would have the right to ransom ecclesiastical properties (whereas the Latins were 
expüdtjy prohibited from possessing churches or other property, and from enjoying any 
other privilèges); and they would enjoy the right to buy and to transmit to their heirs any 
kind of property - induding houses and estâtes.70 
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The reasons for the restoration of the Orthodox Church of Cyprus must have been 
similar to those we saw as applying in the case of the Patriarchate of Constantinople. 
Presumably, the Sultan (Selim II) wished to win his subjects' loyalty so they would not 
seek aid from Western powers, for although the Ottomans had won the battles in 
Cyprus their dominance in the Mediterranean after the Lepanto defeat was 
precarious.71 Internally, the Ottomans wished to ensure conformity and order, plus 
they needed an administrative mechanism which would help them in the collection of 
taxes throughout the island and, for both of these tasks, the church hierarchy and its 
access to the whole population were vital. Finally, the Orthodox prelates acted as a 
check against the possible abuses of the local Muslim administrators against the 
peasants: Since the latter were vital in surplus extraction, the Sultan had every reason 
to care for their well-being, so the fact that the Orthodox Church leaders had access to 
the centrai government and could report such cases, were a guarantee that the 
peasants, as vital wealth producing resources, were fairly treated and protected.72 
Yet we must note that the privilèges bestowed on the Church in the early days of 
Ottoman rule in Cyprus were mostly religious and only to a lesser degree 
economie and politicai. It was more gradually that politicai powers would be 
extended, in relation to the decline of the Ottoman Empire and the loss of grip of 
the centrai government on peripheral territories; the extention of the politicai 
powers of the prelates related to the need to keep locai governors in check, so as 
to thereby protect the surplus yielding peasants in the periphery. That must have 
been one of the reasons why, in the early years, the Church prelates1 attitude 
towards Ottoman rule was quite ambivalent. For, despite the advantages that the 
coming of the new rulers brought to the Church and to the Greek community, 
the Archbishop and other leaders came into contact with Western powers (such as 
the King of Spain and the Duke of Savoy) on a number of occasions, in order to 
explore possibilities for their intervention to liberate Cyprus from Ottoman rule. 
In the first such plea (1587), of Archbishop Timotheos to King Philip II of Spain, 
the Archbishop referred to substantial suppression of the Christians, and to 
abuses by the local government and military (such as stealing from houses, 
churches and monasteries, the imposition of heavy taxation collected through 
threats and torture, plus an enforced child levy) - which had caused strong 
reactions and a minor rébellion. 7 3 Mainstream historiography has interpreted 
these early appeals to Western powers for libération from the Ottomans, as 
implying an underlying naturai, pre-existing and perennial hatred towards the 
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'barbarian Turks', the religious-national Others, and a respective natural affinity 
for the West. But, as we have already noted, these and other problems with 
local Ottoman rule must have related to the fact that the golden years of ascent 
had corne to an end, and the Empire was entering its long period of decline, which 
meant problems of central control, leading to local abuse and oppression. Another 
set of problems must have related to the limitations on the Church's, and especially the 
Archibishop's, real powers in these early years. Yet, gradually, things must have improved, 
for the last attempts to seek Western aid end in 1670, after which there seems to have 
been a tacit adaptation to Ottoman rule.74 
Let us consider how the powers of the Church prelates were gradually extended. In the 
early years of Ottoman rule, the strength of the Orthodox Church was at the level of the local 
communities: The Orthodox priests came from the lower classes, lived amongstthe 
ordinar/ people and laboured next to them in the Heids; folk traditions and customs were tied 
closely to religious events and célébrations.75 At the top Church hierarchy levels, however, 
things were not easy. The long centuries of absence of an Archbishop rendered it 
difficult to have a strong and cohérent leadership at the top. The Cypriot Church was 
quite dépendent on the help of the Patriarchate of Constantinople and, to some extent, 
had also to suffer from the latter's interférence in local Church affairs. In 1600, for instance, 
the Cypriot Archbishop (who was "accused of illegalities") was deposed by the Ecumenic 
Patriarchate; interestingly, in seeking support, the archbishop turned to the local Ottoman 
authorities for assistance!76 
The local bishops, who had lived for long without an archbishop, had grown used to their 
autonomy and were now resenting his priority in church affeirs, disputing the boundaries of his 
aüthority. In 1651, the Archbishop appealed to the Constantinople Patriarchate for 
assistance, whereupon it was the turn of the local bishops to seek the support of the local 
Ottoman authorities in affirming their equal status to the archbishop. The matter was 
fìnally setrJed by a décision of a Synod, which confirmed the archbishop's 
prérogatives,77 thereby reinforcing his authority and enhancing the centralization of Church 
powers. 
Furthermore, from the early stages of Ottoman rule, up to the early nineteenth Century, the 
Orthodox Church faced problems over its grip on some of its Christian members (even 
though decreasingly so). Thus, even if family law had officially been placed under the 
prelates' Jurisdiction, a not însignificant number of individuals resorted to Muslim courts, 
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either in initiating a court action, or once they were dissatisfìed with a décision taken by 
their own communal court;78 the Church fìnally forbade this practice in 1832. 
Finally, it must be noted that the only other officer among the Orthodox community 
with any real amount of authority was the Dragoman, who was the interpréter of the 
governor, and whose position bestowed him great politicai and economie power in the 
affaire of government. He played an important role in fìnancial mattere and in the 
assessment and collection of taxation from the locals.79 The Dragomans were 
customarily chosen by the Orthodox notables and bishops, so their links with the 
prelates were close. 
Overall, in the earlier stages of Ottoman rule in Cyprus, the power of prelates did not 
match the much stronger power of the locai Muslim govemors and bureaucrats. Yet the 
influence and power of the Orthodox Church kept increasing steadily, especially after two 
criticai stages. The first important upgrading took place in 1660, when the Porte extended 
the powers of the Church prelates, respectively decreasing those of the locai (Muslim) 
govérnors, in an effort to curb their greed and their suppression of the reayas, so as to give 
the latter"some hope".8 0 One of the main changes had to do with public taxation, with 
the church taking over major responsibilities from the govérnors. Until this time, the church 
was directly involved in gathering the dues owed to her, and as an intermediary in 
gathering the public taxes assigned by the govemors to the Christian subjects - if need be 
with the help of janissaries.81 From this point onwards, the Church seems to have 
undertaken the task of somehow guaranteeing the collection of the total public taxes allocated 
to Cyprus, of deciding on the allocation of the tax, and of arranging for the actual 
collection of the tax. The tax détermination and collection process was quite complex, 
and involved the création of a large network of secretarial and other administrative staff; it 
also involved the Church in subcontracting parts of the total tax collection to third parties. 
Associated with these new responsibilities was the right of Church prelates of direct access to 
the Porte, without having to notify either the locai Muslim govemors or the Constantinople 
Patriarch or Synod, as was required of them until that time. 
The benefits deriving to the Church were obviously tremendous. Eflectively the prelates 
became an integral part of the Ottoman local administration, with equal (if not more) 
rights to the govemor, whom they could now by-pass to have direct access to the centre. 
Furthermore, these changes opened new opportunities for the enrichment of the Church. 
One of the methods utilized was described by a traveller (Don Domingo Badie Leblich, or 
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'Ali Bey') in 1806: He observed that the prelates were assigned the task of collecting the 
annual taxes of the Christians, so as to pay the Ottoman government the agreed 
amount per person; but the Porte assumed the population to be less than a third of what 
it actually was — so the Church benefited from the excess amount collected, which was 
not passed on. When a commissioner was sent to verify the exact number of families "he 
was got at, loaded with gold" and sent away "his task unfulfilled".82 
A second updgrading of the Church's position is traceable in a 1754 décision, which 
augmented its administrative and politicai powers. This time the Sultan recognîzed the 
Church's prelates as ^kocabasi'of their people, with the responsibility of preparing reports 
on developments in Cyprus and the right of direct access to the Porte, so as to promptly 
advance any matters and problems of the reayas at any time necessary.83 The main thnjst 
of this new development was more politicai than economic - and was to have all around 
conséquences. The prelates were henceforth not to be viewed as simple functionaries 
of the Ottoman bureaucracy, aiding in the collection of money, but as politicai 
représentatives of their people.84 Interestingly, when this development took place in mîd-
eighteenth Century Cyprus, in many other Orthodox countries under Ottoman rule, this was a 
time of socio-economie change in which laymen kocabasiswere the ones gaining prominence as 
the politicai représentatives of their people, at the expense of prelates whose power was 
decreasing.85 This is an indication that change in Cyprus was much slower than 
elsewhere; conversely, this re-enforcement of the Church's position would impede future 
modernization, since the Church's dominating présence was to impede the rise of other 
secular forces, which could have acted as catalysts of change. 
Another source of wealth and power for the Orthodox Church was land holding. We 
already noted that the Ottoman authorities had early on allowed the Church to redeem rts 
monasteries and other properties (previously held by the Latins and seized by the Ottomans 
during their expédition);86 wïthin the first few decades, the process was so successful that 
it promoted reactions among the Ottomans. A second way in which the Church accumulated 
land was through bequests, both for religious and practical reasons. In an age in which 
religious beliefs were deeply ingrained, it is no surprise that many pious people would donate 
land and other property to their church. Often, there was due encouragement on the part of 
the dergy; writing in 1815, an observer commented critically on how the priests would "strip 
the poor, ignorant, superstitious peasant of his last para,87 and when he is on his 
deathbed, make him leave his ali to their convent, promising that masses shall be said 
for his soul".8 8 Practical considérations related to the inability of many families to pay land 
84 
taxes, or to the fear of usurpation of their properties by officiais, botti of which prompted 
the natives to 'donate' or 'lend' their land to the monasteries, which could more easily 
pay taxes and hołd on to their lands.8 9 Rnally, the church accumulated more lands 
once the timar-system started breaking down, leading to increasing pressures on the 
peasants and their fòrceful éviction from their small family holdings, so as to facilitate the 
création of larger estâtes (chiWiks), oriented towards market production.90 Through ali these 
processes and methods, the Church ended up amassing vast properties, so that, by 1844, 
its holdings amounted to more than 16% of the total agricultural land of the island.91 
Besides taxation and landholding, the Church managed to accumulate wealth through its 
involvement in trade. In 1745, Drummond observed that the bishops "move from place to 
place as traders".92 Kinneir in 1814 noted: 'The Governor and Archibishop deal more largely 
in corn than ali the other people on the island put together; they frequently seize upon 
the whole yearly produce, at their own valuation, and either export or retail it at an 
advanced price".93 
The increasing wealth and power of the Church was certainly vital for it to better serve its 
fbllowers - to assist the needy, to contribute to communal provision (such as the building of 
schools), and to act as a strong defender of the interests of Christian subjects as against 
abuses and encroachments by Ottoman officiais. But although, to various degrees, the 
Church did contribute to ali of these, it is also true that the Church developed interests of its 
own, which militated against the interests of those it supposedly served. Mariti, a careful 
observer of lite in Cyprus, in which he resided for two decades, noted in 1769: "The poor 
subjects might very often be saved from oppression if their Archbishop were not 
from policy, and sometimes from personal interest, ready to lend himself to the exactions 
of the Muhassil [Governor], so that they are often abandoned by the very person who 
ought to take their part".94 Other documents reveal that the monasteries 
routinely petitioned Constantinople to intervene in conflicts they developed with heirs of 
land donors (who would contest their parents1 deeds), or with villages over grazing rights 
in contested lands, and so on. 
No wonder many Christians developed negative attitudes towards the Church, which made 
historian Kyprianos, a clergyman himself, to complain that "the people had an evil habit of 
not ascribing their misfortunes to the proper source, nor the increase of their debts to the 
insatiate and heartìess greed of the Govemors, but thoughtlessly laid the blâme on thaï 
spiritual fathers and chiefs".95 But this was just one side of the coin, for overall the 
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Christians had no alternative but to be submissive and deferential towards their prelates, the 
only "rallying points" of a "community of slaves" - as another observer eloquentiy put it in 
1806: "The Greeks are extremely submissive and respectful towards their bishops: in 
saluting them they bow low, take off their cap, and hold it befbre them upside down. They 
scarcely dare speak in their présence. It is true that for this community of slaves the 
bishops are rallying points. It is through them that it préserves some kind of existence...." 
The people were "deferential and respectful" towards their bishops. "These, on their 
part, parade in their houses and followers a princely luxury; they never go out without a 
crowd of attendants, and to ascend a flight of stairs they must needs be carried by their 
servants".96 
Whereas resentment was balanced by submission and déférence by the Christians, 
the same could not apply as regards the sentiments of the local governors towards the 
Church. Düring the early years of Ottoman rule in Cyprus, the governors and 
bureaucracy certainly did have the upper hand in their relations with the Orthodox 
Church.97 With time, however, as the Empire declined and as the problems in Cyprus 
kept mounting - and thereby the revenues from the island kept decreasing - the Porte 
gave increasingly more power to the Church, thereby reducing the power of local 
governors. Effectively, a kind of "uneasy diarchy"98 was created, between the governor 
and the archbishop (or more generally, between the governing bureaucracy and the 
Church hierarchy). By the early nineteenth Century, visitors confirmed that the 
Archbishop "had annexed pretty well the whole administrative authority" and ali the locais 
'Turks and Greeks alike, looked upon him as the real Governor", taking little notice of the 
Muhasst'l." The Archbishop acquired a determining influence on the appointment and 
recali of the latter, as well as of other important officers on the island; he also assessed 
the amount of the annual contribution and sent the collected moneys to the Porte. 
Apparentiy, the Muslims grew resentful of his great powers and, in 1804, there was a 
rising against "the ecclesiastical authority, in whose hands ali power rested", stirred by 
rumours of an insuffìciency in foodstuffs: The insurrection was quenched by troops sent by 
the Porte, but this seems to have heightened resentment against the ecclesiastical 
authorities - which was probably the material cause behind the 1821 mass exécutions of 
the Christian prelates and primates.100 But despite thèse developments and subséquent 
reforms intending to curb the power of the prelates, the latter managed to regain and 
consolidate their authority and influence. Writing at the close of the Ottoman period, 
Dixon described how the Church had acquired quasi-state powers, with the Archbishop as 
head. The latter's prominence was indisputable: 
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First, as head of the Church, he was the chief owner of land [...], and could therefore 
raise the rent on hundreds of farms at any moment and on any pretext. Second, as 
head of the Church, he was the biggest trader in the island, and could therefore raise 
the price of articles in the bazaars of every market-town. Third, as head of the 
Church, he was one of the chief exporters [...] and could therefore easily derange 
the shipping trade and annoy the ports. [Furthermore he enjoyed great spiritual 
powers:] He could stop the Sacraments and suspend the rites of marriage and 
sepulture. He could shut up church and cloister, put the altars under mourning and 
deny a suffering people all the solaces of religion, from the act of baptism to the final 
offices of grace.101 
Overall, the concentration of political, administrative and economic powers in the hands of 
the prelates, rendered the Orthodox Church a quasi-state, substituting for the declining 
power of the Ottoman state, and pre-figuring modem states (which, besides amassing all 
the pre-mentioned forms of authority, and unlike pre-modem forms of government, have 
the added power of moulding their citizens' conscience).102 
The rise of new classes and the diaspora communities 
The period of Ottoman decline was also the era of the ascent of the Balkan Orthodox 
merchants103 (the most dynamic group of which was the Greek merchants), who were 
to play a key role in the empire's downfall, by acting as catalysts in the fostering of 
new nation states in south-east Europe, starting with the Greek state in 1830. Greek 
Cypriot merchants were closely associated with their Greek counterparts through 
contacts in Cyprus but also in the many Greek diaspora communities (paroikies) in the 
West, which grew around merchant activities. 
During the fifteenth and most of the sixteenth centuries, Venetian merchants were the 
protagonists in Eastern Mediterranean commerce. But in 1535, the Ottomans granted 
"capitulatory privileges' to the French and (in 1569) obligated all foreign ships to trade 
under the protection of the French flag, thereby helping the French merchants to seize 
control of trade in the area. In 1580 and 1612, similar privileges were granted to the 
English and the Dutch respectively. At this stage, the Greeks had no state of their own 
to help them achieve similar privileges, but they benefited by acting as intermediaries 
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to Western European merchants. Towards the end of the seventeenth Century the 
Greeks did well at inland trade, once the wars with Russia shifted the centre of 
Ottoman commerce northern up, to Smyrna and Salónica, homes of large Greek 
populations. 
An even more important boost was provided by the dramatic developments of the turn 
of the eighteenth Century: The wars between the Ottomans and Venice, Austria and 
Russia, and the treaties signed at the termination of these wars, offered the Greek 
Orthodox merchants new opportunities for growth, with the backing of the Habsburghs 
and Russia. Thus, after the last Venetian-Ottoman war (1714-1718), the terms of the 
Austro-Ottoman treaty of Passarovits (1718) allowed the free movement of merchants 
and goods between the two powers, including the free use of the commercial ports of 
Salónica and Trieste. The victories of the Russians over the Ottomans led to the 
Kuchuk Kainarji (1774) and Jassy (1792) treaties, which gave legal protection to the 
Christian subjects of the Ottoman Empire and enabled the Greek Orthodox merchants 
to fly the Russian flag. Soon the control of Black Sea commerce passed to the Greeks, 
whose fortunes improved dramatically, leading to the flourishing of Greek colonies in 
the area, such as Odessa.1 0 5 More importantly, the French Revolution (1789), the wars 
between Napoleonic France and England, the latterà naval blockades of mainland 
Europe, and the American War of Independence - ali between them dealt a severe 
blow to French commercial prédominance in the Eastern Mediterranean and provided 
the Greek merchants with a unique opportunity to step in and fili the gap. Overall, by 
the turn of the eighteenth Century, Greek merchants had captured the greater part of 
the Empire's internal trade and were steadily extending their influence in the external 
trade.106 
The rise of the Greek merchant was facilitateci by the backing provided by the 
Patriarchate of Constantinople and the Phanariotes107 - men of wealth who had 
accumulated their riches through trade, and had managed after the mid-seventeenth 
Century to obtaín virtual monopoly of influential posts in the Ottoman administration 
(such as those of dragomán of the Porte, dragomán of the Fleet, and undersecretary of 
the grand Vezir), becoming important technical and politicai advisors to the 
government. From 1716 onwards, and for a Century after, they managed to acquire 
the right to appoint from their own ranks the governor (hospodar) of the Danubian 
principalities (Moldavia and Wallachia), an office which controlied many lucrative 
monopolies, appointments, state contracts and carried other privilèges. 
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All thèse favourable circumstances, plus the European eighteenth Century démographie 
expansion, which led to an increase in the demand and prices of the agricultural 
produets of the Balkans, brought unprecedented prosperity to the Greek merchants, 
who had for a while developed an expertise in exporting (legally or illegally) rural 
goods to the West. 
The Greek Orthodox merchants were not confìned to the Balkans: Their Operations 
proliferated all over Europe and were instrumental in the création and consolidation of 
Greek Orthodox diaspora communities in various European towns. The roots of Greek 
paroikies go back to the fìfteenth Century, with initial sporadic movements of Greeks 
under Venetian or Ottoman occupation to Italy, Sicily and the western coast of the 
Adriatic. Venice hosted the largest and most prominent Greek Orthodox community, 
comprised in the early stages of members of the Byzantine elite (men of letters, 
merchants, craftsmen, Professionals, soldiers) who fled there mostly after 
Constantinople's fall, but also migrants from various Greek speaking lands, such as 
Cyprus. From the late seventeenth and mostly frorn the early eighteenth Century, the 
focus shifted to major centres of land and sea commerce in the northern Balkans, 
Central and Western Europe, as well as in southern Russia,108 mostly along the coasts 
of the Black Sea; Vienna became now the most prominent diaspora community. In 
this second wave, the Greeks were often attracted by incentives given by the host 
countries, aiming at skilled technicians and merchants, important to their own 
expanding économies. Much larger numbers were involved and this is the stage in 
which the paroikies were given real flesh. In Trieste, for instance, by the turn of the 
eighteenth Century, the Greek Orthodox community numbered more than a thousand 
members, coming from various destinations - including Peloponesus, Epirus, the 
Ionian islands, Smyrna, Crete and Cyprus. A third wave was to follow in the èarly 
nineteenth Century, with important communities set up at this stage, ranging from 
Alexandria to Marseilles. Trie former, still under Ottoman occupation, became part of 
the Greek commercial network of exchanges, linking Cyprus, the Aegean islands, 
Smyrne, Constantinople, and northern Greece, to Livorno, Trieste and Marseilles. 
In ali these Greek communities the merchants played a centrai role, along with Greek 
businessmen, clergymen, teachers, doctors, lawyers and other Professionals. In order 
to maintain their separate identities and not to get assimilated by the host societies, 
diaspora communities tended to concentrate in a particular area of a city, creating 
neighbourhoods with a distinct cultural mark, whose life revolved around the church, 
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the coffeshops or clubs (which acted as meeting places where merchants exchanged 
information), and the community's own school. They catered to the welfare needs of 
their members (often sponsoring hospitals, old people's homes, and orphanages) and 
the educational needs of the young (through provision for schools, teachers and 
books), making sure they were taught the basics of the Orthodox doctrine and the 
Greek language. 
The success of Greek merchants related largely to the solidarity that governed their 
relationships. The centrai institution was the family and their businesses depended 
greatly on family involvement. Families provided information, counsel, capital and 
often manpower to young starters in business and commerce; thereafter, families 
supported such ventures and assisted in both the organisation and the Staffing of the 
enterprises. In most companies, fathers and sons were the basis of partnerships (as 
reflected in the names of the companies), but often this expanded to include relatives 
created through marriage (for example, sons in law) or religïous kinship (for example, 
godfathers and best men). The importance of the family grew with time as Greek 
merchants shifted from being mere brokers to establishing their own companies and 
networks of représentatives.109 Family involvement had obvious benefits, such as 
cutting down on labour costs through the utilization of unpaid or lowly paid family 
members (an older child or an aged grandparent), or through avoiding "expensive 
middlemen or brokers, to which European merchants had to resort."110 When family 
members were unavailable, the next best solution was relatives, or persons from the 
same town or village or, lastly, other co-religionists. 
Another institution of primary importance was the Greek fraternities (adelphotites). 
These were community organisations, often of a religious but at times of a secular-
political nature. Together with the Orthodox Church they were the main institutions 
through which the Orthodox organized their collective life and represented themselves 
to the locai authorities. The adephotites assumed important social responsibilities -
such as raising money from donations to assist their needy members (giving grants to 
the poor, dowry allowances to girls from less wealthy families, and scholarships to 
students to study in European universities), to build community schools, and so on. In 
Venice, for instance, the Greek Orthodox community was given officiai permission for 
the founding of an adelphotita as early as 1498; the Constitution of the adelphotita 
specified the proportionate participation of members in the executive organ, in relation 
to their geographica! place of origin - which included Cyprus, Crete, the Ionian 
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Islands, Monemvasia and others. In 1517, a church was built whlch served the needs 
of Orthodox people from many lands and backgrounds. 
The Greek Orthodox merchant class in Cyprus had developed at a slower pace relative 
to some of their most prominent Greek counterparts, such as the Ionians, Smyrna and 
Salonica. In the early years of Ottoman rule, a small colony of Venetian and Genoese 
merchants is reported to have existed in Larnaka back in 1596, and consulates of these 
countries seem to have been established in the early seventeenth Century, followed in 
the next décades by British and French consulates.111 By the eighteenth Century, 
consulates of Austria, Holland, Denmark, Spain, Russia and others, were also présent, 
and many more were added during the nineteenth Century. The présence of all these 
consulates may seem paradoxical if we consider that, in most cases, there were none 
or very few résidents from these countries on the island. Emilianides explains that 
most of these consulates were established at the prodding of Greek or Latin résidents 
of Cyprus, as a way for them to enter commerce while securing, at the same time, 
through the consulates, the privilèges afforded by the capitulations. Even larger 
powers, which did have local résidents, often appointed Greek or Latin consuls, vice-
consuls and other personnel in their consulates.112 The benefits that attachment to 
European consulates bore, included exemption from taxes and the right to trial by the 
consul instead of the Ottoman courts. The effect of such an attachment amounted to 
"removing its récipient from the Status of a dimmito something approaching the status 
of a resident foreigner".113 
Besides individuals linked to the European and other consulates, we have seen how the 
dragoman and Orthodox Church prelates were also involved in trade, taking advantage 
of their privileged position in the Ottoman regime. On the other hand, few Muslims 
seem to have similarly engaged in trade, not so much because Islam discourages 
involvement in trade, as is often assumed, but mostly because they primarily occupied 
administrative and military posts, or derived their incomes as landowners. Since, as a 
conséquence of such priorities, trade came to be associateti with infidels, the status of 
merchants was not attractive to ambitious Muslims.114 Thus, in the late seventeenth 
Century, it was reported that "there are rieh and influential individuals among the 
Greek Cypriots, but not being allowed to carry weapons they devote themselves to 
trade. They carry oil, cheese, and other goods to Tripoli and other ports in Syria, but 
do not make long voyages".115 By the late eighteenth Century, a number of Greek 
Cypriots had managed to enter long distance trade, mostly involving south and central 
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European destinations. Like their Greek counterparts in the Balkans, they seemed to 
have learned to overcome the many restrictions imposed by the Ottoman regime, and 
to engage in the mostly illegal export of agricultural products to the West, catering to 
the needs of the expanding European population.116 They were successful enough to 
outdo some of their more privileged competitore on the island: "By the beginning of 
the nineteenth Century only one English merchant remained in Cyprus" and he, 
according to a contemporary observer, "had to contend with the united phalanx of 
Levantines, who had no inclination to admit a competitor in trade". Much of the trade 
in those times was illegal (particularly in corn): For this reason, it was "necessary to 
keep on good terms with the aga and officers employed at the custom-house by 
présents, the best and only means of ensuring favour in any compétition with 
Levantines".117 
The élimination of English merchants did not mean there was no other compétition. 
Luke informs us that the most prominent merchants in those times were the "small but 
wealthy" Latin (Catholic) community of Larnaka, who were of "varied descent - French, 
Ionian, Venetian, Genoese, Maltese, Syrian", and had managed to take the lead over 
the local Orthodox Cypriot merchants, having "virtually monopolized the foreign trade 
on the island".118 This was due to the fact that being foreigners they enjoyed more 
unhampered access to privilèges linked to the capitulations. In contrast, the local 
Orthodox Greeks could enjoy the same privilèges only if they were connected with the 
merchant consulates - and even in such a case, things were not always easy, for the 
Ottoman governore were often quite arbitrary in their dealings with the consulates.119 
Another important group of merchants on the island were the Greeks from the wider 
Hellenic world (such as Constantinople, Smyrna and the Greek islands), who kept 
arriving in Cyprus ever since the close of the sixteenth Century.120 The most 
noteworthy sub-group was that of the Ionians, who came mostly in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries; throughout this period, the Ionian Islands were not a part of the 
Ottoman Empire, but changed hands from the Venetians to the French and then the 
British, until they finally united with Greece. This meant that the Ionians enjoyed the 
commercial and politicai benefits of the capitulations in Cyprus early on, like all other 
European nationals, which explains why most of them successfully engaged in 
commerce, and why most western consulates throughout this period recruited 
personnel for their higher offices from among the Ionian community.121 Often the 
offspring of Greek (and more rarely of Latin) merchant families would marry with 
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children of Cypriot merchant families, thus strengthening the bonds between these 
communities and enhancing the networks of Orthodox merchants and their respective 
influence. 
From the above, it transpires that the Cypriot Orthodox merchant class was dynamic 
but small in size. Increased opportunities for the local Orthodox to engage in 
commerce came after 1821 and the subsequent formation of the Greek state, when 
many Cypriots, "anxious to emancipate themselves from the status of rayahs, 
proceeded to Greece in order to acquire Hellenic citizenship".122 Apparently, the 
numbers of those who embarked on this undertaking was so large that the Ottoman 
authorities (fearing that they would lose a lot of taxes, or that many would emigrate, 
or worse still that "the island would shortly become a Greek colony")123 refused to 
accept the change of citizenship and threatened the punishment of all those seeking to 
avoid paying their taxes. Things were made worse by the fact that no capitulatory 
agreement was signed between the Porte and Greece; but even when this did happen, 
in 1855, the situation did not improve much. It was only towards the end of the 
nineteenth century that the Cypriot merchant class would become a strong enough 
force to have a significant role in the public sphere of Cyprus. 
If we return to the late eighteenth century, however, the picture emerging is of a small 
but growing merchant class, actively involved with the Greek paroikies all over Europe 
(from Venice to Trieste, Vienna, Marseilles and Alexandria). In the paroikies, Cypriots, 
having the same religion and language, as well as many of the folk traditions, as the 
other Orthodox Greeks, shared the same neighbourhoods, churches and coffeeshops -
while their children shared the same schools.124 Similarly, all shared the same religious 
and family values, and the merchants, additionally, shared the same business ethic. 
Money flew from the paroikies to the places of origin for building a local school or 
repairing a local church; people came from the Greek Orthodox lands to the paroikies 
to study in one of the high schools or universities in the host towns of the paroikies, or 
to find a job in a relative's or co-villager's growing business, or even to seek a spouse 
in these well-to-do European diaspora communities. Books were sent from the 
paroikies to the places of origin, where education was primitive and printing presses 
not yet available - and teachers, priests and icons flew back from the Greek lands to 
the communities and churches of the paroikies}75 Information on the changing 
European world and the emerging new world-views would be exchanged with updates 
on the problems of a declining Ottoman Empire. In all these ways, the Greek 
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Orthodox lands and the Greek paroikies had gradually come to constitute an imaginary 
common space, linked together in multiple ways and at différent levels, through a 
dense network of socio-economie institutions and through the movement of people, as 
well as of material and symbolic goods. This network connected individuals, families, 
churches, businesses and communities and bound them together through common 
material and symbolic interests, common institutions, as well as shared values and 
aspirations. At the same time, the network's existence recreated and reproduced 
multiple contacts, links, transactions, relations and exchanges between the différent 
nodes of the network. 
Up to this stage, the Orthodox religion was the primary basis of the identity of Greek 
and Cypriot Orthodox people. That is why securing special permission for free religious 
practice and an appropriate space for doing so was always the first priority of diaspora 
communities. Beside Orthodoxy constituting the faith of the people, attending church 
was a vital social practice which brought together diverse individuals from différent 
geographica! areas of origin, speaking différent dialects and even languages,126 and of 
différent ethnie backrounds; they all united in the face of their différence to the mostly 
Catholic host communities. The Orthodox religion remained the centrai integration 
élément of the paroikies, even towards the end of the period under discussion, when 
the impact of the Enlightenment brought secularism and a degree of anti-clericalism 
along. What did change at that time was the new emphasis now put on différent 
ethnicity, which acquired equal or higher importance than religious unity, leading to a 
split between the différent Orthodox doctrines, especially the Greeks and the Serbs. 
But the Cypriots did not have a problem in choosing sides: Despite the fact that they 
belonged to an autoeephalous church, the commonality of language and social 
institutions (such as the family and the adeiphotites) identified them with the rest of 
the Greeks, who were being quickly transformed into Hellènes. Besîdes, unlike the 
other non-Greek Orthodox ethnie groups, the Cypriots, as we have seen, had a well 
developed merchant class which, although small, was the carrier of the same ethic and 
values as the other Greek merchants, spearheading developments. 
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From religious to ethnic consciousness 
We have seen how after the Ottoman occupation, the Orthodox Christians carne to 
constitute the religious community of the eastern 'Romans' (millet-i Rum). This united 
the different Orthodox ethno-cultural communities into an imagined community of 
common faith, transcending the constituent ethnic parts, under the Patriarch of 
Constantinople as the overall leader (millet basi). Through time, this new unity 
stimulated the growth of a supra-ethnic, ecumenic, religious consciousness, parallel to 
(and often overshadowing) the pre-existing ethno-cultural identities, which had started 
acquiring strength in the last era of the Byzantine Empire. This strengthened common 
bond differentiated the Orthodox from the Muslim conquerors, but also from the 
Catholic West. Among the Orthodox people themselves, language carne to play a 
differentiating role, in a way which favoured the Greeks over the other ethnicities; this 
was because Greek was the language of the Orthodox liturgy and the administration of 
the church. The latter meant that knowledge of the Greek language became a very 
important qualification for rising to the top layers of the church hierarchy. In Cyprus, 
for instance, right after the Ottoman conquest, the Grand Vezir promoted a Serb monk 
to the post of first Archbishop of Cyprus, but because he was ignorant of Greek, the 
Cypriots quickly had him replaced with someone else, who had the backing of the 
Ecumenic Patriarchate.127 The requirement of the Greek language must not be taken 
to imply a pre-eminence of Greek ethnicity: Indeed, if a person from any ethnic 
background did know the Greek language, he would face no discrimination, as 
demonstrated by the fact that many Bulgarians, Serbs, Syrians and others frequented 
the higher posts of the Church's administration. The Greek language was thus 
necessary in serving religious or church needs, and was not a tool of ethnic pre-
eminence or domination. 
Yet, despite an ecumenic worldview de-emphasizing ethnicity, the prevalence of the 
Greek language in the life of the Church, was to inevitably favour the Greek culture 
and the Greeks themselves. On the one hand, it facilitated the reproduction of Greek 
cultural elements and, on the other, it hindered the respective process among other 
Orthodox ethnic communities. In the Balkans, for instance, "the replacement of 
Slavonic by Greek in the churches made the service incomprehensible to most faithful, 
excluded Slav-speakers from hígh church offices, and made resistance to the Ottomans 
more difficult".128 Gradually, through a subtle process of Hellenization,™ many among 
the non-Greek Orthodox (such as Albanians and Vlachs) adopted Greek as their main 
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or second language. A second factor which contributed to the Greek language 
acquiring such importance was the early development of Greek printing in Europe. 
The Greek language started gaining prominence with the rise in popularity of humanist 
studies in Europe, in the early sixteenth century; the first Greek books were published 
in Venice as early as the second decade of that century/3 0 whereas printing in the 
Slavic languages, Albanian and even Turkish came as late as the nineteenth century.131 
Thus, Greek became the only language used in printing texts for Orthodox lands, for a 
long and cruciai period.132 Finally, the cultural dominance of the Greek language was 
accentuated in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries when the rise to prominence 
of the Greek merchants established Greek as the "principal Balkan language of 
commerce and culture".133 Since the high social status of the Greek merchants made 
them an object of admiration, many merchants and other men from the middle classes 
of non-Greek Orthodox groups adopted the 'Greek' label for themselves, so as to claim 
the superior status involved.134 The groups most affected were the Orthodox 
Albanians, Vlachs and Bulgarians, firstly, because many of them lived as minorities 
dispersed among larger ethnie wholes, and secondly, because they lacked strong 
ethnie cultural traditions; the exception was the Serbs, whose long history of 
ecclesiastical autonomy had produced a more differentiated ethnie self-
consciousness.135 
Overall, the Hellenization process benefìted the Greeks, yet as Stoianovich underlines, 
'being Greek' at the time did not signify ethnicity in the narrow sense we use the word 
today; it rather signified high socio-economie status (as if someone was "a peddler or 
merchant", so that in this sense "even a Jew could be a Greek"); it also implied being 
of the Greek Orthodox religion (so that ali Orthodox Albanians, Vlachs, Macedo-Slavs, 
Bulgarians, and to a lesser extent Serbs, were ali considered 'Greeks').136 
From the above, it transpires that both the Orthodox Church and the Greek merchant 
class wittingly or unwittingly contributed to the prevalence of Greek language and 
ethnicity. But the role of the two in fostering ethnie consciousness, leading to the 
subséquent ethnie rising in Greece, was not at ali similar. The Orthodox Church found 
itself in a very ambivalent position: On the one hand, the many politicai and economie 
privilèges it enjoyed depended on its loyalty and support to the Ottoman regime, of 
which it was effectively an integrai part; on the other, the fact that the Ottomans were 
increasingly attached to Islam, an enemy religion, kept reminding the Church of its 
own captivity and maintained alive a vague hope for the eventual restoration of the 
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Byzantine world. But this was a purely religious vision, in which no special rôle was 
allocated to the Greeks qua ethnie group. 
Although the precursore to the Greek merchant class, the Phanariotes, had managed to 
become "enlightened patrons of Greek culture",137 they also "largely identified their 
interests with the préservation of the integrity of the Empire".138 Their "fully developed 
Ottoman consciousness" did not allow them to view their Greek ethnicity as the 
primary déterminant of their identity, since this would differentiate them from, and set 
them up against, their Ottoman mastere.139 Put differently, their complete dévotion to 
the Ottoman regime meant that they "could not envision another politicai context ndr 
an alternative arrangement for public life".140 Still absent was a social collective actor 
detached enough from the ruling regime, yet at the same time strong and confident 
enough to articulate a new vision for an alternative future. This new social actor was 
to be the rising Greek merchant, whose main stages of progress we traced earlier on. 
Greek merchants sponsored the studies of their own children, and sometimes of other 
young people from their places of origin, in high schools and universîties in the 
West.1 4 1 From the early yeare of Ottoman occupation and right through the turn of the 
eighteenth Century, most of the few young Cypriots who studied abroad chose Italy for 
doing so, and primarily Rome and Venice where there existed lively Greek paroikies.142 
Usually they started their studies at the Greek Gymnasium of St. Athanasius in Rome 
and, if they carried on, they normaliy attended the University of Padua, the first choice 
of Greeks from all Greek lands, since it had a réputation as being the vanguard of the 
new ideas emanating from Italy's belated Renaissance and the rise of humanism, 
including an emphasis on the classics and neo-Aristotelian philosophy. Philippou 
reports that in Padoua was already operating, since 1563, the so-called "Cypriot 
Gymnasium" (Gymnasion Kyprou), founded by Pierre Garfranos [Petras Gafranou], 
with Alexandras Neroulos from Zakynthos as first director.143 
The Rennaisance call to return "back to the classics" found its early admirers among 
Greek figures144 such as Nicolas Sofianos, who in the early sixteenth Century hoped for 
the "renaissance of Greece" through the mimesis of Renaissance Europe; Sofianos 
believed that for the genos to raise its wings once again, young people had to educate 
themselves in the language and works of their "forefathers", the ancient Greeks, as 
well as in other European languages and in the naturai sciences. But, at that stage, 
these were the thoughts of a few isolated individuals and did not articulate into an 
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integrated new discourse. Furthermore, Ottoman power was still at ¡ts prime and 
Greek lands still in disarray. It was in the late seventeenth century, when the process 
of Ottoman decline was well on ¡ts way, and the Greeks in a much improved position 
(as a consequence of improvements in the economy, demographic expansión, and the 
increasing prominence of the Patriarchate, the Phanariotes, and Greek merchants), 
both in Greece but especially abroad in the diaspora, that the ground was ready to 
receive the seeds of European Enlightenment.145 
Neohellenic Enlightenment represented a diverse set of renewal trends in diaspora 
communities in the west, but also in the Ottoman occupied Balkans (what we 
nowadays cali south-eastern Europe), and Minor Asia shores.146 Reversing the 
emphasis of the Orthodox Church on the metaphysical and supra-national unity of the 
Orthodox people, the new approaches sought to use the human faculties in studying 
how the social characteristics of the various ethno-cultural groups were distributed, 
seeking to map their unique identities and differences. In the spirit of the 
lexicographic revolution, "grammars and dictionaries codifying the spoken vernaculars 
spoken by the various Balkan groups"147 were put together. Language and cultural 
traits carne to be seen as delineating one yetñnos'from another. History was another 
domain which was explored, and so was geography, in an effort to discover the origins 
of the different ethno-cultural groups and how space influenced their formation and 
character. The Greeks felt especially proud of tracing their roots to the ancient Greeks 
(as against, say, the Slavs, who could only boast of a medieval past), whom Europeans 
themselves acknowledged as the pillars of Western civilization, and of the Enlightment 
itself. The Greek vernacular was solid proof of the connection with the classical past, 
and its current dominance offered further evidence of its superiority to all other 
languages. Interestingly, ethnic identity at this stage was still in flux, its protagonists 
were not only 'Greeks' but also 'Hellenized' intellectuals.148 The common denominator 
and the Vehicle language' for all changes was the Greek language which, as we saw, 
was the lingua franca, and the language of education and commerce. It is in this 
changing context that the role of Greek logioi and merchants became crucial. 
With time, the identity of the new merchant class acquired new meanings and carne to 
differ from that of ¡ts Phanariote predecessor, ¡n two important ways. First, ¡t 
increasingly turned secular, with the consequence that "being Greek' had less to do 
with Orthodox Christianity and more with being 'progressive' and imbued with a 
Veforming spirif. Thus, the cultural contrast with the Moslems ceased being a mere 
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matter of religious différence and came to be seen as a contest between 'modernity' 
and 'backwardness'. The merchant class became the carrier of European ideas, 
advocating the politicai modernization of the Balkans and, in defending these ideals, 
ended up questioning both the Church's and the Phanariotes' conservative idéologies. 
Second, the new vision now promoted linked together modernization with the création 
of a new form of politicai community: This entailed not only libération from Ottoman 
rule but the création of a European form of polity, which would be the only guarantee 
for economie development and politicai libération - this new model was the nation-
state. 
* * * 
Let us now try to trace these shifts in perceptions and identities in the case of 
Orthodox Cypriots. A convenient starting point could be that of archimandrite 
Kyprianos, author of the Chronological History of Cyprus (Istoria Chronofogiki tis Nisou 
Kyprou). Interestingly, this was published in 1788 in Venice, where Kyprianos stayed 
for a few years; we have already noted the importance of Venice for the Cypriots, as 
the paramount paroikia, which linked them with the wider Greek networks and kept 
them in touch with developments in the West - of which the paroikieswere, after ali, a 
constituent part. 
Kyprianos' Istoria was written at an important time juncture - a few years after the 
Russian-Ottoman wars (1768-1774), leading to the Kuchuk Kainarji treaty, and just one 
year before the French Revolution (1789) - and, as such, it is a reflection of those 
times of transition. Hence, the Istoria constitutes .one of the first attempts by a 
représentative of the emerging Neohellenic Enlightment to study history through 
utilizing ideas and tools of analysis drawn from the European Enlightment. Without 
abandóning the values and beliefs of Orthodoxy, Kyprianos shifts his emphasis away 
from the transcendental, teleologica! perspective of religion and metaphysics, to the 
social and politicai dynamics impacting on human reality; he tries to be criticai in his 
approach and to distinguish well documented views from myth, fiction and bias; 1 4 9 and 
although he draws from the accounts of chroniclers who were often a part of the 
various rulers who held the island, he constantly seeks to balance their views through 
an emphasis on the plight of the ruled and the voices of the subaltern (unlike 
Machairas, for instance, who identifìed with the foreign ruling class with which he was 
associated). 
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Kyprianos aims to inform his compatriote of their country's glorious past - of ite 
customs, religion and laws, of how ite people cultivated the arts, the sciences and 
learning more generally, and of how they excelled in agricultural production, 
commerce, navigation, and war; the Cypriote developed as a people noted for their 
sociability, solidarity and well-governed nature. Cypriote had plenty of glorious 
ancestors - ancient kings, héroes, philosophera, poete and artiste, but especially sainte, 
apostles and other religious dignitaries associated with Orthodoxy, whose struggles 
and martyrdom constituted a cause of "pride for Country" (karxima tis Patríaos). 
Kyprianos hopes that knowledge of their past will help Cypriote thrive through 
"imitating the worthy achievements of the Glorious ones, who blossomed and laboured 
in this Country",150 and especially of the saintly men who, through their teaching, 
introduced their ancestors to the "Holy Faith". 
Obviously Kyprianos' worldview was stili very much dominated by religion. Ethnicity 
was certainly not important in his thinking: He put a lot of emphasis on love of 
country, and of the genos, but the nation is not there yet in his history. His concept of 
space is pre-national: Cyprus for him is not part of the Greek world, but the "last 
[island] to Asia" (teleutaia tis Asias).151 In an interesting section, where he tries to 
account for the "origin" (tin arxin) of the Cypriote, he traces the latterà early 
beginnings to the Flood and to "Noah's grandson", Hettim.152 Yet, he does not seem to 
see his contemporary Cypriote as direct descendante of that early ancestor: Kyprianos 
adopte the view that by the time of St. Helen (mother of emperor Constantine), the 
island was completely depopulated and, thus, she arranged for its re-population by 
people from nearby lands (Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Constantinople and others);153 as the 
residente of thèse lands were of the "Roman" genos, their Cypriot descendante were 
also Romans.154 Kyprianos thus upholds a discontinuous view of descent and does not 
seem to care for establishing a direct link between his contemporary Cypriote and the 
"original" inhabitants of the island. Furthermore, Kyprianos saw absolutely no blood or 
other connection between Cypriote and Greeks. The latter he associated only with the 
ancient Greeks, who were heathen (ethnikoi), and "appeared on earth" before 
Christians.155 They did have a présence in ancient Cyprus but he considere them as 
merely one of many conquerore, quite distinct from the Cypriote.156 The Greeks "called 
their héroes Gods", one of which was Aphrodite, which Kyprianos, as a clergyman, 
seems to particularly dislike, calling her a "false god" (pseudónimos thea)157 or worse, 
a "noxious abomination" (miasma vdeffirori)158 in conséquence of her indulgence in 
"licentious hedonism" (aselgestaton idonon).i59 
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In sum, we have in Kyprianos the traits of a patriot, who wishes to foster love for 
country (patrida) and its people (genos)) but we certainly do not yet have a nationalist 
tracing his descent to the Greek nation, being imbued with a Greek "national identity" 
or "national consciousness". Such ideas were to start gradually developing after 
Kyprianos' history, and were certainly not present in his own work. A little more than a 
century after the initial publication of the History, in 1902, when Ottoman rule was 
over and modernity was changing the face of Cyprus, there was a second reprint. In 
the introduction of the co-publishers, at least one of which (Nicolaos Katalanos) was a 
militant nationalist, they praise Kyprianos for writing his History in order to prepare the 
Cypriots for their "national restoration" - "blowing the trumpet" for their "awakening". 
But the text they cite as evidence says exactly the opposite: Kyprianos proposes that 
the example of "the Glorious ones" among their forefathers, will help his 
contemporaries "gladly bear" their current tribulations, under the Ottomans, especially 
once they considered the much "harsher slavery" of the peasants under the former 
Latin masters of the island, who happened to be Christian (reminding the readers that, 
in those times, "people were sold or traded as beasts").160 As a good Orthodox and as 
part of a Church which was expected to support the Ottoman regime, Kyprianos is 
asking his readers to be submissive; the Ottomans may be suppressive, but their 
Christian predecessors were even worse. Patience, not revolution, is his call. 
Only a few years later, the next person we turn to consider, was toying with 
revolutionary ideas. The young Cypriot logios, Ioannis Karajias (1767-1798), was 
closely associated with Rigas Phereos Velestinlis, the most influential Greek speaking 
advocate of the new ideas stemming from the French Revolution, calling for a 
revolutionary overthrow of the Ottomans in the Balkans. Karajias, Phereos, and 
another six of the latter's associates, were arrested by the Austrian secret service in 
the late 1790's in Trieste and, after interrogation, they were handed over to the 
Ottoman authorities who executed them in June 1798 (hardly ten years after 
Kyprianos' History). The interrogations had ascertained that Karajias had attempted 
reprinting Phereos' "especially dangerous proclamations" and was "in touch with the 
traitors who wanted to spread the principles of French freedom and equality to the 
Greeks residing in Ottoman provinces".161 
Born in Nicosia, Karajias had made a successful start with publishing and trading books 
in the Greek paroikies (mainly Vienna), primarily for use in Greek schools. Two of the 
more well known publications of Karajias related to ancient Greek philosophers and a 
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third one was a collection of romantic stories - a choice pattern reminiscent of the 
early publications of Phereos himself. The works of classical Greece were considered 
important tools for the éducation of the Greek people, whîch itself was a necessary 
precondition for a national revival and revolution; the romantic stories carried 
messages of the equality of people (the falling in love of individuals Coming from 
différent social classes) and were, thus, important tools for the emotional and social 
libération of the readers. 
But the later works of Phereos, which had got the collaboratore into trouble, included 
the much more politicized Déclaration of the Rights of Man, and the New Politicai 
Constitution of the Inhabitants of Rumeli, Asia Minor, the Islands of the Aegean and 
the Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia. Both texts were heavily influenced by the 
respective déclaration and constitution of the French Revolution.162 The Constitution 
was, in fact, a revolutionär manifesto, calling on the descendants of ancient Greeks in 
all Ottoman-ruled Greek lands to rise in revolution against the tyranical Ottoman 
empire, that had reached the ultimate stage of décadence and decay. National 
libération was a first necessary step to further social changes which would lead to a 
transformed "Hellenic Democracy" (Elliniki Democratia). The latter was not to be a 
regime dominated politically by the Greeks, since the vision was for an equal union of 
all peopies living in the concerned lands, including the various Orthodox ethnicities 
(such as Serbs, Bulgarians, Albanians and Vlachs) but also Armenians, Jews and even 
Turks. Rather, the new Balkan démocratie republic would be Heiienic'm the sense that 
the Greek language, éducation and culture would enjoy hegemony - since, after all, 
these were already widespread, serving the unity of the diverse ethnicities in the area. 
Such ideas had alarmed the monarchical conservative European states, as well as the 
Ottoman authorities; that is why the Austrians handed Phereos and his accomplies to 
the Ottomans, and why the latter proeeeded with the exécutions - to quench the 
revolutionary fire before it flared up. What is important for our purposes is the 
présence of Karajias next to Phereos, the harbinger of change, sharing in the new 
revolutionary démocratie spirit, moving around the paroikies and Publishing books 
promoting the new ideas to all Greek speakers, uniting the Greek lands with the 
paroikies'm the new discourse of ethnicity, democracy and freedom. 
Yet, in many ways, Phereos' vision was too radical or utopian for his times, even for 
the very audiences he was addressing, including the Greek merchants who were 
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naturally the most réceptive to new ideas. Stoianovich points out that of the eighteen 
Greeks accused in the 1790's in Vienna of membership in Phereos' team of 
revolutionaries, "no more than a third were merchants", from which he concludes that 
"only a fraction of 1 per cent of the total number of Greek merchants in the Habsburg 
dominions entertained close links with the revolutionary conspiracy".163 The situation 
was to change by the time of the Philike Etairia, in a short few décades thereafter. 
The next important Cypriot figures to consider, as représentative of those changing 
times, were the Theseas brothers, who were active members of the Society of Friends 
(Philike Etairia), a secret organization founded in 1814, in the diaspora community of 
Odessos, in southern Russia. From various studies of the membership of Philike, the 
largest numbers were merchants (54%), educated professionals (13%) and clerics 
(9.5%).164 In the early years, the membership of the Philike remained small, but it 
expanded dramatically after 1818, at which time its headquarters shifted to 
Istambuł.165 Philikés methods and organization were influenced by freemasonry,166 
and included initiation rituals to its four différent grades of membership, as well as 
oaths of commitment and secrecy (betrayal was punishable by death). These features 
invested its activities and the duties of members with a sacred quality, "setting them 
apart and above" ordinary profane activities or obligations, as indeed was necessary in 
serving the purpose of preparing a revolution. Secrecy and detachment were vital in 
Ottoman lands, in societies which treasured close kin relations above ali else, and 
where bribes for betrayal were part of a corrupt system; they were equally necessary 
in European monarchical régimes, which trembled in fear of the radicai ideas of the 
Jacobines and the carbonaros. Hence, Philike initiâtes could move around unhampered, 
in both Ottoman occupied lands and the paroikies, under the pretexts of founding 
schools or churches, or of raising money for needy compatriots, while in fact spreading 
the seeds of revolution^167 
The Theseas brothers were cousins of Kyprianos, who became Archbishop of Cyprus in 
1810, after which the brothers gained in prominence, becoming the most influential 
Cypriots of the time.168 After finishing schpol, Nicolaos Theseas went to Florence for a 
few years, where be published the Iliad; he then became a teacher in a Greek school 
in Trieste and "fìnally settled in Marseilles as an agent of his brother's firm 'Kyprianos 
Theseus and Co' of Larnaka".169 Theophilos Theseas was ordained Archimandrite and 
joined his brother in Marseilles, where the two became members of the Philike.170 
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In 1821, some Philike leaflets, brought to Cyprus by Archimandrite Theophilos, feil into 
the hands of the Ottomans. This, plus other "incriminatory évidence" but especially 
the persistent requests of the local Ottoman governor (Kuchuk Mehmed) and other 
aghas, induced the Sultan to permit the mass exécution of almost 500 Christians -
exterminating literally the whole Christian elite, including Archbishop Kyprianos and 
other prelates. Interestingly, Archimandrite Theophilos escaped "by bribing his 
pursuers",171 and ended up in Rome where, in December 1821, together with a few 
other Cypriot prelates and notables who fled the massacre, published the first 
déclaration of Cypriots, calling for the libération of their country from "tyrannical" 
Turkish rule:1 7 2 Denouncing the massacres of the Christians and the destruction of 
their properties, the déclaration stresses the résolve of the Cypriots to seek freedom, 
much as the rest of their "Greek brothers". The déclaration made it known that 
Nicolaos Theseas was yoted "Commissioner" of Cyprus, with authorization to do 
whatever was necessary towards this end (borrow money on behalf of the Cypriots, 
appeal to European Monarchs, raise a military force, or take any other action possible). 
But, since no help was forthcoming for Cyprus, the brothers joined the Revolution in 
Greece where they fought along hundreds of other Cypriots, and managed to 
distinguisi! themselves in many difficult battles.173 
It must be pointed out that the Greek Revolution was initially intended to liberate the 
whole of the Balkans, much as Phereos had originally planned. Ethnie awareness, 
however, had started spreadïng to other peoples in the Balkans, besides the Greeks -
starting from the Serbs, whose revolt at the turn of the nineteenth Century (1804) had 
led to de facto autonomy by 1815. In the principalities, the Romanians were becoming 
increasingly dissatisfìed with the Phanariotes' rule. Such developments meant that the 
Greek struggle could not inspire a Balkan-wide response, even though many individuals 
of other ethnicities (especially Viachs and Albanians) did rally the cause of 
revolution.174 As a conséquence, insurrection failed to take root in the Principalities, 
where it started, and only managed to make progress in Peloponesos and Rumeli 
(présent day south mainland Greece), where there were majority Greek populations. 
Naturally, the end resuit of the struggle was not a multi-ethnic, multi-cultural polity, as 
Phereos had imagined, but a largely homogeneous Greek state. 
Furthermore, the revolution was not led by the educated, ethnically conscious middle 
classes, as Phereos (and primarily his subséquent theoretician of Greek libération, 
Adamantios Koraes) had expected: It was mostly a peasant revolution175 set in motion 
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in response to the economic hardship of the masses in Peloponesos, but which quickly 
gained widespread support for many other reasons - the arbitrariness and corruption 
of the ruling regime, the suppressed enmities of the subjugated, the spread of 
Enlightment ideas, and so on. Yet, in widening its support, the revolution drew-in the 
"entrenched conservative forces" too, such as the big landowners and local notables, 
led by the Orthodox Church hierarchy; by the end of the independence struggle, which 
lasted for almost a decade, the traditional forces had managed to dominate the other 
social forces, and to impose their own ideologica! slant on the turn of events. Thus, the 
inìtially liberal revolution, which was infused with the humanist, cosmopolitan and 
republican spirit of the Enlightment (reflected in the very progressive First 
Constitutional Charter, voted in Epidauros, in 1822), ended up adopting an increasingly 
conservative ideology; by the 1832 Fifth National Assembly, a monarchical regime was 
confirmed as the outcome of the process. "mis turn of things was also favoured by the 
Great Powers, on which rebel Greeks came to dépend, since developments in Europe 
had made the former sceptical of both national révolutions and Jacobin state 
régimes.176 
Since, during the Revolution, Greek Orthodox Christians were effectively pitted against 
Ottoman/Turk Muslims, religious différences were gradually translated and 
Consolidated into ethnie différences - the ethnie incorporating the religious element; 
the first "savage acts of massacre" committed during the Greek Revolution became 
thus the earlier forms of "ethnie cleansing" in modem history.177 
Late Ottoman rute and the consolidation of ethnie identities 
The fact that Archimandrite Theophilos became actively involved with the Philike did 
not mean many Cypriot prelates shared his views. It is debatable whether his own 
uncle, Archbishop Kyprianos, was very sympathetic to these new ideas178 - his 
previous career and expériences did not militate for this. When young, Kyprianos had 
spent considérable time (1783-1803) in Wallachia, where the Phanariote hospodar 
Michail Soutsos put him under his patronage and helped him combine his post as a 
priest with free éducation in a locai academy. The Phanariote rulers saw themselves as 
continuatore of the Byzantine héritage - as protectore of the Orthodox faith and of the 
Roman genos. Though loyal to the Ottoman order of things, they fostered Greek 
culture and éducation and envisioned a future in which the Orthodox would sort of 
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capture the Empire from within, through dominating its administrative bureaucracy, 
and promoting an ecumenic Greek language and culture.179 Exposed to such ideas, 
Kyprianos returned to Cyprus in 1802, where he quickly worked his way up to become 
Archbishop (1810), and to implement a similar vision. In 1812, he inaugurated the 
Greek School in Nicosia, in the founding document of which he notes how Cyprus was 
lacking in education and Greek learning, "the only means of ornamenting the human 
mind and of restoring man as worthy of being man"; 1 8 0 he, furthermore, notes how 
schools existed in many other Greek lands but not in Cyprus, for which the Cypriots 
were "shamed". But Kyprianos' appreciation of ancient Greece and Greek education 
did not amount to a nationalist ideology. Indeed, only three years later, in 1815, in a 
circular to the faithful, Kyprianos warned them not to be affected by "anti-Christian 
circles", and threatened with excommunication anyone espousing radical ideas 
associated with freemasonry (associated with radical nationalism), which he considered 
as violating both the Orthodox religion but also the Sultan's own commands.181 
When, subsequently (1818), he was visited by Philike delegates who sought his 
support, Kyprianos seems to have promised only financial support, and it is unclear as 
to whether he was fully aware of the revolutionary plans of the organization.182 
Whatever the case, what is certain is that, soon after the outbreak of the Greek 
Revolution, he was executed along with hundreds of other Christian members of the 
elite. This, however, was not because the Cypriots were getting ready for a revolution, 
as the local Ottoman governor reported to the Porte: It was rather because, as we saw 
above, the Muslim elite resented the increasing wealth and strength of the Orthodox 
prelates and notables; it was also a pay back for grudges held since the 1804 events, 
during which the Christian dragoman and archbishop had solicited the Porte's help in 
crushing the uprising of (mostly) Muslim masses, protesting the shortage of food and 
increases in taxation.183 But although the Christian masses were not yet imbued with 
nationalism, these tragic events were to mark their collective memory: "Even the most 
servile of rayahA\ke Christian subject of the Ottoman Empire must have been 
persuaded, by being treated as a revolutionary, that he had some connection with 
what was going on on the mainland".184 
Suppression continued for some years after the July 1821 massacre and it is estimated 
that more than twenty thousand Christian Cypriots left the island in that period. In 
1828, the new Archbishop, Panaretos, along with other prelates and notables, sent a 
letter to Capodistrias, the governor of Greece, the "common mother country", 
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reminding hi'm of the Cypriots' plight and their longing to "drop anchor in the Greek 
harbour", asking him to become a "doctor to heal [the Cypriotsl wounds" in any way 
he saw politically fit.185 Obviously, the position of the Christian elite was very 
precarious: Since help was not forthcoming from Greece, relations with the Ottomans 
had to be mended; in 1830, a délégation was sent to the Porte, pleading for "finding 
the means to heal long-time passions" and for preventing the further dissémination of 
the Cypriots.186 Although the Porte did respond with some reforms, their impact was 
obviously not satisfactory for, in 1833, there were three populär uprisings on the island 
- one of which was led by Nicolaos Theseas.187 
From 1839, we enter the period of the Tanzimat reforms, and even though the 
changes do not seem to have been as radical as the Porte intented them to be, they 
certainly must have made a différence to Cyprus, for henceforth there were no more 
risings, agricultural production and commerce improved, and the population started 
gradually increasing.188 In their efforts to catch up with Europe, the Ottomans wanted 
to modernize their empire and to transform it into a centrally administered state of 
equal Citizens, fostering an over-arching loyalty to the centre, than to their particular 
community of faith. The more famous Tanzimat reforms were those of 1839 and of 
1856, which sought to establish equality among ail Ottoman subjects, independent of 
religious or other group identity. The more significant changes related to the 
reorganization of the millets along more "progressive" lines, to suit the more liberal 
spirit of the times. The main emphasis was on increased lay participation in the 
administration of the community and, especially, in the more 'secular7 affairs of the 
church (such as the church's finances and its involvement with éducation), as well as in 
the élection of its high officiais. The idea behind the reforms was that minimizing 
clérical control of community life and church affairs would reduce the barriere 
separating the various religious groups of the Empire, and foster a sensé of 
commonality - the ideology of "Ottomanism", of equality of all (maie) Ottoman 
subjects; this became a new pillaretone policy until the end of the empire.189 Other 
reforms aimed at modernizing the army and introducing universal conscription (which 
meant that Christians would now have to serve, and not only Muslims); changing the 
law so that discriminations against non-Muslims would be eliminated (for instance, in 
testifying against Muslims); and centrally administering the various territories through 
staff appointed by Istambul (rather than the onerous tax farming method previously 
used). All the éléments for a new "cultural compromise" were thus put in place: A 
vision for a re-imagined nation, congruent with a multi-cultural, centralized state 
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(rather than a 'mosaic' empire), and provisions for new forms of closure as regards 
politics, the military, law and national solidarity. 
Yet Ottomanism and the reforms did not work. A main reason for failure had to do 
with the fact that, in practice, the reforms meant that the millet system was not 
abandoned but simply reorganized, so that the communities were given more 
responsibilities (at the expense of the central state); similarly, the fact that religious 
leaders were made accountable for implementing the changes meant that, in practice, 
the system was actually strengthened. Giving the millets more formal récognition 
effectively institutionalized the séparation of the religious groups, only now the ethnie 
dimension was added, which was acquiring increasing significance with time. As a 
resuit, the millets came at this stage to resemble différent partner 'nations' in a multi­
national Empire, and the Archbishop of each ethno-religious group came to be seen as 
the leader of the nation (ethnarch) - rather than of the religious community as before. 
The Muslims resented the benefrts given to the non-Muslims, and those in key 
positions of authority, who were expected to implement the reforms, often ignored or 
undermined them instead. Similarly, the non-Muslims proved unwilling to go along 
with many of the changes; for instance, in most cases, Cyprus included, the Christians 
did not wish to join the army. And the Church found new ways of maintaining, and 
even of increasing, its power, than sharing it with laymen. But before we consider how 
the latter happened in Cyprus, we must introduce another factor which militated for 
the failure of the reforms: The existence of competing nation-states, with their own 
agendas and Claims, which carne into conflict with the aims of the Ottomans. In the 
case of Cyprus, the création and policies of the Greek Kingdom was to have a 
determining influence on developments in the island. 
The Greek state was put in place a few years after the Revolution - in 1828. We have 
seen how the ideology of the young state turned from a more liberal or civic version to 
a more conservative, ethnie nationalism.190 After a résurgence of religion and the 
establishment of a "national" church (1833), Orthodoxy became an important pillar of 
state ideology, and a useful mechanism in the drive for spiritual and national unity, 
vitally necessary to the state's survival. Furthermore, the initial Enlightment-stimulated 
resort to the ancient Greeks, as a source of inspiration and émulation of liberal and 
republican values, had taken a new turn towards a "romantic historicism" and "a purely 
rhetorical célébration of ancient Greek greatness", which amounted to formalistic 
"ancestral worship", accompanied by "an intolerant sense of self-sufficiency and self-
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confidence" based on the premise that modem Greeks were inheritors of the genius of 
classical Greece.1 9 1 The two apparently incompatible perspectives (of secular 
republicanism and religion) were combined into the idea of "Greco-Christian" 
civilization, which was to be the basis of the Greek nation-state. But the new state 
contained only a fraction (less than a third) of the Greek population of the Ottoman 
Empire, and its territory was still very small when compared with the historié Greek 
territories of Hellas in ancient times, or Byzantine 'Greece'. In 1844, a rising politician, 
Ioannis Kolettis, addressing the National Assembly, which was drafting the constitution, 
was to propose a new, grandiose vision for the Greeks - in the form of the irredentist 
project of the "Great Idea" (MegaliIdea): 
The [présent] Greek Kingdom is not the whole of Greece, but only a part, the 
smallest and poorest part. A native is not only someone who lives within this 
Kingdom, but also one who lives in Ioannina, in Thessaly, in Serres, in Adrianople, 
in Constantinople, in Trebizond, in Crete, in Samos and in any land associated with 
Greek history or the Greek race.1 9 2 
In essence, the proposed vision entailed the restoration of the Byzantine Empire, 
through incorporating within the bounds of a nation-state ali the areas where Greeks 
predominated, with Constantinople as the capital.193 This was the way to bring about 
congruence between politics and culture, state and nation. The way this grandiose 
project was defined meant that the mechanisms for "closure" had to cater for both 
internai and external dimensions of nation building.194 The former had to establish the 
homogeneity of the nation-state: For instance, éducation was to achieve linguistic and 
ideological homogenization; the legal system and judiciary were to ensure compliance 
to national norms and laws (for example, dealing with wide-spread banditry); the army 
was to galvanize the adhérence of young males to the new values and to implement 
the mission of territorial expansion of the state; and through the national Orthodox 
Church, religion was to act as the necessary cernent for the unity of the nation. The 
external dimension, meant that the 'national centre" (the Greek Kingdom) had to 
'export' the national ideas to the unredeemed territories - the 'irredenta'. This was to 
be achieved mainly through the Greek consulates, the Greek schools and the cultural 
associations in these unredeemed lands. The overall purpose was the consolidation of 
Greek identities out of the traditional religious identities,195 with the ultimate aim of 
eventually incorporating these remaining Greek lands into a new whole. 
In the case of Cyprus, the process of identity transformation had already begun, via 
the agency of the Cypriot and Greek merchant class and men of letters {logioi) who 
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were in contact with developments in Europe, through the paroikies and the Greek 
Kingdom. But left on its own, the process of change was both slow and uncertain. In 
1846, a Greek consulate was established in Cyprus, which was to provide an 
opportunity for the Cypriots to vent existing national feelings and to further consolidate 
them, channeling them in specific directions according to the policies of the Greek 
state. The latter was careful not to openly antagonize the Ottomans while Greece was 
not ready to openly confront them; its policies were more long-term and had to take 
into considération a lot of issues - such as the relative power of Greece and the 
Ottomans, as well as the interests and outlooks of the European powers.196 At the 
same time, the Greek consuls were very active in cultural affairs and especially in 
matters of éducation. 
Schools had actually been very few and their activities uncoordinated until 1830 when, 
with the initiative of the Orthodox Church, a General Assembly plus Town and Village 
Committees were set up to oversee and foster their development.197 The prelates 
largely dominated these bodies and controlied educational matters, since the Church 
was the greatest donor for the set up and sustenance of schools. The Tanzimat 
reforms required éducation to become a secular affair, managed by laymen; but the 
secularization of éducation was to be the duty of the Church leaders, as the heads of 
their millet. Most importante, the "secular" éducation envisioned by the reforms was 
not a uniform éducation, for all the Ottoman people, but a separate éducation for each 
millet Moreover, no financial or other assistance was given for furthering éducation -
as indeed for most other developments stipulated by the reforms - since the Ottoman 
state was constantly in financial crisis. 
According to Ottoman reform policies, the Cypriot system of éducation was linked to 
the /?ö/r>oY7/Orthodox millet, under the Patriarch of Constantinople. But after 1850, 
when the latter reluctantly recognized the Church of Greece and relations with Athens 
became much closer, the policies of the much better resourced 'national centre' were 
to gradually prevail. The éducation of ali Greeks, even those under Ottoman rule, 
became an important priority; through the influence of Athens, it started developing at 
a much faster pace than before,198 and became much more uniform, contributing to 
the graduai homogenization of ali Greeks. Since the content of éducation was 
determined in Greece (most books were written there, and many teachers studied or 
were recruited from there), the latter had acquired a powerful apparatus for forging 
the imagined community of nation. 
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The involvement of the Orthodox Church with éducation did not mean that the Church 
adopted national ideas early on. We have seen that the role of the Church - as part of 
the Ottoman establishment, in charge of ensuring the compliance of its members - put 
it in a very ambivalent position. Furthermore, its ecumenic perspective meant that it 
could not differentiate people on the basis of race, nationality, or other distinctions. In 
fact, Gregory V, the Patriarch of Constantinople, had condemned both Phereos'"radical 
republicanism" and the outbreak of the Greek Revolution.199 We have also seen that, 
in Cyprus, Archbishop Kyprianos denounced masonie ideas and activities;200 the 1815 
encyclical charged freemasons that they "oppose[d] the decrees of the Sovereign and 
deserve[d] to be put to death" for what they preached; it further urged the Ottoman 
authorities to "crack down" on thèse heretical Cypriot Christians, "to arrest them in 
their meetings and Councils and to punish them harshly".201 Finally, it made a special 
plea to the Bishop of Kitîon (Larnaka), the centre of merchants, freemasonry and 
radical nationalism, "to be on the alert about this matter which is pit against not only 
our most sacred and pure faith but also against the wishes and commands of our King 
[the Sultan]."202 Katsiaounis notes that: "The denunciation, which was in line with the 
stand of the Eastern Orthodox patriarchates towards French enlightment and 
freemasonry, nipped in the bud the growth of radical nationalist ideas in Cyprus".203 In 
the 1830s, Archbishop Panaretos expressed his contempt at the insurrection headed by 
Nicolaos Theseas, and charged that such men, who were initiated "into the sacraments 
of rébellion", were "abominable smali men". 2 0 4 
But the most elabórate and elear condemnation of nationalist ideas by the Orthodox 
Church came after the proclamations of independence by the various national 
churches,205 and especially that of Bulgaria (in 1865), which caused a great schism 
within the Orthodox Church. In 1872, a major Orthodox synod, attended by the 
Archbishop of Cyprus, issued a condemnation of "phyletism" (which essentially meant 
nationalism), arguing that the formation of national churches, "each accepting ail the 
members of its particular race [phyle], excluding ail aliens and governed exclusively by 
pastors of its own race" was totally against the spirit of the Church which aimed "to 
contain ail nations in one brotherhood in Christ". The synod concluded with a strongly 
worded denouncement of phyletism: 
We renounce, censure and condemn phyletism, that is racial discrimination, 
ethnie feuds, hatreds and dissensions within the Church of Christ, as contrary to 
the teaching of the Gospel and of the holy canons...206 
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Yet, by the turn of the twentieth Century, nationalist ideas would make inroads even 
into the politics of the Ecumenica! Patriarchate.207 In Cyprus, a division into a pro-
nationalist and a pro-ecumenic trend was to divide the Church, and the Greek 
Orthodox community more generally, reflecting a wider socio-political contest between 
traditional and modernizing forces. Since the Church was the paramount institution of 
Cypriot society, the battle revolved around which side would control the Church. 
The power of the Cypriot Church had somewhat decreased after the 1821 events, and 
the Tanzimat reforms had a similar effect through empowering the laymen at its own 
expense. Thus, after a 1840 firman, inspired by the reforms, tax-farming was assigned 
to lay notables (mostly landowners), and a number of committees were set up to 
enhance the involvement of laymen in church affaire. The sélection of the Archbishop 
and Bishops had, henceforth, to be through élections involving laymen, in addition to 
the Holy Synod (which up to that time had the main responsibility for the process). 
But, in reality, whatever power the Church lost through divesting some of its 
authorities to laymen, it regained in other ways, through its enhanced role as leader of 
the Cypriot millet The Church dominated the new bodies assigned the task of 
implementing the various reforms (including the reform of the taxation system): The 
Archbishop was an ex officio member of the Central Council of Nicosia, and the 
Bishops, similarly, of the local District Councils. 
The laymen who mostly benefìted from the reforms were the traditional landowners, 
since they were the ones to fili the posts reserved for the lay notables in the new 
Councils. Some of these landowners did involve themselves with trade, but they did 
not shed their conservative attitudes and ideology. Even the most prominent among 
this traditional elite had but basic éducation, and continued to espouse the norms and 
values of a "corporate and essentially aristocratie society" - that is, "values based on 
honour" and sustained through traditional morality, the only basis for reliable dealings 
in a pre-capitalist world, characterized by unpredictability of Hfe and insecurity of 
activity, including commerce. The material base of this secular elite, much like the 
Church before it, was the extraction of surplus from the labouring population, mostly 
the peasants, for the Sultan and for themselves. They were little involved with new 
productive enterprises, neither could they be the carriere of any new ideology, as that 
associated with the rising bourgeoisie in the West. It must be said that, overall,-
involvement in the various Councils did not give any real power to the traditional 
Christian elite (prelates and prominent lay kocabasis); even though it did symbolically 
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decrease their social distance to their Moslem aristocratic counterpart, with whom they 
mixed socially (jointly attending public celebrations, and so on), below surface 
appearances, the Christian élite were still second best to the Moslems, and thus 
servility combined with resentment.208 
The only group with somewhat different, non-traditional attitudes and ideology was the 
small "European oriented bourgeois", which developed around the merchant 
consulates in the two main port towns, Larnaka and Limassol209 - as outlined earlier 
on. Enjoying the commercial and political benefits of the capitulations, this group's 
contact with the outside world made it a carrier of new ideas, especially radical 
nationalist ideas. The merchant class and most of the logioi favoured the option of 
unión with the Greek state (enosis), and in this direction they received ¡ncreasing 
support from the Greek consulate. The latter was situated in Larnaka, home of the 
strongest community of merchants on the ¡sland,210 and kept cióse relations with this 
small bourgeoisie, supplying them with news and Greek newspapers, helping them in 
their educational and cultural activities. 
The 1850's and 1860's marked a crisis revolving around the bishopric of Kition,211 in 
Larnaka. As a consequence of bad financial management, the local bishop had to quit, 
and his replacement, after facing similar problems, allowed laymen to run the finances 
of the bishopric. Gradually, the bishop became dependent on the help and votes of 
the merchants and it seems that he carne to adopt their nationalistic discourse, 
becoming a carrier of their ideas. Nicosia, on the other hand, without almost any 
presence of either merchants or Europeans, was dominated by landowners, whose 
traditionalistic discourse influenced the Archbishopric, situated in the capital. Over 
time, two loóse coalitions carne to be formed, both closely associated with the Church: 
The more modernizing nationalists, excluded from the power structures of their millet, 
rallied around the Bishop of Kition; and the other more traditional forces of the ancient 
regime, more "Ottomanist" in outlook, around the Archbishop. But the división was 
still at a very early stage of articulation - these were times of early consolidation of 
national ¡dentities, and not of conscious nationalist agitation. 
A number of cultural associations or reading clubs [anagnost/ría] in the main towns 
were gathering spots for reading newspapers from Greece, Constantinople and 
Smyrna, and for hosting lectures by learned Greeks from such áreas, acting thus as 
small centers of intellectual and national revival.212 But little was happening in the 
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countryside, the largest part of which was undeveloped and isolated, with almost no 
road connections to the rest of Cyprus and to the urban centers. In conséquence, the 
peasants were more exposed to the clergy's influence and were thus more deferential 
and conservative, showing few signs of national awareness. Writing in the last years 
of Ottoman rule in Cyprus, Theodoras Peristianis, vice-consul of Greece in Larnaka, 
wrote a report on the state of affaire in Cyprus. The vice-consul noted that whereas 
prior to the Greek Revolution not more than thirty town people could write proper 
Greek, at the time of writing (1872), one third of town résidents could do so; this he 
attributed to the spread of éducation, which had also been beneficiai to national 
identity, éléments of whîch were becoming everywhere apparent, except in the 
countryside, where éducation was almost non-existent, and the many years of 
bondage had kept the peasants in dire ignorance: "Slavery has crushed the mind, the 
body and the hearts of the people."213 At the same time, Peristianis judged that 
religion, and not ethnicity, was still the paramount factor separating the Greeks and 
Turks on the island. Most Greek-Cypriots could not yet distinguish between the two: 
The Christian is not aware of his history, his nation. He considère all Orthodox to 
be co-nationals.214 
Peristianis was convinced that, given the right circumstances, national feelings could 
be awakened. But he saw that time as far away: 
Should a breeze of freedom blow for a while on the island and a national sense of 
direction be inspired in the spirit of the inhabitants, a teaching urging them along 
the road to natìonhood, and these Christians will recover from the lethargy in 
which they have been cast by so many centuries of slavery. That day however 
will dawn very late.215 
That day was in fact to arrive much earlier than Peristianis thought. And the spirit of 
nationalem was soon to change the face of Cyprus. 
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Chapter 4 British colonialism and irredentist nationalism 
Colonial European expansion started from the sixteenth Century onwards, but in the 
last decades of the nineteenth Century, European nation-states rushed into a new 
round of acquisition of overseas territories, parrjcularly in Asia and Africa, "at a rate 
and with a purpose unprecedented in the history of European colonialism".1 Some of 
these new territories belonged to the crumbling Ottoman Empire: Britain had, in 1840, 
initiated the London Convention, which guaranteed the integrity of the Ottoman 
Empire, to forestali its dismemberment; four decades later, her re-defined interests led 
her to detach Cyprus to use as a naval base in the Eastern Méditerranéen, for 
protecting the vital routes to the Middle East and India. In exchange, the Cyprus 
Convention provided for Britain to protect the Porte against Russian advancement in 
Asiatic Ottoman territories. Between 1870 and the end of WWI, Britain's colonial 
empire would almost double in size.2 
Britain's older colonies, mostly established before the mid-seventeenth Century, were 
inhabited by settlers of British or European background and had been granted British 
laws and institutions. The new colonies, which were either conquered or ceded in the 
period under considération, were inhabited by "savages" or other non-Europeans.3 
Much like the Ottomans, Britain managed these new vast territories through indirect 
rule, keeping control and interférence to the minimum necessary, so as not to incur 
large governing costs. Yet, unlike the Ottomans, Britain did not confine her interests 
to surplus extraction or to strategie benefits, but considered herself as having a 
"civilizing mission" - of helping her colonies to transform themselves from their more 
traditional or backward stage of development, to a higher and more progressive stage 
of civilization.4 In the case of Cyprus, this mission acquired a différent twist, for the 
majority of the inhabitants claimed to be Europeans, but were economically and 
socially undeveloped; furthermore, along with the Christians on the island there co-
habited a Muslim community. These were perhaps extra reasons why Cyprus was a 
most suitable case to acquire and to rule in an exemplary manner, so she çpuld be a 
"model" for others to follow - among the others being the Ottomans, whom Britain 
was trying to teach lessons on how to treat subject peoples. The aim was for Cyprus 
to be administered without corruption and arbitrariness, with sound fìnancial planning 
and principies of government, a just legal system, and an efficient state bureaucracy.5 
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But the British were to quickly forget their noble objectives. There were several 
reasons for this, ranging from Cyprus' changing strategie value, to financial constraints. 
But another set of reasons had to do with the plural nature of Cypriot society and the 
complications to représentative demoeraey this presented; this also related to the 
ethno-cultural links of the two communities on the island with the Greek and Ottoman 
states, respectively, and the différent cross-border identities and loyalties these 
entailed. As we have seen in the previous chapter, in late Ottoman years, the Greek 
Cypriots were gradually turning from a religious to an ethno-national community. 
Ottoman reform policies had not arrested this process and national closure was 
carrying on along communal Unes. Düring British rule, the policies adopted by the 
colonial power would augment these processes of closure along the same lines and 
would foster an irredentist movement for union with Greece, which would peak into a 
violent anti-colonial struggle and lead to the end of colonial rule. Meanwhile, the two 
ethno-national communities would develop in very différent ways and directions, with 
"walls of démarcation" growing between them, rendering them increasingly hostile to 
each other. 
The inter-communal cleavage produced as a conséquence of these processes, is 
certainly the most important division within Cypriot society, its roots going back to the 
island's pre-industrial past, and the process of nation-building, the next stages of which 
we will be examining further in this chapter. But, as Stein Rokkan has documented, 
modern states are also marked by a second division, associated with the industrial or 
market-economy stage of development.6 Indeed, another important feature of British 
colonialism in Cyprus, relates to the introduction of capitalist social relations and the 
émergence of associated new social forces. This was to lead to an intra-communal 
power contest within Greek Cypriot society, between the traditional, hégémonie forces 
of the Right and the counter-hegemonic forces of the Left, which were to consolidate 
into two antagonistic camps, each having a différent relation to the nation and 
upholding a différent variant of nationalist ideology. Left-wing nationalism combined 
an internationalist perspective, with éléments of a territorial-civic type of nationalism 
and thus appeared to offer new possibilities for the fostering of cross-communal 
loyalties and identities. 
The cleavage between the two opposing camps was created, and gradually 
entrenched, through processes of exclusion and closure quite similar to those 
associated with the build-up of the inter-communal cleavage.7 The multiple deep 
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divisions which ensued were to acquire explosive proportions, leading to the anti­
colonial struggle, but also to conflict between Greek and Turkish Cypriots and the 
polarization of the division between the Right and Left within the Greek Cypriot 
community. 
Modernity and communalism 
When the first High Commissioner of Cyprus, Lt. General Sir Garnet Wolseley, arrived 
in Larnaka, and his proclamation was read to the gathered crowds, they were jubilant: 
The déclaration conveyed the Queen's interest in the locals' prosperity and of her 
intention to adopt measures to promote the economy and "to afford to the people the 
blessings of freedom, justice and security". The island was to be "administered 
without favour to any race or creed" and, henceforth, ail would "enjoy alike the equal 
and impartial protection of the law"; no measure would be spared "to advance the 
moral and material welfare of the people". Moreover, assurances were given that: 
Regard shall be paid to the reasonable wishes of the inhabitants with respect to 
the maintenance of their ancient institutions, usages and customs - provided that 
they be consistent with just and good Government and [...] principles of 
civilization and liberty.8 
As the proclamation was read, every statement was punctuated with enthusiastic 
cheers (zitos), confìrming the crowd's seal of approvai on all that was said. The Bishop 
of Larnaka gave an initial welcome, but the officiai Greek Cypriot response was given a 
few days later, by Archbishop Sofronios, in Nicosia.9 The Archbishop stressed his 
community's10 willingness to be loyal to the new government, "without renouncing its 
descent and aspirations".11 The island had suffered much and for long, so that 
"intellectually and materially" it could not be proud of its achievements - but now was 
perhaps the chance for Cyprus to enjoy the fruits of the rule of law and "true 
civilization": 
For truly, a great and noble nation, of great achievements, as the English one 
[with] an enlightened and humane and paternal government, is sure to rule the 
various peoples under her sovereign care with appropriate and liberal institutions, 
so that they can gradually improve in their progress and well being...12 
The Archbishop went on to enumerate much the same values as Wolseley's message 
had referred to: The rule of law, equality of rights and duties, freedom, justice, and 
order, inviting the new authorities to seek the counsel of the "more able among the 
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elite" as regards the needs and realities of the country. On the face of it, there was 
complete agreement over values, objectives and expectations. But the assumptions of 
the two sides were radically différent... 
Let us first consider the Greek Cypriots. The Archbishop expressed the thoughts and 
feelings of ali the groups in the Orthodox community, for all were glad to see the 
Ottomans go. Trie more traditional segment, of prelates and landlords, were enjoying 
prevalence within their own community, but although after the Tanzimat reforms they 
were formally participatîng in the various représentative bodies, their overall position 
was still inferior when compared to. the Muslim ruling class. The new merchant class 
and Professionals were totally excluded from the politicai system; at the same time, 
they were the ones who kept doser contact with the outside world and, especially, 
with the Greek diaspora and the Greek Kingdom, so they had knowledge of the 
advances made in the West and shared in the ideas of nation and populär participation 
which were dominant in the West by that time. The peasants had somewhat improved 
their lot after the reforms, but they stili suffered from heavy taxation, high debts, and 
the rapacity of Ottoman officiais. Overall, everyone felt the island was neglected and 
underdeveloped, and power was in the hands of their enemies of the faith. 
Furthermore, increasing numbers, especially among the new elite, wished to see 
Cyprus become a part of the Greek Kingdom. For, if in the latter, the Megali Idea 
signifìed expansion and agrandisement, for the Greeks of the periphery, such as the 
Cypriots, aspiring to union with Greece signifìed libération.13 In this context, the take-
over of the island by Britain, considered the most powerful and enlightened of the 
European powers, and which had furthermore given the Ionians their freedom only a 
few years back, was a form of libération - and just a step away from the final stage of 
enosis. Besides, unlike other countries in Asia and Africa the Cypriots felt they were 
similar to the colonialists - they were no savages but true "Europeans who had fallen 
into difficult times".14 Colonization was not seen as a 'new bondage, but as a 
temporary apprenticeship for acquiring the skills of democracy and modernity from 
those who had the appropriate expérience. 
If we now turn to the British, there were a number of factors which were to render 
them unwilling or unable to deliver on their promises to fulfill their civilizing mission 
and, thereby, transform Cyprus through good government and modernizing reforms. 
First, Cyprus' decreasing strategie value after Egypfs occupation in 1882. Second, 
under the terms of the Cyprus Convention, the British had accepted to pay an annual 
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tribute to the Porte - but because the Ottomans were indebted to British stock-
holders15 and had defaulted on repayment, thîs sum was transferred to the latter 
despite the financial strains it imposed on the Cypriots. For fifty years, until it was 
abandoned, the tribute kept being a major source of complaint since a large 
percentage of government revenue (over 50% during the first decade of British rule) 
was siphoned off, stunting economic development in Cyprus and blocking expenses for 
implementing the promised and badly needed reforms (such as the construction of 
roads and dams). Even more problematic were the politicai reforms the Greek Cypriots 
were expecting: In the new colonies, politicai représentation was not automatic for the 
non-British, but was given in proportion to the Yesponsibility' and 'loyalty' the colonized 
demonstrated towards the colonial regime.16 But here was a serious problem since the 
Greek Cypriots started pushing for enosis with another state right from day one. The 
British had a recent bitter expérience with the Ionian islands, which they had to cede 
to Greece (1863) after unionist stirrings. One of the reasons they had chosen Cyprus 
was precisely because its population seemed to be peaceful and unlikely to similarly 
agitate for enosis.17 What the British forgot was that the passivity of the Cypriots had 
been partly secured after the exécution of its elite back in 1821: Now that they had a 
new, liberal master, they feit freer to advance their 'national vision'. 
To make things worse, the small but signifìcant Muslim community had différent 
objectives and an altogether différent culture, which further complicated the issue of 
politicai représentation. The existence of two diverse ethno-cultural communities on 
the island, which many British viewed as two races, presented unique problems to the 
colonial regime. Demetriadou argues18 that colonial worries with enosis, in conjunction 
with racialist attitudes characterizing most British offìcers and officiais, would make 
them antagonize the emerging ethnie sentiments among the Greek Cypriot elite, 
despite the fact that the demands of the latter were initially of a moderate and-
reformist nature. The outeome would be a self-fulfilling prophesy, since the ethnie 
awareness of the Greek Cypriots would be gradually galvanized into stronger ethno-
national identification and a harder stand on enosis. Obviously, the two problems fed 
into each other, escalating the antagonism between colonizers and colonized even 
further. 
Racialist and Orientalist discourses on the Cypriots became widespread with the British 
occupation of the island; the new colony became an object of interest and a number of 
popularizing accounts started appearing, aiming to provide détails on the island's 
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history, geography, inhabitants and other curia. Paying little attention to the self-
identifications of the locals (see next section), these accounts exhibited a fascination in 
speculating on the racial roots of the natives, and on the relative impact of the orient 
as against the occident on their character and culture. Influenced by the prevalent 
discourses of the times, as well as the worries of British at the prospect of unionist 
agitation, most such accounts tended to stress the impurity of the locals' origins and 
their hybrid nature. One of the earlier popularizing works on Britain's new acquisition, 
appropriately titled British Cyprus (1879), by Hepworth Dixon, provides an interesting 
example of the attitudes of the new British masters. Dixon devoted a chapter of his 
work wondering who "the Cypriotes" were. The author was certain that the natives 
"Except in name [...] are neither Turks nor Greeks" - not even an "amalgam of these 
two races", for in "neither face nor figure, in neither speech nor genius, has the 
Cypriote any resemblance to either Turk or Greek". Dixon did in fact clarify that his 
criteria related to "the race, and not the creed" and, by those criteria, he had found 
the natives to be on the lower steps of the evolutionary ladder. Hence, for Dixon, 
Cypriotes are: 
An indolent, careless, and mimetic people, but without a spark of Turkish fire; 
without a touch of Grecian taste. With neither beauty of body nor sense of 
beauty in the mind - with neither personal restlessness nor pride of origin - with 
neither large aspirations nor practical dexterity of hand, they live on, in a limpid 
state like creatures of the lower types...19 
Scott-Stevenson, a female author, married to a British officer, admonished her readers 
"not to confuse the Cypriotes with the true Hellenes, for in many characteristics the 
two people are essentially different, almost, indeed, forming a distinct race. The 
Cypriotes are dull and lazy, they have no ambition, nor the patriotic longings of the 
Greeks."20 Similar attitudes and values towards the locals were shared by many British 
officiais. The first High Commissioner, Sir Garnet Wolseley, shared such feelings, which 
he recorded in his private diary: 
I don't like foreigners I am glad to say. I hate their ways and customs but I can 
forget those [:] Why I really dislike foreigners is on National grounds. If I had 
ten sons all should be brought up on this feeling [:] The more they hated 
foreigners, the more they would cling to England as their home.21 
As regards Cyprus, more specifically, he carried on to complain that he felt powerless, 
since the terms of the Convention did not allow him to completely transform it into a 
part of glorious England: 
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All my visions of making this an entirely English province with English even for 
the language of the people are rudely dispelled that I can be little better than a 
Turkish Pasha without the arbitrary power the Turkish law gave him.2 2 
From the early days of assuming his post, Wolseley kept worrying of the "danger of an 
Hellenic propaganda".23 He boasted that when the first deputation of Greek Cypriots 
visited him and requested "to make Greek the official language" he immediately 
rejected the suggestion.24 As he confided to Salisbury, he went out of his way to 
"make much of the Moslems", demonstrated an interest in the welfare of their 
mosques and churches, made sure that in all public occasions he gave place of honour 
to the Turkish Cadi - and, in general, tried to show "clearly to all concerned that 
Cyprus was not under English rule to become an Hellenic state".25 Not only that, but 
he (unsuccessfully) tried various schemes to promote immigration from Turkey, or 
from Catholic countries such as Malta, so as to equalize the numbers of Muslims to 
Christians, or to set the "Latins against the Greeks so as to keep the latter in order".26 
At the same time, he tried to stop the influx of "Levantine, Ionian or mainland Greeks" 
into the island, so as not to strengthen Greek numbers.27 Even where he appeared 
more ready to make openings to the Greek Cypriots, he made sure that they were still 
excluded. A good example was that of the police force, which under the Ottomans was 
the exclusive domain of Muslims: Wolseley opened recruitment to all, but insisted in 
maintaining the existing uniform, which included a white turban, a symbol of Ottoman 
rule that no Greek Cypriot wanted to wear, since it would "turn them into Turks".28 
Here, then, were the elements foreshadowing how the colonizers would use cultural 
differences to serve their political purposes: Cypriots were not seen as diverse ethno-
cultural communities, comprising one people, but as fragmentary ethnic others, who 
needed to be manipulated and played against each other, so as not to create problems 
for their rulers. Not all British, of course, shared Wolseley's views or attitudes. In fact, 
the more prominent British officers and politicians would increasingly come to share 
the locals' views on their Greek ancestry and identity. Just two years into British rule 
(1880), William Gladstone, then leader of the Opposition and himself a student of 
Greek antiquity, concurred that "the bulk of the people of Cyprus are Greeks" and 
warned that with the "extending emancipation of the East of Europe, Greek sympathies 
will prevail in the island", and that improving the locals' lot would not win their loyalty 
to Britain but would instead expedite their desire "to be united with the free Greeks of 
the rest of the world".29 In 1907, Winston Churchill, then Under-Secretary of State for 
the Colonies, affirmed that it was "only natural that the Cypriot people, who are of 
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Greek descent, should regard their incorporation with what may be called their mother 
country as an ideal to be earnestly, devoutly, and fervently cherished" - tempering this ' 
with a warning that the Muslim community should not be ignored.30 Similar Statements 
were made by many others on différent occasions; Britain, in fact, offered the island to 
Greece in 1915, on the condition that she joined the Allies (which Greece was unable 
to do at the time so the offer was withdrawn), confìrming the Greek Cypriots' view that 
the colonizers themselves recognized the island's "Greekness".31 Düring World War II, 
the British government mobilized the Greek Cypriots with the recruiting slogan "fight 
for Greece and for your freedom",32 implying that after the war the Greek Cypriots 
could expert their union with the "motherland". But thèse more positive views did not 
lead to a concrete outcome, managing only to stir Greek Cypriot expectations and 
subséquent frustration, as well as Turkish Cypriot anxieties, leading to their collusion 
with the colonizers in order to forestali Greek rule. Both déniai and acknowledgement 
of ethno-cultural différences thus kept fostering ethnie identifications and divergences, 
widening the gulf separating the two communities. Instead of searching for ways to 
build an over-arching sense of unity, the British, who themselves had become a large 
part of the problem, attempted to contribute to its resolution through institutionalizing 
bi-communalism. 
The need for the co-habitation of people with deep cultural différences did not only 
concern Cyprus, but many of the new British colonies which were considered to be 
'plural' in nature. In his classic study of this phenomenon, Furnivall defined a "plural 
society" as comprising two or more éléments or segments whîch "live side by side yet 
without minglïng, in one politicai unit"[...] "a medley of peoples [...] for they mix but do 
not combine. Each group holds its own religion, its own culture and language, its own 
ideas and ways. As individuals, they meet but only in the market-place, in buying and 
selling [...] Irving side by side but separately [...] in the society as a whole there is no 
common social will".33 Faced with this kind of plurality, colonial theory attempted to 
solve the problem by combining politicai représentation with the "balancing" role of the 
officiai British représentatives, who were to have the "casting vote" so as to protect the 
weaker group(s) - assuming that, thereby, they would also be protecting the interests 
of the whole population, whose "divisions render[ed] it incapable of protecting its own 
interests".34 
Cyprus was, in fact, the colony in which "communal représentation [...] was first 
formalized":35 Obviously, the British considered it a plural society par excellence. The 
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décision for communal représentation was apparently taken after intense debate 
among senior officiais of the Foreign and Colonial offices. In response to strong 
worries that the communal approach would divide the two ethnie groups the view 
prevailed that "history, custom and language" had already done that.36 In another 
exchange, the Secretary for the Colonies, Earl of Kimberley, argued that even if the 
principle of fixing a certain proportion of Christians and Muslims in the représentative 
body could have been accepted for ensuring an adequate représentation of both 
"dénominations" (as he assumed the two groups to be), voters should still have been 
free to vote for any candidate they wished, irrespective of community, subject to the 
ratio limitation stipulated; otherwise, he feared, there would have been a risk of 
creating "a wall of démarcation" between the two communities.37 But, again, thèse 
worries were side-stepped. 
The British were, thus, ready to grant a progressive measure of politicai représentation 
to the Cypriots, but they were worrîed of enosis pressures, plus they had to deal with 
the plural nature of local society. These combined facts and constraints influenced the 
way they implemented représentation. As a first step, the Cypriots were only given a 
fully appointed Legislative Council, consisting of 3 British officiai members, plus 3 
unoffîcial members (a Muslim, a foreigner (Latin) and a "Christian"). Soon it became 
apparent that représentation in the Council was "purely cérémonial", since the 
unoffîcial members could not propose législation but simply comment on bills prepared 
by the government. The Greek Cypriots kept pressuring for change: For members not 
to be appointed but elected, for proportional instead of equal représentation to be 
used, and for the décisions of the Council to be enforceable.38 The Muslims objected 
from the start to the principle of proportional représentation, arguing for the equal 
politicai représentation of the two communities, just like in the last years of Ottoman 
rule. After several years of pressure, the Legislative Council was "remodelled" in 
1882,39 so that it had 6 officiai and 12 elected members, 6 of which were to be "non­
Muslim" and 3 Muslim.40 Each community would vote for its own représentatives. 
Obviously, if the Muslims aligned their votes with the 6 officiai British members, and 
hearing in mind the chairman's double vote, they would always outbid the "non­
Muslim" Greeks. In 1925, membership increased to 24, out of which 12 were Greeks, 
3 Muslims and 9 officiai members, so the problem remained.41 
Communal représentation was, in many ways, a new version of the millet system. Did 
it contribute to the further division of the two communities? Would the liberal, 
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majoritarian system have been more démocratie and/or more successful as many have 
proposed since?42 Cross-comparative expérience may shed some light on the issue: A 
British officiai commission, which studied the fìve décades expérience of Ceylon with 
communal représentation, did indeed conclude that the system was "a cancer on the 
body politic, eating deeper and deeper into the vital énergies of the people, breeding 
self-interest, suspicion, and animosity, poisoning the new growth of politicai 
consciousness and effectively preventing the development of a national or corporate 
spirit".43 Thus, communal représentation changed in 1931 to majority government. Did 
this solve the problem? Reviewing developments since, Darini Rajasingham-
Senanayake concludes the opposite: Since ethno-racial thinking was already 
entrenched, "an ethnicity- and minority- blind system", with no concession to 
'communal' interests, led simply to the dominance of the majority. Thus, in the pursuit 
of more democracy, an ethnically bi-polar imagination was Consolidated which 
ultimately led post-colonial Sri-Lanka to conflict.44 
It becomes apparent that once closure is already affected along ethnie Unes neither 
communal représentation nor the majoritarian system are trouble-free solutions for 
achieving peaceful co-habitation under a single politicai roof. In the case of Cyprus, 
separate représentation in the Council may have been necessary for protecting the 
Muslim minority. But ignoring Kimberley's suggestion of not separating the votîng 
constituencies certainly did not help, since division was accepted, built upon, and 
enhanced; a more integrated society would still have some chance, since nationalism 
at that stage had not yet reached the masses - as we will shortly confirm. A second 
considération is how pluralism in the Council was handled: Was the real concern of 
the British how to protect the Muslim minority, or simply how to use it for its own 
purposes? If the former, then they could have usefully coached the two communities 
into learning to share power and to live together - in which case, the British would 
have been true enlightenment partners, guiding the newly-initiated into deeper 
democracy (as the locals had actually expected them to). Obviously, this was not the 
real intention of the colonizers; by the latterà own admission, half a Century after the 
Legislative Council was set up: 
The Government could only carry its measures through the Council, by playing off 
the Greek-speaking against the Turkish-speaking éléments [...] and from time to 
time, when a serious deadlock occurred, by resort to an Imperial Order-in­
Council.45 
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In the early years of British rule, the representatives of the two communities did at 
times join forces to further their common interests, especially in connection with 
pressing economic problems which concerned both communities. Cooperation became 
increasingly difficult, however, and "broke down around the turn of the century when 
the Greek members of the Council began to use the body as a forum for enosis 
demands".46 From that time onwards the Turkish Cypriots would join forces with the 
British - except on the Tribute issue.47 As Governor Storrs, a supposed Philhellene was 
later to admit, this perennial collusion meant that the Greek Cypriots "confronted by 
the unanimous officials and the three almost mechanical Turkish voters, could not but 
feel with irritation that they were little better than a debating society". Storrs was one 
of the most 'enlightened' colonial officers; his view of the Greek Cypriots' identity has 
reminiscences of Max Weber's famous definition of ethnicity, emphasizing the 
importance of the subjective dimension: ..."the Greekness of Cypriots is in my opinion 
indisputable. Nationalism is more, is other, is greater than pigmentation or cephalic 
indices. A man is of the race of which he passionately feels himself to be. No sensible 
person will deny that the Cypriot is Greek-speaking, Greek-thinking, Greek-feeling, 
Greek, just as much as the French Canadian is French-speaking, French-thinking, 
French-feeling and French".48 Storrs was among the British officials who were critical 
of communal representation49 - yet he himself proved unable to treat the locals 
differently than others: When, in 1931, in the face of a great economic depression and 
the dire misery of the people, the British tried to impose new taxes, a new Turkish 
member of the Council sided with the Greek members; Storrs' narration of the event 
reveals the deeply ingrained attitudes of the colonizers in the face of opposition from 
their subjects: "the little Turk - 'the Thirteenth Greek' - in whose hands the Liberalism 
of the 'eighties had placed the casting vote of the Colony, voted with the traditional 
enemies of his race"; the bill was defeated and Storrs, in standard colonial practice, 
resorted to an Order-in-Council to enforce it against the wishes of the locals. This, in 
fact, was one of the main reasons which led to the uprising of 1931, and the end of 
the Legislative Council itself. 
The preceding analysis is not for advancing a crude argument that the divide-and-rule 
policies of the British were solely to blame for inflaming ethnic passions and for the 
increasing distance between the two communities. For, as we have seen, the roots of 
communalism were already strong by the time the British arrived. Thus, allowing or 
encouraging the locals to take political decisions as individuals, and not as members of 
a cohesive community, would not, on its own, have produced very different results. A 
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good example was the Municipal Councils, which operated on différent principles to the 
Legislative Council: Town councilors, who were elected separately through community-
based proportional représentation, voted thereafter jointly, to determine between 
themselves the mayor.50 Unsurprisingly, the main towns, in ali of which the Greek 
Cypriots were the majority (and thus had a majority of councilors), always selected a 
Greek Cypriot mayor throughout British mie, with only one exception - and that was 
not because, in that particular case, the councilors decided that a Turkish Cypriot 
happened to be better for the post, but because, at the time, the Greek Cypriots were 
so deeply divided between themselves (over the Archbishopric issue), that they failed 
to collude in order to determine one of their own community as mayor!51 This, again, 
goes to demonstrate that once closure has proceeded along ethno-national lines, the 
liberal, majoritarian mode of politics (giving each individuai one vote) cannot ensure 
that all will have equal chances of élection, but instead normally leads to majority 
dominance. As with the case of the Legislative Council, the Muslims were unhappy 
with their minority status and kept pressing for a more equal arrangement. Thus, in 
1907, they proposed a system whereby mayors would change by rotation, according to 
ethnicity.52 In 1926, the Nicosia Muslim councilors requested for one of their own to be 
elected vice-mayor.53 In neither case was change forthcoming. Yet it must be noted 
that, despite the prevalence of a communal /77/y/ef-mentality, the overall collaboration 
between the two communities as regards municipal affairs was quite amicable: The 
Muslims to a large extent resigned themselves to the hegemony of the Christians. It 
was only towards the end of colonial rute, when the nationalism of the Turkish Cypriots 
had grown, and especially after the outbreak of the anti-colonial struggle in 1955 
brought tensions to a climax, that they were to seek in more dynamic ways to restore 
their equality - through pushing for séparation.54 
Besides institutionalizing communal politicai représentation, the British were quite 
ambivalent in the way they handled other millet institutions and practices, the end 
result leading to the further embedding of communalîsm. Perhaps the best example is 
how they dealt with the Orthodox Church. Expectediy, the secularly minded British 
imported to Cyprus the idea of séparation of church and state. Early on, they tried to 
limit the power of the locai Church by Stripping it of many of its traditional rights and, 
thereby, eroding the bases of its authority; indeed, this "set the stage for the 
émergence of an intense anti-British campaign," led by the Church.55 Primarily, the 
British antagonized the Church through their unwillingness to recognize the Archbishop 
as ethnarch, that is, as leader and politicai représentative of the Greek Orthodox.56 As 
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we have seen, the British set up political bodies, such as the Legislative Council, to 
carry out the function of political representation. Yet the Church would not give up her 
prerogatives so easily and the Archbishop and Bishops clung on to membership of the 
Central and District Committees, respectively, even though many of the powers of 
these bodies shifted to the Legislative Council. Furthermore, since the law allowed the 
clergy eligibility to stand for election, a number of prominent prelates did successfully 
take the challenge and thereby managed to maintain an important political role "by 
becoming leading figures" of the Legislative Council.57 
A second area of tension arose out of the British refusal to provide the Bishops with 
policemen to help them in the collection of their customary dues, which included 
canonical and liturgical fees - as was the practice under Ottoman times. The Church 
complained that, as a result, many individuals simply refused to pay, reducing her 
revenues to less than a third,58 thereby hampering her educational and charitable 
work, for which it was blamed by the public. Thirdly, ecclesiastical land property, 
which was hitherto exempt from taxation, was now treated like any other private 
immovable property. Fourthly, the Church lost the assistance of the civil authorities in 
enforcing the sentences passed by the ecclesiastical courts on individuals violating 
canon laws (such as adultery, or the cohabitation of couples within the prohibited 
degrees of kinship).59 The Church did, however, continue to have other means of 
controlling the faithful, such as withholding sacraments. Besides, the real issue was 
that personal law remained the domain of the communities which, in the case of the 
Greek Cypriots, meant it continued to be the responsibility of the Church, thereby 
maintaining the latter's hold on the people. Overall, it seems true that the coming of 
the British undermined the status and position of the prelates, since officially the 
Church lost some of the privileges it had enjoyed in the past, thereby losing in wealth 
and status. But the Church did maintain some privileges and it quickly found new 
roles and responsibilities which helped it survive and maintain its hegemonic position in 
colonial Cyprus: "...The ethnarchic tradition, the clergy's control of the education 
system and the strength of religious sentiment amongst the population made the 
Bishops natural raHying points against the abuses of colonial rule".60 
The Church's control of education was especially important. We have seen that the 
Church established and maintained most schools in Ottoman years. The teachers in 
these early schools were mostly priests. During the British period, more and more 
schools were built and, gradually, laymen took over the teaching posts. But for nearly 
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fifty years into British rule, control of the schools remained in the hands of the District 
Committees, which were chaired by the Bishops, while the Church kept fìnancing the 
schools to the extent possible. As we will see in the next section, the curriculum of the 
schools sought to inculcate national values and oriented the students towards enosis. 
The British government initially maintained a very liberal attitude, throughout the first 
fifty years, (wrongly) considering the Cypriot schools as similar to the denominational 
schools in England, but also because it did not wish to assume full financial 
responsibility for the educational system. Thus, it offìcially sanctioned the existence of 
two separate éducation boards and a "dual school system", so that each community 
catered for its own needs and had effective control of the community's éducation.61 But 
the role of the schools in promoting nationalist ideas and the graduai escalation of 
nationalism caused it to change its mind, so, in 1929, it took control over the 
appointment and payment of teachers and, in 1933, it proceeded to take control of the 
curriculum as well. These changes belatedly introduced aimed to stop the two 
communities from looking towards their mother countries. A Student of colonial 
éducation in Cyprus proposes that the British were aiming at the "integration" of the 
two communities and their "assimilation" into a new whole: 
The new curriculum was intended to make ail [Greek and Turkish Cypriot 
students] think of themselves as a separate nation, the Cypriot nation.62 
This may be Overstating the point, but the British did certainly aim at the création of a 
new sensé of Cypriotness. In elementar/ schools, for instance, radical changes were 
introduced affecting the content and teaching approach to most subjects, but 
especially History and Geography, the aim being for thèse subjects.to focus on Cyprus 
and not the mother-countries, as before. Textbooks had to be written locally (and not 
imported from Greece or Turkey), so as to comply with the new emphasis. At the 
secondary level, the création of English schools would be encouraged. And so on. 
But the obvious motive was not the good of the two communities and of the people of 
Cyprus - the development of a genuine sensé of commonality between the two 
communities, aiming at peaceful co-existence and, ultimately, to a future bi-national, 
self-governing state. The new policy rather aimed at how to foster loyalty to 
colonialism, and get the locals to appreciate "the place of Cyprus as a part of the 
British Empire".63 It was Anglicizàtion under the guise of Cypriotization. 
The attempted changes were hot confined to éducation: They were part of a wider 
policy aimed to curb the growing nationalist movement. Georgallides cites a minute of 
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1928 by Leopold Amery, Secretar/ of State for the Colonies, to Governor Storrs, 
suggesting the fostering of "Cypriot patriotism" as an alternative to enosis.6* The Greek 
Cypriots were basing their irredentist demands on their Greek culture and identity; 
they used the mounting archaeological and folkloric évidence, documenting the island's 
Greek cultural roots as weapons in their politicai struggles;65 British Philhellenes had 
repeatedly expressed sympathy with their cause. Therefore, colonial authorities could 
not easily resort to Orientalist arguments (linking the locáis to the East, rather than to 
Greece or to the West) in justifying the perpétuation of their rule. Caught between the 
problematic Hellenic and Orientalist alternatives, the British had to invent a suis generis 
Cypriot identity as the way out. Current needs, at the time, were therefore to 
determine ancient realities: Storr's re-edited 'Handbook of Cyprus' de-emphasized the 
Hellenic aspects of Cyprus' history.66 In the fìeld of archaeology, the "Eteocypriots", 
supposedly the island's first inhabitants, before the coming of the Greeks, were soon to 
be invented.67 In historiography, G. Hill would use a single line from Aeschylos' 
Suppliants (Iketides), to argue against the "pure" Greekness of the Cypriots.68 New 
stamps issued, combined symbols from the Christian, Muslim and Lusignan past.69 
Even the Governor's palace was decorated using mixed motifs from the island's history 
- not out of a desire of celebrating Cyprus' multi-cultural past, but with the intention of 
giving the locáis from both communities pride in a past "wholly unconnected with 
présent or future aspirations" - save, of course, the reality of colonial rule, which was 
the invisible promoter of this neutral Cypriot culture and identity.70 
The policy failed dismally in ail its objectives. The Cypriots understood it as a ploy of 
the British to serve their own politicai purposes. The Church campaigned against the 
proposed changes, arguing that they were an attempi to "de-Hellenize" the Greeks; 
this was actually one of the main rallying criés it used to arouse the Greek Cypriots to 
resist the government, and it was a precursor to the 1955 armed struggle. What is 
unfortunate is not that colonial plans were frustrated. It is rather that the potential of 
steering a new course, starting with éducation, which could have contributed towards 
the fostering of a new over-arching identity, was lost. And the idea would be further 
reinforced that feeling Cypriot was the opposite of feeling Greek - that the two could 
not co-exist, so that the construction of a unifying sense of Cypriotness amounted to 
de-Hellenization and treachery.71 
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From national awareness to nationalisa movement 
At the time the British came to Cyprus, there was no developed national movement, 
and we can only talk of the existence of an ethno-national awareness among the Greek 
Cypriot elite. It was only in the mid-1850s that the first scholarly work putting Cyprus 
in the context of its historical and cultural links with Greece appeared.72 The author, 
Athanasius Sakkelarios, was a Greek mainland philologist, who spent time as the 
headmaster of a Greek high school in Larnaca, and collected materials on the 
geography, history, language and lore of the island; the massive outcome, Cypriot 
Matters, extended the tradition of nineteenth Century Greek historiography and 
folklorism to Cyprus.73 Gradually, other Greeks and Cypriots would build on Sakkelarios' 
work. Georgios Loukas, one of his pupils, was the first Cypriot folklore researcher. In 
the introduction of his Philoiogicai Visits to the Monuments of the Ancients in the Life 
of the Modem Cypriots (1874), Loukas présents his readers with a philoiogicai vision 
he had: Two of the "blessed Teachers of the modem Greeks", Koraes and 
Mavrophrydes, appeared before him dragging along the "German heretic", doubter of 
the Greeks' purity of origin, Fallmerayer. The "Teachers" asked the "heretic" to 
consider the life and culture of the Cypriots, the furthest outpost of the Greek world, 
and determine for himself that they still maintained the purest customs and most 
Hellenic life-style, much like their ancient forefathers. Fallmerayer was shamed once 
he attested to the truth of the matter; furthermore, the évidence did not only make the 
case for Cyprus' continuity with Greek antiquity but, much like the missing link, added 
strength to the argument of the continuity of Greece itself. "Yes! the Hellas of Perikles 
unaltered lives on!", 7 4 exclaimed Loukas - the proof had been conclusively given that 
the nation had survived through the ages, and only needed to be rediscovered.75 
Two years after Loukas' publication, in July 1876, the national vision was still not 
shared by many, to the extent that H. Vassiliades, the vice-consul of Greece in Cyprus, 
lamented that: 
The spirit of Hellenism in some places is asleep and in others is totally non­
existent, owing perhaps to the continuous pressure exerted by the Ottomans.76 
Indeed, the Ottoman regime must have been the paramount reason why national 
consciousness seemed asleep or totally lacking, fbr only three years later, and only one 
year into British rule (in February 1879), the same Greek vice-consul was to report a 
miraculous re-awakening: 
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The spirit of the Cypriote has risen to an unbelievable degree. Four years ago the 
inhabitante of the island, particularly in the hinterland, refrained from calling 
themselves Greek, fearing the wrath of the Asian despote. Today, however, they 
boldly déclare themselves Greek and refer to Greece as their dearest 
motherland.77 
The change-over described seems so swift that one may indeed liken it to a sudden 
awakening from age-long slumber. Would a modernist explanation stili be possible, 
offering an alternative reading of. this unexpected surge of national feeling? 
Kitromilides78 answers in the affirmative, and proposes that such an alternative 
explanation would need to stress the interplay of two factors: First, the "Hellenic 
ethnological character" of Cypriot society, as reflected in ite language, archaic culture, 
ancient myths, memories and traditions, which provided the "démographie and cultural 
substratum" for the implantation and subséquent growth of Greek nationalism. 
Second, the nineteenth century process of exporting nationalist ideas from the Greek 
national centre (the Greek Kingdom) to the "Eastern periphery of Hellenism", in the 
context of the propagation of the politicai programme of the Megali Idea. Building and 
elaborating upon Kitromilides' "model of the pénétration and development of Greek 
nationalism"79 in the "Greek East", we may stipulate that the appearance of an 
"awakening", hid from view a much more complicated process of nation construction, 
entailing a complex set of éléments - which we turn to consider. 
Firstly, we should recali that Greek Cypriote maintained dose links with the wider 
Greek Orthodox world, and were active participante in the processes of change in the 
Greek paroikies and the newly created Greek Kingdom. It would, thus, be wrong to 
portray the pénétration and development of nationalism as simply an "export" from the 
Greek nation-state to the periphery - since the Cypriote themselves (through a small 
section of their elite) were participante in the production of the national vision. Having 
underlined this point, we may concur that the newly created Greek state did play an 
important role in the promotion of nationalist ideas, both directly and indirectly, 
through the educational network, the consulates, the cultural associations, and the 
press. Greek éducation initially focused on the spread of the Greek language among 
the younger, a task which was aided by the fact that Greek was already taught as part 
of the more narrowly focused ecclesiastical éducation, traditionally offered by the 
Orthodox Church. A first emphasis was on the "linguistic homogenization of the 
Christian Orthodox populations of the East", in the face of the existing linguistic 
variations - which were considered "symptoms of cultural and ethnie degeneration". 
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Language would thus supplement religion and, eventually, even surpass it as the major 
bond of nationality. A separate element was the promotion of the ideology of national 
unity of all Hellenes, aiming at the legitimation of the role of the Greek state as 
coordinator of the liberation project of all unredeemed Greeks (the idea of the 
"national centre" of Hellenism). This vision was transmitted via Greek History classes 
and/or through the latent curriculum of national celebrations and other cultural 
activities. 
The basic instrument for translating these policy objectives into educational outputs, 
material and human, was the Athens National University. The state university was 
founded in 1837 and an important part of its vision was the spread of Hellenism 
Eastwards; this it achieved through training young people from the irredenta, or 
through sending Greek mainland teachers and textbooks to wherever these were 
needed. Schools in the Greek East had to comply with the standards and specifications 
set by Athens, both in order to keep up with developments in the mainland, but also 
because school graduates could enter the National University only if the nationally 
agreed curriculum was taught. The work of the university was assisted by 
independent cultural and educational organizations, such as the Athens based 
'Association for the Propagation of Greek Letters' and the 'Greek Literary Association of 
Constantinople'.80 Local cultural associations were also vital in this project, usually set 
up by young teachers or other logioi. 
The work of Athens was supplemented with inputs from the other centers of Hellenism 
and the paroikies - such as Constantinople, Smyrna, Alexandria, Venice, Trieste -
which, besides "commercial commodities exported cultural commodities", such as 
books and newspapers, thus "reinforcing the dialectic of nationalism".81 In Cyprus, the 
project of educational convergence became easier after the improvement of socio­
economic conditions and the setting up of regular postal and commercial connections 
with Athens, Smyrna, Constantinople and Alexandria, in the second half of the 
nineteenth century.82 
A characteristic letter of thanks, sent by the Nicosia Town Committee, to the Ministry 
of Church Matters and Public Education of Greece (February 1862), sums up the 
national values and relationships built through education: 
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Greece being considered by us the cradle of enlightment, from which the whole 
Greek race in Eastern lands awaits progress and advancement, it is fair to receive 
from us the due payment of gratitude. Because it does not only freely offer us 
teaching books but in its various educational institutions teachers are educated, 
compétent to be used as instruments for the dissémination of Greek paedeia 
[éducation] and Christian training without which it would be impossible for the 
whole nation to advance itself. 
It is important to note how quickly the number of schools kept increasing: While, in 
1839, there were only 10 Greek schools, by the end of Ottoman rule, in 1878, the 
number had grown to 76; within a decade into British rule, the number more than 
tripled - and so did the number of students. Considering the crucial rôle of éducation 
in propagating the new ideas of nation, we may take the growth in literacy as an index 
of the spread of nationalism.83 A comparison with the respective numbers of Muslim 
schools and students brings out the point more clearly.84 
Christian Schools Muslim Schools 
Year Schools Students Schools Students 
1878-9 76 64 
1879-0 - 3100 - -
1880-1 - 3145 - 1421 
1882-3 162 - 76 -
1885-6 210 9480 77 2424 
1890-1 241 10944 103 3594 
table 4.1: Growth in number of schools and students, in early colonial years 
The Greek consuls were active catalysts in the development of local éducation and in 
linking together the various relevant actors: In Cyprus, the last consul under the 
Ottomans and first under the British (E. Vassiliades, 1876-1880), for instance, 
established -three schools during his time of service, and elicited the help of the 
'Society for the Advancement of Greek Letters', in sending teaching textbooks for the 
island's schools.85 
The help of the paroikies was equally important. The Cypriot Fraternity of Egypt had 
been financially supporting four elementary schools, when, in 1889, it decided to help 
with the establishment of the first Greek secondary school (Gymnasion) in Nicosia. 
The request and pressures went to the Archbishop as the one in charge of educatîonal 
matters. Once the relevant décision was taken at a spécial meeting of the Nicosia 
School Committee (1893), the Fraternity carried on with pressure to impose the 
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"classical" form of Gymnasium (which more clearly fostered national ideals, rather than 
alternative models) and, subsequently, requested its récognition by the Greek 
Government.86 The Fraternity actively promoted national ideas in various ways. 
When the British first came to Cyprus, written requests were sent by the Fraternity to 
the Archbishop, urging him to do away with the "humble and servile spirit" which 
characterized his stance during Ottoman rule and to "recover the grandeur and 
eminence" fit for his position, now that the "more civilized" British were Coming; it 
furthermore, advocated a welcoming stance, representing not just the Greek Cypriot 
community {the Orthodox millet) as in Ottoman times, but the "entire Island" or the 
"Fatherland" - in other words, the Archbishop was exorted to act as a modern leader, 
representing the whole Cypriot people.87 High Commissioner Wolseley had accused 
the Fraternity of aiming at "the spread of disaffection amongst the people of Cyprus 
and the general propagation of Hellenism throughout the Levant".88 
The first printing press was imported to Cyprus in 1878, after the financial help of the 
Cypriot community in Egypt. The man who coordinated the effort and published the 
first newspaper in Cyprus (1878) was Theodoulos Constantinides, who had spent 
several years in Egypt, teaching in Greek schools.89 Printing had a difficult start and, 
out of the 8 newspapers that circulated in the first decade, only 5 survived tili the end 
of the 1880s, but in the last decade of the nineteenth Century, another 8 newspapers 
appeared, bringing the total number to 13, and by 1914 there were 23 titles!90 The 
circulation increased as the rate of literacy improved, and as the standard of living 
made newspapers accessible to a wider audience. Most newspapers maintained a 
criticai attitude towards the colonial government and canvassed strongly for enosis. 
As already mentioned, before the locai press made its présence in Cyprus, newspapers 
were imported from other Greek centers, predominantly Athens. This contìnued to be 
the case even after locai newspapers were available - in fact, the latter often drew 
news and others stories from Greek newspapers and, in this way, Greek Cypriots kept 
in touch with developments in the motherland, sharing in the joys of national victories 
and the sorrows of national defeats. Similarly, a number of Cypriots were subscribers 
to periodicals published in the Greek speaking lands, some sent literary contributions to 
such periodicals (mainly to Athens, but also to Alexandria, Constantinople and 
Smyrna), and others were themselves publishers of various literary publications in 
these lands.91 
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At the same time, many, mostly upper class, Cypriots kept visiting Greece, some for 
university studies, others for business, and yet others as pilgrims - to pay homage to 
the hellenic sacred land, so as to have first hand expérience of free Greece, and to 
view with pride the ancient relies and the Parthenon (symbols of Greece's diachronic 
pre-eminence and universal récognition). Some Cypriots would even become 
permanent résidents of Greece and, from there, represent and promote Cyprus' best 
interests with the Greek politicians and the wider public, making sure that their "private 
patois" (idiaitera patrida) was always "counted in" as an integral part of the imagined 
community of Hellenism and as a candidate for rédemption, to be added to the 
expanding free Kingdom.92 
Similarly, many Greeks would corne to Cyprus as visitors or to stay. In fact, a number 
of the most prominent nationalists of early British rule were Greeks from the mainland: 
Mention has already been made of Sakkelarios, Zannetos and Katalanos: Sakkelarios 
was a prominent philologist who taught in Cyprus and wrote on Cyprus' Greek history 
and culture; Zannetos practiced medicine in Larnaca, wrote the first modem History of 
Cyprus using the perspective of diachronic national unity, and had a very active 
politicai career (serving as mayor, member of the Legislative Council, and head of a 
number of cultural associations); Katalanos worked as a teacher and Journalist and 
became known as a stirrer of nationalist passions. 
Greeks were especially dominant in the teaching profession. The case of the 
Pancyprian Gymnasium of Nicosia, the oldest and largest on the island, demonstrates 
the point well: Between the foundation year of the school and Independence (1893-
1960), 14 principals were to serve, out of whom 12 came from Greece. Düring the 
same period, there was a total of 428 teachers, out of whom 151 (35,3%) were from 
Greece. Out of a total 133 Greek Language and Literature teachers (Philologoi ), 87 
(65,4%) came from Greece. Most of thèse Greeks came from the mainland, although 
some came from other areas with a large Greek présence - such as Constantinople.93 
It is significant that the University of Athens and various cultural associations, or 
sometîmes the Greek Ministry of Education, would assist in the sélection of the 
"appropriate" candidates, especially of the principals94 - the main criteria (besides 
competency) being their dedication to national ideas. 
Beside the direct influence of the manifest educational curriculum in fostering a sense 
of identification with Heiienism and the Greek state, of equal importance was the latent 
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curriculum: This included the various national célébrations, such as the "25* of March", 
symbolizing the launching of the victorious 1821 Greek Independence struggle; on 
thèse occasions the principal, and other teachers and honourary guests, would give 
commemorative speeches, while students would engage in a program comprising 
patriotic poems, and national hymns and dances; the climax of the célébrations were 
usually parades in the main streets of the town, in which the Greek flag would lead, 
the flag holders usually dressed in Greek national costumes.95 Another component of 
the latent curriculum was the staging of ancient Greek dramas or more modem Greek 
productions with "patriotic messages". Other aspects included the drawing of heroes 
of the Greek Révolution in art classes and the pinning of such pictures on class walls, 
along with the pictures of the Greek King or of other members of the Greek royal 
family.96 The neoclassic architecture of many schools, the names and emblems chosen 
(usually of ancient Greek gods or philosophers) for the schools, and other such 
features, ail reinforced the perceived bonds with ancient Greece and the modem Greek 
state. 
The occasions for strengthening the émergent national identities were not confined to 
éducation and the young. National célébrations, parades and other collective 
commémorations, involved the whole community. Théâtre productions, which were 
gradually gaining in importance, were to become a main means of fostering national 
émotions and awareness. Katsouris97 documents the impressive growth of théâtre 
productions in Cyprus during British rule - before the introduction of the cinéma (which 
brought a flood of Greek produced films) and télévision, towards the middle and end of 
this period, respectively, which were to gradually offer alternative modes of 
entertainment for the masses: What is striking is the extent of visits by Greek 
theatrical companies, but also the number of local productions involving patriotic 
thèmes or ancient Greek plays. 
Similar occasions were afforded by the various athletic contests. A good illustration is 
provided by the Pancyprian athletic compétitions at the turn of the century (1900), in 
Larnaca: The event started with the prelates' blessings with holy water (ayiasmos), 
and the athlètes' kissing of the holy cross. The chairman of the hosting athletic club, 
who happened to be Ph. Zannettos from mainland Greece, gave the main address. 
Linking the occasion to the ancient Greeks' emphasis of training both body and mînd, 
he stressed that the memory of those days of "national glory" constituted the basis for 
"today's national cohésion", which was vitally necessary for sparking current national 
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praxis; much like Hercules, contemporary Greeks were called on to overcome their 
many problems so as to achieve pan-hellenic unity and recommence the unfìnished 
work of their glorious ancestors, for the benefit of mankind. The speech was followed 
by the national anthem sung, by the students, and by the salute to the slowly 
ascending Greek flag, while 21 mortar shots were fired, accompanied by the crowds' 
cheers for enosis. The local Bishop then declared the start of the contest "In the name 
of God and of Hellenism"! Next, the athlètes paraded round the Stadium, with the 
Greek flag leading the procession; the winners of the contents received the wreath, 
much like the ancient Greeks after their own contests.98 The blending of national and 
religious symbolism obviously created a unique mystical atmosphère, which bonded 
closely all those présent with those near and far, in Cyprus or in other Greek lands, 
those alive with the ancient Hellènes, the living faithful with Orthodox saints - surely a 
most potent mix. 
Yet again, the involvement of the Orthodox Church with nationalism should not lead us 
to the assumption that the Church was always the carrier of this new ideology. We 
have seen how ambivalent its stand was under the Ottomans. Düring the first 
décades of British rule, the représentatives of the Church did give vent to national 
ideas, but they were quite moderate initially - as most lay notables were too. It was 
with the passage of time and the escalating antagonism with the British and the 
unfolding of the nationalizing processes described, that the Church and a section of the 
Orthodox elite started hardening their positions. The initially milder nationalism of the 
Church may explain the more moderate stand of the masses of peasants, for their 
views were obviously not the outcome of the educational system, but of their close 
attachment to the churches and its rituals. It is no wonder that in the first rally of the 
1890s, expressing the Greek Cypriots' disappointment with a statement in the British 
House of Commons (that in case Britain left Cyprus it would revert back to Turkey), the 
largest segment of those protesting were the young, those in their late teens, who had 
only recently completed elementary school. But as tîme went on, the impact of 
éducation was to become more visible. 
Another group affected by éducation was the children of the upper classes, who could 
carry on beyond the primary schooling of the masses - to the secondar/ level, and 
sometimes to university. For the latter, they ended up mainly in Greece, swelling the 
ranks of the Professionals - lawyers, doctors, teachers, journalists - who returned to 
Cyprus imbued with the spirit of irredentist nationalism prévalent on the mainland. 
137 
An important factor in nation-building in the West, as many studies have shown, was 
war. The Cypriots, as an enslaved people as of long, did not have their own army. 
We have seen how, at the time of the Tanzimat reforms, they had refused to join the 
Ottoman army, since they did not feel a part of the Ottoman state. We have also 
seen that many Greek Cypriots fought in the Greek War of Independence. This 
readiness to contribute to the war efforts of the Greeks continued under the British. 
In 1880, when Greek army officers99 came to buy Cypriot mules, to use in the 
prospective war with Turkey, there was a great rush of the locals to organize 
collections and many donated their own animais (the only means for their livelihood) 
for free.1 0 0 In 1896, during the Cretan revolt against Ottoman rule, collections were 
again organized, housing was offered to refugees, and 75 young recruits set off for 
Crete to help the national cause.1 0 1 Only a year afterwards, in 1897, the Greco-
Turkish war raised a patriotic fever and approximately 1,000 volunteers enlisted - as 
testimony to the gathering momentum of the forces of nationalism.102 
Inevitably, such occasions increased tensions between the two larger communities on 
the island, although no major incidents were noted. But this explains the concerns of 
the Muslim community who, in an 1882 memorandum to Kimberley, expressed their 
worries at the mounting agitation "by Greeks around the world" aiming to "restore 
Greece in its previous powers" or dimensions. They charged more specifically their 
"Greek co-citizens" as lacking in modération, and stressed their objection to the 
introduction of the principle of proportional représentation in the politicai sphère, as 
requested by the Greek Cypriots, for: 
No community anywhere on earth can enjoy safety of life, property, or honour 
under the rule of the Greeks who are arrogant in relation to the glorious 
achievements of their ancestors, unless there is equal représentation in the 
administrative affairs of the country; this would especially apply as regards the 
Muslims, who are naturally the object of the Greeks' revenge.103 
The last and, perhaps, most important factor in the hardening of the nationalist 
positions of the Greek Cypriots, was the intra-communal contest for hegemony. We 
have seen how when the British came to Cyprus the elite was broadly divided into a 
loosely defined traditional class, mostly comprised of conservative landowners, and the 
more modem and pro-nationalist merchant class. By the end of the nineteenth 
Century, the latter were joined by an emerging manufacturing segment, plus the 
growing group of university educated Professionals, who were becomîng the most 
influential section on the basis of the cultural capital they acquired. When the 
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Archbishop died in 1900, the post was contested by the Bishops of Kition and of 
Kyrenia. The nationalists rallied mostly around the first, while the traditionalists rallied 
around the second, so that the Greek Orthodox community was divided between the 
two camps.1 0 4 Trie ten-year long ferocious contest which followed, "inaugurated the 
era of mass politics" on the island.105 Since élections for the Legislative Council were 
limited to the districts, and there were limitations as to eligibility (such as a certain 
level of wealth), the Archbishopric élections became the first island-wide politicai 
contest.106 The outcome was the clear victory of the nationalists, who would 
henceforth gain hegemony over the Greek Orthodox community. But, from another 
point of view, as Sia Anagnostopoulou underlines, the real winner was the Church: 
First, through managing to give expression to both antagonistic camps, it prevented 
the formation of a sphère of politics autonomous from the Church; second, once the 
more modernizing nationalists won, the whole Church as an institution identifìed with 
their positions, thus re-establishing itself as the main exponent of the new hégémonie 
views - and leaving little role for the lay politicians: In effect, the Church had thereby 
managed to re-affirm its ethnarchic role. 
Changing economy and ciass formations 
When the British took over Cyprus from the Ottomans, the socio-economie 
transformations which the new regime set in motion started changing the configuration 
of local socio-political forces. In the early part of British rule, investment in new forms 
of economie production was very limited, due to a variety of reasons: The colonial 
rulers did not undertake substantial infrastructural investment^, since they considered 
Cyprus a temporary acquisition; not only that, but a large amount of the limited public 
funds raised locally, had to go towards the Tribute. Furthermore, the surplus extracted 
from agriculture and trade, by moneylenders and merchants, was not invested in 
industry - but in land, urban property, trade, and usury, where it yielded higher 
returns (this led to the growth of merchant capital and the associated financial 
services, at the expense of industriai capital).107 
Gradually, however, progress was achieved as a conséquence of the very nature and 
the activities of the colonial state. For one, the colonial government sought firm, 
centrai politicai control over the whole territory, eliminating challenges to its power 
coming from areas distant from the centre - thereby, gradually consolidating a single 
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economic space.1 0 8 Its concern with the enforcement of law and order fostered a more 
secure envîronment, within which relations of trust could develop: This applied to all 
aspects of life, from the élimination of banditry in the countryside, to the greater 
predictability in business dealings, enabling entrepreneurs to take risks and to expand 
their economic activities.109 Internal local boundaries to economic activity were 
overcome through extensive road construction - by the early 1900s, all main towns 
were connected by roads.110 Harbours were reconstructed so as to allow the 
expansion of trade and commerce with other countries.111 Although manufacturing 
initially declined, due to foreign (mostly British) compétition, it was subsequently given 
a boost, with the development of some light industries.112 The educational system kept 
expanding continuously, leading to an enormous growth in adult literacy.113 
Significantly, whereas the population remained more or less the same (approx 
180.000) throughout the 300-year Ottoman rule, within the first two décades of British 
rule, it rose by more than 25 percent (and within the first fifty years it nearly 
doubled)!114 These changes were accompanied by altérations in the class structure, 
especially as regards the constitution of the middle classes, in which, as we have seen, 
came to predominate the trading and manufacturing bourgeoisie, augmented by the 
members of the new professions (doctors, lawyers, teachers). But how were the lower 
classes affected? 
The British had found an economy which depended almost exclusively on agriculture. 
In contrast to Britain, which, after the enclosure movement, was virtually a country 
without a peasantry, Cyprus was a land of peasants, or more precisely, a "sea of 
smallholders", since there was an overwhelming prevalence of small family 
ownerships.115 For most of the Ottoman period, peasants enjoyed rights of occupancy, 
but not ownership, of the land. The Tanzimat reforms "acknowledged and confirmed a 
process similar to that experienced in Western Europe two centuries earlier", through 
which land became private property.116 Peasant ownership, and the consolidation of a 
small-holders class (along with the deeply rooted religious feelings), may in fact 
account for the shift from peasant radical protest, to the social conservatism that 
increasingly came to characterise Cyprus' countryside from this period onwards.117 But 
although land ownership was a blessing for the peasants, it carried a potential curse, 
since the other side to ownership was the possibility of aliénation and dispossession of 
their land. Indeed, the graduai shift from self-subsistence to a market economy, 
encouraged by the reforms, made it increasingly necessary for the rural population to 
seek cash money for their various needs. To secure this, most villagers resorted 
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regularly to richer co-villagers, or to town merchants, for loans, pledging their land in 
return. The latter often utilised the opportunity to extol high rates of return and cheat 
the peasants in as many ways as possible; in conséquence, the peasants often ended 
up in debt, and sometimes in bankruptcy. 
Yet despite perennial indebtedness and failure to serve their debts, there was, in 
practice, little dispossession at this stage. There were several reasons for this, mainly 
relating to the Ottoman state's lingering pre-capitalist rationale and mode of opération, 
but also with its "built-in" concern to protect the peasant small-holders, who 
constituted the backbone of the economy. Despite institutional reforms, conversion of 
state to privately owned land proved to be quite a slow process. For one, the state 
itself continued to assess property tax on whole villages, rather than on individuai 
holders of plots, betraying its own unwillingness to accept the implications of the 
privatisation it had instituted.118 Similar inconsistencies prevailed as regards taking 
debtors to court: Pre-existing social norms viewed the inability to repay a debt as a 
moral failing, and, thus, respective laws punished this "immorality" by imprisonment. 
Hence, the increasing resort to borrowing and the subséquent failure of repayment did 
not lead to increasing aliénation of properties, but on increased numbers of 
imprisonments! This explains why when the British arrived to the island, they found the 
prisons full of indebted peasants, but only a very small extent of "absolute 
destitution".119 
British rule was soon to change thèse realities, completing the process of land 
privatisation started by the Tanzimat reforms. One of their early fiscal reforms (in the 
mid-1880s) entailed the abolition of the communally assessed property tax, in favour 
of a new system of individuai assessment. Furthermore, new laws regarding credit 
shifted emphasis from the imprisonment of faltering debtors, to confiscations of their 
movable and immovable property. These measures, along with British efficiency în 
collecting taxes and in executing justice, plus the peasants' ordinary practices (for 
example, borrowing in order to finance next yeaKs production), and nature's extra-
ordinary calamities (draughts, locusts, crop diseases) that befell the country in the first 
décades of British rule, led to massive forced sales of land and property, at very low 
prices, and thereby to the first waves of total destitution.120 These developments were 
accompanied by a "profound crisis" of Cypriot society, marked by Wide increases in 
inequality between rich and poor, widespread démoralisation, and the conséquent 
effects of alcoholism, prostitution and mass paupérisation.121 
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Declining respect for the new regime, which instituted the changes, but could not 
control the conséquences, of free market forces, led to widespread "disorderly 
conduct", déviance and crime.122 In many ways, disrespect extended towards the local 
elite, since many of its members were often money-lenders, takîng advantage of 
developments. Though part of the problem themselves, members of this elite, along 
with the Church, attempted to address the increasing poverty and accompanying 
lawlessness of the new poor, by setting up charitable brotherhoods which provided 
free medicai and other welfare services to the needy.123 Often, these voluntary 
organisations aimed at the "moral re-education" of the new poor, by offering free 
teaching in basic literacy skills but also in moral and ethical principles, aiming at taming 
their insubordinate passions and spirit, which constituted a threat to the prevailing 
social order.124 What is important for our thesis is that, since the colonial state with its 
laissez faire policy was not ready to assist the needy, welfare provisions were taken 
care of on a communal basis - thus, further reinforcing trends for cohésion on a 
communal basis and the Church's rôle as the quasi-state of Greek Cypriots. 
As the government proved unable or unwilling to deal with the problems of usury and 
heavy taxation, ili-feeling kept mounting among the peasants and the lower classes 
more generally. The bourgeoisie (and, more specifically, the rising merchant-
professional class) tried to galvanise such feelings înto more cohérent anti-government 
attitudes through the nationalist ideology.125 Since the traditional elite were more 
moderate in their attitude towards the British, their authority within the Christian 
community kept dwindling. The rift between the old and new wings of the elite 
climaxed with the battle over the élection of the Archbishop, during which the mass of 
the people supported the hard nationalists.126 
In the next decade or two, the original opposition between traditìonalists and 
nationalists was recast as an ongoing opposition between two versions of nationalism. 
Broadly speaking, the soft-liners [diailaktikoi\ adhered to the view that, while 
supporting union with Greece, as the ultimate goal, Greek Cypriots should aim at 
achieving more constitutional and politicai freedoms, along with improvements in 
socio-economic conditions. The hard-liners [adiallaktoi, or ethniko/] believed that 
enosls should be the only aim so as not to detract Cypriots from this paramount 
national duty. What united the nationalist elite was their common exploitation of the 
peasants.127 Client-patron relationships, established between merchant-brokers and the 
peasants, were one more mechanism for the pénétration of the nationalist ideology 
142 
from the cities to the countryside: "Generally people simply voted for whomever the 
broker they dealt with told them to vote for [...]. Through a séries of individuai vertical 
coalitions [...] the brokerage system provided the urban and rural merchant class with 
an extremely tight control over the peasant producer".128 
Yet, by the early 1920s, nationalist politicians of all shades had reached an impasse, 
since their policies failed to win any signifìcant concessions from the British - be it in 
matters of economie development, of more substantiel politicai représentation, or of 
acceptance of the idea of enosis. In 1921, Greek Cypriot politicians resigned from the 
Legislative Council and, in the next élections (1922), they supported abstention as a 
déclaration of protest.129 In the very same year (1922), Hellenism was to expérience 
the unprecedented shock of the Minor-Asia debacle [Mikrasiatiki Katastrophi]. This 
dealt a death blow to the "Great Idea" [Megali Idea] of a 'Greater Greece, spanning 
two continents and fìve seas'; naturally, it also amounted to a severe blow to the 
nationalist aspirations of the Greek Cypriot elite. 
This was the social, economie and politicai context within which the first socialist ideas 
were to emerge, with the dawn of the twentieth Century. Before proceeding with the 
historical analysis, it is important to consider some of the implications of the structural 
context outlined, for Cypriot politics. A first issue to note, relates to the fluidity of the 
class boundaries between the différent sections of the elite in this formative period, of 
early British rule. It should not be forgotten that Cyprus never had a native aristocratie 
class. Its elite was decimated in 1821 and the small traditional landowner class, plus 
the even smaller but more modem merchant class which emerged prior to British rule, 
were not well entrenched. Indeed the division between 'traditional'and Wew'wings 
among the elite under Colonial rule was not a hard and fast one: Landowners would 
enter trade and commerce (if they did not, their children would); merchants would 
invest in land; and ali would engage in lending and usury. Realising the increasing 
value of cultural capital, they would ali educate their children, most of which would 
enter the professions, or business - or both! This means that there were no solid, 
long-term interests or cleavages over which politicai formations could aggregate.130 
The fuzzy nature of class boundaries also accounts for why the main organised politicai 
conflict of this period was not over any major class issue, but over an institutional 
matter - the succession of Archbishop and influence or control over the Church. 
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A second issue relates to the early prevalence of nationalism among the bourgeoisie. 
Nationalist demands included a number of libéral items (ranging from a freer press, to 
a more représentative form of political représentation). This meant that liberalism did 
not have the space to grow as a separate, organised, political expression of the middle 
classes. As elsewhere (for instance, Ireland, Finland) the prédominance of the national 
issue subordinated liberalism to nationalism.131 To bring the various points together, 
fluid class boundaries and class formations, a weak bourgeoisie overshadowed by the 
Church, and the early prédominance of nationalism, amounted to a weak libéral 
ideology. Finally, the early mass mobilisation over control of the Church, the 
paramount institution within the Greek Cypriot community, strengthened and 
Consolidated identities based on religion and ethnicity, pre-empting subséquent 
mobilisations by other collective actors (such as the working class) along alternative 
political idéologies.132 
The communist party and its internationalism 
In the first décades of the twentieth century, increasing numbers of peasants whose 
land was expropriated, ended up as workers on the land of the more wealthy (mostly 
chtftlik owners), or moved to the growing urban centres, to set up as independent 
craftsmen, but mainly to join the small construction and manufacturing industry of the 
times. The post-WWI crisis in agriculture, created more landless peasants. Usury grew 
rampant in the 1920s so that, by the end of the decade, an officiai survey of rural life 
found that three out of four peasant owners of land were in debt. The various policies 
of the government to stem the problem (such as the création of an agricultural bank), 
did not meet with success.133 In the 1920s, more light industriai units, plus the 
nascent mining industry, rejuvenated through the investment of foreign capital, offered 
new outlets to the waves of the dispossessed.134 
At the same time, increasing exploitation and inequality led to enhanced feelings of 
social injustice. The general radicalîsation of working class politics, as a conséquence of 
WWI, and the spread of communism in the world after the Russian Revolution of 1917, 
provided new hopes to the labouring poor, together with a new ideology and a living 
example of radical social change. European countries were already hosting working-
class parties, mostly of socialist or social-democratic persuasion, associated with earlier 
stages of industriai growth (and manned by the more skilled sections of the working 
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class). Yet the choices of thèse parties in the Great War, abandoning their 
Internationalist ideology (of the solidarity of all workers across national borders), so as 
to lend a hand to their national bourgeoisie, had split the unity of the world working-
class movement. This led to the création of the xnew type' left-wing parties, namely 
the Leninist communist parties (usually dominated by more radicai, unskilled workers, 
agricultural labourers, and small peasants), which were to often enter into intense 
strife with the socialist parties.135 
In Cyprus, the above developments allowed a space for the newly emerging socialist 
ideas to gain ground, towards the late 1910s and early 1920s - quite belatedly, if we 
are to compare with ideological developments in most other European countries. A 
main factor related to the delayed and slow industrialisation already noted. 
Furthermore, as Bartolini argues, such contexts do not favour socialism or social 
democracy (which were typical products of industriai society), but communism. 
Indeed, in Cyprus, there was a brief contest between the two left-wing idéologies, with 
communism the eventual winner. In 1922, the first Cypriot left-wing newspaper, 
yPyrsos'(Torch), was published, giving voice to the newly-established 'Cyprus Workers' 
Party', comprised of a small group of intellectuals and workers. Confirming the choice 
of a communist over a socialist direction,136 the nascent Party soon broke with the 
socialist éléments137 and with Pyrsos newspaper, issuing (1 January 1925) its own 
newspaper titled Neos Anthropos [New Man], "organ of the worker-peasants and poor 
life-strugglers", under the "politicai control of the Communist Party of Cyprus" (KKK). 
Carrying the rallying slogan, next to its title, "workers, peasants of the world, unite", 
the first newspaper's main article was KKK's manifesto. In this, the main objective was 
defined to be "economie libération", entailing the termination of "exploitation of men 
by [other] men". To achieve this, their Internationalist perspective dictated: 
Our first concern is to eradicate ali racial hatred existing among the inhabitants of 
the island, to teach the masses that people cannot anymore be separateti into 
Greeks and Turks in order for them to consume each other for their countries' 
self-aggrandisement - instead people [are divided] into poor and rich. 
The communists were to be "heralds of love and union of ali the poor for the collective 
pursuance of their interests".138 The second, parallel objective was to be politicai 
libération: Since "the happiness of a country cornes with its real libération", the 
communists declared that they would "work for the independence of Cyprus, under a 
Worker-Peasänt Government, with full freedom rights to the people, far from any 
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influence or protection from the outside". Espousing the policies of the Third 
International, the Communist Party proposed that an independent Cyprus would then 
join the 'Sodalist Soviet Fédération of the Balkan Countries', a union which would 
consolidate co-operation and internationalist solidarity between thèse countries, being 
constantly torn asunder by ail kinds of nationalist conflicts.139 
The Communist Party thus took a stand against enosis, which it considered a goal 
promoted by bourgeois nationalist politicians, supported by the capitalist class of 
mainland Greece. Although the rationale for this negative attitude towards enosis was 
not explicitly spelled out in its manifesto, it became more apparent in subséquent 
éditions of Neos Anthropos. The main objections were that, first, the enosis goal 
"divided the people" into Greeks and Turks, preventing the création of a common front 
against British colonialism; and second, that for the "Cypriot people" union with Greece 
would have simply meant libération from the *yoke of English imperialism, in order 
only to taste the worse Greek [yoke]", the "harsher slavery to the Greek megabeasts" 
- that is, Greek mainland big capital...140 
Overall, enosis was seen by KKK as a populist objective, advocated by the "local 
bourgeoisie" (the "largest of the usurers and their faithful organs in the National 
Council"), as the "panacea for all evils" - whereas it was precisely the same people 
who grabbed the land, the houses and the means of production of the peasants, 
leading them to immiseration and desperation. The Church was considered equally 
responsible for the exploitation of the peasants and for appropriating the land they had 
put under its protection at earlier times, during Ottoman rule, in their effort to avoid 
excessively high taxation; in conséquence, KKK advocated the distribution of church 
land to the landless peasants.141 
Not unexpectedly, the radical platform of KKK - against nationalism, the bourgeoisie, 
the Church, and British imperialism, provoked strong reactions from ail fronts. The 
bourgeoisie and the Church used the premier ideological apparatuses (the schools, the 
reading clubs, the press, and the pulpits), to fight back against thèse dangerous new 
ideas. The British exercised more naked forms of control, through censorship of the 
press, the courts and the police force.1 4 2 
These were not the only hurdles making it diffìcult for the young party to gain 
supporters. Its recruitment capabilities among the masses, mostly peasant small-
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holders, were hampered by the prevailing patriarchal family ideology, the deeply held 
religîous commitments, the high degree of informai social control in a small, closed 
community, and the socio-political conservatism of the people. The working class was 
stili in its infancy: Industry was completely undeveloped and the few available 
enterprises were of a very small scale, employing less than five workers, and mostly 
family-owned; workers were thus subject to the patronising influence of their 
employers.143 Hence, industriai workers were almost non-existent and the KKK 
recruited mostly from small business, crafts and the construction industry. Even in 
subséquent years, when light industry was to grow somewhat, heavy industry was 
never to take root; as we will see later on, it was mostly in the mining industry, the 
public service, construction, and a few large enterprises (which brought large numbers 
of workers together under the same roof), from the late 1930s onwards, where the 
workers' movement would take stronger root. Finally, the lack of indigenous, radical 
traditions, led to an almost complete dependence on international communism for the 
importation of ready-made théories, which took little notice of local realities and had 
little to say about nationalism, the hégémonie ideology on the island. Ali the above, 
constituted serious limitations to the party's development and possible impact on 
Cypriot society.144 
Despite thèse diffìculties, members of KKK, though few in numbers, proved to be 
valiant in spirit, and determined to put up with tribulations, persécutions and social 
stigma, in order to uphold and further their radical cause. Focusing on building sound 
organisational structures, on being in constant contact with the working people and 
their problems, and especially in co-operating closely with the trade unions, they kept 
together a party which did not rely on clientelistic networks, but on horizontal 
relationships and a cohérent politicai ideology - an altogether new phenomenon of the 
times.145 Such features balanced out the very hostile social environment, as well as the 
party's own shorteomings in its formative stage of development, enabling it to survive 
thèse hard times.146 Indeed, by the early 1930s, it had gained enough popularity for 
the Church and the politicians to bëgin worrying and to start reacting back- the Church 
through excommunicating left-wing intellectuals, the established politicians through 
ostracising anyone supporting radical ideas, and the press through scourging articles, 
denouncing the ideology of the communists as both atheistic and unpatriotic.147 
Perhaps the-most important problems for the young Communist Party arose from its 
wavering and often contradictory positions on national issues.148 This proved to be a 
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serious limitation in a society in which nationalist ideology had achieved hegemonie 
prédominance (even though, as we saw, the harder nationalist positions were 
temporarily in retreat). KKK's pro-independence, ant\-enos/s platform, linked with the 
Comintern's policy on the Balkans, was hardly convincing: The idea of an independent 
Cyprus joining a wider Balkan Fédération seemed far-fetched and highly unrealistic, 
precisely because that area was ridden with conflict, and the federalist spîrit totally 
lacking. In fact, to many Greek Cypriots, this linkage of Cyprus' future to the Balkans, 
was reminiscent of the Comintern's support for the création of a Balkan 
(Con)Federation, in which Macedonia and Thrace (both inhabited, at the time, by a 
majority Greek-speaking population) would be incorporated, after their sécession from 
Greece and subséquent independence. Thls position had already created many 
problems for the Communist Party of Greece, sińce Greek people saw it as a blatant 
betrayal of their country and its national interests. It was subsequently to change both 
by the Greek and the Cypriot communist parties.149 
The way the young KKK handled the 31 October uprising in Cyprus is a good example 
of the party's ambivalent stand on national issues. The uprising was preceeded by the 
1929 Elementary Education Law (through which the Britîsh tried to increase their hold 
on éducation), plus by an attempt to impose new taxes through the 1931 budget. The 
mounting frustrations of the Greek Cypriots, combined with the diffìcult economie 
conditions of the times, had created an explosive atmosphère. In this milieu, a group 
of radical nationalists,150 who had the backing of the Greek consul in Cyprus,151 was 
preparing to announce their radical platform of "fanatically seeking the union of Cyprus 
with the Greek whole". In an apparent step of pre-empting this move, the till then 
moderate Bishop of Kition, Mylonas, took the lead himself in declaring a more radical 
stand against the British, which led to a spontaneous rising - first in the capital, then 
quickly spreading to the whole island.152 The KKK initially condemned the uprising as a 
"nationalist, chauvinist" act of provocation by the local big capitalists. Shortly after, 
once the party's leadership ascertained the broadly based support of the revolt, it 
shifted to a more positive stand, underlining the national-libération, anti-irhperialîst 
nature of the uprising, and even sought the création of a 'United Fronf, in which it 
wanted to have a leading role.1 5 3 But it was too late, for the Orthodox Church, through 
Mylonas, had managed to assert its leadership; not only that, but it had managed to 
transform its previous, mostly passive, role into a more uncompromising, dynamie 
stand, under the rallying ery of enosis. Once agaïn, the Church had proved capable of 
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re-affirming its ethnarchic function, as the only force capable of givîng politicai 
expression to Greek Cypriot feelings and aspirations.154 
After the Octovrìana, the Colonial regime removed its liberal façade and imposed harsh 
authoritarian measures, further limiting the politicai and cultural freedoms of the Greek 
Cypriots. The measures included the abolition of the Legislative Council, the banning 
of municipal élections, press censorship and the prohibition of the flying of Greek or 
Turkish flags. The Church was "practically stripped of its leadership", since two of the 
bishops were exiled, which made élections to replace the deceased (in 1933) 
Archbishop impossible. Since the Communist Party's militant insubordination was a 
constant cause of concern, the British tried to suppress its activities, culminating in the 
imprisonment of twenty-eight leading figures of the party, along with the outlawing of 
the party itself, in August 1933.155 
Yet whereas, for the nationalist forces, the 1930s was a period of retrenchment, for 
the young KKK, it proved to offer blessings in disguise. First, the curtailment of politicai 
freedoms and KKK's outlawing, forced the party to focus more on trade union activity 
(a new law in 1932 had made the opération of unions legal), which was to pay multiple 
dividends from the end of the decade onwards.156 Developments in the economy were 
favourable to the growth of the trade union movement: Since the late 1920s, the 
mines had been expanding their activities and were becoming a large employer of 
workers; the mines were owned by foreign capital and brought together thousands of 
workers in conditions of impersonal relations to their employers, very différent to the 
small family units and the associated patronage relationships between owners and 
employées, prévalent until that time. These novel conditions were conducive to 
emerging feelings of class solidarity and class consciousness, so that the trade unions 
of the mines were to become the most powerful and militant arm of the working class 
movement.157 
Second, the ideological shifts in the international communist movement, espousing the 
need to build broad anti-fascist fronts, led to an atténuation of the antì-nationalist 
rhetoric of communist parties Worldwide. The 7* Congress of the Comintern (Summer 
1935) adopted the new policy of creating 'Populär Fronts' against fascism and 
imperialism. Building on this opening, the 6* Congress of the Communist Party of 
Greece (December 1935) re-adjusted its policy on Macedonia, which, until then, had 
left it exposed to accusations of treachery: Abandoning the stand of a "united and 
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independent Macedonia", it adopted the new thesis of "full equality of minorities". 
These shifts allowed the Greek Communists the opportunity to step out of their politicai 
isolation, into a new role of increasing prominence; the combination of social with 
national rhetoric enhanced its appeal and following, rendering it a significant politicai 
force, and the leading national libération power (through EAM and ELAS) in the years 
of Nazi occupation.158 
These developments created important opportunities for the Cypriot communists. The 
new ideological directions allowed them to seek new politicai alignments. The rallying 
cali of the mid-1930s for a 'Populär Front' implied that ali socio-political forces, 
including the nationalist bourgeoisie,159 had common interests and objectives, since 
they ali comprised "the people". Put differently, the new discourse emphasised 
whatever united the people against the external Nazi threat; this was a shift from the 
position of unity on the basis of class, to that of unity on the basis of nationality. This 
new policy allowed KKK a new role within the Greek Cypriot community160 - but it was 
also going to ultimately limit its role among the Turkish Cypriots. 
Having altered its policies as regards "national issues", and being now more mild as 
regards a number of matters which previously acted as stumbling blocks for most 
Greek Cypriots (viz its anti-Enosist and anti-Church/religion stands), KKK found it easier 
to approach the workers and to help them organise into trade unions. Thus, whereas 
until 1935 there were only two registered unions,161 by 1937, they became six (with 
367 members) and, by 1939, they reached the number of forty-six (with 2544 
members)! In addition to directly creating new unions of their own, the communists 
managed to infiltrate and to take over most of the unions formed by right-wing or 
independent unionists.162 This was to be the base of the left's subséquent impressive 
growth, for as Bartolini reminds us: "No strong communist party developed after the 
second World War, if it had not already made considérable inroads between the world 
wars".1 6 3 
The Left-Right contest and the two variants of nationalism 
With the start of WWII, Britain saw the need to win its subjects' co-operation so it 
began to introduce more liberal policies in its various colonies. In Cyprus, politicai 
parties were legalised and municipal élections announced, in the context of measures 
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for increased politicai participation. On 14 April 1941, AKEL was launched, at a 
gathering of left and other "progressive" Greek Cypriots, who aimed to form a "party of 
principies" as an alternative to the short-lived, leader-oriented, clientelistic parties of 
traditional nationalist politicians. The still outlawed KKK saw AKEL as a legal venue of 
expression, through which it could widen its mass appeal. 
From inception, AKEL's discourse fused together socio-economie, politicai and national 
demands.165 Its very first déclaration enumerated the various economie problems of 
the working classes, and proposed concrete measures as remedies (such as, 
progressive taxation, labour législation). But it also criticised the colonial regime for its 
policy of denying the national identity, consciousness and traditions of the "Greeks and 
Turks of Cyprus" (who were thought to "live in full harmony, without any racial or 
national enmnity separating them apart"), demanding the récognition of the "national 
essence"of the two neighbouring communities. Finally, it criticised the colonial regime 
for depriving the locáis of their politicai rights and for its meddling with the "church 
and religious-related concerns of the people", pushing for the restoration of the 
church's "full politicai rights" through the élection of Représentatives via universal 
suffrage, in conjunction with communal autonomy, as regards the sélection of local 
authorities in villages and towns.1 6 6 
A few months after the création of AKEL, in June 1941, Germany invaded the Soviet 
Union, whereupon the latter promptly joined the anti-fascist Allies camp. 1 6 7 The 
common external enemy attenuated confrontation between the Greek Cypriots, 
allowing the new party a breathing space for attracting followers. Furthermore, the 
newly adopted anti-nazi, anti-fascist discourse of AKEL, enhanced its appeal with the 
masses. The victories of the Red Army on the Eastern Front tremendously increased 
the popularity of the Soviet Union. Moreover, in Greece, the main résistance forces 
were those of the left. At the same time, AKEL's open adoption of a pro-enosls stance 
in late 1941, its militant style in seeking socio-economic change, its organisational 
capabilities in mobilising the masses for démonstrations and rallies (constituting new 
forms of anti-colonial struggle for the Cypriots), greatly enhanced its legitimacy and its 
appeal with the masses.168 A part of AKEL's early success can also be attributed to the 
fact that it did not have to face any other already established parties (such as, liberal, 
socialist, or even nationalist) in those initial, formative years. AH these factors, explain 
why it grew from strength to strength, whereas tens of other parties, which were 
hastily put together at this time, disappeared with equal speed, without leaving behind 
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any trace of their existence. At the same time, the lack of alternative parties, and the 
fact that AKEL's leadership, constituency and ideology were not narrowly working class, 
allowed the party to play a much wider rôle than its predecessor. Furthermore, the 
combination of an internationalist perspective, with civic concerns and a stress on 
trans-communal coopération, turned it into a party of modération. 
In November 1941, the tili then disparate unions, formed a common Pancyprian 
Unions' Committee (PSE, later re-named to PEO); 1 6 9 through achieving control of PSE, 
the left managed to keep the trade union movement under its own influence - and to 
gain from its increasing strength and popularity.170 At the same time (like ail strong, 
post-WW II communist parties), it sought to expand its inroads to the countryside, 
through the formation of a network of peasant unions, organised subsequently into the 
Union of Cypriot Agriculturalists (EKA). With the support of the unions and the 
elaborate network of party controlied organisations (including cultural and athletic 
clubs), but also with the forging of a Populär Front, bringing together ail "progressive 
forces", AKEL had a land-slide victory in the first municipal élections of March 1943.171 
Meanwhile, the nationalist forces, which now started calling themselves the "Right",1 7 2 
were in complete disarray: The 1930s outlawing of politicai organisations and activities 
(including the dissolution of the Legislative Council), the co-optation of prominent elite 
figures by the colonial regime, and the fact that the ethnarchic Church had been 
headless for some time now, depriving it of its collective leadership and of ali its 
vitality, were ali contributory causes to the Right's malaise. To thèse extra-ordinary 
developments, one should add the perennial problem of traditional politics in Cyprus -
that of division along patronage figures, and along différent stands (soft/hard) as 
regards the "national" issue, which prevented the dominant classes from consolidating 
an effective front of the Right. Yet the rise of the Left as an important new player, in 
the early 1940s, was enough to cause alarm to, and the re-awakening of, the 
nationalist forces.173 The électoral victories of the Left in the 1943 and especially the 
1946 municipal élections, as well as the Leff/s success in getting the candidate it 
backed elected as the new Archbishop of Cyprus, in 1947, amounted to undisputed 
proof of the new threat. Pulling themselves together, anti-communist forces started 
creating, one after the other, their own organisations: the Agrarian Union of Cyprus 
(PEK),1 7 4 the Cyprus National Party (KEK),1 7 5 the New Trade Unions - which, soon 
after, joined together to form the Fédération of the Workers of Cyprus (SEK)1 7 6 - as 
well as their own religious, cultural and other associations. Henceforth, there would be 
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two opposing politicai camps, each with its full array of mass organisations (politicai 
parties, trade unions, peasant unions, cultural and athletic clubs - and so on), ready 
for battle! Indeed, this cleavage within Greek Cypriot society was to become deeper 
and deeper, ending up as the dominant division - even more pronounced than the rift 
between the Greek Cypriot community as a whole and the colonial regime. 
A number of factors contributed to the reinforcement of the cleavage between the two 
camps. Among others was the alignment of social forces and idéologies in Cyprus with 
the respective camps in Greece and the wider world. Thus, whereas during WW II, the 
unity of the allied forces had contributed to an amélioration of social tensions within 
the Greek Cypriot community (which had allowed a space for the rise of the Left), the 
end of the war and the graduai growing apart of the allies, culminating in the Cold 
War, had a différent impact on Cyprus, as each of the two local rivais identifìed with a 
différent superpower - along with the respective world-views, idéologies and values 
entailed.177 
More important was the impact from developments in Greece: There, the British 
helped the traditional politicians of the Right to contain, and eventually to take over, 
politicai power from the Left (1944-1945) - despite EAM's unrivalled military 
prominence ali over the country. Subsequently, during the ensuing Civil War (1946-
1949), the British, and then the Americans (1947), assisted both militarily and 
economically the allied forces of the Right and Centre, to win over the Left.178 The 
aftermath of the Civil War in Greece left dévastation of immense proportions -
thousands of dead 1 7 9 and wounded, hundreds of thousands made homeless or 
refugees, enormous material damage suffered (which kept the country on its knees for 
years to come); terror, insecurity and unbearable pain reigned among the people. Yet, 
as Tsoucalas reminds us, thèse were only a part of the picture, for "the decisive legacy 
of the civil war was not the enormous human and material disaster, but the 
unprecedented politicai, ideological and cultural cleavage between what was labelled 
'the national attitude' on the one hand, and the remnants of the progressive forces on 
the other".180 After the Civil War, thousands of the defeated leftists (but also many 
progressives, whom the establishment conveniently identifìed with the communists) 
were persecuted, exiled, imprisoned, tortured and executed. Yet the Right was not 
content in imposing only its material power on the victims - it attempted to also 
impose its own culture and ideology on society. Ever since the 1922 destruction and 
the death of the "Great Idea" which had dealt a severe blow to the developing 
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bourgeoisie, the latter were in constant search of a new ideology and identity. The 
congruence between the nation and the limited territory of the Greek state had now to 
be taken as granted. In the late 1930s, Metaxas' regime underlined the importance of 
"state nationalism" in upholding the "national state". The state was seen to be the 
"manifestation of the organised will of the nation", but the nation was prior to the 
state, being the diachronic "soul", or a "spiritual community"—"its members being 
imbued with the national spirit" [ethnikon fronima]}*1 State nationalist ideology 
revolved around combining Hellenic and Christian ideals (which would together foster 
the "Th/rd Hellenic Civilization"). To these ideals was now added anti-communism, a 
"general-purpose ideology to justify the régression into the dried-up womb of Greco-
Christian traditions";183 in practice anti-communism was utïlized to totally silence all 
criticai and dissenting voices, in the name of conservative ideals (nation, country, 
religion and family). 
These developments in Greece greatly influenced the Greek Cypriots. To begin with, 
both the Right and the Left tried to play the card of patriotism - albeit with changing 
emphasis, depending on developments in Greece. We have seen how the Left's rise in 
Greece, and its shift to patriotic or nationalistic positions, encouraged AKEL, in the 
early 1940s, to adopt a similarly patriotic or nationalistic discourse. Since the Greek 
Right depended on the support of the British in its contest with the Germans, and 
subsequently with the Left, it could not adopt a strong anti-British or pro-enosis stand, 
as regards Cyprus; consequently, the Cypriot Right could not be so vocal in its own 
campaign for enosis. This, again, allowed AKEL to be more militant in supporting 
enosis, and thus to appear more patriotic than the Right (which it actually accused of 
being subservient to colonialist and Imperialist interests), something which certainly 
helped it gain in popularity and électoral appeal.184 
The British found themselves caught in the cross-fìre, between the nationalist Right 
and the communist Left. In search of a way of sidetracking attention from enosis, and 
to appear more in tune with the liberal-democratic spirit prevailing after the war, in 
July 1947 the British came up with the proposai for a Consultative Assembly 
[Diaskeptiki ], which would advise the government as to a more suitable form of 
Constitution, than the one of 1882, stili largely in force. After some wavering on both 
sides, the Left decided to take part in the negotiations. The Right, fearing that future 
free élections for a Parlîament, under a more autonomous regime, would be won by 
the Communists, chose to abstain from the Assembly, and to accuse AKEL of a 
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supposedly unpatriotic move. In the middle of these developments, the moderate 
Archbishop Leontios died, and the nationaiist and fanatical anti-communist Bishop of 
Kyrenia took over as his temporary replacement. Taking advantage of his position, the 
temporary Archbishop openly allied himself with the Right and won the élections. Soon 
after, the allies managed to get their own anti-communist candidates voted-in for the 
three vacant Bishop sees. With a now rejuvenated, anti-communist Church hierarchy 
assuming the role of leader of the Right, the balance of power was starting to change 
again. 
Meanwhile, the Left was taking part in the Consultative Assembly process, under the 
banner of "self-determination-enosis"™ in other words, supportìng the idea of "full 
self-rule"as an intermediate, in-between objective, which would open and prepare the 
road for the eventual, ultimate aim of enos/s. The Right, however, with the help of the 
Greek mainland government, managed to create the impression that somehow a deal 
between Greece and Britain was imminent, bringing enos/s only a breath away - thus 
rendering the Consultative Assembly and any talk for self-government meaningless, 
and even suspect for undermining impending developments; thus the Leffs 
participation in negotiations with the British was rendered tantamount to treason.187 
The climax of the escalating confrontation between Left and Right was reached in 
1948. The division of the world into two opposing camps, aligned with the two 
superpowers, and the fierceness of the Civil War in Greece (which was approaching its 
final stage, and the victory of the Right) was the external context of the contest. But 
developments within Cyprus were equally intense: The left-controlled Trade Unions 
were heavily involved in battle with employers - locai ones, in the construction and 
manufacturing industries, and foreign ones, in the mining industry; plus the 
government-as-employer, in the public service sector. Strikes and mobîlïzations of ali 
sorts, mostly instituted by the Left through its unions and other organisations, were 
shaking Cyprus. The employers were answering back, using every possible means -
fìring 'troublemakers', declaring lock-outs, calling in strike-breakers, while at the same 
time appealing to the state and the police to restare law and order! The Church, clearly 
siding with the Right, assisted it in the création and consolidation of its diverse 
organisations, including the New Unions; during the historic strike of the mine-workers 
of the American owned KME (1948), the Archbishop went out of his way ta put 
pressure on the striking workers, by issuing a circular calling on them to stop the 
"communist inspired" strike, and to return back to work, certain that God would reward 
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their trust, and satisfy ali their reasonable and just demands. The cycle was joined 
by outsiders, namely members of "Xi", Grivas' paramilitary, extreme right-wing group 
in Greece, who were imported to Cyprus to help tight the left unionists, engaged in 
battle with right-wing strike-breakers.189 
In such an atmosphère, fraught with tension and conflict, politics and negotiations, 
such as those for a Constitutional Assembly, ceased to be the terrain of logicai 
argumentation and the différent politicai positions turned into Symbols of the waging 
all-out warfare. When the British finally submitted their proposais, those dîd not, as 
promised, provide for full self-government (neither at that, nor at a future stage), as 
the Left was hoping, bringing the whole process to a dead end. The British proved 
unwilling to trust the Cypriot Left. Although they initially did see AKEL as a possible 
ally against traditional nationalists, what eventually prevailed was their fear of the 
party's militancy and pro-Sovietism. The Cold War, and the division of the world into 
the West and East sphères of influence, placed Greece and Cyprus in the anti-
communism camp. In Greece, the British were collaborating with the Right in its fight 
against the communists - it was not easy for them to do differently in Cyprus; hence, 
external considérations overshadowed local realities and prejudiced the British attitude 
toward AKEL. The British choice not to make sufficient concessions in the negotiations, 
effectively bringing about the collapse of the Diaskeptiki and the undermining of AKEL 
and other voices of modération, inflamed the forces of extreme nationalism and gave a 
new impetus to the "dialectic of intolérance" - which was to culminate in the '55 
struggle, but also in the intra- and inter-communal violence which ensued.1 9 0 
The collapse of the negotiations for a Constitutional Assembly hallmarks the end of the 
brief period of the ascent of the Left. 1 9 1 Henceforth, the Left would be contained: The 
rejuvenation of the Church with a new, militant, nationalist, anti-communist leadership, 
openly collaborating with the Right; the colonial governmenfs adoption of a strong 
anti-left stance (including firing communists from government posts); some 
unsuccessful strikes which disheartened the workers; above ali, the colonial 
governmenfs failed promises as regards the prospect for self-government, which left 
AKEL exposed to accusations of treachery and anti-hellenism (since it was ready to 
accept self-government instead of enosis) - were the new realities that the Left had to 
grapple with. In contrast, the Right emerged as the great Victor from developments: 
After a temporary set-back, it had succeeded to re-coup and to produce a full sway of 
supporting organisations; it managed to rally the Church, the paramount institution 
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within the Greek Cypriot community, in its support; it had the fìnancial backing of 
employers, whose interests it served; it also enjoyed the sympathies and the quiet 
support of the colonial government, which did not wish to allow the pro-Soviet Left a 
more prominent politicai role (especially so jn a more autonomous future polity).192 
Yet, despite its Containment, AKEL had achieved important inroads into the traditional, 
conservative Cypriot society. We saw above, some of the reasons explaining the Left's 
spectacular post-WWII growth. Other features or strengths were to help AKEL survive 
the hard times which it now had to face. One such strength was the party's peculiar 
combination of radicalism and pragmatism. AKEL had managed to keep many of the 
radical features of KKK: The strong organisational structure of the party and the 
associated skills and discipline of its leadership and cadres; the ability of utilising these 
skills in mass mobilisations, such as rallies, protest activities and strikes; its militant 
and confrontational style. But, at the same time, it succeded in transcending KKK's 
extreme radicalism and parallel marginalisation: Its discourse managed to combine 
orthodox Marxist-Leninist dogma, with workerist, liberal-democratic and national 
libération demands; the former éléments were important amongst the leadership and 
the core nucleus of the party, whereas the latter were stressed when addressing the 
wider public, non-core members, and allies. Consider its attitude on important social 
institutions and values. The Communist Party did not challenge religion and the church 
in toto - but rather concentrateti its fire on the practices of the higher clergy and on 
the church's scant concern with social justice and the lot of the underprivileged (henee, 
its opposition to the accumulation of land and other wealth by the Church).193 
Similarly, the party was not criticai of the patriarchal family as an institution, but 
advocated more equal, non-exploitative relationships among family members. It did 
not antagonise the educational system as such, but worked within it, through left 
students' organisations and left teachers' alternative discourse. Furthermore, the party 
never emphasized the need for a violent revolution to seize power, the élimination of 
private property, collectivisation, and control of the means of production by workers; 
instead, it concentrated on achieving instrumental goals for improving the lives of 
working people. The theoretical justification was usually couched in terms of the 
"stages of struggle" and respective priorities (henee, during British rule, the primary 
objective was "libération from colonialisme chains").194 Meanwhile, all victories of the 
party were haîled as important steps in the great march forward of the "forces of 
progress" (the Left and its allies). 
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On the negative side was AKEL's empiricism - whatever 'worked' was right. Lacking in 
theory, maturity and self-confidence, when it came to the crucial juncture of dealing 
with the collapse of the Diaskeptiki, there was a failure of nerve, and a resort to 
solutions from above - the views of the communist parties in Greece and the 
Comintern more generally. We saw. earlier on how the views of KKE had tilted the 
balance in favour of a harder nationalist line. This dependence of AKEL's leadership on 
the views of'higher authorities' was to have multiple effects in its future development. 
After 1948, internal dialogue on the most crucial issue facing Cyprus and the party had 
to corne to a halt: Witch-hunting began, so as to détermine who were not adhering to 
the "correct doctrine" (enos/'s). Heretics, who had supported self-govemment, had to 
publicly confess their error - or be expelled from the party instead. Party surveillance, 
so far a means to protect the party against external dangers and intrusions, was 
henceforth turned against internai enemies. Démocratie centralism was to shift from 
an emphasis on democracy (a method of systematically gathering views from below), 
to a practice of centralism (a rigid System of control by the leadership, whose 
proletarian origin somehow secured the wisdom and fairness of its décisions).195 Worse 
still was the fact that AKEL's harder nationalist stand now adopted was to further 
alienate its Turkish-Cypriot supporters, or to expose them to the mounting nationalist 
pressures from within their own community. The only party which kept the bridges 
open between the two ethnie communities, with its allied organizations, would thus be 
turning inwards towards its own community, thereby consolidating political closure 
along communal Unes. 
The anti-colonial struggle and the entrenchment of the cleavages 
By the late 1940s, the two Greek Cypriot camps were of almost equal strength, and a 
very délicate balance of powers prevailed - which from another point of view, 
amounted to an impasse. The intra-communal contest had become both polarised and 
generalised, affecting ail walks of life, and justifying the use of any method in 
achîeving supremacy.196 In this climate of polarization there could be no 'middle' 
positions, for everyone had to take sides and join one of the two rival camps. By now, 
there had been separate newspapers, trade unions, cultural and athletic associations: 
Henceforth, were to be added separate coffeeshops, groceries, pharmacies, barber-
shops and even brands of cigarettes, drinks and coffee!1 9 7 Through every choice Greek 
Cypriots had to make - whether in shopping, or smoking, or going to a doctor - they 
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would be declaring their politicai identity. And through every choice, the division into 
Right-wing/nationalists and Left-wing/communists would be reinforced. 
After the collapse of the Diaskeptiki, and of accepting as sacrosanct the views of the 
Greek Communist Party, AKEL changed line and leadership (August 1949). Self-
determination was deemed to be a misdirected platform, imposed on the party by 
"petit-bourgeois éléments" among its leadership. The new, hard-headed leadership 
was of undisputed proletarian origin, and was soon to adopt the dominant patriotic 
slogan of "enosfs-and-onfy-enosfs". Indeed, soon the Left would outbid the Right in 
initiatives promoting the unionist causes. A fierce contest ensued, over who were the 
most loyal and sincere supporters of enosis, and, accordingly, who were the best 
patriota. Thus, for instance, in 1949, AKEL started an initiative for organizing an enosis 
plébiscite; soon after the ethnarchy announced a similar initiative and, since AKEL 
realized that the Church's involvement would ensure the success of the former, it 
abandoned its own campaign and joined efforts with the ethnarchy;the 1950 plébiscite 
produced a massive 95.7% Greek Cypriot support for union.198 
In 1954, after many pressures from the ethnarchy, the Greek government took the 
Cyprus demand for enosis to the United Nations. The internationalization drive caused 
the British to escalate its 'divide and rule' policy by actively involving Turkey with the 
problem.199 Frustrated with developments, the Greek Cypriots were soon to initiate the 
1955 EOKA 2 0 0 anti-colonial struggle. This was a decisive step of the Right, under the 
politicai leadership of Archbishop Makarios and the military leadership of General 
Grivas, in augmenting pressure on the British, but, at the same time, in consolidating 
their nationalist hegemony as against the Left. In the first proclamations of EOKA's 
pre-cursor (EMAK),201 it was made clear that the communists were not welcome to 
partîcipate in the armed struggle; similarly, the Turkish-Cypriots were re-assured that 
they had nothing to worry of, but the struggle was surely not theirs. AKEL was initially 
sceptical of the suitability of the form of struggle chosen: Since its early steps, in the 
relatively liberal environment of the 1940s, its involvement and success in fighting 
municipal and church élections, as weli as its expérience in waging battles for the 
widening of politicai freedoms and for improving the lot of the working classes, 
through industriai action and mass rallies, it had developed great faith and the 
necessary skills in open, mass démocratie forms of struggle. Hence, the EOKA choîce 
for an underground or guerrilla form of warfare, waged by select brave young men 
[pailikaria], did not meet with its approvai. After some initial negative reactions, 
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however, realising that EOKA was quickly gaining the sympathies of the masses, it 
moved to active support of the struggle through démonstrations and mass rallies -
obviously, in an attempt to overcome its exclusion and its feared future 
marginalisation. 
But the EOKA struggle, aiming for enosis wìth Greece, could certainly not have 
included the Turkish-Cypriots, whose ethnie consciousness had been developing 
separately and in opposition to Greek Cypriot aspirations. Nevzat documents how, 
after the island's take-over by the British, the Turks of Cyprus continued "to interact 
with the Ottoman Empire socially, economically, politically and intellectually".202 Turkish 
Cypriot schools multiplied, though at a slower pace than Greek Cypriot ones. Those 
who sought to advance their studies went primarily to Istanbul (in the same way that 
Greek Cypriots went to Athens). The first Turkish Cypriot newspaper was published in 
the 1870's and the first public reading room (where locai newspapers, along with ones 
arriving from the wider Ottoman Empire, could be read) was established in the 1880s. 
By the early twentieth Century, the emphasis was shifting from Ottomanism to Turkism 
- the virtues of the Turkish nation, culture, language and history.203 These tendencies 
were to be strengthened in the 1920's, with the formation of the Turkish state; by the 
end of the decade, young politicians influenced by Kemalist ideas, managed to pose a 
challenge to the traditional anglicised elite, still clinging to Muslim values. In the 
1930s, there were calls to reform, in émulation of Turkey, and a further shift from the 
Islamic to an ethnie secular identity; characteristically, self-identifìcations changed from 
"Muslims" to "Turks of Cyprus". In 1943, the first mass-organisation - the Association 
of the Turkish Minority of Cyprus (KATAK), was formed. In 1948, the "Special Turkish 
Committee" was formed (with British approvai), whose main objective was to facilitate 
doser relations with Turkey: School teachers and educational materials were to be 
imported from Turkey, Turkey's national days to be commemorated, and so on. But 
intercommunal tensions escalated after the EOKA struggle commenced and Turkey got 
more involved in Cyprus affaire, at British prodding. Characteristically, the 'Cyprus 
Turkish National Party', formed back in 1945, was renamed, in 1955, to the "Cyprus is 
Turkish Party". Towards the end of 1955, the Turkish Cypriots set up their own armed 
underground Organization called Volkan, which, in 1958, gave its place to the more 
violent TMT. 2 0 4 In August '55, the British formed the "auxiliary police force", staffed 
exclusively with Turkish-Cypriots, to combat EOKA insurgents: Expectedly, after the 
death of the first Turkish policeman, the Turkish Cypriot masses took to Street rioting. 
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Within a few years after the commencement of the anti-colonial struggle, AKEL was 
gradually recomposing itself, after losing ground to the Right - to the extent that 
Grivas started seriously worrying about the Left seizing power after a future politicai 
arrangement.205 To forestali such an outcome, Grivas gave orders for EOKA to start (in 
early 1958) executing Greek Cypriot leftists under the accusation of treachery, aiming 
at the humiliation and stigmatisation of the Left - and its future banishment from 
politicai power.206 For analogous reasons, the Turkish Cypriot TMT started murdering 
Turkish Cypriot leftists, mostly collaboratore of AKEL. 2 0 7 This cycle of violence led to an 
escalation of the conflict between the two communities. 
Meanwhile, the British were resorting to a tougher game. In December 1956, Lennox-
Boyd waged the threat of double self-determination on the Greek Cypriots. In mid-
1958, the Macmillan Plan was a concrete Step towards the institutionalisation of 
partition, pushing Makarius, who was becoming increasingly worried over 
developments, to publicly déclare his support for Independence as a compromise 
solution: 
Ideal (GC) Compromise Ideal (TC) 
Independence 
< 1 • 
Enosis Partition 
Figure 4.1: Ideal and compromise positions of the two communities in the late 50's 
AKEL, being under fire by Grivas and the extreme Right, but also realising the dangers 
from the escalation of conflict among the Greek Cypriots, and between the two 
communities, endorsed Makarios' turn. A few months later, however, AKEL would 
disagree with Makarios on the provisions of the Zürich-London Agreements, calling on 
him not to sign but, instead, to abandon the guerrilla warfare, and shift to a peaceful, 
démocratie mass struggle. Since the ethnarch ignored its call and proceeded with 
signing the Agreements, AKEL resorted to cooperating with the extreme nationalists(!), 
who also rejected the Agreements for their own reasons, and together they fought 
Makarios in the first élections for an independent state. Makarios won the contest, 
securing a large 67 per cent of the votes, entrenching hîmself as the undisputed leader 
of the Greek Cypriots, and becoming the first President of the newly-born Republic.208 
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Makarios and the Right were the great victors, cashing-in the returns of the glorious 
anti-colonial, libération struggle. AKEL was the great loser: Not only was it excluded 
from the armed struggle and branded as a party of traitors, it also lost badly in the 
élections. A little later, it would corne to a compromise with Makarios, joining the pro-
independence camp and being allocated a small number of seats in the Parliament of 
the young Republic. For the years to corne, AKEL was going to live in Makarios' 
shadow, accepting a subservient rôle, in order to gradually regain its lost legitimacy. 
* * * 
Colonialism was to bestow on Cyprus a dismal legacy of division and strife. To some 
extent, this was not the fault of the British, since they had inherited a colony governed 
along communal lines, where bonds of loyalty and solidarity, as well as networks of 
civil society organisations, had been developing along ethnie lines. The British simply 
built on this pre-existing basis, re-inforcing, politieizing and (often) manipulating social 
divisions. Early on, they resigned themselves to a view of Cypriot society as plural and 
deeply divided, and made few efforts to construct a sensé of over-layïng unity. And 
any such attempts towards fostering a common imagined community, a sensé of 
Cypriotness, came too late and aimed at Anglicizing the locals, so that they would be 
more loyal to colonialism, rather than in building a common identity over and above 
the communal ones, to facilitate their co-habitation. This was similarly the case with 
the other dimensions of social closure. 
Consider légal closure: Ensuring the equality of ail before the law was indeed one of 
the great benefits of British rule, yet this did not concern ail aspects of life, for 
communal law maintained its validity as regards the personal sphère (hence, in 
matters relating to the crucial institutions of family and marriage, for instance, Greek. 
Cypriots came under the jurisdiction of the Orthodox Church). Public law did separate 
Cypriots from aliens, but private law maintained a séparation between Cypriots 
themselves.209 
But, as we have seen, the potentially more explosive cleavages related to the political 
sphère. The consolidation of ethnically-based political divisions in the Législative 
Council and the municipalities, enhanced the feelings of separateness, irrespective of 
whether the communal or the individual (majoritarian or libéral démocratie) prînciple 
was used in sharing power and in political decision-making. Once again, political 
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closure was accomplished along ethnic, and not national, lines. Trie Orthodox Church, 
acting as the quasi-state of the Greek Cypriots, played an important role in pushing 
social closure along ethnic (rather than national) lines. The Church had a key 
contribution in fostering the desire of becoming a part of the Greek imagined 
community - taking over the leading role from the bourgeoisie. Finally, as regards 
military closure, EOKA (much as TMT) managed to harden the division along ethnic 
lines, through excluding Turkish Cypriots, and, to a large extent, Greek Cypriot leftists, 
from the anti-colonial armed struggle. 
Yet, as we have seen, inter-communal cleavages were not the only ones, for intra-
communal divisions had grown to be equally, if not more, strong. Within the Greek 
Cypriot community, the appearance to outsiders that all adhered to an undifferentiated 
form of irredentist nationalism, was only a "public face", the community's "boundary", 
symbolically simple and uniform ("all Greek Cypriots want enosis"). But the internal 
discourse, within the Greek Cypriot community, remained complex and diverse.210 
Again, this division was not merely along the lines of class or ideology - it had 
gradually become a much deeper cleavage between two historically constituted sub­
cultures. Anthony Cohen reminds us that cultures have no stable, essential character, 
save the need to distinguish themselves from significant others: "Culture is thus 
inherently antithetical";211 the Left had developed as the antithesis of the established 
forces of the Right.212 Overall, the two camps clung fast to the opposing poles of a 
distinct binary code. The Right upheld the nation, tradition and freedom of choice 
(and thus the free-enterprise system); the Left emphasized the people, progress and 
equality (and a system in which the state would ensure social justice). The Right, 
despite fighting an anti-colonial struggle, was pro-West. The Left was deeply suspect 
of the West and was vehemently anti-imperialist. But, perhaps, the most important 
difference had to do with the way the two camps related to the 'national issue': The 
Right saw enosis as purely a matter of ethnic ties, of joining the greater cultural 
community of the Greek nation. The Left shared the belief of ethnic continuity, but its 
constant wavering as regards the rationale, or the alternatives to enosis, betrayed its 
more instrumental or strategic approach to the issue.213 In future, the exact content of 
the respective differences and identifications would vary:214 What would remain 
constant was the deep cleavage dividing the Greek Cypriot community. 
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Independence was thus to find Cyprus a deeply divided society, both intra-communally 
and inter-communally. Up to this stage the intra-communal division was the dominant 
one. Soon, the ethno-national division would come centre stage. 
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Chapter 5 The Cyprus Republic: From bi-national to national state 
From the late eighteenth century onwards, Europe was increasingly organized into 
nation-states.1 Although the form of these new regimes varied, all shared common 
characteristics and had a similar view of themselves and the world. Internally, there 
was a stress on the need for unity of the national community, which led to great 
energies expended in homogenizing the subjects. The latter were viewed as one 
people, sovereign over their own affairs and free to determine their fate. Above all, this 
self-determining people had a right and duty to control their own land, so that there 
would be a coincidence of territory, sovereignty and nationality. Externally, the world 
was viewed as constituted by sovereign states interacting with each other, whether in 
trade or war. The Jacobin project of organizing the nation into an all-powerful state as 
the motor of society's forward march, was the best, if extreme, exemplification of this 
new paradigm of political organization, which had swiftly established itself in Europe.2 
But transplanting the model to non-European countries did not prove easy:3 Perhaps 
the most important reason was that western Europe was already reasonably 
homogenous in culture by the time the nation-state began consolidating; this was not 
so in many other parts of the world where, historical developments had produced 
different realities, for which the nation-state model was not well suited. 
Such was the case with Third World countries, liberated from colonial rule. On the 
surface, one could find important homologies between these countries and Europe. If 
the French Revolution was Europe's "key moment at which nation and people became 
one",4 anti-colonial struggles could be seen as the corresponding key moments in the 
Third World. Peter Alter proposes: "In much the same way as Risorgimento 
nationalism in Europe had been directed against existing structures of domination and 
the multinational empires, nationalism in the Third World was now channeled against 
colonialism and the political, economic and cultural imperialism of the Europeans".5 
Yet anti-colonial struggles did not automatically lead to the fostering of new nations, 
but only of new states, as instruments of central power.6 In Africa, for instance, any 
pre-colonial national traditions were destroyed by Colonialism. Territorial boundaries 
were often quite arbitrarily drawn by colonial officers, with little regard to pre-colonial 
ethnic, religious, political or other social realities, and, at de-colonization, these were 
used to delineate new states - consequently, the states so created ended up 
incorporating an amalgam of peoples, with little to unite them. The new leaders and 
intellectuals of these emergent states then faced the task of forging a new nation out 
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of the heterogeneous materials at hand (tribes, clans, ethnic groups and so on); such 
particularistic impediments had to be transcended in order to create overarching 
identities and loyalties, which were to be the 'glue' holding the new nation together.7 
Writing in the early twentieth century, and commenting on the Gold Coast (future 
Ghana), Attoh Ahuma painted a picture of his country as characterized by a "multiform 
composition of congeries of States or Provinces, independent of each other, divided by 
complex political institutions, laws and customs, and speaking a great variety of 
languages". Many refused to acknowledge this mix as a nation, yet Ahuma insisted on 
the "inalienable heritage of nationality" of his "people", which, despite divisions, had 
historically been sufficiently united to justify them being considered as "still a Nation": 
"If we were not, it is time to invent one".8 
But how were the new nations to be forged? The prevalent vision was that a colony 
had first to become an independent state and then cultivate national consciousness 
and nationalism, to weld the diverse peoples and cultures into a nation.9 As Holsti puts 
it, "the nationalist elites borrowed Western ideas of nationalism and the Western 
concept of the state, and melded the two". The problem was that "the crucial question 
of who, exactly, formed the new political community, the fundamental basis for the 
legitimacy of the state"10 remained unclear, and was to plague many post-colonial 
states which carried within them "the seeds of political fragmentation".11 
In Cyprus, developments were very different to both Europe and the prevalent model 
of the Third World; not only was society marked by heterogeneity, but local collective 
visions did not aim towards creating a new nation, since the two main communities on 
the island perceived themselves as already belonging to pre-existing distinct nations. 
Back in history, they had started as ethnoculturally heterogeneous religious 
communities, in the context of the Ottoman multicultural empire. But the politicization 
and institutionalization of ethnicity under British rule and the growth of antagonistic 
irredestist nationalisms, culminating in the intercommunal violence which sealed their 
conflict with blood towards the end of the anti-colonial struggle, had gradually 
transformed initial cultural differences into deep national heterogeneity. Ethnic 
differences in Cyprus were thus not seen as particularistic impediments which had to 
be transcended so as to create a common nation. They were not of the 'thin' kind, 
mere expressions of cultural attributes distinguishing one community from the other; 
they had, instead, grown to be of the 'thick' variety, "understood and experienced as 
constitutive of nationhood"12 - only not of a common Cypriot nationhood, but of a 
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disjointed one, related to two other 'mother' nations, given voice by the transborder 
Greek and Turkish nation-states. 
Independence and the création of a common state was not the original choice of the 
two local communities, but an undesired, second best solution thrust upon them. The 
newly born Cyprus Republic was not the outcome of a shared vision but of a 
compromise, a balance between the many diverse internai and external powers and 
interests. Makarius, who was soon to be the first President of the new republic, was 
very clear as to what the Zürich-London Agreements had accomplished: "We have 
created a state, but not a nation".13 The new regime was not going to be a nation-
state; it was rather to be a multi-national, or more precisely, a bi-national, bi-
communal state, which was to house the two "deeply divided" communities. 
Plural society and the bi-national, consociational state 
On the dawn of its independence, Cyprus had all the characteristics of a plural society 
divided by segmental cleavages - that is, deep, politicized social divisions along 
ethnonational and ideological lines, all its social institutions being organized on the 
basîs of thèse cleavages. In plural societies, cultural distinctions are perceived to be 
deeply embedded in the very fabric of society, constituting an acquired 'second 
nature'. We have seen how religion, for instance, was no ordinary cultural trait: The 
Orthodox clergy were not only servants of God but of the Greek nation. Orthodox 
churches were the bastions of national ideals, and pulpit sermons aimed to indoctrinate 
believers into the values of both religion and nation. Similarly, the Greek and Turkish 
languages were not innocent Channels of communication, since they linked the two 
communities not only with the cultures but also with the national idéologies pf the two, 
mother countries. Each community had its own newspapers, which carried mostly 
articles and news on the particular ethnonational community, from an ethnocentric 
point of view, with none or little coverage on the other community. The educational 
system was segregated and the schools of the two communities followed their own 
distinct curriculum, in line with that of the two mainlands. Most textbooks were 
imported from the 'motherlands' and most teachers had studied there. In language 
teaching, the locai dialects were downgraded and the more standardized versions from 
Greece and Turkey were promoted instead. The narratives carried in the reading-
textbooks, and discusseti in class, familiarized Cypriot youth with the institutions, 
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values and other social realities of their cross-border counterparts, but not with each 
other. Greek history textbooks focused on the glory of Ancient Greece and the 
Byzantium, whereas the corresponding Turkish ones on the splendour and tolérance of 
the Ottoman Empire and on the achievements of the inheritor national state. 
The public sphère was also split in two, with each community having its own politicai 
structures - politicai parties and other voluntary associations. The few institutions 
which encouraged bi-communal integration, such as the left-wing labour union PEO, 
which had in the past enlisted a good number of Turkish Cypriots in its ranks, had 
suffered severe setbacks after the ascent of extreme nationalism and, especially, TMT's 
violence and intimidation of Turkish Cypriot leftists. Even though territorially there was 
some mixing of the two communities, séparation was on the increase.14 Intercommunal 
marriages were not only few or non-existent, but they were increasingly becoming a 
"structural impossibility".15 Besides ethno-national segmentation, there were deep 
intra-communal socio-political cleavages, while ideological différences had gradually led 
to the formation of discrete Left and Right sub-cultures.16 
How could such deep fragmentation be dealt with? Lijphart, a prominent analyst of 
plural societies, proposes that there are five logicai solutions to the problem of deep 
fragmentation - namely, assimilation, consociation, partition, mass émigration, and 
génocide (more recently dubbed ethnie cleansing). Noting that the last two are not 
politicai solutions which any contemporary démocratie society would condone, O' Leary 
has proposed an amended list of six "ideal-typical stratégies for Stabilising segmented 
societies": Hegemonial control, integration (similar to Lijpharfs assimilation), 
participation, internationalization, arbitration and consociation. Most of these methods 
of dealing with deep division, have been used in the case of Cyprus, to one degree or 
another, as we will shortly see. 1 7 But, starting with the dawn of independence, some 
options had already been eliminated: To begin with, enosis (which would have entailed 
integration of the smaller Turkish Moslem community, as happened with the other 
Moslem communities in mainland Greece), and partition, were explicitly ruled out by 
the Constitution of the new republic. And even though not specifically mentioned, a 
majoritarian form of government, leading to a unitary state, was sifnilarly excluded, 
presumably because it could have ended up in the permanent exclusion from power of 
the Turkish minority community, by the Greek majority. Instead, the solution adopted 
was that of consociationalism, a system which aims to build on existing divisions, 
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transforming them into some form of unity.18 Consociationalism is defined by four 
basic characteristics: 
(1) Grand coalition, is seen to be the determining feature, giving rise to a minimal 
definition of consociation as "government by elite cartel designed to turn a 
democracy with a fragmented political culture into a stable democracy"; put 
differently, grand coalition entails cooperation of the political leaders of the 
various "segments" or "pillars" of society to co-govern the country. 
(2) Mutual veto, which allows each segment or minority not to be outvoted by the 
majority on important matters concerning their vital interests (this is the same 
principle as that of "concurrent majorities"); 
(3) Proportionality, ensuring that positions in the government and scarce state 
resources are allocated to each segment, according to its proportion of the 
population; 
(4) Segmental autonomy, which entails that the various segments are internally 
self-governed as regards matters that are of exclusive concern to them.19 
Taking the segmental nature of plural societies as given, this approach attempts to use 
"consociational engineering"20 to hold the fragments together. In the same way, the 
Cyprus Republic was premised on the existence of deep divisions separating the two 
communities. 
In a comparative study of democracies in plural societies, Lijphart noted that the 
Cyprus constitution was "thoroughly consociational", and "elaborately embodied" "[a]ll 
of the principles of consociational democracy - grand coalition, proportionality, 
autonomy and veto".21 As regards the grand coalition aspect, the executive branch 
provided for a Greek President and a Turkish Vice-President, elected by their respective 
communities, through universal suffrage. The two office holders had the right of final 
veto on decisions of the Council of Ministers concerning foreign affairs, defense and 
security.22 Obviously, the consequence was that the proper functioning of the 
executive branch relied "on the absolute cooperation of the leaders of the two 
communities".23 And the provision for a "strong Vice President" was one of the many 
checks "intended to prevent the Greek majority from overpowering the Turkish 
minority".24 The grand coalition arrangement was completed with a Council of 
Ministers, which had to consist of seven Greek ministers appointed by the President 
and three Turkish ministers appointed by the Vice-President. 
The same proportionality formula (7 to 3) was also applied to the composition of the 
House of Representatives - thirty-five members had to be elected by the Greeks and 
fifteen by the Turks. The President of the House had to be Greek and the Vice-
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Président a Turk, elected by the Représentatives of the two communities respectively -
themselves elected separately by their communities. Most laws of the House required 
a simple majority, except in certain key areas (the électoral law, taxes and the 
municipalities),25 where concurrent majorities of the Représentatives of both 
communities were necessary. The seven-to-three ratio was also used in the public 
service and the police; in the armed forces it was fixed at six-to-four.26 The Suprême 
Court was composed of a Greek, a Turk and a neutral judge (not a citizen of Cyprus, 
Greece, Turkey or Britain), who acted as président.27 The over-representation of the 
Turkish mînority in ail cases (the population ratio was approximately 8:2) served to 
strengthen its voice as against the Greek majority. 
Finally, the constitution provided for considérable autonomy of the two communities 
through the élection of two "Communal Chambers", charged with a compétence on a 
number of issues relating to religion, éducation, culture and personal status; communal 
"courts dealing with civil disputes relating to personal status and to religious matters" 
were provided for, plus taxes to pay for communal institutions. Communal Chambers 
were also authorized to supervise the functionïng, and to pass by-laws relating to, the 
municipalities, as well as to control producers' and consumere' co-operatives and crédit 
establishments.28 Another way in whîch autonomy was provided for, was through the 
establishment of separate municipalities in the five largest towns, run by Councils 
elected by the respective communities, in each town.29 
The Cypriot constitution was thus strongly bi-communal and bi-national in character -
it acknowledged, legitimized and built on bi-communalîsm, through an "intricate 
System of constitutional devices".30 According to consociational theory, that in itself 
was not a problem: What was a problem was that it made few provisions for fostering 
the unity of the Republic; not only that, but it legitimized the continuous attachment 
and dependence of the two communities on their 'motherlands', opening the way for 
the intervention of the latter into the internai affaire of the young Republic. The 
Cypriots were recognized as citizens via membership of their respective community, 
and not through direct relation to the state as individuals. Article 2(1) of the 
Constitution specified: "The Greek community comprises ail citizens of the Republic 
who are of Greek origin and whose mother tongue is Greek or who share the Greek 
cultural traditions or who are membere of the Greek-Orthodox Church";31 and Article 
2(2) similarly delineated the citizens "who are of Turkish origin", speak Turkish and are 
Moslems.32 Article 3 specified as officiai languages both Greek and Turkish, requiring ail 
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légal and other officiai documents to be written in both languages. Acknowledging the 
national cross-border ties to Greece and Turkey, the Constitution allowed "[a]ny citizen 
of the Republic or any body [...] other than public, whose members are citizens of the 
Republic", the right to fly the flag of the Republic or Greece or Turkey without 
restriction.33 Public officiais or bodies, as well as communal authorities and 
institutions, could fly the Republic s flag along with the Greek and Turkish flags on 
public holidays. Article 5 gave the two communities "the right to celebrate [...] the 
Greek and Turkish national holidays". Furthermore, the two communities had the 
constitutional right of receiving subsidies for their educational, cultural, athletic and 
philanthropie institutions, from the Greek or Turkish governments respectively; 
similarly, the two communities could receive teachers or clerics from the motherlands, 
to supplément their needs as necessary.34 Finally, the Republic could give Greece, 
Turkey and the United Kingdom the status of "most privileged state" in any agreement, 
of whatever nature.35 
To complète the picture, we should add that, along with the Constitution, three other 
Treatîes were ratified: the Treaty of Establishment provided for two sovereign military 
British bases on the island,36 which "in essence, secured British influence in the Middle 
East"37 and the Eastern Mediterranean; the Treaty of Alliance, which was a défense 
part between Cyprus, Greece and Turkey, providing for the permanent stationing of 
950 Greek and 650 Turkish troops on the island. Finally, the Treaty of Guarantee was 
an agreement on Cyprus' "independence, territorial integrity and security"; it is this 
treaty which specified that union with another country (enosis), as well as partition, 
was to be permanently excluded.38 Britain, Greece and Turkey, as guarantor powers, 
were assigned the right of taking action, jointly or individually, toward "reestablishîng 
the state of affairs" in case the status quo was violated. Finally, a number of 
constitutional provisions, classified as "basic Articles" (including the ones outlined 
above), were declared as permanently unalterable. 
But the Cypriot experiment in bi-communal co-habitation would soon fail. Why was it 
that a régime which was "thoroughly consociational" and meticulously embodied ail the 
principles of consociational democracy, aiming to create unity in diversity, collapsed a 
short three years after inception? To respond to the above question is to address the 
issue of the conditions conducive to the success of consociational democracy. 
Theorists of consociationalism have in fart proposed a list of such factors, the main 
ones of which include: Segmentai isolation, the présence of cross-cutting cleavages, 
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overarching loyalties, prior traditions of elite accommodation, a multiple balance of 
powers, external threats, and the small size of the country involved. Below, we will 
consider the main ones of these, while examining why the consociational state in 
Cyprus failed, what role nationalism played, and how the relationship between state 
and nation developed. 
The collapse of consociational democracy 
Segmentai isolation 
Segmental isolation relates to the functional and territorial séparation of the 
component parts of a consociational regime, which ensures that there are limited 
contacts between people and groups from the différent segments, thereby limiting the 
chances of the éruption of antagonisms into actual conflict. In the case of Cyprus, 
there was a strong degree of functional segmentai isolation, resulting from the 
separate social and politicai Organization of the two communities, but there was no 
absolute geographica! séparation. Prior to 1960, Cypriots lived in villages which were 
wholly Greek or Turkish, or mixed, and in towns which were mostly Greek but with 
Turkish Cypriot quarters. There was, thus, some intermixing and some séparation. 
It will be recalled that territorial séparation, taksim, became the counter demand of the 
Turkish Cypriots as against enosis. So even though there was no complete 
geographica! isolation, this in itself was not a cause of the subséquent breakdown of 
the consociational regime. It did, however, become one of the most important such 
causes, once the matter became politicized. The central issue of contention concerned 
the municipalities: Up to 1958, Cypriot municipalities were unified, but once inter­
communal tensions arose, the Turkish Cypriots, with British consent, createci separate 
municipalities for themselves. The 1960 constitution, with Greek Cypriot consent, 
requïred the création of ethnically separate municipalities a few months into 
Independence, once practical issues such as municipal boundaries were settled. But 
the Greek Cypriots were soon to change their minds, first because of the difficulties 
involved in drawing the boundaries (deriving from the intermixed patterns of 
settlement), but, most importantly, because the early difficulties in co-habitation 
increased their concerns that separate municipal areas would constitute the basis of 
subséquent Turkish Cypriot demands for partition. Although lack of territorial isolation 
was not per se a cause of the 1963 breakdown, the latter did lead to the first step 
172 
towards the former; and complete geographica! séparation (and the création of 
ethnically clean areas) was to resuit after the 1974 Turkîsh invasion. 
777e grand coalition 
The core principle of consociational democracy is grand coalition, the readiness of the 
segmentai leaders to cooperate with each other, "in spite of the deep cleavages 
separating their segments".39 This is presumably because they are committed to the 
unity of the country and because of the "self-negating prophesy"*0 - the récognition 
that if they do not cooperate through sharing power, disaster may follow. In the case 
of Cyprus, the consociational regime, which resulted from the Zürich-London 
agreements, was not the choice of the Cypriot politicai leaders, aiming to secure unity 
or to avoid conflict. The Greek Cypriots had long struggled for enosisanó it was only 
when Makarius got worried that Britain would have gone ahead with the partitionist 
Macmillan Pian,4 1 that he decided to opt for independence. When the basic framework 
of the agreements was laid down in Zurich, by the représentatives of Greece and 
Turkey, the Cypriot leaders were not présent. Later on, when they did have the 
chance to join the discussions, in London, little could be changed. Makarios seems to 
have felt uncomfortable with a number of the provisions and gave his consent only 
reluctantly, after pressures from the Greek mainland délégation.42 He apparently 
maintained ambivalent feelings about the agreements and, on différent occasions, 
gave contradictory explanations as to why he had accepted them.43 
But even though Makarios consented, the more extreme nationalist Greek Cypriots 
were not that Willing to do so. Grivas gave his last minute blessing grudgingly and 
only because he realized that if he did not, and had carried on with the struggle, he 
would have divided "not only the Cypriot people but the whole Nation", leading to 
more devastating conséquences than accepting a compromise solution; he thus called 
on everyone to "rally around the Ethnarch, who constituted the only symbol of unity 
and might" of the Greek side.44 Yet, after only a few months, he would publicly 
condemn the agreements, encouraging thereby the small group of staunen enosists, 
rallying around the Bishop of Kyrenia, to more vocally oppose independence. Overall, 
it quickly became obvious that the concern of Greek Cypriot leaders was not with the 
unity of the country, but with the unity of their own community and of the wider Greek 
nation. Similarly, they did recognize that disaster would follow if accommodation was 
not reached, not so much because of possible conflict with the Turkish Cypriots, who 
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were a much smaller and weaker community, but of the consequences of the action of 
more powerful third parties (Britain and, especially, Turkey). The agreements were 
thus seen to be the consequence of outside imposition, accepted under duress, and 
the hope was entertained that they could in future be improved upon. 
Another aspect of the "grand coalition" idea, is that it should involve the participation 
of the leaders of all significant segments of society in governing a plural society.45 Yet, 
in the case of Cyprus, one of the main intents of the agreements for a "guaranteed 
independence"46 (guaranteed by three NATO powers), was the exclusion of the Left 
from power, and thereby the forestalling of a feared Soviet take-over of an island vital 
to Western strategic interests. Interestingly, beside the officially publicized documents 
(the Constitution and the three Treaties), a secret "Gentlemen's Agreement" was also 
signed by the Prime Ministers of Greece and Turkey, whereby the two agreed to 
support Cyprus' membership of NATO and to encourage the (future) President and 
Vice-President of Cyprus to outlaw the Communist Party and communist activities.47 
AKEL leaders were not aware of this secret agreement, but they were naturally 
opposed to the whole idea of guarantees by NATO powers and to various aspects of 
the Constitution - thus, at Zurich, they had advised Makarios not to sign the 
agreements and to instead abandon the armed struggle and revert to a mass political 
struggle. At the first Presidential elections they cooperated with the extreme enosists, 
forming an anti-Zurich alliance which contested the agreements and Makarios. After 
the elections, however, AKEL joined the pro-Makarios Patriotic Front and concurred on 
not staging the Greek Cypriot Parliamentary elections and to, instead, settle for a share 
of 5 out of the 35 seats in the House (even though it represented approximately 30% 
of the voters), and 3 seats in the Greek Communal chamber.48 
AKEL's support of Makarios aimed at moderating the Right's relentless criticism for not 
having participated in the armed struggle - which the extremists saw as outright 
betrayal. Its options were limited since the majoritarian electoral system would have 
resulted in its total exclusion from the House of Parliament and, thereby, to its further 
political isolation. For Makarios, the gain was a further strengthening of his position, 
since he now commanded more than 95% of Greek Cypriot votes. Furthermore, the 
incorporation of the Left meant that he could count on sympathetic votes in the United 
Nations from the Soviet Union and its allies, as well as from countries in the non-
aligned movement, many of which were experimenting with socialist ideas after 
liberation from colonial rule. Besides, his pact with AKEL was from a position of power 
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and dïd not entait apportioning any seats to it in the executive. Furthermore, his 
officiai tolérance of the communiste went hand-in-hand with his parallel endorsement 
of an anti-communist orientation of the state apparatus, since most key positions in 
government were held by ex-EOKA fighters or associâtes, who espoused an extreme 
anti-left, anti-communist ideology.49 Indeed, Makarios had early on tried to pre-empt 
the opposition from hardline enosiste, through forming his first Council of Ministers 
exclusively from EOKA members or affiliâtes. 
The overall impact of the above developments was that the Greek Cypriote tended to 
consolidate qua Greek Cypriote into a broad front, under Makarios, so that little room 
was left for a strong opposition which would have questioned Makarios on any of his 
policies. The common core of the pro-Makarios front was an ethnonational perspective 
which ail participante shared and which translated into différent degrees of 
dissatisfaction with the various provisions of the Zürich-London agreemente. To make 
matters worse, the only real opposition remaining came from the small group of more 
extreme enosiste, and this tended to shift Greek Cypriot positions to even more 
inflexible attitudes in their différences with the Turkish Cypriote. 
On the Turkish Cypriot side, unity was more easily achieved. The increasing strength 
of the enosis movement during Colonial rule, and especially after the second World 
War, had rallied the Turkish Cypriote together, to face this imminent threat. The EOKA 
struggle and, especially, the shedding of Turkish Cypriot blood, had turned tensions 
into open conflict. Britain's encouragement of Turkey to more actively involve ïtself in 
Cyprus had added another dimension to the problem. And TMT's attacks on the 
Turkish Cypriot Left had severed the few remaining links between the communities. 
The smaller size of the Turkish Cypriot community, facing the more numerous and 
mightier Greek Cypriot community, ite less differentiated social structure, and the more 
monolithic domination achieved by TMT, rendered the community more cohesive. 
Added to thèse, the fact that the Zürich-London agreemente had given them a number 
of privilèges to compensate for their minority status and had, effectively, made them 
equal partners with the Greek Cypriot majority, rendered them on the whole more 
satisfied with the new state of affaire. An indication of Turkish Cypriot solidarity was 
the fact that Fazïl Kuchuk was unopposed in the first élections of the Republic (3 
December 1959), for the Vice-Presidency.50 His party went on to win ail 15 Turkish 
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Cypriot seats in the House of Parliament; Rauf Denktash was elected President of the 
Turkish Communal Chamber.51 
Finally, it must be pointed out that most individuate who were to assume leading 
politicai rôles at independence "found themselves in power before they had 
matured".52 On the contrary, most of them had risen to prominence through their 
involvement in the nationalist movement, where they had to demonstrate traits of 
toughness, single-mindedness, and uncompromising détermination, to win against ail 
odds. They had little chance to learn the skills of governance, compromise and 
conciliation, which are so vital in consociational régimes. 
Overarching loyalties 
Another important principle of consociationalism is that deep cleavages may not 
necessarily lead to conflict if "overarching loyalties" moderate their impact.53 In the 
case of Cyprus, the anti-colonial movement involved only the Greek Cypriots since it 
aimed at enosis, an objective which alienated the Turkish Cypriots.54 The latter had 
initially wanted the British to stay on, so that they would not end up as a powerless 
minority in a Greek dominated land; once Turkish national consciousness gradually 
took root and Turkish nationalism gathered force after the second World War, 
especially in the late fifties, in response to the growing militancy of enosis nationalism, 
it acquired a more reactionary form, passionately advocating "taksim or death".55 
Makarius was the first Cypriot leader to espouse the idea of an independent state, not 
because he believed in a bi-communal partnership, but in order to forestali the British 
partitionist plans. Independence became the solution everyone agreed upon because, 
for différent reasons in each case, it happened to secure, at that particular juncture, 
the conflicting interests of Britain, America, NATO, Greece, Turkey and the two warring 
communities in Cyprus. The fact that independence was only a second best, 
compromise solution, which the locai communities had never really sought, plus the 
fact that it was backed by outside powers with diverse relations and interests in 
Cyprus, rendered the idea suspect to many Cypriots, who could not readily identìfy 
with, or feel loyalty towards, à regime they never desired or had fought for. Only a 
week after the signing of the Zürich-London agreements (25 February 1959), the 
leader of the hardline enosists, Bishop of Kyrenia, in a letter to the head of the Greek 
Parliament, was confiding his great fear - that independence meant permanent 
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aliénation from Greece: "Whilst in British hands Cyprus was maintained as a Greek 
héritage, whereas now it is to be finally severed from Mother Greece's body. The 
sacred and inviolable right of self-determination, which is exercised by the very blacks 
of Africa, is forever thrown away".56 Furthermore, the Bishop feared that the 
conséquence of the provision which prohibited any activity likely to promote (directly or 
indirectly) enosis, would be the encouragement of activities for steering "Cypriot 
patriotism", and associated with this was the aim of the "enemies of Cyprus" who 
always harboured the "perennial and only objective of dehellenization".57 Obviously, 
the idea of an overarching patriotism was not perceived positively, as linked to the 
possibility of uniting the two communities; it was viewed as simply a threat to Greek 
Cypriot identity, much in line with British colonial policies. 
Makarius was severely criticized by the extreme nationalists for his turn to 
independence and for forsaking his sacred oath for union, which turned him into 
enosis' "gravedigger". Yet the Archbishop was not only the leader of the Greek 
community but was now President of ali Cypriots, and had just agreed to power-
sharing and co-habitation with the Turkish community - thus, he did seem to be in 
search of a new ideology, suitable for the common future which lay ahead. The 
historic public speech, which he delivered upon his return to Cyprus (1 March 1959), 
right after signing the agreements in London, is characteristic of a discourse still deeply 
embedded in an ethnonationalist outlook, while seeking to transcend it so as to move 
towards a new overarching ideology, which would build bridges between the two 
communities.58 In the initial part of his speech, Makarios sought to emphasize that the 
new Cypriot state constituted a victory for the Greek Cypriots - for "the darkness of old 
is giving way to the sweet light of day". Attemptîng to draw légitimation from the 
past, he carried on to déclare that from the "depths of history" the immortai spirit of 
"our ancestors" is visiting to "spread the glorious message": 
...We have overcome! Today Cyprus is free: Celebrate ye brothers! [...] for the 
first time in our three thousand years of history we are taking into our hands the 
responsibility of our future. For the first time after long centuries of slavery we 
are becoming free. [...] Let it not be assumed that the présent day constitutes 
the finishïng point. On the contrary it constitutes the starting point of new long, 
peaceful struggles [...] It constitutes the starting point of new ventures for 
securing populär well-being and progress, and for making our country into a land 
which is prosperous and where the rule of law abides. 
Obviously, the "brothers" whom he was invitino, to celebrate victory after "three 
thousand years history" were the Greek Cypriots. At the same time, however, he 
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proceeded to stress that they needed to see positively the ethnic Others and to 
"cooperate wholeheartedly and honestly with the friend neighbour Turkish element"; 
he thus called on everyone to adopt a new vision of becoming peace's bridge-builder: 
...We are called upon to transform our island into a golden bridge which will unite 
and not separate opposite forces. We are called upon to transform our island into 
a great cross-road, which will materially and spiritually link North and South, East 
and West... 
In closing, he stressed that Cypriots were a "small people" who could only rely on 
"spiritual might" and "moral splendour", so he called his people to envision "a country 
free at last, full of youthful rigour and strength", "walking down the road of civilization 
and progress": 
Close this vision in your soul and be assured that the state, which is founded 
today with your love and sacrifice, will grow to be a real state of welfare, 
progress, morality and justice, a state of God. 
A year later, in his speech to all Cypriots, on the date of the official establishment of 
the Cyprus Republic (16 August 1960), Makarios was more pragmatic as to what could 
hold the two communities together, this time emphasizing the common benefits which 
all stood to have from the many socio-economic gains which would accrue to all 
classes in the future independent state; at the same time, he did not fail to underline 
the need for the new polity to "implement the principle of equal rights, equal treatment 
and equal opportunities to all citizens, irrespective of race, beliefs and religion", calling 
on all to cooperate in a "spirit of solidarity and love". Ominously, while the Archbishop 
stressed the equality of all citizens as individuals, in the new state, the Turkish Cypriot 
Vice-President, Kutchuk, was stressing the equality of the two communities. 
Yet it seems that Makarios was torn between his past oaths for commitment to enosis 
and the need to forge a new ideology. The problems of sharing power with the 
Turkish Cypriots had already started appearing during the transition period between 
signing the agreements and the declaration of independence. His nationalist 
opponents were using these difficulties to step up their criticism of the agreements and 
his own capabilities as leader. Even more moderate Greek Cypriots were increasingly 
questioning the various provisions of the Constitution, as they started witnessing the 
difficulties the political leaders were facing in sharing power. 
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There was yet another factor which influencée! the social milieu of the times. Since the 
termination of the struggle and the aeeeptance of independence were presented as a 
victory, EOKA was naturally considered as the harbinger of the new regime. Also, 
since the first appointments to positions of power were of EOKA members or 
associâtes, having close relations or being a supporter of the Organization and of its 
ideology was gaining new ground! Thus the spirit of nationalism lingered on, acquiring 
new forms and followers. Fearing that Grivas and the extreme nationalists might win 
substantial inroads into the Greek Cypriot community, through monopolizing the 
powerful enosis ideology, Makarios felt it necessary to pay homage to the ideals of the 
anti-colonial struggie and to convince his audiences that independence was yet a new 
phase of the libération effort. In a speech, just a few months before formally 
assuming the office of President of the Republic, he declared: 
The epic grandeur and glory of EOKA's libération struggle has laid the foundation-
stone of national freedom. This freedom it is our sacred duty to safeguard and 
complete. National struggles never come to an end. They merely change their 
form [...] The realization of our hopes and aspirations ïs not complete under the 
Zurich and London Agreements... The glorious libération struggle, whose fifth 
anniversary we celebrate today, has secured us advanced bastions and 
impregnable strongholds for our independence. From thèse bastions we will 
continue the struggle to complete victory.59 
These trends magnifìed with time. Instead of withering away, ethno-nationalism was 
simply changing forms. Indeed, since Cypriots were now in control of the state, 
"officiai nationalism"60 was for the first time finding expression - only this was not a 
'civic' form of nationalism, rallying loyalty to the common state. Instead, state offices 
were used in the service of a communally oriented nationalism: "On Sundays, and on 
'national' occasions, mémorial services were held in honour of the dead of the struggle, 
in which Makarios himself, his Greek ministère and other politicians made patriotic 
speeches. Streets and squares, social clubs and athletic games were named after 
EOKA heroes".61 The media published articles and put out programmes extolling the 
heroic deeds of EOKA and of the Greek people and nation more generally.62 The new 
power contest between pro-Makarios and pro-Grivas supporters, which translated into 
pro-independence and pro-enosis core positions, kept pushing the officiai Greek 
Cypriot views into a synthesis which stressed the temporary nature of independence, 
as a step to the unfulfilled longer term national goal of enosisP Some have argued 
that this was mostly talk, on behalf of Makarios and his supporters, as a defence 
against staunen enosists. But it made the Turkish Cypriots increasingly suspidous of 
Greek Cypriots for what they perceived as the latter's double-talk; which caused them 
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to cling even more tenaciously to their rights enshrined in the Constitution, especially 
those underlining their separate and equal status as a community. This pushed them 
nearer their own original goal of taksim and further away from the Greek Cypriots. In 
turn, such a stand provoked the Greek Cypriots, who themselves suspected the Turkish 
Cypriots of double-talk, and of secretly harbouring partitionist plans. 
Overall, the Greek Cypriots felt they were double losers. Not only had their preferred 
collective vision of enosis not marerialized, but their second best solution of 
independence was not working to their liking either. Although they were the ones to 
wage the anti-colonial struggle, and despite the fact that they were the majority, they 
were forced into a situation where they had to share rule with the Turkish Cypriots -
the ethnonational Others who had tried to frustrate the libération struggle and who, 
after ail, were a mere minority. Meanwhile, a few months after Cyprus won its 
freedom, the United Nations had adopted the 1960 Déclaration on Granting of 
Independence to Colonial Countries and People.64 Self-determination and majority rule 
were the order of the day in most emerging Third World countries.65 The Greek 
Cypriots felt they were deprived not only of enosis but of their 'natural rights' as a 
majority. Hence "Makarios tried to make good in government practice what Zurich and 
London had denied him - namely, a pattern of government where the majority will 
prevailed, albeit with some guarantees for the minority".66 So, for instance, when in 
May 1961, the Turkish Cypriots refused to vote for the renewal of the tax law, he 
nevertheless gave orders for the collection of the taxes - despite Turkish protests that 
he was thereby violating the Constitution.67 Hard-line Greek Cypriots concluded that 
whenever a provision of the Constitution became a source of friction between the two 
communities, the answer was simply not to "stick to the letter" of the particular 
provision.68 Others argued that if Greek Cypriots "wanted to survive as Hellènes and 
especially as the hégémonie élément on the island"69 then they had to control the 
state. On the other hand, Turkish Cypriots felt that the Greeks were using their 
numerical strength to pass pre-determined décisions in the Council of Ministers and in 
the House of Parliament, without really paying attention to their concerns as a 
minority, contrary to the spirit of the consociational power-sharîng arrangements: "In 
essence, the Turkish Cypriots felt that, whatever the constitutional package they were 
being excluded from government".70 
Voices of modération were rare and feeble, and few paid much attention to them. 
. AKEL spoke from a position of weakness and tended to adopt positions which were not 
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very sensitive to Turkish Cypriot concerns, seeing the latter as mostly stressed by the 
extremist leadership of the minority community. 
Among the liberal bourgeoisie, N. Lanitis represents a clear and prophetic voice which 
Greek Cypriots did not heed to, at their own detriment. Back in the 1940's, Lanitis was 
one of leaders of the Social Progress Society, which had been arguing against extreme 
enosis positions, proposing instead an evolutionary process of "constitutional 
development and the acquisition of self-governing powers", after which self-
determination would be assured, so enosis would still be an option. That road was not 
followed and the Cypriots had to live with the Zurich agreements, reached "by force of 
circumstance". In a series of articles, published in March 1963, just a few months 
before the collapse of the bi-communal Republic, Lanitis argued that the main 
advantage of Zurich was that Cypriots were now masters of their own house which 
they had to "put in order". The main disadvantage was the division of the country, 
effected mostly through the separate Communal Chambers and, to a lesser extent, the 
separate municipalities, both of which prevented unity - "an essential provision for 
progress". Lack of unity and trust between Greeks and Turks had led to the problem 
with the municipalities, as well as inefficiencies in government, the economic war 
between the two communities and other evils. Lanitis stressed that Greek Cypriots, as 
the majority community, had more of the burden of exercising responsible leadership.71 
This included avoiding to "blatantly celebrate on Greek national occasions", which 
caused "fear and hatred amongst the Turks" - who, in reaction, "indulge in their own 
celebrations". Instead, "purely Cypriot occasions" such as Independence Day, should 
be celebrated. Greek Cypriots had to work hard at gaining the confidence of the 
Turkish Cypriots otherwise the latter would be forced to increasingly "rely on Turkey". 
After all, besides the "ostensible differences of religion and language", there was more 
that united the two communities: "Basically we should be one country and one people. 
The Turks are above all Cypriots; and so are the Greeks". Hence the "idea of Cyprus" 
as an independent country had to be fostered, through giving prominence to its own 
symbols and commemorations. 
Here, then, were clear views arguing in support of an overarching identity and loyalty -
which, however, in the intolerant milieu of the times, were considered unfounded and 
unpatriotic. In his articles, Lanitis had warned that if differences with Turkish Cypriots 
were not addressed, they would turn into hatred and open conflict - which would 
mean the loss of control of the situation by the political leaders, and power passing 
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into "the hands of irresponsible gunmen" - which ¡s exactly what happened a few 
months later, in December 1963.72 
Traditions of élite accommodation 
Consociational theory proposes that a pre-democratic historical tradition of moderation 
and compromise can be an ¡ndependent favourable factor that can "appreciably 
strengthen the chances of consociotional democracy."73 In his brief commentary on 
"Consociational failure in Cyprus, 1960-1963",74 Lijphart opines that the "only mildly 
favorable element" for the consociational experiment in Cyprus, was its "historical 
experience [...] of being ruled under the Ottoman millet system",75 which he obviously 
associates with multicultural toleration. Judging from the end result of failure in 
Cyprus, however, he carries on to pessimistically conclude that "[t]he Cypriot example 
again shows that such prior traditions are not of decisive importance". There are two 
main problems with such a position: First, Cyprus' experience under the Ottoman millet 
system was not as unequivocally positive as is implied (see chapter three). Second, 
aside from the exact nature and record of the Ottoman regime in Cyprus, the most 
¡mportant ¡nfluence on élite traditions was surely the subsequent period of British 
Colonial rule, which lasted for almost a century, and was the midwife of the 
¡ndependent state. 
We have seen (chapter four) that far from contributing to the creation of a liberal spirit 
of pragmatism and moderation, British rule had a determining role in the fostering of 
exactly the opposite tradition. Kitromilides sums up the three aspects of Colonial policy 
which mostly contributed towards nurturing a culture of intolerance:76 First, 
institutionalizing the system of communal representation, which had the consequence 
of politicizing ethnicity and stirring passions along ethnic lines; second, the very 
structure of the Legislative Council, which deprived the Greek Cypriots of having a real 
say in the governing of the island; and third, the British attitude towards the Greek 
Cypriot demands for self-determination and self-governance, which became 
increasingly inflexible as British strategic interests on the island acquired higher 
significance - leading to the parallel growth of intransigent attitudes among the locáis, 
and the undermining of all voices of moderation. The combination of these three 
factors with irredentist nationalism led to the prevalence of immoderation and 
extremism in the relations of the two communities. This "dialectic of intolerance", as 
Kitromilides aptly calis it, had ¡mportant consequences in Cyprus' political life - such as, 
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subverting all initiatives for reforms whenever thèse appeared (viz. the case of the 
Diaskeptiki in 1948), forestalling most forms of public criticism, and hindering support 
to alternative politicai forces which would have been more committed to transcending 
the dialectic. Overall, the latter amounted to the "mutuai isolation" of the two ethnie 
communities, which led them to develop separate politicai visions, which in turn 
constituted the basis of subséquent intercommunal conflict; furthermore, wîthin each 
community, hegemony in the politicai sphère became associated with adhérence to 
"nationalist orthodoxy".77 
It is important to recali that the prévalent nationalism was imported from two 
motherlands which had several times in the past engaged in war: Especially in their 
latest clashes (1919-1922), hundreds of thousands from each nation were killed and 
millions violently dispiaceri - indeed, the exchanges of population which followed the 
war were perhaps the first instance of state-led ethnie cleansing in modem European 
history. Both states were guilty of organized mass atrocities and had "authorized the 
murders of unarmed civilians as part of their war policies".78 In conséquence, the 
social représentations of the two communities in Cyprus held the respective other 
nation as their worse external enemy; and leftists/communists as the dangerous 
internai enemy.79 The fact that EOKA had taken up the armed struggle against the 
British, and had established its dominance through kîlling British soldiers, but also 
Greek Cypriot leftists or "traitors", as well as Turkish Cypriot regime collaboratore, had 
normalized the use of violence as a means of solving politicai problems; TMT had also 
used violence for similar purposes among the Turkish Cypriots. Thereby, a "habit of 
lawlessness" and disrespect for law and its organs was inherited from the period of 
emergency.80 
Düring the transition period, between the Zurich agreements and the déclaration of 
Independence, the authorities found it difficult to press for the surrender of all 
weapons of EOKA and TMT: Some membere of the former were not happy with the 
agreements and kept their weapons just in case patriotic duty would call on them to 
continue with the unfinished struggle in the future; TMT patriots similarly wanted to 
hold on to their weapons, worrying that EOKA might use their guns against Turkish 
Cypriots. Yet the primary form of violence in the first years of Independence proved to 
be intra-communal. On the Greek Cypriot side, as already mentioned, the Right 
started showing signs of a fracture into pro-independence and pro-enosis factions, 
which amounted to a pro-Makarios and pro-Grivas division respectively, especially after 
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Grivas publicly criticized the Zurich agreements, in July '59. Pro-Grivas supporters 
were in the minority, in terms of numbers, but managed to aggravate their opponents 
by using a discourse which was "harsh, fanatical and intolerant".82 Pro-Makarios 
supporters proved to be equally prone to ïmmoderation: Initially, they reacted at 
verbal provocations with attacks on the personnel of enotist newspapers in both 
Athens and Cyprus.83 By a year later, verbal attacks had given way to physical abuses 
and, in August 1961, the first murders occurred of two pro-enosts, ex-EOKA members. 
Greek Cypriot newspapers were lamenting the reign of an atmosphère of "fear and 
insecurity". Ierodiakonou documents how between 1959 and 1962 politicai violence 
and terrorist acts had become a daily phenomenon - including threats, shootings, gang 
attacks, sabotage, and continuous rumours of planned or imminent conspiracies.84 
Evidence indicates that Greek Cypriot members of the executive (and especially the 
powerful Minister of the Interior, Polykarpos Giorkadjis) were behind most incidents of 
pro-Makarios violence - the extent of Makarios' complicity being difficult to assess. 
Little police action was taken and no case was cleared or taken to court. Furthermore, 
public condemnation by state officiais of pro-state violence was often quite lukewarm 
and, sometimes, it was even justified as an inévitable response to the provocative or 
inflammatory language of the pro-enos/svictims.85 
The enotist opposition also resorted to physical violence even if, initially, to a lesser 
extent, düe to its smaller numbers. It was more guilty of ideological violence, an 
"aphoristic and extreme" discourse which stirred "passions and antagonism"; pro-
Makarios circles proved utterly intolerant of such caustic criticism of their leader, so 
they would resort to 'punishing' the irreverent opposition members. The press proved 
unduly partisan and did not help the situation, since its coverage was usually 
"inflammatory, exaggerated and uncorroborated", serving the interests of its particular 
side or patrons. Meanwhile, TMT was equally active on the Turkish Cypriot side: For 
instance, during the transition period, it executed Turkish Cypriot policemen who 
proved zealous in cooperating with the British in collecting illegal weapons held by 
members of their own community; it was also instrumental in enforcing the campaign 
"from Türk to Türk", which aimed at making the Turkish Cypriot community more 
economically independent from the Greek Cypriots;86 similarly, it imposed adhérence to 
a policy of Turkish Cypriots not talking or writing in Greek.87 
On 25 March 1962, bombs blew up two mosques on the Turkish Cypriot side, 
whereupon Kutchuk and Denktas accused "extremists encouraged by the Greek Press 
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and the Greek leadership" as the guilty parties. When two Turkish Cypriot lawyers-
politicians, publishers of the opposition newspaper Chumhurriyet, started dropping 
hints in their articles that the bombings were a Turkish Cypriot provocation, they were 
swiftly silenced forever by TMT, and accused posthumously as collaborators of the 
enemy.88 What actually differed in the two communities was that, in the Turkish 
Cypriot community, TMT had not dissolved, was pretty cohesive, and under the 
constant politicai leadership of the hard-liner Rauf Denktas, the military leadership 
being provided by Turkish military officers. On the Greek Cypriot side, EOKA had 
officially disbanded right after the Zurich agreements, and there was initial antagonism 
between pro-Makarios and pro-Grivas groups. This was soon to change, however, 
when in October '59, the British intercepted Den/z, a Turkish vessel, in Cyprus waters, 
carrying weapons and ammunition to the Turkish Cypriots.89 The incident put the 
Greeks on the alert, and soon they sent a delegate to Greece to make arms deals.90 
The effort was stepped up about a year later, once the first problems in politicai 
decision-making caused tensions to escalate: Worrying that the Turkish Cypriots were 
deliberately trying to push things to the limit so as to cause Turkey's intervention, 
Giorkadjis himself flew to Greece to request the government weapons; since the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs (Averoff) turned him down, he ended up securing the secret 
help of Greek military officers. With the guns he received, he set up a para-military91 
chieftain (kapetanato), called Organosis. Giorkadjis, code named Akritas, was the Chief 
of the Organisation, with other high officers of the government manning the executive 
committee. 9 2 The Organisation's backbone became an anti-communist network that 
Giorkadjis managed to set up with American funding. 
Two other para-military organizations were also set up, again indicating the splits and 
lower cohesiveness of the Greek Cypriot community. One of them was led by Nicos 
Sampson, an ex-EOKA leader, who was disgruntled for not having shared the spoils of 
power at Independence, and was contesting Giorkadjis' monopoly of violence. The 
other, Vassos Lyssarides, the private physician of Makarios, was of socialist leanings. 
As Attalides points out, ff Samspon was "between Grivas and Makarios", Lyssarides was 
"between AKEL and Makarios", creating a delicate balance of para-state power.93 
Interestingly, since the two communities never agreed on setting up a common state 
army, as provided by the constitution, a security vacuum was left, and when conflict 
erupted in December 1963, these three Chieftains were to do the fighting on behalf of 
the Greek Cypriots - with TMT organizing the defence on the Turkish Cypriot side. 
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Documentation that came to light subsequent to the '63 clashes, demonstrates that the 
two communities had been preparing for an eventual showdown. On the Greek-
Cypriot side, the secret Akhtas plan was premised on the unjust nature of the Zurich-
London agreements, seen to be imposed by force, and the pressing need for their 
revision. In case of Turkish Cypriot reactions and ensuing conflict the insurgents were 
to be swiftly contained, so as to prevent or pre-empt outside intervention by Turkey; in 
case of a wider escalation of violence, enosls would be declared - otherwise the plan 
was for "removing the fetters of independence" so that the ultimate aim of full "self-
determination of the people" could be secured, which would have allowed for union in 
the future.94 
On the Turkish Cypriot side, corresponding plans95 were premised on Greek Cypriot 
non-compliance and delays in implementing various provisions of the constitution; the 
Greek Cypriots were to be provoked into taking the first step to change the 
constitution, whereupon Turkish Cypriot officials in the government and Parliament 
would withdraw to form their own "Cypriot" or "Turkish" Republic, under Vice-President 
Kutchuk (who would become president), and which "motherland" Turkey would 
"immediately recognize". Predicting a dynamic reaction by the Greek Cypriots, the 
plan provided that Turkish Cypriots, at that time spread across the whole island, would 
be "forcibly concentrated in one area", which they would thereby "be obliged to 
defend"; subsequently, Turkish Cypriots living in Turkey would be encouraged to 
return and settle in Cyprus (this provision demonstrating the minority's worry of their 
opponents' numerical superiority).96 
The para-military organizations received weapons and advice from Greek and Turkish 
military officers, respectively. By the end of 1962, they had started enlisting and 
training members, who had to take oaths of secrecy and obedience; the communists 
were obviously excluded, since they were still considered internal enemies and haters 
of the nation97. Men from the two communities were thus coming together to 
demonstrate solidarity to their own people in preparation for the oncoming 
confrontation. The problem, of course, was that this "totalizing doctrine of [collective] 
responsibility", and the "coming together of men capable of violence, with a historically 
justified mission to defend their ethnic group against a 'traditional enemy",98 could 
easily turn, with the slightest spark, into uncontrollable intercommunal violence. 
Makarios' thirteen-point proposal, for revising the Constitution, provided that spark. 
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A multiple balance ofpowers 
Consodational theory proposes that a "multiple balance of power among the segments 
of a plural society is more conducive to consodational democracy than a dual balance 
of power or a hegemony by one of its segments".99 A multiple balance implies that no 
segment or subculture may acquire majority or dominance on its own, which ensures 
coopération will have to prevail; such "multipolarity" is characteristic of the 
Netherlands, Austria and Switzerland, and seems to considerably contribute towards 
the success of consensus politics in thèse countries. On the other hand, a dual balance 
may lead to instability as the leaders of either or both segments may attempt to 
dominate (shifting the system to a dual imbalance), thereby hampering coopération. 
Furthermore, dual balance situations may lead to "an interprétation of politics as a 
zero-sum game" so that a gain for one segment is viewed as a loss for the other.100 
In the case of Cyprus, Lijphart believes the dual imbalance of power was "the main 
reason why consociationalism failed": 1 0 1 The Greek Cypriots constituted a dear 
majority and wanted to act as one; they "reluctantly accepted" power-sharing in 1960 
but viewed the main provisions of the consodational constitution with "increasing 
distaste", therefore, coopération became unpalatable to them. On their part, the 
Turkish Cypriot minority proved too rigid, "and insisted on the faithful adhérence to 
every consodational principle and overused their veto power". Presumably the lesson 
is that consociationalism "cannot be imposed against the wishes of one or more 
segments in a plural society and, in particular, against the résistance of a majority 
segment" - such as the Greek Cypriots. Yet Lijphart's analysis is again quite limited. 
For one, it is not merely numerical majority which made the Greek-Cypriots feel 
justified to dominate, but the fact that they had identified democracy with self-
determination and majority rule - concepts which were enjoying universal acceptance 
and légitimation by the 60s. Belief in thèse principles, in conjunction with the strong 
ethno-national feelings which had been deeply embedded within the Greek Cypriot 
community (as of course they had been among Turkish Cypriots), made coopération 
very difficult - unlike the northern European countries, where différences were mainly 
religious, cultural or ideological, and thus not as unbridgeable as in Cyprus. Secondly, 
the "segments" in the case of Cyprus were more than two - if we remember how deep 
the Left and Right cleavage was. But, again, it was the influence of ethno-nationalism 
which diminished the salience of ideological segmentation, since, as we saw, AKEL had 
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to accept the hegemony of Makarios and of the Right more generally, having been 
stigmatized and marginalized after the anti-colonial struggle. The new regime was 
predicated on securing the external interests of the guarantor powers and ensuring the 
Left would have few chances of rising to power. 
Finally, we should not lose sight of the importance of interventions by outside powers -
which had a determining effect on the internal developments. For instance, the rigid 
behaviour of the Turkish Cypriots cannot be properly understood outside the context of 
Turkey's support, on which the former counted on for equalizing the power of the 
Greek Cypriot majority. Again, ethno-nationalism was at the root of the problem - and 
not the mere imbalance of numbers. 
External threats and interests 
Early théories of consociationalism tended to view society and the state as closed 
Systems, change presumably coming about only, or mainly, as a conséquence of 
internai dynamics. The only case in which the impact of external actors was 
acknowledged was that of external threats, seen to rester the internal cohésion of a 
system. More recently, McGarry and O'Leary have underlìned the rôle that external 
actors may play, emphasizing their possible contribution in promoting consociational 
arrangements.102 Yet this position is itself limiting for it is préférable to consider 
societies as open Systems in continuous contact with their outside environment, the 
one impacting on the other in multiple ways: External actors can have a significant 
influence, not only through constituting an outside threat, but through the material or 
ideal interests they may develop in connection with a particular society - as happened 
in Cyprus. -
We have already seen how, in the case of Cyprus, external agents (Britain, Greece, 
Turkey, NATO, the United Nations), while pursuing their own différent interests, were 
ali instrumentai in promoting the Zürich-London consociational agreements. A 
common external threat could henceforth have pushed the grand coalition of Greek 
and Turkish Cypriot élites towards more coopération and unity. Indeed, in ali Western 
European consociational democracies (Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, and the 
Netherlands), the great stir towards the consolidation of grand coalitions was given 
during periods of international emergency or conflict, such as the First and Second 
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World Wars. Yet the connection is not automatic: For an outside threat to lead to 
unity and solidarity, there must be two conditions - first, that all segments share a 
commitment to maintaining the prevailing social order and, second, that the threat is 
perceived as equally dangerous by all the segments of the plural society.. As we have 
noted, the two communities in Cyprus, and especially the Greek Cypriots, were not 
very happy with the new regime, which did not fulfill their ideal goals. They were not, 
therefore, committed to maintaining the prevailing status quo, seeking instead to 
radically alter it. Furthermore, what was perceived as an external threat by one, was 
seen to be a source of security by the other, and this drove the two communities 
further apart. For the Greek Cypriots, for instance, the greatest external threat came 
from a possible military intervention by Turkey; while for the Turkish Cypriots, Turkey's 
backing was precisely what they needed as a counterbalance to the superiority 
(numerical and political) of the Greek Cypriots. 
But, most importantly, as we have noted, the impact of external actors was not only as 
constitutive of outside threats. Having played a role in instigating the initial 
settlement, they each continued to have a part in supporting or subverting the new 
regime. After all, the Zurich-London agreements had "constitutionalized"103 foreign 
interests in Cyprus. Lehmbruch has underlined that when internal cleavages 
correspond with international fault-lines of division, this "results in the internal 
replication of international conflicts, especially in the case of religious and ethnic 
conflicts".104 This was certainly true as regards the constitutionalized interference of 
the two 'motherlands' in Cyprus. Turkey for one, kept encouraging the Turkish 
Cypriots towards adopting more separatist positions. In one of the most important 
controversies between the two communities, in which the Greek Cypriots wanted to 
keep the municipalities unified and the Turkish Cypriots wanted to keep them separate, 
it proved practically impossible to move towards more segregation simply because 
residential patterns were quite intermixed: Although Turkey seemed to acknowledge 
the practical difficulties involved, it still insisted on separation for political reasons - so 
that the Turkish Cypriot community would have a territorial base in case it wished to 
push the option of partition at a future date.1 0 5 A second example relates to the way 
Turkey outrightly rejected Makarios' 1963 proposal to change the Constitution - even 
before Turkish Cypriots had the chance to give their own response. 
Greece was not so interventionist in the period under consideration (1960-1963), as 
the Karamanlis government felt quite vulnerable regarding Greece's external balance of 
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powers. Yet the Greek opposition was extremely critical of the Zurich-London 
agreements, hurling charges of treachery and betrayal of the national cause, so as to 
undermine the government and cause its downfall - and this it eventually 
accomplished in the summer of 1962. George Papandreou's opposition, and 
subsequent rise to power, were thus signals to the Greek-Cypriots that Greece would 
be supportive in their efforts to change the Constitution. 
Additionally we should not forget that both countries were secretly providing illegal 
military assistance (weapons and expert advice) to the two Cypriot communities, 
helping them in their preparation for the oncoming clash. 
It should not be assumed, however, that outside parties were just imposing their 
wishes on the locals, as, in most cases, the latter invited or manipulated the former 
into intervening on their behalf. And this did not relate only to Greece and Turkey, but 
to other outside powers the assistance of which each community tried to solicit for its 
own purposes. This was primarily true of the Greek Cypriots who felt deeply 
dissatisfied with the restrictions imposed upon them by the Agreements. Realising that 
it was almost impossible to change any part of the deal, to loosen the grip of the 
guarantors, and that Greece itself could do little to help them in this count, since it was 
totally committed and dependent on the NATO alliance, they tried to forge other 
external alliances. It is thus no wonder that the Greek-Cypriots made sure to secure 
for themselves the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and representation at the United Nations. 
Despite the secret "Gentlemen's Agreement" entailing the request of the Greek and 
Turkish Prime Ministers for Cyprus to join NATO, Makarios consciously promoted a 
policy of non-alignment, against the views of the Turkish Cypriot Vice-President;106 
subsequently Makarios made openings to the Soviet camp. Obviously, the Greek 
Cypriot side was preparing the ground for future battles in the United Nations. They 
surmised that the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity, in conjunction with 
Article 103 of the UN Charter, which in cases of clash of its principles with other 
agreements (such as the Zurich-London ones), assigns priority to the Charter, would 
constitute strong weapons in a possible future contest against Turkey and its 
entrenched rights of intervention in Cyprus.107 
This involvement of outside parties in Cyprus, either because they wanted to promote 
their own interests or the locals wanted to use them for their own purposes, was to 
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become a constitutive feature of political life in Cyprus and to have dire consequences 
on the future of the new Republic and on the relations between the two communities. 
The first partition: Captured state and the resurgence ofenosis (1964-74) 
The main consequence of the intercommunal conflict, which began in December 1963 
and continued intermittently until late 1967, was the exodus of large numbers of 
Turkish Cypriots from areas where they were in the minority into a number of self-
contained enclaves, where they set up their own separate administration; this was the 
"first partition"108 of the island, which was to radically change the centuries-old pattern 
of mingled cohabitation, leading to extensive territorial separation of Greek and Turkish 
Cypriots.109 Many of those who moved did so for security reasons, following the 
outbreak of violence which led to numerous casualties, atrocities and the taking of 
hundreds of hostages by both sides.1 1 0 Others seem to have moved after the 
prompting of their leadership; most importantly, once they did move into the enclaves 
they were strongly discouraged, and even intimidated, so as not to return. Within a 
year, 20% of the Turkish Cypriots had moved and half of the community was cramped 
in the enclaves, which covered a much smaller percentage of land (2-4%) as compared 
to their ratio of population (18%) at the time.1 1 1 The barricaded enclaves were 
guarded by irregulars and living conditions were difficult since important public 
services, such as electricity and telecommunications, were in Greek hands. Hardship 
increased when the Greek side imposed an embargo on "strategic goods", presumably 
to prevent their usage for military purposes, but also to discourage the consolidation of 
the enclaves and thereby of separation; for instance, building materials were 
disallowed for fear of being used for military fortifications, but this also made difficult 
the repair and building of houses. Since thousands of jobs, primarily in the public 
sector but also in Greek enterprises, were lost, unemployment among Turkish Cypriots 
increased dramatically and they had to rely heavily on Turkey's financial aid for 
survival.112 
At the initial stages of separation, the Turkish Cypriots organized politically under the 
leadership of the Vice-President, who acted as head of a loose administration, 
comprised of the three ministers, the fifteen members of the House of Representatives 
and the Communal Chamber; similarly, other officers in the Cyprus Republic undertook 
the corresponding functions in the new administration. Patrick notes that a mainland 
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Turkish militar/ offìcer was attachée! to each enclave, whose job was to support the 
administration but also to ensure compliance with Ankara's policy guidelines and to aid 
the efforts of maintaining a united communal front. Obviously, dependence on Turkey 
was all round - economic, mîlîtary and politicai. 
The Turkish Cypriot leadership viewed thèse developments as temporary and as 
"necessitated by the crisis". Since, as we will see below, the Greek Cypriots swiftly 
managed to gain international récognition for the now mono-communal Cyprus 
Republic, Turkish Cypriots maintained that they were effectively pushed out of the 
state, which was usurped by the Greek Cypriots; they upheld the validity of the 1960 
Constitution and charged the Greek Cypriot controlied government as illegal and 
unconstitutional, claiming that they themselves hsd no intention of creating a separate 
state. Indeed, their first move to giving a politicai flavour to their autonomy came only 
at the end of 1967, after a major set-back in Greek Cypriot plans, whereupon they took 
the first step towards formalizing their separate status by declaring an autonomous 
"Temporary Turkish Cypriot Administration". 
Meanwhile, the Greek Cypriots had failed to contain the Turkish Cypriot reaction, as 
they had planned, but had found themselves with de facto control of the state. Yet the 
legitimacy of the now Greek Cypriot controlied government was questioned by the 
Turkish Cypriots and Turkey, since the essence of the Constitution rested on bi-
communal power-sharing. Furthermore, Turkey kept threatening to invade, according 
to its "constitutional right" as a guarantor of the status quo. An equally important 
threat carne from Britain and the USA, which were trying to help with peace 
restoration, but wanted to make sure the problem was handled within NATO circles, so 
as to best serve their own interests (preventing a confliet between Turkey and Greece, 
while avoiding the involvement of the Soviet Union).113 Makarios successfully managed 
to steer through ali external pressures and took the issue to the UN Security Council 
instead. There, the Greek Cypriots argued that the cause of the problems in Cyprus 
was the unfair 1960 settlement, imposed on Cyprus by outside powers without its free 
consent, which rendered "the doctrine of unequal, inéquitable, and unjust treaties 
relevant";114 they similarly argued that the Treaty of Guarantee violated the UN 
principles of non-intervention and the sovereign equality of states, and its provisions 
endorsed the unlawful use of force.1 1 5 The Security Council vindicated Makarios, 
unanimously adopting a résolution (183/1964) which mostly endorsed Greek Cypriot 
positions. The resolution acknowledged the "sovereign Republic of Cyprus" and urged 
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all parties to respect "the territorial integrity and politicai independence" of the island. 
The décision further called for the création of a "United Nations Force of Cyprus" 
(UNFICYP), to "preserve international peace and security" and "to co-operate with the 
government of Cyprus in restoring law and order"; fìnally, it recommended the 
appointment of a UN mediator to promote a "peaceful solution and an agreed 
settlement of the problem".116 As Joseph puts it, "the Security Council resolution 
became a politicai wild card in Makarios' hands",117 for the bicommunal Cyprus 
Republic could now start functioning as a true sovereign and independent country, 
with the blessings of the international community, despite the absence of one of the 
two founding communities. 
Soon the now Greek controlied House of Représentatives started passing législation 
which incorporateti most of Makarios' thirteen prpposed amendments to the 1960 
Constitution, which had originally sparked the crisis118: A first law placed the Police and 
Gendarmerie under a single command; a Conscription Law created the National Guard 
into which ali the "irregulars" were to be housed, along with young male conscripts;119 
the Supreme Constitutional Court and the High Court of Justice were incorporateti into 
a single Supreme Court; a Municipalities Law gave powers to the Council of Ministers 
to appoint Municipal Councils, thereby providing necessary continuity after the expiry 
of the previous Municipalities Law (December 1962); the Greek Communal Chamber 
was abolished and replaced with a Ministry of Education; a law extended the term in 
office of the President and the members of the House until élections were held; 
another law provided for the abolition of separate électoral lists, as well as the 
separate électoral districts, for Greek and Turkish Cypriots, and replaced thèse with 
unified électoral lists and électoral districts, for the élections of the President and 
Members of the House of Parlement.120 But, ail of thèse could have been questioned 
by the Turkish Cypriots, since the Constitution could not change without their consent 
- let alone the vital provisions which were altogether unchangeable. The issue was 
solved through a décision of the Supreme Court which determined that the 
Constitution could be interpreted as implying a "doctrine of necessity in exceptional 
circumstances", deemed necessary in order "to ensure the very existence of the 
State".121 Since the Greek Cypriot interprétation of the crisis was that the minority 
community had undertaken a rébellion (antarsia) against the Republic and had 
abandoned it, they felt justifìed in taking control of the executive and public service, 
and in distributing the various posts and powers the departed rebel members of the 
government enjoyed, to Greek Cypriot members.122 As Tzermias observes, ail thèse 
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changes effectively amounted to a "hellenization"'of the Republic123 and were directed 
toward establishing a majoritarian "unified state with 'unfettered' independence".124 
Meanwhile, an important development was the coming to power (February 1964) of 
George Papandreou in Greece. The new Prime Minister was strongly pro-enosis and 
encouraged Makarios in this direction. Yet there were important differences in the two 
leaders' approach: First, Papandreou saw Greece as the "national centre" of Hellenism, 
which meant that Athens had to have a certain precedence over Nicosia in decision­
making regarding "national matters"; second, Papandreou felt uneasy with Makarios' 
inclusion of the Cypriot communists (AKEL) among his allies, and with his seeking help 
from the Soviets - which allowed many countries of the western world to charge that 
the Greek Cypriots and especially Makarios were influenced by the communists and 
that, thereby, Cyprus ran the risk of becoming a new "Cuba of the Mediterranean". 
Makarios, on the other hand, felt that the real problem was the negative attitude of 
western powers (namely Britain and America), which made Greek Cypriots turn to 
assistance "from the East". Overall, however, he maintained that "Cyprus historically 
and culturally belongs to the West", even though it had to continue with its non-
aligned foreign policy if it were to further its interests. Where the two men did seem 
to agree was on the fact that Greece was too far from Cyprus to be of any use if 
Turkey was to invade, so they decided on the secret dispatch to Cyprus of weapons 
and troops which would restrain Turkey from aggressive military initiatives, as well as 
strengthen the Cypriot government's political bargaining position. After the arrival of a 
Greek brigade on the island (April '64), the two heads of state agreed for Grivas to be 
sent to Cyprus (June '64), to coordinate the combined Greek and Greek Cypriot forces. 
Besides his manifest mission, Papandreou, as well as Britain and America, intended 
Grivas as an "anti-communist balance" to Makarios. Makarios had ambivalent feelings 
about Grivas but considered that his return to Cyprus was necessary to assuage the 
fears of the West and Greece, while holding on to his internal and external alliances 
with the communists, who were instrumental in his drive for'unfettered' independence. 
All these developments - the hellenization of the state, the victories in the United 
Nations, the rise to power of pro-enosis George Papandreou, the strong support of 
Greece and the coming of the Greek army, as well as the renewed cooperation 
between Makarios and Grivas, created an atmosphere of "pro-enosis euphoria", and 
Greek Cypriots felt that self-determination, leading to the "sacred vision" of enosis, was 
just down the corner. The Greek Cypriots were now completely united as against the 
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common threat of Turkey and were ali equally resentful of the Turkish Cypriots who 
had unwittingly accepted to play the role of 'trojan horse' - since they constituted the 
cause of a possible Turkish invasion.125 The newspapers were expressing the optimism 
of the times, predicting a vindication of national aspirations, students demonstrated in 
the streets in support of union, and civic organizations were publishing déclarations in 
favour of enosis.i2è So convinced was the Greek Cypriot politicai leadership that enosis 
was near that the Council of Mînisters asked its Minister of Finance to set up a team for 
studying the economie situation in Cyprus, in view of the upeoming union. Makarios 
went ahead to ask the Cypriot Ambassador in Athens to prepare a letter to the king of 
Greece, reporting that soon the Greek Cypriots would be dissolving the Republic, in 
order to déclare enosis, so the Greek government should start making the necessary 
advance préparations. Makarios never sent the letter, fearing a Turkish invasion in 
case the plan was put into effect - but the incident demonstrates how ready the Greek 
Cypriots were to abandon their Republic, believing this to be their "moral and national 
duty", necessitated by the "dictâtes of history".127 
Yet Grivas présence and the rekindling of enotist nationalism were to set off an 
unpredictable dynamic to developments.128 His authoritarianism, militancy and anti-
communism were soon to cause disunity among the Greek Cypriots; furthermore, his 
présence contributed to the further aliénation of the Turkish Cypriots and increased the 
risks of igniting a wider Greko-Turkish confliet in the area. 1 2 9 Indeed, the latter almost 
soon carne true in August '64, when Grivas led an attack against the strategically 
important "Kokkina-Mansoura" Turkish Cypriot enclave.130 Despite initial success, 
Grivas did not comply with orders from Athens to cease fire, with which he disagreed, 
and acknowledging his disobedience,131 he proceeded to resign. This did not stop 
Turkey from reacting violently against the Greek Cypriot attacks, through bombing 
their positions in the vicinity of the area under attack (Tylliria), causing hundreds of 
deaths and casualties.132 Ongoing confliet was to be one of the reasons why outside 
powers kept involving themselves with Cyprus, ostensibly to help with confliet 
résolution, but mostly to secure their own interests. 
Ever since the inter-communal clashes of December 1963, the Cyprus problem had 
entered a course of increasing internationalization. Besides the involvement of the 
three "guarantor powers", the superpowers were trying to promote their own views 
and interests, as concerning developments. The USA, as the new western superpower, 
was trying to take over the place of Britain so as to ensure NATO's strategie interests 
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in the area and prevent a Greek-Turkish war. To counteract Western influence, the 
Soviet Union was increasing its own involvement, taking advantage of Makarios' need 
to secure allies in his struggle to loosen the grip of NATO powers, and primarily of 
Turkey, on Cyprus. Adding to its many internai problems, Cyprus became entangled in 
Cold War rivalry.133 Once the Americans realized they could not deal with Makarios 
directly, they tried to push for a solution to the Cyprus Problem via Greece and 
Turkey.134 In this they found a Willing collaborator in Prime Minister Papandreou, who 
believed he could convince Americans to accept the idea of enosis, through stressing 
that union with Greece, already a member of NATO, would be the best way of 
guaranteeing that the "Red Priest" would not be allowed to take Cyprus down the road 
of communism; as he put it to the US President, the dilemma was between 
"Natoifìcation or Cuba". 1 3 5 The problem with this line of thinking was that Turkey could 
daim somethîng similar. No wonder then that the Americans soon came up with a 
proposai which became known as the "double enosis" plan. It was masterminded by 
Dean Acheson1 3 6 (which is why the pian often goes by his name), and it mainly 
provided for Cyprus to be united with Greece, but Turkey to be given, in exchange, a 
military base on the island (plus the tiny Greek island of Kastellorizo, just off the 
Turkish coast); Cyprus was to be divided ìnto eight cantons, two of which would be 
controlied by the Turkish Cypriots, who would be granted a self-governing regime. 
The Acheson Pian 1 3 7 thus aimed at bridging the conflicting national goals of enosis and 
partition, bringing peace in Greek and Turkish relations, and restoring Cyprus to firm 
NATO control; at the same time, the dissolution of the Republic would marginalize 
Makarios and would eliminate the internai and external communist danger. But 
Makarios saw through the plan and its implications, so he promptly dismissed it, 
despite American, Greek and Turkish pressures. Some authors believe that one of the 
reasons he approved of the Kokkina opération had to do with sabotaging the American 
initiative; others believe the Americans tolerated the Turkish bombings in Tylliria in 
order to put pressure on Makarios to accept the plan. To get out of the bind, Makarios 
turned to Soviet help again, and the Kremlin responded by sending a strong message 
of warning to Turkey. At the same time, Greek Cypriots appealed to the Security 
Council, charging that Turkey had "obtained the full consent of NATO headquarters for 
the air attacks". 
The Acheson Plan provided perhaps the first opportunity for important différences to 
become apparent in the approaches of the Nicosia and Athens government. The key 
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divergence had to do with Nicosia's stress on "true" or "pure" enosis, without giving 
away territory or other powers to Turkey, which could constitute props to future 
Turkish demands for partition, or even the full annexation of Cyprus; Athens seemed to 
be open to discuss concesions to Turkey, believing the most important issue to be the 
fact of enosis as such, and the removal of a constant source of tension in the relations 
of the two countries, which weakened the southern flank of NATO. 
In the ensuing years, Greece went through long-term politicai instability, culminating in 
the 21 April 1967 coup of the militar/ junta. The regime of the Greek colonels had little 
sympathy for Makarios, who insisted on resisting the wishes of consecutive Greek 
governments, and had acquired the réputation of a strong démocratie leader of non-
aligned, anti-imperialist leanings, who kept close relations with the communists. Soon 
after their seizure of power, the Greek colonels declared their détermination to renew 
dialogue with Turkey and to press for enosis, but indications were that they too were 
ready to grant territorial concessions without Cypriot involvement or consent. In 
Cyprus, the press and politicians were quite criticai of the junta, while Makarios tried to 
cairn them down by stressing the need to cooperate with the government of the 
mainland, whatever its ideology or policies. On 26 June 1967, the Cypriot House of 
Parliament adopted a unanimous resolution which supported the continuation of the 
struggle "without any inbetween halt, until it was consummated in the union of the 
whole of Cyprus with Mother Greece."138 While at face value the resolution appears to 
be straight-forwardedly pro-enosis, on doser look the référence to the union of "the 
whole" of Cyprus with Greece was a clear massage against double enosis and any 
territorial concessions to Turkey. The junta understood too well the message of the 
Cypriot House and, on 1 July 1967, it released a strongly worded communiqué against 
the "communists and their allies", as well as the "hypocrites" and "opportunists" who 
pretended they wanted enosis, while they rendered enosis unfeasible through 
attaching to it unrealistic conditions. 
But the more important crisis to face the Greeks and Greek Cypriots came with the 
Kophinou events in November 1967: These had to do with yet another attack of Greek 
Cypriot forces on a Turkish Cypriot enclave, after initial provocation by the latter. This 
time Turkey did not stay with threats of an invasion but its militar/ units started 
embarking on warships, while planes started Aying over Cyprus, and a war atmosphère 
prevailed. As the Greek junta was unprepared for a clash with Turkey it ended up 
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accepting the latter's ultimatum demanding, among other things, that Athens withdraw 
the Greek contingent. 
Most Greek Cypriote saw the withdrawal of the contingent (December 1967) as a 
severe blow to the enosis dream. Feelings of regret were mixed with anger at the 
"betrayal of the national centre";139 to add to it ali, at the end of December 1967, the 
Turkish Cypriote took advantage of the weakened position of the Greek side, and 
declared the formation of the "Temporary Turkish Cypriot Administration": The 'first 
partition' thus received ite symbolic seal. 
On 12 January 1968, Makarios called a press conférence to déclare a new approach to 
the Cyprus Problem. After referring to the dead-end in the Greco-Turkish dialogue of 
the previous few years and the décision of the Athens government to withdraw the 
Greek troops from the islands, both of which militated for a new realistic policy on the 
Cyprus problem, he stressed the need for peaceful co-existence with the "Turks of 
Cyprus" - who were recognized as "equal citizens" and could be given further "special 
privilèges" in the form of a "Charter of righte". The crux of his message was that the 
solution to be sought had to be "in the context of what would be feasible (efikto), 
which does not always coïncide with what is désirable" or ideal. In effect, Makarios 
was declaring enosis a far distant dream, if not completely dead, "mis was a dramatic 
change in policy, involving the abandonment of the sacred ideal which générations of 
Greek Cypriote had adhered to, for more than a century. Makarios accompanied his 
announcement of the new policy with a cali to Presidential élections, intending thèse as 
a sort of a referendum in judgment of the new historical turn away from enosis. 
Incipient state nationalism Vs militant ethno-nationalism 
At the time of the 1968 Presidential élections, the only organized party was AKEL. 1 4 0 
Makarios declared élections on 12 January, set to take place on 25 February 1968, 
which gave little time to the opposition to organize. Nevertheless, staunch enosiste of 
various shades decided to contest the élections, with Dr. Takis Evdokas, a psychiatrist, 
as leader of the quickly put together initiative, whîch was to become the Démocratie 
National Party (DEK).1 4 1 In the February élections, Makarios won a landslide victory of 
95.4%, to 3.7%, but the pre-election campaign was marred by acte of provocation and 
violence of pro-Makarios supporters against Evdokas (with the tolérance, if not 
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instigation, of Giorkadjis). The Présidentiel élections, the formation of DEK, and the 
commencing of bi-communal negotiations for the resolution of the Cyprus Problem, 
gave a stir to the formation of new political parties - such as the socialist EDEK of 
Lyssarides, the short-lived Eniaion of Clerides, Papadopoulos and Giorkadjis, and the 
Proodevdiko Komma of N. Sampson.142 AH of thèse, shared the feature of being 
connected to powerful or influential 'personalities', rather than having a clear ideology 
and constituent base; and ail kept close links with pre-existing para-state militias, 
which they used as props for their opération.143 
Less than a year had passed from the time Makarios announced the policy of efikton 
when a new pro-enosis organization, named "National Front", made its appearance. 
Subséquent évidence was to show that the Front was closely linked to the Greek junta, 
and was guided directly by hard-line Greek military offlcers in Athens, working closely 
with Greek officers in the Cypriot National Guard, as well as with ex-EOKA fighters;144 
other recruits came from various nationalist right-wing associations (conservative 
Orthodox societies, cultural organisations and so on). Much like the first EOKA and the 
Akritas Organisation, its members had to be bound by an oath, swearing allegiance "to 
God and Greece", and to déclare "commitment to national freedom and the cleansing 
of the country". The latter implied the need to purge Makarios' government and other 
public offices from "corrupt" and "vicious" éléments, who were viewed as taking 
advantage of their positions in o'rder to undermine the national ideals and the sacred 
vision of enosis; the Front was to ensure that ail those who were doing damage to the 
national problem would be "severely punished". Initially, the Front appeared not to 
blâme Makarios himself, considering he was the victim of "bad influences" from his 
corrupt associâtes or wider circle. At a later stage, as it attracted disgruntled 
supporters of the embittered Giorkadjis (Makarios' powerful minister who clashed with 
the Greek junta and had to therefore submit his résignation, after which he blamed 
Makarios for not having supported him against the junta),145 the Front was to include 
the Cypriot Président in its targets. 
The Fronfs early activities consisted of distributing leaflets with accusations and 
threats against Makarios' close associâtes, or pro-Makarios journalists and newspapers 
(ail charged of being "communists and cryptocommunists"), as well as other 
supporters of the policy of efikton. Soon it turned to more violent methods, such as 
the planting of bombs, murder attempts and sabotage. In late August 1969, the 
Council of Ministers declared the Front illégal, temporarily suspending its opérations -
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but after reorganizing and recomposing itself, the Front recommenced activités, this 
time aiming at collecting guns and explosives. In March 1970, there was an 
assassination attempt against Makarios himself; a week later, Giorkadjis was 
murdered. Evidence that has subsequently surfaced confirms that Giorkadjis had been 
collaborating with National Front figures against Makarios, including the attempt 
against the latter's life; once the attempt failed, Giorkadjis had to be silenced, so that 
the identity of those responsible (viz. Greek military officers) would remain secret.146 
Düring his years in power, Giorkadjis had used his post as Minister of Interior not only 
to control the police but to create a parallel network of power and influence which was 
dépendent and deeply loyal to him. The legai state security apparatus seems to have 
had close links and often many overlaps with the illegal para-state apparatus. The key 
functionaries in both networks came from ex-EOKA fighters and shared the bonds 
deriving from their common 'agonistic héritage'. Many members of the parallel 
structures had close connections with each other and with Giorkadjis himself - either 
directly or through hïs close associâtes. As long as Giorkadjis was a member of the 
government his control of both state and para-state security networks rendered them 
loyal to Makarios and his policies. Similarly, it ensured that few ex-EOKA members 
would join the opposition against Makarios. The pro-Makarios, para-state networks 
used quite heavy-handed methods to intimidate their opponents, thus cultivating a 
culture of intolérance, violence and monolithic allegiance to Makarios. When Grivas 
and the Greek government started undermining Makarios, they acted as counter 
forces, restraining Giorkadjis' impact. Even after he resigned from government, 
Giorkadjis maintained a strong influence over thèse parallel power networks; and when 
he started questioning and subverting Makarios, a lot of his associâtes followed along. 
Giorkadjis' links with the police explain the successes of the National Front in its many 
raids against police stations to collect weapons, which had to heavily rely on internai 
collaborators. The peak of the Fronfs action was the attack of the Limassol police 
headquarters, which its men easily managed to bring under their control: Not only did 
they steal large supplies of armaments but they left behind leaflets calling upon 
policeman not to obey their leadership but the National Front instead! 
The reasons for the prevalence of such para-state military organizations in post-
independence Cyprus are thus obvious: First, they were initially put together so as to 
compensate for the non-existence of a legai state army; second, they received 
widespread legitimacy when they defended the Greek Cypriot community in the 1963 
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conflict; third, they were used by state officiais themselves to promote their purposes, 
including the Containment of the opposition; finally, their use of nationalistic symbols 
and rhetoric gave them a certain aura of légitimation, even when their actions, as in 
the case of the National Front, violated the laws in the most flagrant way. 
Two of the main weaknesses of the National Front, which contributed to its demise, 
had to do with - first, its high fragmentation, consisting of cadres from widely differing 
backgrounds which remained largely uncoordinated and heterogeneous; and second, 
its omission to cultivate links with the wider nationalist constituencies.147 These 
Problems were to be addressed by the next contester of Makarios, General Grivas, who 
re-appeared on the Cyprus scene in August 1971, determined that the struggle he had 
set as his life's goal be "brought to a successful conclusion".148 Grivas' first priority was 
to launch a new military Organization, named EOKA B - the choice indicating his intent 
to reap the benefits of his involvement in the "glorious" anti-colonial struggle; after 
some time, he stirred the formation of the Committee for Coordination of the Enosis 
Struggle (ESEA),149 as the politicai wing of the enosists, who were henceforth to corne 
directly under his own control - despite the existence of Evdokas' DEK. 1 5 0 For two 
years, between January 1972 and January 1974 (when Grivas died), EOKA B would 
escalate its actions - from securing arms and explosives (mostly from National Guard 
camps), to bombings, attacks against police stations, ambushes of policemen and 
other opponents, acts of sabotage, beatings and exécutions of Makarios supporters, 
the kidnapping of Makarios' Minister of Justice, plus a number of coup plans and 
attempts at overthrowing Makarios and his government, which did not materialize or 
were not successful. 
While accusing Makarios as a traitor of enosis, Grivas seems to have been ready to 
accept concessions to Turkey as a trade-off for union. He thus considered the Acheson 
Plan as a lost opportunity for which Makarios was to blâme: A few months before his 
arrivai on the island, he sent the Acheson Plan to the extreme right-wing newspaper 
Patris in Cyprus, and to two other nationalist newspapers in Athens, asking them to 
highlight the rejection of the plan as évidence of Makarios' anti-enotism. This 
infuriated Makarios, who was for some time trying to avoid références to enosis, so as 
not to offend the Turkish Cypriots and the ongoing bi-communal negotiatións. But as 
in the past, the fear of allowing Grivas the monopoly of enosis sloganeering led 
Makarios to start re-introducing the "age-old" vision. Characteristically, in a speech in 
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Yialousa, locateci in the Karpasia area, where the Acheson Plan provided for the 
proposed Turkish militar/ base to be located, he declared: 
Cyprus is Greek. Cyprus has been Greek since the dawn of her history and will 
remain Greek; Greek and undivided we nave inherited her, Greek and undivided 
we shall preserve her, and Greek and undivided we shall deliver her back to 
Greece.1 5 1 
Naturally, the speach upset the Turkish Cypriots, who took it as direct évidence of 
Makarios' double talk - but it is interesting to see how the enosis discourse served 
primarily intra-communal politics, in this case Makarios' public criticism of Grivas' 
version of enosis, involvîng concessions (such as the granting of a base in the Karpasia 
areas), which he viewed as against Cyprus' best interests, violating the island's long 
history and Greek identity. 
Once in Cyprus, Grivas worked closely with Greek offìcers in the National Guard, and 
especially the Second Bureau, which acted as his administrative headquarters. Grivas 
and EOKA B were also assisted by the locai chapter of the Greek Central Intelligence 
Agency (KYP), which was closely linked with the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). 
Even the officiai Greek embassy was involved in aiding Grivas and his terrorist 
Organization. A good example of how the Athens Junta, the locai Greek embassy, and 
Grivas circles collaborateti to subvert Makarios was the crisis relating to the import of 
arms from Czechoslovakia.152 Makarios had ordered these arms ostensibly to use in 
case of conflict with the Turkish Cypriots, as he had already informed Greek Prime 
Minister George Papadopoulos - but the real reason had to do with the mounting 
évidence of Grivas' préparations for a military confrontation with Makarios, and the 
latterà realization that he could not dépend on the National Guard which was 
controlied by junta offìcers. When the arms arrived in January 1972, the Greek 
government decided to use the opportunity for pushing Makarios into a corner; it thus 
requested Makarios to hand over the cargo to the National Guard, but Makarios 
refused. The matter was leaked to the pro-Grivas press, which questioned Makarios' 
motives, wondering why the guns (including tanks) were going to the police. The 
Greek government colluded with Turkey in jointly requesting the United Nations for the 
weapons to be handed to UNFICYP, but again Makarios refused to comply; Athens kept 
the pressure on Makarios, demanding the reshuffiing of his cabinet to form a 
'government of National Unity' (excluding the communists but including Grivas' 
supporters), and his acknowledgement that Greece was the national centre whose 
décisions had to be abided by. Makarios was also asked to voluntarily resign the 
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Presidency and to withdraw to his church duties. Interestingly, the Greek ambassador 
had convinced the Athens government that once the Cypriot public became aware of 
the conflict between mother Greece and Makarios, it would spontaneously rise against 
the latter - after which a coup could easily be staged.153 But this prédiction proved 
utterly wrong, for Makarios commanded the loyalty of the mass of Greek-Cypriots. On 
the evening of 14 February, an unprecedented populär mobilization took place. 
Crowds of people from ali over Cyprus gathered in the enclosure of the Archbishopric 
and outside government offices. Makarios, who had been informed of the plans for a 
coup, used the night to seek diplomatie interventions to forestali it. When, the 
following day, it was announced that the coup had been averted, a mass 
démonstration took place outside the Archbishopric. Addressing the crowds, Makarios 
thundered: 
Cyprus Hellenism has demonstrated that it forms a wall of granite, on which any 
machinations aimed at Cyprus will shatter.154 
The mass mobilization in support of Makarios put an end to the affair. A month after 
the Greek governmenfs written demand for Makarios to resign, he sent his reply to 
Prime-Minister Papadopoulos in which he clarifìed his own views on Greece being the 
"national centre": Makarios stressed that Greek-Cypriots "are, and feel" themselves to 
be "a part of the Greek Nation" and accept that "the national centre is Athens"; he 
questioned, however, the "implication that the Greek government has a say in the 
internai affairs of Cyprus, and even further, that it has the first and last word 
concerning the type of solution to the Cyprus issue". Certainly if the chosen line was 
enosis, Athens would have precedence. "But if Athens was prepared to accept a 
solution not approved by Cyprus Hellenism, the opinion of the Greek Cypriots must 
have more weight. Because the conséquences of whatever solution are to be borne by 
them, and they will be the ones to live with the conditions thereby created".155 
Another example of the clash between Makarios and his opponents was the church 
crisis, which developed in the early 1970's. When Makarios ran for President in the 
first élections of the Republic, there did not seem to be any disagreements from within 
the church hierarchy. But by his second bid for office in 1968, the new policy of efìkto 
seems to have made the Bishops increasingly uneasy and two of the three took a 
public stand advising him not to stand for re-election.156 This was because the 
traditïonal rôle of Archbishop as ethnarch (leader of the church and its people), had of 
long been directly related to enosis as the ultimate goal of the struggle: When 
203 
Makarios declared the new policy which equated independence (till then considered 
only an intermediate step) with the end itself, the Bishops considered the move as 
sacrilegious. Their initial uncertainties were heightened when Grivas appeared, re-
affirming his insistence on enosisanû on the priority of the nation - so they were soon 
in communication with him, as well as with the Greek ambassador. They ail agreed 
that the Bishops would proceed to ask Makarios to resign from the presidency and in 
this they "would enjoy the support of the national centre".157 In the Holy Synod 
meeting of March 1972, they tabled their demand for Makarios' résignation on the 
basis that "the Apostolic Canons and those of the Ecumenical Synods"158 did not allow 
the simultaneous holding of politicai and ecclesiastical office (a full twelve years after 
Makarios had been in power). Yet, once again, when the Holy Synod made its 
délibérations public, there were huge démonstrations in support of the Archbishop. In 
Nicosia, an impressive mass rally (estimated to be approximately a quarter of the 
Greek-Cypriot population) of "men, women, young and old from ali over Cyprus 
carrying their banners and flags, gathered in the Archbishopric's Square and shouting 
in disapprovai of the Bishops and of the Athens junta, demanded of Makarios to stay 
where the Cypriot people with their votes had vowed him to remain - as both 
Archbishop and Ethnarch".159 In other towns such as Paphos and Limassol, where the 
Bishops had their seats, the latter were made the object or ridicule and harassment by 
the crowds or by pro-Makarios priests.160 In letters that were subsequently exchanged, 
Makarios argued that his "conscience as a Greek and as an Archbishop" and his 
"mission as an Ethnarch", did not "permit [him] to abandon the people at this time of 
great péril", as this could be tantamount to "high treason": 
In the face of the oncoming wolves the good shepherd never abandons his flock 
to run away. 1 6 1 
In March 1973, the three Bishops convened a Synod but Makarios refused to appear 
before it, so they proceeded to convict him in his absence, sentencing him to 
defrocking and réduction to lay status. Soon after, Makarios himself called a Larger 
and Supreme Holy Synod, consisting of high clergy from the wider Orthodox world; 1 6 2 
the Synod urged the three Cypriot Bishops to repent, in order for "peace and unity" to 
be restored in the Church, but the latter refused, whereby they were found guilty and 
dethroned. The Synod also confirmed the legitimacy of holding the offices of 
Archbishop and Président of the Republic at the same time, as this was found not to be 
in contradiction to the Holy Scriptures and Canons, and as the two did coexist in the 
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"tradition of the Orthodox Church and the history of the Greek Nation".163 After this 
décision new Bishops were elected who were known to be loyal to Makarius.164 
* * * 
What explains the résurgence of enosis, in its militant and subversive form, after 1968? 
Part of the explanation is obviously the fact that enos/s had been the dominant 
ideology since the dawn of the twentieth Century, and had thus acquired immense 
symbolic and emotive strength. It had been completely identifìed with the anti-colonial 
struggle and libération from foreign rule. And it had resurfaced as the collective Greek 
Cypriot dream after the collapse of the bi-communal regime of 1963. Between 1964-
67 it commanded universal appeal, but two versions were distinguished: Makarios and 
his supporters (Makariakoi) insisted on 'pure'/'genuine' enos/s, fearinç^hat territorial 
concessions would lead to 'double-enosis' or partition; the pro-Griv^camp (Grìvikoi) 
seemed to believe Makarios used the need for concessions as a pretext for avoiding 
enosis, having grown complacent with Independence. The turn to the policy of ef/kton 
after 1968 gave a new content to the division, from that between two versions of 
enos/s, to that differentiating staunen pro-enosis (enotikoi) from pro-independence 
(anexartisiakoi) supporters. 
Markides gives a good analysis of the social background of post-'68 enosis supporters, 
whom he calls the "disloyal opposition", in the sense that they were ready to 
undermine and destroy constitutional order while promoting their views.1 6 5 Broadly 
speaking, they ali belonged to the "quasi-crisis strata", that is groups of individuals 
negatively affected by changes in society impinging on their status, power or economie 
interests.166 There were four broad such groups:1 6 7 First, some members of EOKA who, 
for a number of reasons, were not co-opted into the Makarios administration in the 
early years of independence, plus a number of the followers of Giorkadjis (mostly 
policemen), who defected to the anti-Makarios front after their leader^ assassiriation in 
1970. Second, some "traditional intellectuals", mostly Athens-trained philologists, 
theologians and lawyers. Phiìologists were the most prominent sub-group: As the 
teachers of Greek language and history, the two subjects through which nationalist 
ideas were transmitted, they possessed significant 'cultural capital'. AH of the 
principals and assistant principals of public secondar/ schools were philologists - and 
so was the first Minister of Education, Constantine Spyridakis. As Makarios steered 
away from enosis and as other groups (for instance, graduâtes from non-Greek 
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universities) started breaking their monopoly as guardians of Hellenic nationalist 
traditions, they became increasingly alienated - and either undermined Makarios' 
régime in class, or through direct involvement with EOKA B. 
A third segment of the anti-Makarios camp were businessmen and professionals: Most 
of thèse were uneasy with the strength of AKEL, as well as with Makarios' tolérance of 
its existence, and his increasing reliance on Soviet and non-alligned support; others 
were concerned about the expansion of the co-operative movement, church 
enterprises and other state or communal institutions, which they took as indications 
that the free enterprise system was at risk (for thèse same reasons they were 
attracted to the Greek junta's anti-communism and pro-right rhetoric).168 The fourth 
group which formed part of the disloyal opposition were the three bishops and some of 
their clérical followers. Although the élection of the Archbishop as first Président of the 
Republic appeared, on the surface, to préserve and even enhance the power of the 
Church, in reality this was not so. For, before independence, the bishops and clergy 
were held in high esteem and their views carried spécial weight. But, after 
independence, government officiais and officers, members of parliament, technocrats 
and other members of the new élite started gainïng increasing prominence. Parallel to 
this objective secuiarization (the decrease in the Church's prestige and power), there 
was a process of subjective secuiarization - so that church attendance started 
decreasing, and being mostly limited to middle-aged women and older people; religion 
gradually ceased being the central value System and the determining component of the 
identity of Greek Cypriots. 
From the above four groups came most of the recruits of the anti-Makarios and anti-
independence front. This does not mean that ail or most in thèse groups condoned 
the violent turn of the pro-enosis campaign after 1968. In fact, before Grivas' re-
appearance and take-over of the leadership of this camp, violence was exercised 
mostly by the ex-EOKA members and their followers in both the pro- and anti-
Makarios camps. The small DEK was definitely not a part of the violence - in fact, its 
leader (Evdokas) was himself, as we have seen, the victim of abuse as the candidate 
opposing Makarios back in 1968; later on, once the game became violent, he was to 
separate himself from the pro-violence section of the Grivas camp. Yet it is interesting 
to consider the discourse of the members of pro-enosis supporters, to ascertain what 
united them as against pro-independence supporters. 
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In March 1970, after the attempt against Makarios' life and the subséquent murder of 
Giorkadjis, Edvokas wrote a caustic article, published in DEK's newspaper Gnomi, titled 
"Machiavelli to Makarios".169 The article was supposed to be friendly advice to the 
'Prince' (Makarios), as to how to deal with "internal anomaly" and better comprehend 
the malaise of the times. Evdokas Starts by condemning violence and re-affirming his 
faith in democracy, but wonders whether resort to illegality and crime had explainable 
causes. He, in fact, proposes that violence could be the result of disappointment with 
the functioning of démocratie institutions and with developments regarding the 
national issue - and the belief, by some, that remédies could not be had through 
démocratie means. Turning first to the feelings of national discontent, Edvokas traced 
the Steps of regress: One, EOKA fought solely for enosis and was "victorious on the 
battlefield", but this was turned into politicai defeat with the "shameful and 
treacherous Zurich Agreements"; two, after Independence, there was an effort at 
creating a "Cypriot consciousness" and for the parallel "érosion" of the "idea of Greece 
and Enosis"; three, the "antì-enosis" and "anti-Greece" campaign was intensified after 
the "Turkïsh rébellion", espedally after Turkey's bombing of Tylliria in the summer on 
1964 - when Greece frustrated Greek Cypriots' expectations for rallying to their 
defence; four, the Cypriot government torpedoed every pian which aimed at enosis, to 
the extent of losing both the latter but also independence itself - the new policy of 
efìkto was vague and dependent on what Turkey would allow as the parameters of a 
solution. Makarios, who was the leader for the last 20 years (1950-1970), and had 
started with the 1950 enosis referendum, and the clear mandate of 96% of the 
Cypriots for union, was clearly responsible for the impasse reàched, and for the 
conséquent "national disillusionment" of "a large segment of the people". For some, 
thèse setbacks were tantamount to "national treason", which could explain their 
feelings of exaspération and their resort to violence. 
As regards his assessment of démocratie institutions, Evdokas charged Makarios of 
maîntaining a "police regime", characterized by politicai assassinations, kidnappings, 
beatings and persécutions of those of contrary convictions, and in particular of the 
enosis opposition. Düring his ten-year stay in power, he established a regime 
characterized by "meritocracy, nepotism and the side-tracking of values", while at the 
same time he encouraged a personality cuit, which viewed him as "irreplaceable", and 
as personifying the people ("Makarios equals the people"). 
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Thèse were heavy accusations and seemed to hołd Makarios responsible for much that 
could have been the work of the strongman Minister of Interior and his network of 
patronage. In fact, the General Attorney of the Republic prosecuted Evdokas, accusing 
him that the article was libellous and offended the "honour of the Head of State", 
thereby violating the Legai Code. The court found Evdokas guilty and sentenced him 
to a two-month imprisonment. 
Yet the ideas expressed by Evdokas were shared by many others in the pro-enosis 
camp. We may return to the three Bishops who, as we have seen, colluded with 
Grivas and the junta in undermining Makarios. In their Second Memorandum to 
Makarios, asking him to step down from the Presidency, they argued that the policies 
of Makarios' government "strayed from the straight national path", that is enosis, 
"aspiring in reality to the création of a Cypriot consciousness". The language evokes 
the religious narrative of the straight and narrow path, leading to salvation, as against 
the wider and more pleasant but stray road to perdition. Carrying on, the 
Memorandum laments that whereas the "souls of the Church's faithful [were] 
previously filled with faith and hope in God and in [the prospect of] national 
vindication, they are now infiltrated by atheistic nihilism and disbelief towards the 
values and ideals of Religion and Country". Here, the confiation of religion and nation 
is complete, both in their présence (faith in God accompanies faith in the nation) as 
well as in their absence (atheism and disbelief in national values, go together). 
Makarios' turn to independence was next blamed for ali the evils normally associated 
with modernization and secularization: 
The extraordinary [...] for our National History policy of efìkton, constitutes a 
vociferous rejection of Enosis which, once put into practice, will cut Cyprus for 
good from the National Body[...]. Whilst during the four-year EOKA fighi: Cypriot 
Hellenism engaged in a struggle replète of national virtue and godly zeal, and the 
Island was delivered to us by Dighenis [Grivas] vibrating with national conviction, 
we nowadays gaze at the disheartening view of its dehellenization and its 
orientation towards foreign countries. Ideals are mocked and ali those insisting 
in the ideas of Hellas and Enosis are contested and variously persecuted [whilst] 
atheistic and anti-christian communism has been strengthened.170 
Overall, the policy of strengthening independence was seen to lead to de-hellenization, 
a Cypriot consciousness, atheism and communism - in sum, the betrayal of whatever 
Church and Nation traditionally stood for. To recali Evdokas' expression, staunch 
enosists considered such a setback as tantamount to national betrayal, and could 
account for their "feelings of exaspération and resort to violence". But herein lays the 
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explanation of intra-communal violence, which was to lead to the coup of 1974 - in 
this justification of violence when carried out in the name of the nation, against those 
considered as acting contrary to the national interest, even if the latter are co-
nationals. Prior to the inter-communal killings of 1958, EOKA had started with the 
killings of communists - not the ethnie Others, but the "internai enemy", the traitors 
who were no longer members of "Us", the "Likes". In the late 1960s and early 1970s, 
the traitors were those who abandoned the sacred ideal of enosis. As Reicher and 
Hopkins point out, in such cases of intra-national killings, three levels of construction 
underlie the deep émotions of hatred involved: Firstly, a particular construction of the 
national community in religious and messianic terms; secondly, a construction of 
particular acts (such as those by Makarios and his associâtes) as putting the 
community in danger. And thirdly, an interprétation of particular norms as allowing the 
élimination ofthose "construed as endangering [...] the community".171 
Let us now turn to the pro-Makarios or pro-Independence camp. Since Makarios 
commanded the massive support of more than 95% of the Greek Cypriots, it would not 
make sense to talk about the social origin of his supporters. But we can concentrate 
on the reasons why he commanded such vast support, as well as on those most loyal 
to him as a President, and to the Independence regime, as against enosis. 
Makarios' constant efforts to resist the pressures and machinations of Greek 
governments (and especially of the unpopulär military junta), their Western allies, and 
local collaborators, won him the fame of a bold democrat, engaged in anti-imperialist 
and anti-junta struggles for defending his people's best interests. His fréquent resort 
to the masses, and his rallying of their support, in maîntaining the integrity of the 
Republic, helped in fostering a sense of loyalty with the independent state, which 
Makarios came to symbolize or personify.172 
Among the most loyal pro-Makarios and pro-independence supporters were the 
followers of the communist AKEL. We have seen how, although the party had opposed 
the Archbishop in the 1960 élections, charging that the terms of the independence 
agreements were a sell-out to the West, it subsequently made peace with him and 
joined the pro-Makarios front. When Makarios tried to amend the Constitution and do 
away with the Treaty of Guarantee, AKEL backed him up. Between 1963 and 1967, 
AKEL supported Makarios' efforts for a form of enosis which would not have entailed 
granting NATO Turkey a base - or maintaining, in other ways, the Republic's 
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dependence on Western guarantees. And when Makarios turned to the theory of 
efikton, AKEL became the policy's most ardent supporter - since e/7os/5 would have put 
Cyprus under the control of the fiercely anti-communist military junta and within the 
doser grip of NATO. Besides, finding a peaceful solution through inter-communal 
negotiations bode well with AKEL's internationalist philosophy. 
The small socialist party, EDEK, was also pro-independence, largely in conséquence of 
its strong commitment to the non-alligned movement, but also because of its criticai 
stance towards the military regime in Greece, and due to its leader's close association 
with Makarios.173 Aside from the two well organized left-wing parties, the Right was 
characterized by fragmentation and by politicai parties which were short-lived and 
based themselves on influential personalities; on the whole, they also appeared to be 
pro-Makarios and pro-independence, although on the ève of the coup they largely 
disintegrated, and small fragments joined the anti-Makarios camp.1 7 4 
Party ideology was not the only factor contributing to the rise of pro-independence 
attitudes. Socio-economie factors were of equal, if not more, importance. Post-colonial 
economie development had been making great strides and most Greek Cypriots were 
very content with the achievements of Makarios' governments. In the ten-year period 
1961-1971, the per capita GNP reached an average yearly rate of increase of 
approximately 70% (at constant 1958 prices). Between 1962 and 1971, the GNP 
annual growth rate was 7% (at 1970 market prices).175 During the first twelve years of 
independence (1960-1972) the inflation rate did not exceed, on average, 2.2% per 
annum, and registered unemployment was on average 1.5%. The island was bustling 
with economie activity and was being rapidly transformed through the building of new 
roads, the expansion of communications, a boom in construction, and advancements in 
the fields of éducation and health. The growing affluence led to dramatic 
improvements in the standard of living and to increases in consumption, especially of 
durable goods (such as cars, TV and radio sets, and téléphones). There was an 
impressive multiplication of business establishments, services, leisure outlets and shops 
which, as Mavros puts it, "constituted the sparkling façade of change and provided the 
spectacular 'proof that independence could deliver the goods".1 7 6 
Naturally, most Greek Cypriots benefìted from economie growth and many developed 
vested interests linked with the success and future prospects of independence. For 
instance, the merchant bourgeoisie were benefìting greatly from increased imports and 
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consumption; many others found new employment opportunities in the expanding 
public services (between 1960 and 1973, the government sector grew by almost two 
thirds) and civil servants enjoyed the privilege of steady jobs, good salaries and high 
social status. The lot of peasants improved substantially due to corresponding 
improvements in agriculture (such as state infrastructural projects, better cultivating 
techniques, and new product marketing schemes).177 
The performance of the Cypriot economy compared well with that of Greece. Even 
prior to independence the differences were substantial: After WW II, Greece had gone 
through the devastating experience of the Nazi occupation and the subsequent Civil 
War, whereas Cyprus had started enjoying the benefit of British ten-year planning 
(meant precisely to improve standards of living so as to lure Cypriots away from 
enosis), so that by the mid-fifties income per head in Cyprus was roughly double that 
of Greece, and the gap widened after independence. This revived argument by the 
critics of independence, who charged that improved life conditions and standards of 
living made the Cypriots complacent and undermined their drive for enosis.17S In his 
speech to the House of Representatives, during discussions for the 1967 budget, the 
Minister of Finance had to defend modernization efforts, arguing that adverse criticisms 
were "shallow and anti-patriotic", since Cyprus could not postpone its efforts "towards 
development and progress", while waiting for union with Greece; on the contrary, 
economic success would cause the Turkish Cypriots to realize that their future lay with 
peaceful cohabitation and in the common effort for improving everyone's welfare on 
the island.179 
Furthermore, greater post-independence contacts with Greece brought improved 
awareness of life and institutions on the mainland, and the realization that Cyprus was 
often better off on many counts - there was more political freedom (including the fact 
that the communist party in Greece was still outlawed, whereas the local AKEL was 
fully integrated into the political system), a much more efficient state administration 
system, and so on. At the same time, the presence of large numbers of Greek soldiers 
and officers in Cyprus created a number of problems in their relations with the locals; 
for instance, many of these, imbued with the junta's negative attitude towards 
Makarios, talked disrespectfully about the Cypriot President and his government, 
offending the Greek-Cypriots.180 Overall, increased contacts with mainland Greeks 
widened the psychological distance with the Greek Cypriots, whose scepticism 
regarding enosis was enhanced. 
211 
At the same time, Greek Cypriots were getting used to the local social institutions, the 
Cypriot "life-world" as Mavratsas calls it, borrowing Habermas' term. But the 
significance of these institutions was not in their being 'naturally' Cypriot, a part of 
Greek Cypriot society: They were rather the direct or indirect creations of the Cypriot 
state, which, unwanted as it was by a number of Greek Cypriots, was becoming an 
important part of their lives. 
The crisis of national identity and of Makarios' state 
In 1964, only a few months after the '63 collapse, Theodoras Papadopoulos published 
a landmark essay, titled "The Crisis of Cypriot Consciousness", which highlighted an 
"acute contradiction" facing the Greek Cypriots, deriving from the incongruence of 
nation and state. More specifically, the writer pointed to the fact that whereas since 
antiquity the "intellectual and cultural traditions"181 of "Cypriot Hellenism" were similar 
to those of the Greek mainland (so that the Cypriots felt they were an integral part of 
"Metropolitan Hellenism"), ever since "Cyprus was detached from Byzantine Hellenism 
[1191]", so that "Cypriot institutions, with the exception of religious and educational 
ones, have never been identical with Greek ones". Papadopoulos linked this 
disjunction to the different historical trajectories of Cyprus and mainland Greece, and 
especially to the impact of British rule on Cyprus and the concomitant introduction of 
Anglo-Saxon institutions (as against mainland European institutions adopted by 
Greece).182 As long as they were under foreign rule, the Greek Cypriots could do little 
about this contradiction. But now that they were masters of their future there were 
three alternatives "open to Cyprus" (meaning the Greeks of Cyprus): First, to go their 
own separate way, which would entail fostering a uniquely Cypriot national 
consciousness; second, to persist with the aim of integrating themselves with the 
"main body of Hellenism" - that is Union with Greece; and third, to settle with the 
compromise solution of political independence, with the parallel fostering of Greek 
identity and culture. 
Papadopoulos argued that developing a Cypriot national consciousness was difficult 
because Cyprus was too small to be an autonomous nation and, therefore, incapable of 
creating new national traditions at will. Enosiswas also difficult - partly because of the 
existence of Turkish Cypriots and Turkey, but also because of the noted differences 
between Cypriot and Greek mainland institutions. The third choice, of a politically 
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independent Cypriot state, while also fostering Greek culture, constituted a temporary 
solution, but did not remove the contradictions entailed in the previous two 
alternatives - if anything, it accentuated them through provtding fertile ground for 
fomenting the contradictions. The crisis, he concluded, had to be resolved either 
through a "disastrous solution" or through "transcendence", which would remove the 
contradictions. Ten years after this prédiction, the Greek Cypriot controlled Cyprus 
Republic met with the disastrous floundering of 1974. 
Although a full description of developments that led to the coup and the invasion is not 
within the purposes of this thesis, it is useful to hîghlight how the trends we have been 
focusing upon converged, to bring about the 74 disaster. Back in the early 1960's the 
consociational experiment had failed, as it did not constitute a successful national 
compromise between the two commun ities. An over-arching Cypriot consciousness 
proved impossible to build, and closure had proceeded along ethno-national Unes, 
reinforcing previous différences. But even when Turkish Cypriots walked out of the 
Republic, a new compromise did not prove possible to achieve, not only because of the 
différences between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, but also because of the divisions 
within the Greek Cypriot community, as well as between Cyprus and Greece. The pull 
in différent directions, by Turkish Cypriots and enosists, created cracks in the new 
national compromise Makarios was trying to foster. 
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Figure 5.1: The spectrum of idéal choices and compromise positions of the two 
communities in the late '60s and eàrly 70s. 
Once Makarios realized that enosis was not possible to achieve, he switched to the 
goal of consolidating independence and removing or minimizing the power-sharing 
rights of the Turkish Cypriots. Effectively he was aiming for majoritarian democracy, 
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with minority rights for the smaller Turkish community. But, as Papadopoulos had 
pointed out, this choice would not remove the contradictions. The Turkish Cypriots 
had already developed a strong ethno-nationalism and Turkey was there to support 
them. Yet the biggest danger proved to come not from the Turkish side, but from 
Greece and the 'disloyal' Greek-Cypriot opposition. Makarios did not manage to forge a 
new social compromise with the latter: There was, primarily, a disagreement as to the 
desired imagined community to aim for. Social closure had of long created a strong 
ethno-national identity, so that a new over-arching identity was not easy to accept. 
But besides this, the remaining mechanisms of social closure had also failed to produce 
a cohesive national state. Military closure was unsuccessful: We have seen how 
initially the Republic had no army of its own and had to rely on para-mîlitary forces; it 
then set up the National Guard and smuggled-in Greek soldiers and offìcers to 
supplément its defence, crowning the set-up with General Grivas - an enemy of 
Independence - as leader, but both the Greek military and Grivas ended up subverting 
Makarios' state. Since the army proved to be beyond the state's control Makarios had 
to resort to two remédies: First, in 1972,183 he created a small auxiliary police force 
(Efedrikorì), composed of carefully selected recruits, dedicated to the independent 
state and to Makarios himself, whose mission was to contain EOKA B terrorism. 
Second, in early 1974, he tried to regain control of the National Guard through various 
measures - such as putting under government control the décision as to whïch young 
Greek Cypriots were to be army cadets (up to that time, the Greek offìcers of the 
National Guard were giving strict préférence to anti-Makarîos candidates);184 reducing 
army service to one instead of two years; and, finally, demanding the Greek 
government to remove Greek army offìcers altogether from Cyprus. The first policy 
met with considérable success and, by the early summer of 1974, EOKA B was mostly 
dislocated (Grivas died in January 1974 and shortly after EOKA B's deputy commander 
and many of its other leaders were arrested; important documents captured proved 
-the junta's links with the terrorists). But the second policy misfired, for the junta had 
meanwhile changed hands from Papadopoulos to the hard-liner Ioannides, who 
assumed more direct control of EOKA B and decided to put an end to Makarios' 
résistance through a military coup - using the National Guard's power before Makarios 
managed to bring it under his own control. 
Politicai closure was also problematic, since politicai developments were influenced by 
the interventions of the Greek governments and the local Greek embassy (and, to a 
lesser extent, of other foreign embassies): More specifìcally they influenced local 
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politicai actors, funded specific newspapers through which ethno-national propaganda 
was propagated, and worked with individuáis conspiring against the legitímate 
government of the Republic. Parallel to outside infiltration, the Republic failed to 
develop strong politicai institutions, which would have supported the regime in times of 
crisis. Although the Greek Cypriots demonstrated great dévotion to Makarios as their 
leader, this loyalty was mostly personalised and did not necessarily carry over to the 
state as an institution, or to the polity more generally. Makarios himself seemed to 
encourage this personal dévotion and, on occasion, claimed "I am Cyprus" [ego eimai I 
Kypros], equating himself with the state and/or the people.185 Politicai organizations 
were mostly feeble 'fronts' and depended on important politicai figures and/or 
Makarios, while maintaining strong links with para-military organizations, which 
fostered networks of patronage. Furthermore, almost ali politicai parties had dose links 
with other countries and their governments or politicai organizations, from which they 
received ideological and/or financial support, which, in turn, influenced their décisions 
and policies, but also their corhmitment to the Cypriot state and polity.186 Loyalty to the 
state was further undermined by the timidity of the pro-Makarios elite - the 
bourgeoisie, the politicians, and high civil servants. Rather than a "genuine 
bourgeoisie", the former were primarily "an intermediary merchant group", with hardly 
any long-term investments and commitments, and lacking the ideology characterizing a 
truly "national" bourgeoisie.187 High-ranking civil servants had learned to stay away or 
"above" politics188 in conséquence of the values of impartiality carried over from 
colonial times, but also in order not to be exposed to the attacks (verbal or physical) of 
the small but violent pro-enos/s faction.189 The pro-Makarios politicians, as well as 
other regime sympathizers, found it increasingly hard to take a clear stand for 
Makarios and the independent state, once the Greek junta's conflict with Makarios 
came into the open: The fact that the junta traded on the traditional values of nation, 
religion and family, plus anti-communism, touched the conservative chords of many 
among these groups, whose dedication to Makarios wavered.190 
Finally, as regards soda/ security provisions, which tend to enhance feelings of 
solidarity within a community, the Republic's record was positive but flimsy. The 
colonial héritage "consisted of a basic (albeit limited) social welfare system",191 which 
provided a basis on which welfare policies were built. But despite improvements in the 
áreas of mostly health services, social insurance and state educational provision, 
overall, public assistance remained minimal for two reasons: First, post-independence 
full-employment conditions and rising standards of living alleviateti pressures for public 
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provision; second, the rôle of traditional institutions, such as the extended family and 
the Church, in providing social services deflated the need for the state to undertake 
responsibility in thèse domains. The corollary of this was that particularistic 
attachements remained strong, whereas loyalties to the state, and a strong civic 
consciousness, were feeble. The Cypriot state did collapse as a resuit of outside 
interventions. But its inner résistances did not prove strong enough to help it in its 
hours of need. 1 9 2 
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Chapter 6 Unimagînable community: natïonalist closure and the 
prospects of federalism 
Back in 1956, while facing the anti-colonial revolt and the increasing tensions between 
the two ethno-national communities, the British assigned Lord Radcliffe, an eminent 
judge, the task of suggesting a framework for a new constitution for Cyprus. Faced 
with the wishes of the Turkish-Cypriot minority community (constituting, at the time, 
18% of the population) "to share power equally" with the Greek-Cypriot majority 
(80%), Radcliffe took a clear stand: Such an arrangement would only make sense 
under a "fédération rather than a unitary state", since in the former equality of 
représentation could be granted in the federai centrai body, "regardless of the 
numerical proportions of the populations of the territories they represent". But in 
Cyprus, he added, there was no base for a federai arrangement since the two 
communities were not territorially separated - so he proceeded to suggest a unitary 
system of government, with provision for protecting minority interests through legai 
means.1 Subsequently, Turkish-Cypriots began pushing for the autonomy of the 
municipalities in order to create the territorial basis for a future move towards a federai 
regime and/or sécession.2 In 1964 the UN mediator Gaio Plaza had also ruled out the 
possibility of a federai system for Cyprus, on similar grounds: The population was 
intermixed throughout the island, and thus creating homogeneous territories would 
necessitate massive forced population transfers, something objectionable on economie, 
social and moral grounds, and totally contrary to the démocratie values of modem 
times.3 
The 1974 Turkish invasion and the forced population exchange which followed 
accomplished precisely what Radcliffe and Plaza considered unacceptable, namely 
dividing the island into two ethnically clean or homogeneous zones, at great human 
cost - yet thereby laying the basis for a federai resolution of the "Cyprus Problem". 
The Greek-Cyprîots tried to use diplomatie means for averting the fait accompli but had 
no other choice than accepting the idea of fédération.4 The high level agreements of 
1977 between Makarios and Denktas, and of 1979 between Kyprianou and Denktas, 
established the broad guidelines for a federai arrangement. Henceforth, the various UN 
mediators would try to combine consociational principles (deriving from the 1960 
constitution), with federai ideas, to produce a new social compromise for the co­
habitation of the two communities. Indeed experts on federalism concur that it is an 
"appropriate form of government to offer to communities or states of distinct or 
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differing nationality who wish to form a common government and to behave as one 
people for some purposes, but who wish to remain independent and in particular to 
retain their own nationality in ail other respects".5 
Federai Systems have been around for some time now, the earlier and more well-
known being those of the United States of America and Switzerland, but numerous 
other countries use federai prindples in diverse ways. Opting for some form of federai 
regime has become so prévalent in the contemporary world that Daniel Elazar talks of 
a "federai revolution" which he considers to be "among the most widespread - if one 
of the most unnoticed - of the various révolutions that are changing the face of the 
globe in our times".6 He in fact estimâtes that nearly 40% of the world's population 
lives presently in régimes which are formally federai, while another 30% lives in 
polities that apply federai principles in some way. Murray Forsyth introduces an 
important distinction between "classical" and more recent forms of federalismi7 The 
former involved more "positive" motives for federai arrangements, entailing the doser 
integration of entitîes which were more loosely unifìed in the past; more récent forms 
of federalism relate to the "new historical challenge" of dealing with régimes which 
used to be unitary or integrated but have broken apart as a conséquence of 
incompatible aims or visions, and have espoused fédération as a means of re-
constituting or re-integrating themselves on the basis of a new looser relationship. In 
the more récent cases, the constituent parts of a federai arrangement may aim at 
staying together in order to secure spécifie objectives (such as economie viability), 
while simultaneously maintaining some distance or autonomy as a conséquence of the 
difficulties of co-habitation in the past, memories of violence, lack of complete trust, 
and so on - the kind of problems Cyprus has had. One of the strengths of federai 
régimes is precisely their ability to combine the seemingly contradictory aims of self-
determination and co-determination, autonomy and unity, interdependence and 
independence.8 
Yet despite the potential merits of federai arrangements, and the fact that both Cypriot 
communities have agreed to the basic guidelines of a future federai regime, no final 
resolution has been fortheoming, despite efforts spanning more than three décades, 
climaxing in the rejection of the UN proposai for a comprehensive solution (codified as 
the Annan Plan), in Aprii 2004. The perspective of social closure and the spécifie 
nature of nationalist exclusion in Cyprus, provides a fruitful approach for better 
understanding why the proposed federai schemes, culminating in Annan's United 
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Cyprus Republic, failed to be accepted, so that a re-united regime proved a community 
beyond imagination - at least for the Greek-Cypriots. 
After the coup and the invasion: The ascent of Cyprocentrism 
The 1974 Greek junta sponsored coup and the Turkish invasion which followed, were 
to dramatically change every facet of Cypriot society. For the Greek-Cypriots the 
outcome reached the proportions of biblical destruction: There were thousands of 
dead, wounded, and missing;9 about a fourth of the population were forcibly displaced 
from the occupied northern part of the island, where they had constituted 80% of the 
population; almost 40% of the land was captured; the economy was in disarray, with a 
third of the economically active population unemployed, and approximately half of the 
gross output, tourism capacity, agricultural exports, and industriai production lost. 
Besides the feelings of grief and despair, the Greek-Cypriots also harboured bitterness 
and a sense of great betrayal against those responsible for what had happened. To the 
populär imagination the extreme Right supporters of the coup, the Greek junta, and 
the Western powers (especially Britain and the United States), which seemed to be 
aware of the junta's plans but chose not to stop them, or even encpuraged them, 
carried equal responsibility: Put briefly, the blaim lay with the "Right and its allies". 
Two years after the invasion, in 1976, two new parties were formed - DIKO and 
DISY.10 The first was led by Kyprianou, ex-Foreign Affairs Minister in Makarios' 
government, a strong supporter of the non-aligned policy, who prior to the coup was 
removed from office, after pressures from the Greek Junta. DIKO was actually put 
together after Makarios' prodding so that he wouldn't appear to be backed only by the 
two left wing parties. Thus, it was meant to be a party of the pro-Makarios forces 
identified as belonging to the Centre Right and Centre of the politicai idéologies 
spectrum (ranging from liberal to social démocratie ideas - to the extent that these 
had any meaning in the largely nebulous ideological terrain of Cyprus at that time); in 
practice its most vocal supporters were various 'circles' associated with the Co­
operative Movement and the Church, as well as individuai politicians, civil servants, and 
Professionals loyal to Makarios. The second party, DISY, was led by Clerides, past 
chairman of the House of Représentatives and for many years the Greek-Cypriots' 
représentative in the intercommunal talks; Clerides' more pro-West stance and more 
Yealist' attitude as regards the Cyprus Problem (he was the first Greek-Cypriot to 
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publicly argue that a bi-zonal fédération was the only solution remaining to the island), 
allowed his opponents to brand him with defeatism and to denounce him for serving 
western and especially American interests.11 DISY's constituency came mostly from 
the urban bourgeoisie (the previous supporters of the Enta/on, of which Clerides was 
the leader), including the wealthier members of the upper class; but it also accepted 
into its ranks individuals from the old enosist opposition - including the whole of 
Evdokas' DEK, plus many other pro-Grivas supporters who were considered as 
collaborators of EOKA B [prax/kop/maù'es] - so its critics felt justifìed in declaring the 
party a "refuge of fascists", backed by big capital.12 Clerides' line was that old enmities 
had to be put aside in the spirît of Makarios' call for reconciliation and his offer of 
unconditional amnesty and pardon, aiming at restoring unity among the Greek-
Cypriots. The enosists, on the other hand, saw în DISY the only possible resort in the 
diffìcult times they had to face, having become the "major target of populär wrath 
because of the calamity they [had] caused".13 Overall, DISY's pro-westernism and 
anti-communism made it the party to attract most of the traditional nationaliste who, 
along with the middle and upper classes, shared a common dislike and fear of the Left 
- and especially of the communists. The new party of the Right was thus to articulate 
a peculiar ideology which combined conservative and sometimes extreme "Greco-
Christian" ideals, expressing its nationalist component, with the more liberal values of 
the urban bourgeoisie - the party's much larger constituency. 
In the highly charged milieu of the times and the need for scapegoats, DISY was 
completely identifìed with the "extreme" Right and came to be blamed for the 1974 
treason and destruction, holding responsibility for "opening to the enemies the guard-
door for entering Cyprus".14 In the power struggle for gaining hegemony over Greek-
Cypriot society in the new post-74 conditions, it was the Leffs turn to strike back at 
the Right. AKEL had been ostracized and marginalized since the mid '50s for not 
taking part in the 1955 armed struggle; EDEK had been accused of anti-hellenism by 
the Greek Junta and its local supporters because of its criticai attitude towards the 
regime of the Greek dictators. Now both left-wing parties feit vindicated for their 
loyalty towards Makarios and the Republic: It was the turn of the Right to be 
stigmatized and forced into retrenchment and banishment from politicai life. In the 
first post-invasion élections, of September 1976, the parties of the Left joined forces 
with the more "centrist" and "moderate" pro-Makarios DIKO, forming an alliance of the 
"démocratie patriotic forces", against DISY. Since Makarios had avoided apportioning 
blâme to anyone, the élections turned into a sort of "open court", which was "to put on 
220 
public trial and to punish all those guilty of national betrayal".15 The main rallying 
slogan of the alliance was the need for "catharsis"- after the tragedy there was a 
need to release suppressed feelings of despair, fear and anxiety but also of deep anger 
towards those guilty of bringing about disaster. There were thus calls for punishment 
and for purging public offices in the government, the police, and the army, of ali the 
"abominable éléments" which had supported the coup as a prelude to the catastrophe. 
Such was the depth of enmities and passions of the period that the élections ceased 
being an ordinary ideological contest and turned into a clash of two worlds at war with 
each other, a struggle for the moral annihilation and total extinction of the politicai 
enemy. The majoritarian électoral system allowed a complete sweep by the alliance, 
which won ali the seats in Parliament, thereby depriving DISY, which secured more 
than 25% of the Greek-Cypriot votes, of a public voice.16 
More important perhaps was the fact that the 1974 developments brought the end of 
the enosis ideology and created a psychological distance from Greece, which was 
considered responsive not only for the coup but for subsequently deserting Cyprus to 
the mercy of the Turks. Many Greek-Cypriots were so disillusioned and angry at the 
motherland that they ended up blaming everything Greek, effectively equating the 
Greek junta with Fascism - Nationalism - Enosis - the Right - and Greece as a whole. 
In its extreme form, this 'équation' rendered everything Greek or Hellenic as 
questionable or suspicious. Since union (enosis) was now dead for good, the new ideal 
became that of the re-union (epanenosis) of Cyprus - restoring the integrity of the 
island and negating de facto partition. The independent state was now the only resort 
left to the Greek-Cypriots in their struggle for survival: Restoring and strengthening the 
state became a main priority, since it was necessary for both internai and external 
purposes - for housing the refugees and for providing them with the necessary 
services, for stirring the economy to give jobs to the unemployed, and for solving the 
thousands of problems involved in picking up the pièces after the war, so as to bring 
life back to normalcy. At the same time the state was the Greek-Cypriots' only shield 
against Turkey's overwhelming military might; the legitimacy and international 
récognition of the state was to become a formidable politicai weapon in the Republic's 
battles against the acceptance of the realîties on the ground, achieved through the 
military invasion. 
With the death of enosis and the new stress on independence, a lot was to change. 
Perhaps the greatest transformation had to do with the redéfinition of Greek-Cypriot 
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identity - of who the Greek-Cypriots were, to whom they related, and who were their 
significant Others; this implied a redefinition of the relation of the Cypriots to the 
motherland, and of the kind of political future that the island should be striving for. Up 
to that time the predominant expression used to designate collective national identity 
was "Greeks of Cyprus" - that, in any case, was the expression of the Constitution 
itself, and that is what was used in official discourse. But since the latter part of the 
1960s, the hyphenated combination "Greek-Cypriot" was increasingly used, in line with 
the wider changes noted earlier. After '74 the duplet was consolidated through official 
and more widespread usage.17 There was now a new stress on "Cypriotness" - the 
second component of the hyphenated duplet, expressing the commonalities of all 
Cypriots: The two communities were seen to share common traits of character, ways 
of life, problems, and hopes for a peaceful future. Trie enemy was singled out to be 
Turkey, and not the Turkish-Cypriots: Turkey was the terrible external Other, the 
aggressor who had attacked the innocent natives and had disturbed the pristine peace 
of the island, bringing violence, pain, and destruction. Turkey acted thus because it 
was "by nature" an expansionist state, harbouring long-standing evil plans for Cyprus 
(she was after all "Hellenism's greatest enemy since time immemorial").18 The Turkish-
Cypriots were similarly seen to be the victims of Turkey since they also suffered as a 
result of the 1974 clashes, being forced into dependence on Turkey and on living in a 
highly militarized land, cut off and isolated from the outside world. The division of the 
island was considered as something that the Turkish-Cypriot people did not want, an 
outcome imposed on them by Turkey in collusion with their nationalist, chauvinist and 
intransigent leadership, which was the puppet of the motherland. 
Official Greek-Cypriot historiography had therefore to be re-oriented so that the past 
could be re-interpreted in such a way as to cater for present-day needs and purposes. 
In effect, there was a shift of paradigms, from primordialism and perennialism, which 
had dominated analyses until the late '60s, to classical modernism. The past ceased to 
be the monopoly domain of archaeologists, folklorists and traditional historians, who to 
a large extent had been using nationalism's own categories in their work: The Greek 
nation's existence since antiquity and its diachronic continuity to the present; the deep 
organic link between Greece and Cyprus resting on a bond which was natural as much 
as cultural, a part of the 'order of things', rendering the desire' for enosis a natural 
sentiment or emotion (much like the bond between family or kin members). Greek-
Cypriots were treated as an undifferentiated/homogeneous entity, whole, with similar 
interests, aims and desires; the Turkish-Cypriots''difference' was refused or minimized, 
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so as not to acknowledge their claims being related to another nation, since it was 
feared that this would legitimize their demands for separate self-determinimation -
thus every effort was expended to prove that they were mostly Christian converts to 
Islam; there was a constant pre-occupation with the cultural sphere and of 
documenting all kinds of connections with the Greek culture, while there was almost no 
interest in the 'material sphere' (hence there was almost no work on social history and 
political economy till the '90s); there was little reflection on nationalism's own nature 
and meaning, and in fact no use of the term as such, for enosis was viewed as a 
natural "passion" (much like biological instincts) for national restoration or fulfillment. 
The new turn to modernist approaches entailed the involvement of social scientists, 
such as anthropologists and sociologists. These saw nationalism as a social 
construction whose existence was not simply given or natural, but had to be explained 
by reference to society and social dynamics; significantly, there was little effort to trace 
the roots of national belonging back to ancient times, but analysis started or focused 
on the modern period - since nationalism was seen as a product of modernity. Efforts 
were now expended in documenting "the progress of Greek nationalism" (the choice of 
words signifying that nationalism was not an unproblematic, natural desire, nor an 
unchanging one, since it could progress in relation/response to socio-historical 
circumstances). New studies tried to unearth the role of social forces or interests 
(such as the clash between social classes and/or political movements), as well as the 
part played by 'external' actors and interests (that is, international politics); Greek-
Cypriots were now analysed as a heterogenous entity, comprised of different social 
classes or segments, each of which was guided by different material and ideal 
interests; Turkish-Cypriots were seen to have been legitimately different on the basis 
of their religion and culture (proving their racial purity was no longer necessary or 
important).19 
A new interpretation of the past emphasized the traditional "harmonious co-existence" 
and "symbiosis" of the two communities under Ottoman and British rule; inter-
communal conflict was seen to be solely the result of colonial policies of divide-and-
rule, and of Turkey's subsequent stirring of passions which fed into the militant 
nationalism of a small group of Turkish-Cypriot chauvinists - who were not considered 
to be representative of Turkish-Cypriots in general.20 Similarly, the 1955 struggle for 
enosis was re-interpreted as an anti-colonial struggle for the liberation of Cyprus, 
which implied underplaying the emphasis on enosis; the Cyprus Republic was viewed 
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not so much as an end no-one intended or fought for, but as a distorted form of 
independence, fraught wi'th problems deriving from the unworkable Constitution which 
outsiders had imposed on the Cypriots, and which became the source of bi-communal 
tensions leading to the 1963 conflict.21 
Parallel shifts in meaning were gradually effected in all aspects of life. At the level of 
public symbolism, for instance, Independence Day célébrations came to acquire a new 
significance, whereas up to that time Greek national days and the date of the start of 
the enosis struggle were the only ones commemorated. For the first time after 
independence the Cypriot flag started to be hoisted widely on public buildings, 
complementing the Greek flag which up to that time was the one almost solely used. 
This new emphasis on Cyprus and Independence has been termed "Cyprocentrism", in 
the sensé that it represented a "turn" to Cyprus and the Cypriot state. Cyprocentrism 
was not so much a cohérent ideology as a vague mix of éléments, bound together by 
their relatedness to Cyprus - "whatever was of Cyprus" and could hold the fragments 
of the island together. Since the cohesive force of a shared nationality was lacking, this 
"whatever" ranged from the common territory, traits and habits characterizing the 
Cypriot people (from folklore songs and dancing, to eating habits), to common external 
enemies - mostly foreign/western powers or imperialism (depending on one's 
ideology) - comprising the basis of common idéologies of résistance (anti-nationalism, 
and anti-imperialism). For communist AKEL, for instance, the common link with 
Turkish-Cypriots was, as always, common class interests among the working people, 
but since the new stage of the Cyprus Problem was redefined as one in which the ré­
unification of Cyprus had prédominance over the class struggle, the unity of ali 
Cypriots (including "Turkish-Cypriot brothers") as against imperialism was emphasized. 
Another important component of Cypriot commonalities and unity was the state itself, 
but since the Turkish-Cypriots were no longer a part of the Republic of Cyprus, a 
common civic identity did not prove easy to use as a basis of a new unity. As a 
conséquence, all other components of commonality received the emphasis instead. 
Besides, even among the Greek-Cypriots loyalty to the Republic was still quite weak. 
Till Makarius' death (1977) he was the one Greek-Cypriots mostly identified with, than 
the impersonal state. After Makarios' death, there ensued fierce struggles between 
politicians as to who would be the legitimate heir of Makarius' legacy and héritage. 
Kyprianou managed to become the new President for two consecutive terms, and used 
his position to build up the power base of his own party (DIKO); this inaugurated a 
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new era in which the state came to be identifiée! with narrow, particularistic interests, 
rather than as expressing universal values and representing ail citizens equally, thereby 
commanding everyone's respect and loyalty. In this new era, party politics and battles 
for gaining hegemony over the state and its resources would be prévalent. As we will 
see further on, at a later stage, loyalty to the state was to be enhanced- but only at 
the expense of increasing distances to the Turkish-Cypriots. 
One of the most interesting early attempts to formulate a perspective expressing the 
emerging Cyprocentrist awareness of the times, came from the Neo-Cypriot 
Association. The Association was founded a few months after the invasion (March 
1975), by a small group of Greek-Cypriots who envisaged "a new Cyprus" rising out of 
"the chaos and destruction" of that period. Cypriots were called to build on the new 
premises of love of Cyprus (as a topos), bi-communal understanding, and a démocratie 
way of life, which entailed "résistance to chauvinist attitudes which [have always] been 
a hindrance to the unity of the people."22 The founding déclaration of the Association, 
attempted an assessment of the causes of Cyprus' problems, arriving at important 
"lessons" for ail locals: 
In this land we réside as Greeks, Turks, Armenians, Maronites and others, who 
despite différences, real or imaginary, share common interests and objectives 
which détermine our identity as Cypriots [...] The most important cause of the 
current sorry state of affaire is that the two larger communities lived in splendid 
isolation, without contact, [and] with wrong perceptions of each other [...] 
Although we cannot forget our national origin and cultural ties, we must [...] start 
thinking first as Cypriots and only subsequently as Greeks or Turks...Despite the 
fact that the Cyprus Republic is there for fifteen whole years, it has not managed 
to have any citizens [...] to love it, to respect it and to believe in it...23 
The Association considered itself "Cyprocentric in its expositions", "in the sensé that 
the guiding princîple of ail its actions was the interest of Cyprus". The primary 
objective was the consolidation of Cyprus' independence:24 Although it did not 
advocate the cultural "detachment of Greek-Cypriots from Greece", it stressed that 
Cyprus was a separate political entity and that the Republic needed its citizens' "loyalty 
and dévotion" if it was to survive and avoid the "danger of the partition of Cyprus or 
the dissolution of the state".25 
The initial réception of the Neo-Cypriot Association from most quarters was quite 
positive, and a number of its suggestions were officially endorsed; for instance, the 
Association was among the first to push for the use of the Cypriot flag on public 
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buildings, and for the célébration of Independence Day. Inevftably the Association 
became the early target of extreme nationalists and chauvinists; but strangely enough 
négative criticism was soon to be added even from supposedly friendlier quarters, such 
as journalists from the pro-Makarios camp, who charged the Association as bent on 
undermining the Greek-Cypriots' national consciousness. As one of thèse critics put it 
"Hellenism cannot be equated with the junta" for it "transcends any particular 
individual or government": If the Greek-Cypriots attempted to sever their links with the 
motherland (as the Association was charged of advocating), "they would not only be 
betraying Greece, but themselves as well".2 7 Once more, the fear of de-Hellenization 
and de-ethnicization prevailed. Criticism against the Association kept mounting and 
becoming devastatingly négative, to the extent that eventually the word "neo-Cyprîot" 
came to acquire ail kinds of stereotypically derogatory meanings, ranging from traiter 
of country to shallow cosmopolitan, rootless, and imbued with nouveau-riche attitudes. 
Part of the explanatîon of the latter characterizations may relate to the social 
characteristics of the carriers of this new ideology, since most of the supporters of the 
Association were state officiais or employées, professionals, and more generally 
members of the western (mostly Anglo-Saxon) educated élite, who had corne to 
espouse liberal cosmopolitan ideas and multicultural values while studying abroad. 
Obviously the interests of thèse groups were tied to the survival and well-being of the 
state and this made them suspect to their opponents of being self-serving.28 Further 
than that the views of the Association were more positively received early on, at a 
stage when the state's very survival was still at stake. As time progressed and as a 
number of Cyprocentric changes were adopted, there was increasing concern of going 
too far in the other direction, away from the nation and Greece. As we will see further 
on, this became increasingly problematic as relations with Greece started improving 
and as it became évident that Greece was the only ally of the Greek-Cypriots in their 
battle against mighty Turkey. But another factor which was to prove equally important, 
was the résurgence of nationalism, albeit in a new form, which would fïercely resist 
Cyprocentrism of ail shades. The end of the 1970's onwards is widely recognized as the 
period in which the impact of globalization started to be felt around the world. In 
Cyprus the associated socio-economic changes, combined with local realities, were to 
elicit responses calling for cultural résistance - which were to contribute to the rise of 
neo-nationalism and the return of the Right. 
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The return ofthe Right, Hellenocentrism and neo-nationalism 
Despite the marginalization of the Right in the early years after 1974, in less than two 
décades it managed to recompose itself and return to power.29 What made such a 
comeback possible? There are of course many factors and intricacies affecting Cypriot 
politics that we cannot here delve into. What interests us for our purposes is the trend 
of events connected to relations between state and nation, collective identity formation 
and social closure. 
DISY started back in 1976 as the most well organized party of the Right, uniting under 
its ranks the largest segment of the urban middle classes (businessmen, Professionals, 
and white collar workers), with the more traditional nationalists, under a common anti-
communist, pro-West and pro-Greece orientation, at a time when other parties kept 
distances from both the West and from the motherland.30 In Greece, after the junta's 
fall, Karamanlis had returned to power; even though the Greek-Cypriots were initially 
skeptical of him, because of his Zurich role, his moderate internai and external policies 
(democratization, legalization of the Greek communist party, European Union 
accession), soon gained him sympathies - which had a rub-on effect on Clerides and 
DISY who shared the same ideology with Karamanlis and his party (Nea Demokratia). 
But the other Greek-Cypriot parties kept their distances from the conservative, pro-
Western Greece of Karamanlis. When the socialist Andreas Papandreou took over, in 
1981, the Cypriot socialists (EDEK) were the second party to turn positive towards 
post-junta Greece.31 Papandreou's more independent and assertive policy towards the 
West, promising to sever Greece's ties of dependence on foreign patrons, resonated 
well with the Greek-Cypriots in general, who saw in him a braver and more self-
confident Greece, on which Cyprus could rely for resolving its own 'national problem'. 
A year after coming to power (February 1982) Papandreou was in fact the first Greek 
Prime Minister to visit Cyprus, rekindling local hopes for a speedy return to normalcy -
the return of the refugees and a re-united Cyprus. Papandreou went out of his way to 
reassure the Greek-Cypriots that his visit aimed at healing the "wounds" resulting from 
the "feelings of désertion" of 1974; Greece was now ready to accept its responsibilities 
to the Cypriots, so henceforth the guiding principle would not be mere solidarity but 
"conjoined responsibility" [symparataxi, not symparastas/]. The Cyprus problem was 
redefìned as an issue of "invasion and occupation" by an expansionist aggressor (viz. 
Turkey), and not a matter of "bicommunal différences".32 Consequently, any 
negotiations were to be carried out with Turkey, as the occupying power, and not with 
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the Turkish-Cypriot puppet regime, only after Turkey agreed to withdraw its forces and 
allow the return of the refugees plus freedom of movement, settlement and property 
acquisition. When the Turkish-Cypriots a few months later (November 1983) declared 
a separate state, Papandreou responded by proclaiming a "casus belli" policy, 
according to which any new, Turkish aggressive act against Cyprus would constitute a 
cause of war with Greece. 
Meanwhile, Kyprianou had taken over as Makarios' successor - for the first five year 
period uncontested, and for the second term supported by AKEL, after the two parties 
agreed on a "minimum program" on how the country was to be ruled and on how the 
Cyprus Problem was to be resolved. On the latter, the policy proposed differentiated 
between "two dimensions" of the problem - the internal dimension, addressing the 
need to deal with inter-communal relations and the conflict with Turkish-Cypriots, and 
the international dimension, relating to the intervention of outside forces and primarily 
Turkey.33 Papandreou was upset with the "minimum", firstly because of its prioritizing 
the "internal" aspect of the Cyprus Problem (which undermined his own emphasis of 
the problem as resulting solely from Turkey's expansionist designs), but also because 
Kyprianou's pact with the communists rendered his policy of internationalization of the 
Cyprus Problem more problematic. The Greek Prime Minister did not hesitate to 
interfere in Greek-Cypriot politics, in trying to undermine Kyprianou's cooperation with 
the communists (who, respectively, accused the former of interfering with the internal 
affairs of an independent, sovereign state). Shortly afterwards, DIKO walked away 
from collaborating with AKEL, and Kyprianou adopted Papandreou's harder stand, 
leading to the rejection of the "guidelines" proposed by the new U.N. Secretary 
General, Perez de Cuellar, for resolving the Cyprus Problem. DIKO was thus the third 
Cypriot party to draw closer to Greece, whereas AKEL would maintain its distances and 
consolidate its image as the main carrier of the Cyprocentric ideology on the island. 
At this point, it is pertinent to introduce another dimension of Greek-Cypriot politics, 
namely the division between soft-liners34 and hard-liners on the basis of their different 
attitudes pertaining to the solution of the Cyprus Problem.35 In the early post-74 
period the hard-liners' camp included EDEK, AKEL and DIKO,36 whereas DISY adopted 
Clerides' more compromising stand (in the expectation that only the mediation of 
Western powers, and especially of America, could help solve the Cyprus Problem). 
Soon after, AKEL was to cross over to more pragmatic positions,37 while maintaining a 
strong anti-imperialistic discourse which differentiated it from DISY.38 When Kyprianou 
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abandoned the 'minimum' program and cooperation with AKEL, and carried on to reject 
the U.N. Secretary General's proposal towards resolving the Cyprus Problem (known as 
the de Cuellar Plan), the communists put up a fierce battle against the President, to 
the extent of trying to pass a law in the House of Parliament, backed by DISY, to force 
Kyprianou into accepting the UN plan. But, as we noted, AKEL had built its post 74 
identity around its opposition to DISY - the party of "big capital" and "fascist" 
tendencies, "hosting EOKA B supporters": What was seen by many as its pact with the 
devil led to its losing a large chunk of its votes, which migrated to DIKO and EDEK.39 
The conflict between Kyprianou and AKEL led the latter to support Vassiliou's 
independent candidacy for the 1988 presidential elections.40 Once in power Vassiliou 
tried to stir a new course, combining elements from the two conflicting approaches to 
the Cyprus Problem. On the one hand, he attempted a more conciliatory approach to 
the Turkish-Cypriots and even Turkey (emphasizing, for instance, the "need to take 
Turkey's strategic needs into consideration"). On the other, he encouraged an all-
round improvement in relations with Greece (for instance, through providing access to 
the Greek national television channel (ERT) to freely transmit its programs in Cyprus); 
he also considerably increased defence spending, while at the same time stressing the 
huge economic benefits to be derived by the two communities (but especially by the 
financially weaker Turkish-Cypriots) from the solution of the Cyprus Problem and the 
consequent defence cuts or even the demilitarization of the island. Vassiliou believed 
that the federal solution envisaged would turn Cyprus into a new Switzerland, in terms 
of the multi-national co-habitation entailed; similarly, that the commercial and other 
financial benefits accruing once political stability was consolidated, would turn Cyprus 
into the "Mediterranean's Singapore".41 
But although Vassiliou brought a fresh approach to Cypriot politics, and managed to 
stir new hopes for a solution to the Cyprus Problem, he did not manage to get re­
elected into a second term in office. Whereas in his first bid to power, he had received 
support from all three parties comprising the "democratic patriotic forces" (still united 
as against the Right, at that time), by 1993 Clerides, leader of the still stigmatized 
DISY, managed to achieve the support of DIKO, and the indirect consent of EDEK, 
which secured him the Presidency. Beside the many other factors which may explain 
this shift, two were paramount: First, that a few months prior to the elections Clerides 
hardened his positions as against a new attempt by the UN Secretary for resolving the 
political problem (known as Boutros Galli's "set of ideas"), and in doing so pushed 
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himself nearer the positions of the more hard-ltne DIKO and EDEK - and thereby 
nearer to what seemed to be a more acceptable national compromise at the time. The 
second, related to the rise, during Vassiliou's office in power, of neo-nationalism - a 
new wave of nationalism in Greek-Cypriot politics, focusing this time not on union with 
Greece, but on a new politics of identity. Neo-nationalism was to prove a formidable 
enemy of Cyprocentrism and of Vassiliou, contributing to the latter's fall and to the 
return of the Right. 
Neo-nationalism's conditions of émergence may be traced to structural developments 
in Cyprus'economy and society, linked to globalization and modernization, and to the 
unique circumstances on the island after the 1974 events. Briefly put, after the 
dévastation of the economy and the displacement and conséquent unemployment of 
the masses of refugees, there quickly followed in the late 70's and early 80's a period 
of rapid reconstruction and development, which foreign analysts dubbed "the Cyprus 
economie miracle".42 The main reasons contributing to this "miracle" related to the 
successful planned, expansionary economie policy of the state, the availability of the 
cheap labour of the refugees,43 which stirred the growth of light industries (mainly in 
clothing and shoe-making),44 the new opportunities which opened up for Cypriots to 
work or do business in the booming Middle East markets (this was the time many Arab 
countries were investing their profits from increased oil prices in the 70s), the many 
incentives the Cypriot government made available for new entrepreneurial ventures, 
and the restraint shown by the trade unions in lïmiting labour demands.45 This period 
saw the transition of a largely agricultural economy, with little industrializatîon, into a 
service economy with an emphasis on tourism.46 Rapid growth was soon translated 
into a situation of full employment, with a substantial increase in the Gross National 
Product and the per capita income.47 The newly found wealth was to lead to a 
rampant increase in the consumption of ali kinds of goods and services - new houses, 
cars, television sets, higher studies for the young, and at a later stage holiday traveling 
abroad. Consumerism, a new affluence and nouveau-riche attitudes were to 
characterize the 80's onwards, which in turn were to lead to new social phenomena 
and problems, conséquent to the rapid modernization of the 90's - the weakening of 
family and kinship ties, increases in divorce rates, secularization and the decline of 
church attendance, youth delinquency (small theft, burglaries, and the beginnings of 
the drugs problem), environmental problems, and so on. 4 8 In thèse new conditions the 
issue was not so much how to strengthen the state (as was the primary need right 
after 1974), but how culture and especîally national identity could best be protected. 
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Put differently, as global forces were seen to infiltrate Greek-Cypriot society from ail 
directions, the need for cultural résistance acquired pre-eminence. A similar point is 
made by Miroslav Hroch who observes that in the late twentieth Century ethnie or 
nationalist résurgence is often "a Substitute for factors of integration in a disintegrating 
society. When society fails, the nation appears as the ultimate guarantee".49 Indeed, 
in this phase of Cyprus' history traditional society was changing at an unusually rapid 
pace, producing the feeling that nothing was stable or certain any more - hence calls 
for erecting "barricades to keep at bay the forces of the modem world," and for a 
return to ethnie roots and certitudes, feil on fertile ground.50 
The main carriers of neo-nationalism in Cyprus were intellectuals on the fringes of the 
socialist EDEK, or altogether unattached to politicai parties, who had become 
radicalized in the fervent milieu of the early 70s and the post-74 period, thus turning 
criticai of the status quo and traditional society and politics. Others had been 
nationalists in their youth days before 74, and had become disappointed and 
disillusioned with the turn of events leading to the coup and the invasion, and with the 
guilty rôle assumed by extreme nationalists at that time. In terms of social 
background, they were mostly young and middle class (Professionals, journalists, 
académies and lawyers). The common factor uniting them was their anti-imperialist 
and anti-authoritarian orientations, stirred by their expériences in the mid-70s. One of 
their main différence to traditional nationalists was their criticai attitude towards the 
West and its values; a segment of the neo-nationalists sought their values in the neo-
Orthodox movement, which was on the rise in Greece, advocating a return to a more 
'uncontaminated' version of Orthodoxy and to the "long pushed aside traditions of the 
nation [from which] answers could be drawn to contemporary problems";51 others 
drew from various traditions of criticai and anti-establishment thinking, and yet others, 
at a later stage, from post-materialism. Neo-nationalism shared with traditional 
nationalism a belief in the priority of the nation, rather than the state. The re-defìned 
common new focus was not on enosis but on Greek identity and culture, and on a 
renewed relationship with Greece. Hence the slogans "we are firstly Greeks - and then 
Cypriots", "Cyprus is Greek", which were the exact opposites to the Cyprocentric "we 
are first Cypriots - and only then Greeks or Turks", and "Cyprus belongs to its people". 
Greek- and Turkîsh- Cypriots were not considered as autonomous collective actors, but 
as parts of the larger mother-nations and of their wider conflict. Greece was seen as 
vital for the military protection it could afford the Greek-Cypriots, and Greek identity as 
a necessary weapon for cultural defence against the encroaching forces of modernity. 
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Contrary to Cyprocentrism, the new emphasis was on asserting ethnicity as a vital 
component of one's identity. Co-habitation with Turkish-Cypriots was not be achieved 
through hiding or underplaying cultural or historical différences and conflicts, since 
thèse were real and impacted on contemporary realities. The idea of peaceful co­
existence in the past was a myth, as it involved a pre-industrial stage of development, 
characterized by cordial personal relationships between peasants in a mostly 
agricultural society, which had little to do with sharing power in a modem context. 
Similarly, the policy of rapprochement wrongly assumed that the root cause of the 
Cyprus Problem was bad inter-communal relations, whereas the real problem was 
Turkish expansionism. It followed that the solution dtd not have to do with mending 
intercommunal relationships, and passively waiting for third-parties to mediate 
between the two sides; it rather involved seeking an active "libération strategy" 
(defined variously, at différent times, from military résistance with the aid of Greece, to 
an intifada-style risîng). Fédération was thus seen with suspicion and even as a Vacisf 
solution since it sought to re-institutionalize power-sharing on the basis of ethnie or 
racial origin. 
The new perspective was to gradually gain increasing influence on ali levels of society, 
for it re-asserted the old Hellenic cultural values and symbols through a new 
perspective which was not conservative and rigid but more creative and assertive. A 
good example îs the case of the women's walks (or marches) organized by groups of 
Greek-Cypriot women, contesting the occupation and the imposed divide of the 
island:52 In 1975, the first such event, which gained significant international 
participation and publicity, ended with a peaceful démonstration which stopped at the 
border. In January 1987, the second protest march was stili peaceful, and the women 
carried white flags and banners, stressing "we come in peace" - culminating in an 
attempt to cross into the buffer zone, but not to transgress the border. Yet, 
apparently, the women groups were already divided between the two alternative 
perspectives, so a third march (November 1987) culminateti in crossing the border - to 
be stopped violently by the Turkish army. Finally, after a split in the movement, the 
last march (July 1989) ended up stressing ethnie symbols (for instance, the date of the 
march was chosen to coincide with the anniversary of the invasion; the chosen protest 
site was a Greek school and a çhurch in the buffer zone, where a Greek and a Cypriot 
flag were raised and a priest commenced the Orthodox liturgy), causing the violent 
attack of Turkish-Cypriot policemen, and the arrest and trial of the participants. 
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Neo-nationalism managed to graft a new spirit to the more traditional, conservative 
nationalism of the Right, but it also influenced the parties of the Centre (DIKO and 
EDEK). In the élections of 1993, DISY's candidate (Clerides) managed to outst 
Vassiliou from power, after a campaign which accused the latter of being too soft on 
the national issue, and imbued with a cosmopolitan spirit which rendered his national 
credentials suspect.53 Clerides' initial years in power were marked by a return of 
Hellenocentric ideals and a nationalist agenda. Cooperating closely with Papandreou, 
who had returned to power in Greece (1993), the Joined Defence Doctrine (JDD) was 
introduced, which openly placed the Republic of Cyprus under Greece's military 
umbrella (entailing the coordination of military stratégies, joint military exercises and 
so on), presumably so that In case of a military provocation by Turkey, the Greek side 
would be ready to défend itself.54 In 1996, Clerides announced the Cypriot 
government's intention to acquire S-300 missiles from Russia,55 which caused Turkey's 
intense reactions and threats.56 Although the missiles were again meant to enhance 
the defensive capabilities of Cyprus, a second reason was politicai: The Greek side 
judged that the long but "false" peace on the island was contributing to the 
indifférence of the West as to promoting a solution. The new tensions between Greece 
and Turkey as a conséquence of JDD and the S-300 were re-introducing the danger of 
a flare-up between two NATO allies, so Western efforts at a solution would be 
rekindled. 
Clerides won his second period in power (1998-2003) by appearing more resolute on 
national matters - but also for successfully stirring Cyprus' accession route to Europe. 
The former of thèse two prongs to power was soon to prove a mirage, since in 
December 1998, after two years of escalating tensions, the missiles had to be deployed 
in Crete instead, after yielding to pressures from Turkey, America, the European Union 
and the UN. But the road towards European membership was gaining important 
momentum: The 1999 Helsinki European Council lifted a previous condition linking 
membership to the resolution of the Cyprus Problem, making almost certain the 
Republic's accession to the EU in 2004. 
These, then, were the important landmarks in developments regarding national issues 
in Cyprus, and the contest between the two rival versions of nationalism, at the close 
of the twentieth and the dawn of the twenty-first Century. But how did thèse realitîes 
reflect on Greek-Cypriots' sensé of attachment to state and/or nation? What was the 
impact of the return of the Right and Hellenocentrism, and the apparent retreat of 
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Cyprocentrism, on national identifications, attitudes towards the ethnic/national Other, 
and the prospects of reconciliation? 
Nation, state and Greek-Cypriot collective identities 
Up to this point, our analysis has been socio-historical, since the object was to trace 
the diachronic development of nationalism and the processes of attachment to state 
and nation, resulting in respective collective identifications which were at odds to each 
other - and again this we tried to determine through considering historical evidence, 
connected to social change in Cyprus. Yet as Goldthorpe observes, historical accounts 
are by nature finite and incomplete, for they have to depend on data gathered in the 
past, usually for purposes other than the research at hand.5 7 The analyst of the past 
may obviously attempt to trace and unearth new Yelics', and to re-interpret the 
available materials (both of which we have been doing this far), but he cannot 
generate evidence through producing custom-made data which did not exist before. 
Since our study has progressed to the contemporary period, it became possible to 
utilize sociological tools of the trade, in order to create appropriate, specifically 
intended data, to supplement the preceding socio-historical analysis. 
Relevant data were produced in the context of two surveys co-ordinated by the author, 
and a number of in-depth interviews with Greek-Cypriots on issues relevant to this 
thesis (details of all these are provided in Appendix 1). The first survey was carried 
out in 2000 and the second in 2006; as the referendum on the Annan Plan took place 
in 2004, the data from the surveys allow us to consider not only how the Greek-
Cypriots felt prior to taking this major historical decision, but also whether any 
significant shifts in collective attitudes and identifications occurred as a result of the 
referendum experience. In-depth interviews with approximately 150 respondents in 
the year 2000 and another 100 just prior to the referendum (2004), provide valuable 
additional materials which complement the quantitative data, shedding light as to the 
meanings respondents attached to the various issues under investigation. 
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National identity and party affiliation 
Collective identities are complex constructs of individuals and are context dépendent -
rather than fixed characteristics or essences. As the social anthropologist Thomas 
Eriksen puts ìt: "Ethnie classifications are [...] social and cultural produets related to the 
requirements of the classifiers. They serve to order the social world and to create 
standardised cognitive maps over catégories of relevant others".58 It is obviously not 
very easy to determine how Greek-Cypriots view themselves and the extent to which 
they identify with the nation and/or the state and, furthermore, to also evaluate how 
their politicai affiliations and adhérence to specific politicai idéologies influence or 
interact with their ethno-national identifications. 
William Bloom reminds us that idéologies on their own cannot "evoke identification" in 
a "psychological vacuum" but must be underpinned by "appropriate attitudes," modes 
of behavior, and "identity-securing interpretive Systems" for dealing with real 
situations.59 In other words, people identify with an ideology only if it is seen to 
adequately interpret experienced reality. Building on thèse observations, we may 
propose that the two antagoniste politicai idéologies and nationalist discourses in 
Cyprus provide Greek-Cypriots with identity-securing interpretive schemes through 
which they may comprehend the social world, the recent history of Cyprus, and 
everyday experienced reality. These interpretive schemes are obviously associated with 
"appropriate attitudes," which we now turn to consider. 
The traditional social scientific tool for unraveling attitudes has been the survey 
method and the two social surveys mentioned earlier on (2000, 2006) included a 
question devised by Luis Moreno, aimed specifically at exploring dual national 
identities; indeed it has by now been extensively used in cases such as Scotland, 
Wales, Catalonia and Euscadi, hence availing possibilities of cross-country comparions. 
The specific question was: "As regards the issue of collective identity, which of the 
following best describes how you feel?"60 The tabulation of the answers to this 
question (table 6.1) reveals interesting outeomes. 
A first observation is that a large number of Greek-Cypriots acknowledge the "dual" 
nature of their identity (35 % say they are equally Cypriot and Greek and another 13% 
feel the two in differing degrees - an overall total of 48%). 
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I I I I I 
CYPRIOT MORE CYPRIOT EQUALLY CYPRIOT MORE GREEK THAN GREEK CANNOT DECIDE 
THAN GREEK AND GREEK CYPRIOT 
• • • • • • • • WM 
Cypriot 46.8 
More Cypriot than Greek 9.9 
Equally Cypriot and Greek 35.4 
More Greek than Cypriot 2.5 
Greek 4.5 
Cannot décide 0.8 
Figure and Table 6.1: National identity of Greek-Cypriots (2000) 
What is even more interesting to note, however, is that almost half (47%) of the 
Greek-Cypriots sampled give priority to their Cypriot identity. From one point of view, 
the strength of a unitary Cypriot identity cornes as a real surprise, considering the 
hégémonie position of Hellenocentric discourse in récent history and the multifarious 
ways in which Greekness has been underlined ail along. Yet, from another point of 
view, as our analysis has shown, this might have been expected for a number of 
reasons: We have noted how the différent historical trajectories of Cyprus and Greece 
have naturally given rise to différent social institutions, values, and overall social 
realities; of primary importance is the existence of a separate state in Cyprus with its 
own political, économie, and social institutions, its own international représentation. 
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and so on. 6 1 More generally, "indigenous Cypriot institutions" have led to the graduai 
entrenchment of a Cypriot life-world that is responsible for the formation of an 
"everyday pre-theoretical consciousness", which seems to be the "stronghold of 
Cypriotness and Cypriot identity".62 Furthermore, we have seen how identîfyîng with 
Cyprus is more prévalent among the Left, since its particular historical and social 
expériences resulted in its sharing a différent habitus (such as symbols, associations, 
networks and newspapers) than the Right, leading to différent classificatory schemes 
and ultimate values.63 
The extent to which their immediate habitus and social relations shape the politicai 
choices of most Greek-Cypriots, can be gleaned from their responses to the question 
whether the party they vote for is the same as the one their father supported: An 
affirmative response was given by 84% of AKEL, 81% of DISY, 69% of DIKO and 46% 
of EDEK respondents (see Appendix 2), which illustrâtes the importance of family 
values in politicai socialization, especially in the case of the larger parties of the Left 
and Right. Furthermore, the extent to which 'national issues' are the most important 
ones in determining Greek-Cypriots' décisions in politics, can be ascertained by 
considering the responses as to the criteria they use in voting for a politicai party: The 
modal position for the supporters of all parties indicates that they vote for the party 
with the "most correct" stand on the Cyprus Problem, with the exception of AKEL, the 
majority of which said they vote for the party which best "expresses their interests", 
the national issue still being their close second choice (see Appendix 3). 
The survey outcomes can be scrutinized more closely by correlating identity with 
politicai ideology (to the extent that this is evinced in politicai behaviour or party 
choice). Table 6.2 présents a cross-tabulation of national identity and party affiliation. 
It is obvious from the results that the party adhérents who mostly stress their Cypriot 
identity are AKEL supporters: By far the largest percentage (70%) of the latter view 
themselves as "Cypriot" and smaller percentages as "more Cypriot than Greek"(ll%) 
or "equally Cypriot and Greek" (18%). Almost no-one among AKEL's supporters feels 
only "Greek" or "more Greek than Cypriot"! This resuit fits the preceding analysis, 
which accounted for AKEL's history of Cyprocentrism. 
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80% 
AKEL DISY DIKO EDEK ENOM. DIMO. NE. O. OIKOL. 
• CYPRIOT OMORE CYPRIOT THAN GREEK • EQUALLY CYPRIOT AND GREEK « M O R E GREEK THAN CYPRIOT • GREEK 
AKEL DISY DIKO EDEK ENOM 
DIMO 
NE.O. OIKOL 
Cypriot 69.8 27.9 51.2 35T~ 44.4 20.0 
More Cypriot than Greek 11.0 7.9 9.3 9.3 22.2 33.3 
Equally Cypriot and Greek 17.9 47.9 34.1 53.7 22.2 60.0 66.7 
More Greek than Cypriot 7.0 0.8 20.0 
Greek 0.3 9.1 4.7 11.1 
Figure and Table 6.2: National identity by support of political party among Greek-
Cypriots (2000) 
DISY is considered to be the polar opposite of AKEL and is widely perceived as 
primarily Hellenocentric in orientation. The survey results demonstrate that indeed, 
among the larger, more established parties, DISY adhérents are the ones who least 
stress the Cypriot component of their identity (36%) - even this percentage, however, 
is quite high, considering this is the Hellenocentric party par excellence.64 A similarly 
interesting finding is that the majority of DISY supporters do not go to the other pôle 
or extrême to emphasize their Greekness but stress both components of the Greek-
Cypriot identity equally. Thèse findings seem to relate to a number of factors: Firstly, 
DISY's supporters represent a wider spectrum of political/ideological views and 
attitudes than is often assumed - indeed, the previous historical analysis has indicated 
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the coexistence of a spectrum of ideological currents in this party. Furthermore, it is 
possible that some of DISY's supporters feel more Greek than they are Willing to admit, 
but choose to stress a more 'balanced' identity so as not to be perceived as adhérents 
to an extreme Rîght ideology, which still carries negative connotations (that this does 
indeed seem to be the case is demonstrated further on, when we analyze the 
discourses of respondents). 
DIKO supporters put the primary stress to being 'Cypriof (51%) or 'more Cypriot than 
Greek' (9%). These may, again, seem surprisingly high percentages, considering 
DIKO's public image as a hard-liner on 'national issues' and its tenacious emphasis on 
the Greek héritage and the need to work as closely as possible with Greece. To a large 
extent, the pro-Cypriot stance could be traced back to the identification of the 
supporters of this party with Makarios and his latterly pro-independence policies. 
Successive leaders of DIKO tried to adhère closely to the policies of Makarios (both S. 
Kyprianou and T. Papadopoulos were his close associâtes), posing as his acknowledged 
heirs; this allowed DIKO, much like Makarios, to play a balancing rôle between the Left 
and Right, reaping obvious politicai benefits (încluding holding the office of President of 
the Republic three out of six terms, after Makarios' death). The party's long association 
with Makarios and the state must account to a large extent for the strong identification 
of its supporters with the 'Cypriot' component of their dual identity. This brings DIKO 
near to AKEL but, as we will see further on, there is an important différence: AKEL's 
Cyprocentrism more strongly relates to its emphasis on commonalities with the 
Turkish-Cypriots (the common interests of the peopìeffaos of Cyprus and the equality 
of Citizens in a common state) and thus tends to a 'state' or 'civic' form of nationalism; 
DIKO's emphasis is mostly on the integrity and sanctity of the state, but since Turkish-
Cypriots have long abandoned the Cyprus Republic, and the state has effectively been 
taken over by Greek-Cypriots, such as emphasis amounts less to state nationalism, and 
more to another version of ethno-nationalism (focusing on the survival of a 
homogeneous/majoritarian Greek-Cypriot state). 
Perceptions of relations with significant national Others 
The way Greek-Cypriots view themselves, in identifying with nation or state, greatly 
impacts on how they view significant national Others. This was clear in questions 
where respondents were asked to evaluate the relations between themselves and 
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Turkish-Cypriots, Greeks, and Turks, or to assign characterizations to the différent 
nationalities. So, for instance, when asked whether they consider Turkish-Cypriots as 
"aggressive and violent", among those viewing themselves as "Greek" or "more Greek 
than Cypriot" 59% and 65% respectively answered in the affirmative, as against 45% 
and 33% of those feeling "Cypriot" or "more Cypriot than Greek". 
There were even larger différences when respondents were asked to evaluate whether 
Turkish-Cypriots have more in common with Greek-Cypriots than with Turks. Those 
feeling more Cypriot were more confident that indeed they do so, whereas the majority 
of those feeling more Greek did not wish to acknowledge many commonalities with 
Turkish-Cypriots. Interestingly, however, when the question was reversed, to ask 
whether Greek-Cypriots have more in common with Turkish-Cypriots, not only did the 
concurrence of those feeling Greek drop down even more, to around 10%, but 
similarly for those feeling Cypriot it dropped to below 25%. Obviously Greek-Cypriot 
respondents tended to feel that their own identification with their national "kin" is more 
significant than that of Turkish-Cypriots with Turks. To some extent, this must relate 
to the post-74 Greek-Cypriot historiography's stress (adopted by officiai discourse) on 
the largely Christian origins of present-day Turkish-Cypriots (whereas the origin of 
Greek-Cypriots is traced thousands of years back, to the links with the ancient Greeks 
who colonized Cyprus). There were also significant différences as to how 
Cyprocentrics and Hellenocentrics evaluate whether commonalities between Greek-
and Turkish-Cypriots are more than their différences - the former being much more 
positive in their assessment than the latter: 
IBCYPRIOT BMORE CYPRIOT THAN GREEK DEQUALLY CYPRIOT AND GREEK «MORE GREEK THAN CYPRIOT • GREEK] 
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(%) Cypriot More Cypriot The same More Greek Greek 
T/Cs are violent and aggressive 44.7 32.7 36.8 65.4 58.7 
T/Cs have more in common with 
the G/Cs than with the Türks 
70.5 64.3 61.7 25.9 33.3 
G/Cs have more in common with 
the T/Cs than with the Greeks 
24.8 13.0 8.1 11.1 8.4 
What unites G/Cs with T/Cs is 
more than what separates them 
57.7 49.0 49.2 22.2 38.3 
Figure and Table 6.3: Views about the Turkish-Cypriots by collective identity 
Finally, as we would expect, much larger percentages seeing themselves as more 
Cypriot (than those seeing themselves as more Greek) feel that what unites Greek-
Cypriots with Turkish-Cypriots is more than what separates them. To a large extent 
this reflects prevalent official and party positions: As we will see further on, this picture 
changes completely when we come to consider stereotypes regarding Turkish-Cypriots. 
Attachment to Cyprus, Greece and Europe 
Feeling more "Cypriot" does not necessarily mean that Greek-Cypriots do not value 
their connection with Greece. The 2006 survey included a question on how closely 
connected respondents feit towards neighbourhood, village/town, district, Cyprus, 
Greece, and Europe. 
1 1 1 1 1 1 
NEIGHBOURHOOO VILLAGE CITV DISTRICT CYPRUS GREECE EUROPE 
[•AKEL BEDEK DDIKO BDISY 
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A M S A h l llNëiqribo^oôcIll llvlllaqel mua llDistrictl SSreecefl lEuropei 
AKEL 1 3.41 1 3.60 1 3.47 1 3.46 3.85 2.80 1.83 
EDEK 1 3.37 1 3.41 3.50 3.38 3.85 3.33 2.22 
•DIKO— - -3r37 - 3.67- 3.48- —3.42 - -3.83- 3.11- 2.10-
DISY 3.43 3.60 3.50 3.38 3.84 3.50 1 2.36 
Figure and Table 6.4: Attachment to dose and distant communities 
It ls obvious that there are no significant variations in attachment to the more 
immediate communities of affiliation - such as neighbourhood and village/town. But 
as regards the wider imagined communities, identification with Cyprus looms large, 
next comes feeling close to Greece, and lastly to Europe. Whereas there are no large 
variations between the various sub-categories as regards identity with Cyprus, there 
are significant différences in the case of Greece (those feeling more Cypriot or more 
Left indicating less attachment, than those feeling more Greek or more Right). Thìs 
reverses when we consider feelings of closeness towards Europe - the biggest 
différence owing to AKEL, which for a long time maintained a degree of skepticism 
towards the European Union (as a part of the West and of big capital), which has 
obviously filtered down to its supporters. 
* * * 
Discourses on National Identity 
Useful and interesting as quantitative survey results may be, they cannot provide 
explanations on their own, since we do not know of the reasoning or meaning behìnd 
the various numerical responses. That is why we attempted to complément 
quantitative data with in-depth interviews carried out with a sub-sample of our 
respondents. The aim of the interviews was to elicit "commonsense" talk or discourses 
(views, opinions, arguments, narratives) on the topics under investigation and then to 
analyze thèse as social constructs, reflecting not only the personal beliefs of the 
interviewées but also the wider public discourses dominant in Cyprus at the current 
historical juncture.65 
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In the last few décades, the ìncreasing attention to discourse, or language, has 
"contributed in the breakdown of artificial barriere between the various social science 
fields,"66 including those among anthropology, sociology, social psychology, and 
politicai science. This shift in emphasis helps move analysis away from considering 
-ethnic-or-national identity as an underlying essence that must somehow be discovered-
and attitudes as the privileged pathway that provide access to this hidden reality. 
Rather, the différent responses or attitudes of people are seen as actions in themselves 
(language is social practice), which try *to do' or to achieve' things (for instance, to 
argue for or against a particular public discourse). To our knowledge such an analysis 
was not carried out in other countries where dual identities were scrutinized. In all 
such studies, respondents were asked to choose between a number of discrete identity 
catégories (Scottish or British, Catalan or Spanish, and so on), but we have no way of 
knowing what the respondents' interprétation of each category was - and as we will 
see below, in the case of Cyprus at least, this is of determining significance.67 
In what follows, the classificatory scheme used is based on "ideal types"; that is, the 
grouping together of views that have internal consistency regarding their meaning. In 
practice, no speaker ever sticks to absolutely consistent views (so that, for instance, a 
Cyprocentristmay espouse ideas properly identified with ethnie nationalism - much as 
a right-winger may adopt leftist positions on some matters). 
Before we proeeed with our analysis we must make an important preliminary point. All 
Greek-Cypriots are obviously Greek culturally, since they speak the same language, 
share the same religion and other cultural traits. At the same time, most Greek-
Cypriots pereeive themselves to be part of the wider "imagined community" of the 
Greek nation, which is seen to link together all the Greeks living in différent countries 
around the world; this link is also seen to extend back in time, unîting the Greeks 
diachronically in 3,000 years of common history. Almost all Greek-Cypriots make a 
distinction between belonging to the wider Greek nation (ethnos) and to Cyprus as 
their "particular homeland" or country (idiaiteri patridä). It should not be forgotten 
that this is how the 1960 Constitution put it: Cypriots are either Greeks or Turks of 
Cyprus; there is no such thing as a Cypriot nation. Which leads to the distinction 
Greek-Cypriots make between Greek nationality and Cypriot citizenship - being 
members of the Greek nation, but Citizens of the Republic of Cyprus. Only extreme 
views diverge from this orthodoxy (as in the case of xextreme' Cyprocentrics, which is 
presented below, who go to the extent of suggesting that Cyprus itself is a nation); the 
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issue is thus which of their loyalties is stronger - to nation or to state. This, in fact, is 
where in-depth interviews elicit important information, in demonstrating how 
respondents argue the choices they make, and how they thereby construct their 
collective identities. 
LOYALTY TO NATION: HELLENOCENTRISTS 
As expected, Hellenocentrists stress their primary identification with and loyalty to the 
nation (the identity argument). They are proud of the Greek nation and of being 
Greeks. They are concerned with diachronic and ontological continuity of the présent 
with the past, and of the particular with the universal: 
I feel Greek. I am part [aneiko, I belong] of the Greek nation, since our history, 
héritage and civilization has its roots in ancient Greece (129).68 
As we already pointed out, most Greek-Cypriots seem to acknowledge their cultural 
links with Hellenism; what distinguishes Hellenocentrists is what they make of this 
cultural affinity. First, they underline their pride for their Greekness and for the Greek 
nation, the corollary of which is their underevaluation of Cyprus and its status as an 
autonomous entity; whatever value Cyprus has, is derivative, since it is seen to 
completely dépend on its link to Greece and Hellenism. In a similar manner they 
underevaluate their own identification with Cyprus: "I feel more Greek than Cypriot, 
because I see no reason to separate out a tree from the wood. Cyprus is Greek." In 
fact, such comparisons may render Cyprus and Cypriotness a second-best option: 
I feel very proud of being Gree/r-Cypriot. Cypriot says nothing. Cyprus has no 
history of which it could be proud, whereas Greece can be very proud of its 
struggles. I am very proud as a Greek-Cypriot, for many conquerors passed 
through Cyprus, but Cyprus managed to maintain its Greek identity (286). 
Indeed, this feeling that Cyprus in relatively unworthy in comparison to the glorious 
past of Greece, which obviously reflects on present-day évaluations, leads some to 
exclaim that they would "rather be called Greeks" than Cypriots (176). 
A second, related use of the 'given' association with the Greek nation, is to use it as a 
weapon in attacking their Cyprocentrist opponents and in responding to their 
arguments: Since Greek-Cypriots are a "part of the Greek nation consisting of Hellènes 
ali over the world", there cannot be a separate "Cypriot nation, as some would want, 
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who wish to change the national anthem and so on". "It is bad enough we are not 
united with Greece, and we are independent" (10). 
Enosis thus émerges as the underlying agenda, as an unfulfilled noble dream which 
has been sacrificed for the lower causeof independence; An older respondent pondère-
that in older times, "we never had a state ourselves, ever since we were born, and our 
parents and grandparents, weVe ail been slaves." But the state eventually founded 
was a disappointment too, not managing to attract its citizens' loyalties because "laws 
are not kept properly, everywhere connections and interests reign" (15). "I don't 
believe in a Cypriot state" complains another one, who considère it a mundane reality 
as compared to the nation which he deems to be "of a higher order" (19). For othere 
the state is a distant apparatus, controlied by a faceless social elite that has power 
over ordinary people, turning the relationship into a vertical one, of domination, as 
against the horizontal and more equal relationships assumed by the brotherhood of 
nationals (26). This means that the symbols of the state do not elicit the same 
emotive response as those of the nation: 
I was raised up with Greece, the Greek flag, the national anthem...When I see 
the Greek flag or hear the national anthem I am moved deep inside me, my eyes 
run, I am exhilarated..The Cypriot flag does not move me in the least, ifs an 
ordinary piece of cloth for me (15). 
To the Hellenocentrists the symbols of independence are unclean and despised: "I 
never care to hold or hoist [the Cyprus Republic' s flag], it is like a bastard baby. 
Whereas the Greek flag does express me and elicits from me that enthusiasm which 
anyone must feel for his country" (10). 
The thème of uncleanliness récure in other contexts and perhaps best expresses the 
contrast between the sacred nation and the profane state: "The Greeks are proud of 
their nation. As Cypriots we haven't decided what we are: A bastard amalgam in 
search of an identity - sometimes we are ail Greeks, at other times we are ail Cypriots, 
and at othere yet we are one with the Turks, the Maronites and the Armenians"... 
"What does the Cypriot flag stand for - beside the fact that we have a state, itself 
bastardized?" (24) 
An altogether différent set of arguments stresses the synchronie aspect, the présent 
commonalities of ail Greeks who constitute the "imagined community" of the Greek 
nation: 
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Cyprus may be thought of as a part of Greece, in the same way that Crete and 
Rhodes may have their own local traditions, but they simultaneously partake in 
the panhellenic heritage which unites all Greek people, including Greek-Cypriots 
(195; see also 789). 
Similarly, other- respondents comment-that-they "feel-firstly Greek and-then Cypriot," 
and they suppose this applies for the inhabitants of all the Greek islands: "They feel 
they are [firstly] Greek and then islanders." Or, again, the differences between 
mainland Greeks and Greek-Cypriots are explained analogically through comparing 
them to the differences between Greek-Cypriots who live in the various districts of 
Cyprus. These arguments imply that Cyprus could be seen as a district of, and thus as 
a part of, Greece. 
The corollary to such arguments is the emphasis on vital differentiation with other 
nations, primarily, of course, the Turks (the difference argument). Turkey is seen to be 
the complete opposite of Greece, the eternal enemy of the nation: Lacking in history 
(because it is of recent origin, a mix of Asian/Oriental tribes which expanded through 
conquest and plunder) and thus lacking in civilization (because it is barbarous, violent, 
and cruel).69 Turkey's invasión of Cyprus is seen as a logical expression of its violent 
and expansionist character or essence. "The most basic cause of the Cyprus Problem is 
Turkey's expansionism" is a recurring mantra or statement of faith, one that provides 
clear answers about the goodness and innocence of the collective Self and the evil and 
guilt of the collective Other. Turkey is evil, violent, and expansionist by nature; it has 
always been like that, and "Greek history bears witness to this, from the fall of 
Constantinople [Istanbul], to the destruction of Smyrna, and the invasión of Cyprus." 
An extreme Hellenocentrist carries the argument to its logical conclusión when he 
claims that the Cyprus Problem cannot be solved through political means, only through 
war: 
I am ready myself to fight for my country at whichever time. I even contest 
Constantinople, Ayia Sofía, in the same way as [I contest the loss of] Kerynia and 
Apostólos Andreas. 
Attitudes of Hellenocentrists toward Turkish-Cypriots vary considerably but they are, on 
the whole, quite negative. Since the prevailing views see them as Hellenes who were 
converted to Islam in Ottoman times, they are not seen as "foreigners". But "because 
they've been isolated" from the Greek-Cypriots they have developed a "different 
mentality" from the former, so they are not to be trusted: "I don't hate them, but I 
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won't open my house to let them in and embrace them" (10). "You cannot trust a Turk 
to be a Cypriot as you are. A Turk is a Turk" (17). But exactly how Turkish and how 
Cypriot are they? For most Hellenocentrists, "Turkish-Cypriots are more Turkish than 
Cypriot" because of the éducation, socialïzation, or indoctrination they had. This means 
-that-in-the eventuality of-a-solution to the-Cyprus-Problem, "living together-may be-
impossible" (129). History is often quoted as proof of the impossibility of 
rapprochement and cohabitation (230). This may lead to complete rejection, a wish 
that they were not there - "I don't like them very much and I would prefer it if they 
had not exîsted at ail or if we lived completely separated" (288). Alternatively, one is 
advised to keep as far away as possible from them, because nearness may lead to 
contamination - "we will be Turkicîzed, we will forget our holy and sacred." In such a 
case, the resuit will be national emasculation: "Well be Cypriots only, not Greek-
Cypriots" (17). 
LOYALTY TO STATE: CYPROCENTRISTS 
Most Cyprocentrists would not be as extrême as to deny their Greekness altogether. 
To stress the point once more, almost ail Greek-Cypriots acknowledge they are 
culturally Greek, since they share the same language and religion. But whereas in 
dominant public discourse Greece is very often taken to be indistinguîshable from 
Hellenism, and the Greek state becomes identified with the nation, Cyprocentric views 
often try to reassert thèse distinctions through various means and with varying 
intensity. 
As shown in the previous section, Hellenocentrists' concerns revolve around the glory 
of the nation and identity with Greece and mainland Greeks. Extrême Cyprocentrists' 
views and opinions are in many ways the complete opposite of thèse, so that identity 
arguments become converted into différence arguments. The following are two quite 
extrême such views that do, however, highlight the vastly différent évaluations 
involved: 
I feel Cypriot, I am Cypriot. Greeks for me are foreigners/strangers [xenoi]. They 
are those who destroyed us. I feel Cypriot, I believe in the independence of my 
country, I believe we should have our own national anthem and hoist our own 
flag (604). 
Our national identity as well as our citizenship must be Cypriot. I do not feel 
Greek. I grew [up] in Cyprus and I am Cypriot. Greece destroyed us. Greeks are 
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crooks, Mars and self-interested [symferontologoi], They are not hospitable 
[fìloxenoi], I also want to stress that we should only have a Cypriot flag and must 
be called Cypriots and not Greek-Cypriots (126). 
One cannot help but be impressed with the intensity with which such views corne 
across. This must relate to the fact that the speakers are contestino a firmlv 
entrenched discourse: As outlined earlier on, Hellenocentrism has been the dominant 
ideology and interpretive scheme for so long that it seems invincible. Thus a contester 
must fight harder. Furthermore, contestation must be total - compromises cannot be 
accepted. "Compromise" is the almost universally accepted, more "balanced" officiai 
view that Greek-Cypriots are bearers of Greek ethnïcity/culture but holders of Cypriot 
citizenship. The extrême Cyprocentrist rebels against this orthodoxy and counterargues 
that s/he is not a Greek but a Cypriot; s/he "will not bow to Greek symbols" (flag and 
national anthem) but wants "our own," including the ultimate symbol of one's very 
name - which must be "Cypriot" and not "Greek-Cyprìot." What are the reasons for 
this total rébellion? Rupture, discontinuity, the end of innocence. Greeks are held 
responsible for the great destruction [katastrofi] of 1974. The Greek junta is squarely 
blamed for the coup and for the subséquent Turkish invasion which it could not 
forestali - together this amounts to the "great betrayal" [megali prodosia]. As we saw 
earlier on, even though real responsibility lay with a relatively small group of junta 
members or collaborators, feelings of wrath were generalized to include "ail Greeks" 
and "eyerything Greek," including ail right-wing/hellenocentric Greek-Cypriots. This 
explains why for many Greek-Cypriots, such as the respondents quoted above, the 
"umbilical cord" with "mother Greece" was fìnally and brutally cut, so that Greeks are 
seen as "xeno/," "those who destroyed us," "crooks and liars." Another respondent 
comments: "I don't believe we are brothers with the Greeks. I used to believe that 
when I was young. Nowadays IVe changed my mind"(533). 
In many cases, Greek-Cypriots are stili involved in a struggle to transcend the past and 
what happened in 74, to put the trauma behind and differentiate between those 
Greeks who brought the catastrophe and ordinary Greek people. This is more difficult 
for the generation actually involved with the tragic events: "There was a préjudice [...] 
that ail evil that befell Cyprus came from Greece; without the Greek people being 
responsible - the Greek people I love, I overly love... [It îs] because of the Greek 
junta, when I was in the army, [that] I was for many years prejudiced against Greeks; 
I must admit I stili haven't got over it one hundred percent...Of course this was wrong, 
what I was feeling, but the conditions of the time influenced me greatly..." (40). 
248 
There are endless discussions among Greek-Cypriots about the Greeks of the mainland 
and the extent of similarities or différences between the two. On the main 
Cyprocentrists stress the uniqueness of the Cypriots, who are seen to be more easy-
going, trustworthy, hard-working, committed to famüy and so on; whereas mainland 
Greeks are-seen as selfish, arrogant, boastful, devious and-not to be relied-upon (66,-
23). These are defïnitely différent évaluations than those made by Hellenocentrists, 
who tend to stress the more positive traits of their "Greek brothers". 
Let us also consider Cyprocentric views of the ethnie or national Other - Turkish-
Cypriots and Turks. As expected, assessments of the former are much more positive. 
Turkîsh-Cypriots are seen to be "far from cruel and violent," proposed one respondent, 
who then proceeded to critieize the "social system" that turns Greek-Cypriots against 
Turkish-Cypriots. This respondent feit that the "wall that separates us is a false one" 
and that "we must change attitudes through éducation and other means" (201). 
"Cyprus belongs to ail Cypriots," says another, reciting a well-known slogan of 
Cyprocentrists, pointing out that Cypriots of both ethnicities should leave behind 
whatever separates them and to approach each other once more to solve the Cyprus 
Problem. 
Their attitudes toward Turkey are more ambivalent: "I am a Cypriot but I feel [like] a 
Greek too... Perhaps we "feel" Greece [sic] because of the Turks" (546). "The Cyprus 
Problem was the resuit of Turkish expansionism and the attitude of the Americans... 
We must have good relations wîth Greece, as it is the only country which supports us" 
(520). Thus, the arguments come full circle: Cyprocentrists may not feel strongly 
Greek and may not wish Greece's involvement with Cyprus; they want to have the 
chance to give it another go with the Turkish Cypriots. But because of Turkey's threat, 
they often fall back on the need for Greece... 
DUAL IDENÌTTY AND THE BALANCING OF LOYALTIES 
As shown in Table 6.1, the majority of Greek-Cypriots (48%) give credit to the "dual" 
nature of their national identity. Here is a "représentative" account, coming from a 
DISY supporter, of what this may mean: 
I feel [that I am] as much Greek as Cypriot. Greek as to ethnicity because we 
share with Greeks the same language, perceptions, civilization and religion; and 
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Cypriot as regards citizenship, sirice I was born in Cyprus and I am a citizen of 
the Cyprus Republic, with ail rights and duties that any citizen enjoys (728). 
Obviously, a "perfect balance" between the two components of ones identity is not 
always possible, and many Greek-Cypriots would stress one or the other component -
-but notât the cost of-total rejection or at-the expense of the remainingone-(as in-the 
case of "extrême" Cyprocentrists or Hellenocentrists). For instance, after opting for the 
more balanced option ("as much Cypriot as Greek"), many respondents would qualify 
their choice and/or stress the Cypriot component, giving various justifications for this: 
One points out that although he feels both Greek and Cypriot, this does not mean he 
will "support Greece over Cyprus in case of need" (378). Others add that "feeling 
Greek does not mean support for enosfs" (12, 14) or "that Greece should get involved 
in the affaire of Cyprus" (290). 
Convereely, many chose the more balanced option but then qualified their sélection 
and/or stressed the Greek component. The justifications, once again, are quite varied: 
Some start with the admission that Greece is to blâme for the destruction of 1974 but 
then proceed to make the realistic assessment that "she is our only help" (605). Others 
recognize that they "are Cypriots" but then stress that "Cypriots are more Greek than 
mainland Greeks" - for various reasons, such as that "our tradition" or "our language" 
is more "pure," concluding that it would be a mistake to "abort our Greekness" 
[eilinikotita] (1003). 
Placing an equal emphasis on both components of one's identity seems to be seen as 
of paramount importance in itself, as it indicates a sensé of the "golden mean," an 
avoidance of extrêmes. Consider the following statement, where the effort to reach a 
middle position with regard to both politicai ideology and nationality seems to acquire 
primary importance: 
The party I support is DIKO, the center, I am not an extrême or absolute pereon 
[akraios kai apolytos anthropos]. . . I feel Greek-Cypriot, as much Cypriot as 
Greek. As I said, I am not an extrême pereon, to feel only Cypriot or only Greek. 
I feel Greek-Cypriot because I believe Greece and Cyprus can co-exist and 
without wanting to contradict myself I'd like to stress that I feel Cypriot and 
believe in the independence of Cyprus . . . for I live in Cyprus, but I feel Greek as 
well since I believe that we have common roots, and a common civilization - thus 
I am both, Greek and Cypriot (750). 
Another respondent admitted loyalty to the nation, but then rushed to add (without 
solicitation) that he doesn't "consider it the best or greatest nation on earth, [thereby] 
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underestimating the other nations" - obviously in an effort to demonstrate that his 
adhérence to nation was not an extrême, "nationalistic" one. Carrying on to déclare a 
parallel loyalty to state, he admitted that in large part this was due to the fact that he 
served for many years as a senior public servant - so as a "power holder" his personal 
interests were closely tied to those of the Cypriot state. Without a state, he points out, 
"Turkey would have swallowed us up". He is much softer on the Turkish-Cypriots who 
he feels "suffered many tribulations", so the Greek-Cypriots, "as the bigger, more 
powerful, and wealthier community" must care for their survival - "for without them 
there can be no solution to the Cyprus Problem". Besides keeping a balanced position 
on national tnatters, he tries to do similarly on politicai and ideological affairs: 
I am neither on the left nor on the right, since I do not fully accept the 
communist ideology and its statism [...] and I cannot sympathize with the Right 
which has brought so many calamities to our land, as a conséquence of their 
conservatism, their fanaticism, their nationalism and chauvinism...I am a 
moderate pèrson in my life, I am ready to défend any correct position wherever it 
is coming from, I want to be free and independent to decide, without fanaticism 
[...] hence I am thereby a man of the centre (63). 
This need to maintain a balance seems to derive from various sources. Papadakis 
attempts to explain the centripetal forces involved through a structural analysis of what 
he calls the "dilemma of Greek-Cypriot identity."70 He proposes that Greek-Cypriots are 
faced with a situation in which they need Greece to help them deal with Turkey, but in 
the process they must try not to alienate Turkish-Cypriots, whom they need to 
convince of their good intentions in accepting a unifìed state as a solution to the 
Cyprus Problem. Thus, a dilemma is created: "On the one hand, the dependence on 
Greece and the belief in the Greek origins and cultural héritage of Greek-Cypriots 
requires the stressing of the 'Greek' part" of their identity. "On the other, the need for 
rapprochement with the Turkish-Cypriots leads to a desire to stress the 'Cypriot' part 
[...] That it is not possible to definitely choose one over the other is the source of 
ambivalence. At the same time one has to choose position on [an imaginary] 
continuum; choosing any (with the exception of the middle) means that one would 
lean more towards one side. This makes the ambivalence acquire the form of a 
dilemma over which side to stress more".71 
The preceding diachronic/historical account, as well as the synchronie analysis of the 
current politico-ideological "field of forces", help to complément and put into context 
Papadakis's situationalist perspective. The picture he paints has obviously not always 
been that way (for instance, décades ago the Greek component of Greek-Cypriot 
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identity would have been stressed more). The présent emphasis on balance is the 
outcome of the fìerce ideological contest between Hellenocentrlsm and Cyprocentrism 
that has been waging since long. Expressing support for any one side in this battle 
would mean risking the chance of being identified with extreme positions and of being 
guilty of-betraying the ethnos (anti-hellenism) or -the-state (anti-cypriotism).-Many,-of-
course, were ready to accept such a label while the contest was at its peak, and taking 
sides was an act of heroism and honor. But nowadays, after the dust from the 
ideological battles has largely settled, revealing convergence on a number of issues 
(witnessed, for instance, in the realist/conciliatory attitudes of AKEL and DISY 
regarding the Cyprüs Problem), being moderate has merit. Thus, more "balanced" 
views and constructing a respectively balanced "dual identity" have gained wide 
acceptance. 
II 
III 
Identity with Nation 
(Hellenocentrism) 
Identity with State 
(Cyprocentrism) 
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• 
Greek-Cypriot 
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Close to Greece 
Far from Turkish-Cypriots 
Far from Greece 
Close to Turkish-Cypriots 
Figure 6.5: The Greek-Cypriot identity dichotomy and dilemma 
The basic dimensions of the tension/dilemma relating to Greek-Cypriot identity is 
represented in figure 6.5, which shows that the more a social actor identifies with the 
nation, the doser s/he draws to Greece, which has obvious symbolic and instrumental 
benefits (for example, identification with Greece's glorious past and the military 
security it provides against Turkey). Yet, such a move entails moving further away 
from Turkish-Cypriots, which has obvious symbolic and instrumental losses (for 
example, undermining the commonalities vital for reuniting Cyprus and the loss of a 
possible ally in the struggle against Turkey).72 The opposite applies when the social 
actor identifies with the state. 
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This dilemma as regards the identity and loyalties of the Greek-Cypriots signifies the 
inhérent tensions in the very constitution of Cyprus' bi-ethnic/ bi-national state with 
regard to the "dual identity" and "dual loyalties" of Greek-Cypriots: On the one hand, 
their loyalty to the politicai unit, the state, which carries the prospect of unifying 
everyone, despite ethnie-origine on the-basis of-common-citizenship rights and 
obligations; on the other hand, a sensé of affiliation with and loyalty to the ethnie 
community of their origìn and the associated héritage of cultural features (language, 
religion, etc.), which constitute "social/ethnie markers" that set Greek-Cypriots apart 
from the members of other ethnie communities on the island (and, especially, of 
course, from Turkish-Cypriots). 
The two variants of nationalism and the associated loyalties/identifications find 
expression in différent symbolic codes which constitute différent discourses and 
ultîmately différent conceptions of the world. One could propose that the more 
traditional division of the world on the basis of politico-ideological dichotomies 
(Left/Right, refiecting différent emphases on moral-political issues, such as 
justice/freedom and so on) is losing its power and is being replaced, or at best 
supplemented, by thèse new divisions (see Appendix 4 for a fuller treatment of this 
point). Even this new polarity is gradually being attenuated as a resuit of a process of 
convergence that is very much like the dilution of the ideological polarity between Left 
and Right. Meanwhile, at the level of everyday consciousness, the two variants of 
nationalism have managed to imbue ordinary common sensé with national 
ideas/symbols. Whenever there is occasion, such as at a politicai rally/campaign before 
élection time, opposing concepts, thèmes, and stereotypes are "awakened, so that old 
adversaries will face each other in battle once again".73 
SOCIAL CHANGE AND IDENTTTIES IN FLUX 
Obviously the above summary présentation only broadly captures how Greek-Cypriots 
view their identity, and how they try to deal with the disjunction between state and 
nation. Some of them, those at the extreme, see their identities as unchanging and 
often feel this as a source of pride, since it demonstrates steadiness and a respective 
firm loyalty to state or nation. Many others, however, understand their allegiances as 
temporary and shifting, dépendent on life expériences, the changing realities around 
them, and their own perceived place in the world. It would be interesting to consider 
253 
in more depth how such changes come about and how Greek-Cypriots deal with them 
in some more détail. A good case study is offered by A.X., who seems to be shifting 
from a Hellenocentrist to a Cyprocentrist perspective. 
- A^X-is a young Gypriot în-hîs mid-fortiesrborn to a rural family of modest-means, who 
studied abroad and returned to work in Cyprus. During the interview A. X. reflected 
back on his early years when he was "well raised" in a caring family environment and 
learned the values of "respect for other human beings and for older people", and had 
the benefit of a "good éducation". But there he paused and pondered: 
When I was in primary school it was always the idea of a Hellène and the idea of 
Enosis with Greece...I was always involved with the various choirs where we sung 
patriotic songs...I remembered just the other day, the time we had a torch-
procession in the village...the national commémorations, I used to be involved in 
school plays, and went to church...I had a lovely circle as a Greek Christian 
Orthodox - but primarily a Greek - who happened to live in Cyprus, itself a part 
of Greece... 
The next important step carne when he joined "the army" (the National Guard) where 
his éducation into a Greek, with an attendant Greek identity, was completed: 
[We learned] that we were Greeks, that we have this great civilization which 
excels as compared to whatever anyone else could offer to mankind - a totally 
ethnocentric approach; we never learned of anything else that happens in other 
countries, in other cultures, to develop an appréciation for other civilizations; the 
measure of things was always us the Greeks, we were the bravest in wars, we 
were the most intelligent of ali, we were the most creative of ali... 
A.X. had some exposure to différent ideas at high school from some teachers who, 
after 1974, were radicalized and began to think more critically. Then he went to 
America for studies - "a great land", where he carne in touch with "new, more liberal 
ideas" and a criticai, liberal éducation which induced hîm to "keep some distance from 
whatever concerned Greece and Cyprus", instead of being totally immersed in the 
respective feelings associated with such identifications. Trie final distancing carne after 
he graduated, when he visited Greece itself, whereupon he was totally disappointed: 
The real Greece had little to do with the Greece of his imagination; he felt like this was 
not "his own country", he felt "a stranger" [xenos] in his supposed home. He realized 
that he had a différent way of thinking, speaking, and expressing himself than the 
Greeks, and he "felt a bit of an idiot when trying to put on the Greek accent" ("we 
studied Greek at school out of books, but this was not how we spoke at home, or the 
way we expressed ourselves in the village or in town").74 More importantly, he did not 
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feel as if "we were kindred soûls" with Greeks from the mainland, and this was perhaps 
why he feit such little bonding with them: He found them too ethnocentric, "looking at 
the future with their backs", through the past, whereas he felt that "the Cypriots have 
learned their lesson after 74 and look at the future head on"... 
It was after thèse expériences that he started feeling that "first of ali he was a Cypriot 
and not a Greek". He now started feeling proud of being a Cypriot, since Cyprus was 
after ali his own country; ali of a sudden he began noticing the progress achieved 
after 74 - how the economy was re-built from its ruins, how (Greek-)Cypriots opened 
up new businesses, were rushing abroad for further studies, and literally transforming 
the country altogether. 
At the current stage of his life A. X. is "not sure" anymore as to whether he "belongs to 
the Greek nation". Reflecting back in his early years, which he recognizes as formative 
to his Greek identifications, he feels that "it was prohibited for us to think that as 
Cyprus, as a nation, we are a différent people", or to think about "a Cypriot nation" 
altogether. 
Through ail thèse expériences and the reflection that went along with them, A. X. 
began seeing his identity as shifa'ng and the process of identity formation as "a 
journey". When he embarked on this journey, the identification with Greece was 
paramount. By now, the order of priorities had drastically changed: Nowadays he feels 
"strongly identifiée! with [his] country [Cyprus], second with the state, and only lastly 
with the [Greek] nation". He even realizes that how he currently feels may change, 
according to the particular situation: "Düring a conversation, within ä context that I 
feel more attached [to things Hellenic], I will not externalize my own doubts about the 
Greek nation". But overall he feels that in Cyprus "a small revolution is in the making", 
and that Cypriots' feelings of identity will keep changing, emphasizing more and more 
the Cypriot part, and he himself feels implicated in this important project - to 
"construct this new Cypriot identity". The launch forwards, towards this new direction, 
was already a reality: 
The day Cyprus entered the European Union [during that evening's célébrations], 
I was greatly moved: When I saw the fìreworks I felt absolutely a Cypriot 
[apolyta Kyprios]. 
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Greek-Cypriot nationalism, national closure and the rejection of fédération 
In April 2004 the UN plan for the "Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem" 
(the Annan Plan)75 was rejected by an overwhelming majority (75.8%) of Greek-
Cypriots, whereas it was endorsed by most (65%) Turkish-Cypriots. Interestingly on 
the Greek-Cypriot side it was the Hellenocentric DISY which put up the strengest fight 
in support of the Plan, entailing extensive power-sharing with Turkish-Cypriots under a 
loose, federai regime; whereas AKEL, the Cyprocentric party par excellence, and long-
tîme supporter of rapprochement and peaceful co-habitation with Turkish-Cypriots, 
was to turn the Plan down. What may explain this surprising reversai in positions? And 
what may explain the rejection of the Plan, pushed by the UN and the European Union, 
both of which the Greek-Cypriots had repeatedly pleaded with to mediate for the 
resolution of the Problem, so that Cyprus would be re-unified? 
To understand Greek-Cypriot positions on the federai solution, and the Annan Plan, 
more specifìcally, we should briefly consider developments between the end of the 
1990's (the decade of the return of the Right and of the rise of nationalism) and 2004. 
We have seen how in December 1999 the Helsinki agreement gave the green light for 
Cyprus to join the EU: An important detail was the stipulation that even though a 
settlement of the politicai problem would not be a precondition for Cyprus' accession, 
the EU Council was going to "take account of all relevant factors";76 this implied it did 
not want the Greek-Cypriots to feel that their entry would be automatic, without their 
real efforts towards a resolution of the Cyprus Problem; in the same way, Turkey, 
which was given EU candidacy at the same meeting, could not stall Cyprus' accession 
process by simply refusing to cooperate in searching for a settlement. Both sides were 
thus given strong incentives to try harder. The Helsinki décision was to give a new 
boost to the improvement of relations between Simitis's Greece and Erdogan's Turkey. 
In this new atmosphère, Clerides was compelled to shed the 'harsher7 nationalist 
posture and to cooperate closely with the UN Secretary-General, who started work on 
his new plan for a comprehensive solution of the Cyprus Problem in mid-2000, "with an 
eye to resolvîng the conflict before Cyprus' likely entry to the EU". 7 7 
We have already seen that the two sides had already determined, since the 1977 and 
1979 high level agreements, that the solution had to be based on a bi-communal, bi-
zonal fédération. Yet, beside this minimal basis of agreement, a great gulf separated 
the positions of the two communities. The Greek-Cypriots pressed for a fédération 
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with a strong central government which would guarantee the unity and integrity of the 
state. Having started their collective struggle with the aim of enosis with Greece, they 
had accepted the compromise position of the consociational Republic of i960, and had 
moved on to the policy of efikton, that is, a unîtary state with minority rights for the 
Turkish-Cypriots,-towards the-end of the-'60s and the early 70s; after-the debacle-of-
1974 the next best position was a fédération system with a strong central government. 
The négative aim was to avoid partition, or a very loose (con)federal System through 
which Turkey would directly control the north part of Cyprus (via the small and weak 
Turkish-Cypriot community) and, through the partnership agreement, have a 
determining say in the affaire of the south. The Turkish-Cypriots advocated the exact 
reverse positions: Starting from the idéal position of having their own separate state 
(partition), their next best solutions were a confédéral or loose fédéral System, with a 
weak centre and strong constituent states, which tried to ensure as much autonomy 
for their community as possible. The négative aim for them was how to avoid 
domination by the more numerous and financially stronger Greek-Cypriots.78 
Behind thèse positions of the two sides lay two différent political philosophies. The 
Greek-Cypriot préférences dérive from a majoritarian, libéral view of democracy, which 
is based on the individualist principle of one-man one-vote. Turkish-Cypriot 
préférences rely on a communitarian view of democracy, which stresses the equality of 
the two historic, cultural communities in forging a partnership régime (much like the 
Ottoman millet System). 
Ideal 
Positions (GC) 
Compromise 
Positions 
Ideal 
Positions (TC) 
Enosis Unitary 
State 
Federation 
(with Strong 
Central Govt.) 
Confédération Two States 
(Partition/ 
Sécession) 
Double 
Enosis 
Figure 6.6: Ideal and compromise positions of the two communities post-74 
Many other conflicting positions derive from the above differing perspectives. For 
instance, the Greek-Cypriots insist that the future solution would have to evolve from a 
transformation of the Cyprus Republic: Firetly, because it is an already internationally 
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recognized sovereign state, and secondly, because in case of a collapse of the solution 
there could be a safe return back to the original state of affairs - with the Republic of 
Cyprus intact, maintaining its international récognition. On the other hand, the Turkish-
Cypriots insist on prior récognition of their own "state" (TRNC), so that the fédération 
is constituted-through-the-joining together of- two -sovereign-states in -a -new-
partnership; in such a case, a possible collapse will find them with a recognized state, 
which is precisely what the Greek-Cypriots fear, as this would constitute a path to 
legitimizing partition. 
The above briefly describes the différent positions between the two communities. But 
there are great différences within the two communities: Basically the less nationalistic 
positions in each community tend to move towards the centre of the above axis, and 
thus nearer to the positions of the non-nationalists/moderates of the other community 
(for which reason there is always the danger that such positions will be accused as 
going too far in identifying with the enemy, and of betraying the interests of ones own 
community). The nationalists obviously gravitate to the two extreme ends of the 
continuum.79 
These contradictory positions allow one to understand why the job of any mediator to 
the Cyprus Problem is always so tough. Trying to steer a path which would avoid the 
numerous hurdles and to bridge the vast gap separating the two sides, the Annan Plan 
was an elaborate scheme comprising the basic proposai of more than 150 pages, plus 
supporting documents nearing 1,000 pages. Building on the 1960 agreements, 
consociational principles, and federai provisions (inspired by the Swiss model of 
fédération), the Annan Plan proposed among others:80 Maintaining the three 1960 
treaties (of Establishment, Guarantee, and Alliance) along with new treaties related to 
the new state of affairs in Cyprus - to be signed by Greece, Turkey and Britain; Cyprus 
to maintain special ties of friendship with Greece and Turkey, and commit to 
supporting Turkey's accession to the EU; the union of Cyprus with any other country, 
or partition, to be prohibited; the new Cyprus to be composed of a central common 
state and two component states with politicai equality; the common government and 
component states to be modelled on the Swiss type of relationship between federai 
government and cantons; the common state to be the voice of one Cyprus 
internationally and in the EU; the component states to exercise all residual powers not 
vested by the constitution in the common state government; a single Cyprus 
citizenship, complemented (but not replaced) by internai component state citizenship; 
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a common state parliament composée! of two Chambers (the Senate and Chamber of 
Deputies) - the Senate based on 50:50 membership and the Chamber on the 
proportion of the population of the component states; parliament décisions to require 
the approvai of both Chambers by simple majority; the Presidential Council to consist 
-of six-members,81 and the offìces-of President-and-Vtce President to rotate every ten-
months among the members of the Council; the Supreme Court to consist of 9 judges 
(3 GC, 3 TC, 3 non-Cypriot), responsible for dealing with unresolved disputes between 
the component states. 
Overall, the proposai aimed to combine principles from the liberal, majoritarian model 
of democracy, with the communitarian/consociational model. It is of course diffìcult to 
summarize ali the provisions of a very complex and finely balanced document. But 
enough has been given to illustrate how fragile the proposed scheme ended up being, 
having to satisfy such contradictory initial préférences and constraints. 
Meanwhile, in Greek-Cypriot politics, there was to be a change of scene. We have 
noted how in the post-Helsinki era Clerides had to move to a 'softer' attitude on the 
national issue, as a conséquence of the need to be seen to be working hard towards a 
solution, prior to EU accession.82 Improved relationshîps between Greece and Turkey 
were pushing him in the same direction, and so did the proddings of other interested 
international actors, such as the US (which wanted the Cyprus Problem removed as an 
obstacle blocking Turkey's EU accession). But Clerides' new attitude did not help him 
within Cyprus, for his 'softer' positions drove him further away from DIKO and EDEK. 
On the contrary, AKEL, worried for having stayed away from power for the whole 
previous decade, had begun 'hardening' its own positions, thus bringing itself nearer 
the two smaller parties of the politicai centre, which held harder positions on national 
issues. Accepting Papadopoulos, the leader of DIKO, known for his more conservative 
views on the Cyprus Problem, as the common candidate of the opposition parties 
(AKEL, DIKO and EDEK), in the impending 2003 presidential élections, AKEL ensured 
victory over Clerides.83 TTie latter had campaigned for a short-term extension of his 
term in office so as to finalise détails of the Annan Plan, solve the Cyprus Problem, and 
put a united Cyprus in the EU. The opposition and Papadopoulos expressed serious 
concerns over the provisions contained in the current, at the time, version of the 
Annan Plan (Draft 2) and campaigned for the need of a new, 'tougher' President who 
would re-negotiate the worse, for the Greek-Cypriots, such provisions. Papadopoulos 
won from the first round of the élections, something that had not been accomplished 
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since the 1983 presidential élections (when in the stili much heated politicai climate of 
the times, Kyprianou, as leader of DIKO and supported by AKEL and EDEK, had 
achieved a triumph - which Papadopoulos was now repeating). 
-Once in powerrPapadopoulos did appear-to be trying hard towards achieving progress­
in the negotiations. In fact, he pleaded with the U.N. Secretary to give a new stir to 
his initiative, which was making slow progress as a conséquence of Denktas' stalling. 
But perhaps he was counting too much on the latter's intransigence. When an 
impatient Turkey pressed Denktas to take a more positive stand, during the New York 
negotiations of February 2004, the two Cypriot leaders surprised the world by 
accepting the UN Secretary-Generars proposais, which entailed: That the two Cypriot 
leaders would commence direct negotiations on the basis of the Annan Plan; that 
Greece and Turkey would join the negotiations if the Cypriot leaders could not 
conclude; and that the U.N. Secretary-General would be asked to fili-in the blanks 
where the two sides were not able to agrée, so that the final version of the Plan could 
be put to a referendum prior to Cyprus' entry ïnto the EU. 8 4 Effectively, this was a full-
proof method for carrying the problem to its final conclusion. 
In the ensuing negotiation period the two sides tried to improve on the provisions of 
the Plan each thought negative for its own community. In Aprii 2004, one month 
before Cyprus' EU accession, the stage was set for the referenda to take place on each 
side. Withîn the Greek-Cypriot community, ali the polis were indicating that the public 
was mostly negative on the finalized Plan. In the very tense campaign atmosphère for 
a "Yes" or a "No" in the referendum, the final verdicts of the Président and the politicai 
parties were to be announced. 
Papadopoulos' televised national address of Aprii 7, 2004 confirmed the prevailing 
negative public atmosphère.85 Papadopoulos tried to achieve the difficult task of 
speaking to his viewers as both "Président of the Republic and elected représentative 
of the Greek Cypriot Community" - as the leader of ail Cypriots despite nationality, and 
as leader of the Greek-Cypriots' community on whose behalf he had taken part in the 
negotiations. In practice, almost ail of his attention focused on the Greek-Cypriots 
whom he addressed as the "Hellenic Cypriot People" [Ellinike kypriake iae], the 
expression used by the deceased Archbishop Makarios; there was, in fact, an obvious 
attempi through the language used, tone, and whole mode of expression, to emulate 
the ethnarch, addressing his ethno-national community, so as to endow his speech 
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with the authority associateci with that powerful institution and its charismatic 
incumbent. 
Right from the start, Papadopoulos aimed to establish his message by embedding it 
within an essentializing discourse of-a bounded community of destiny,-moving together-
through time and now faced with "the most dramatic hours in its age-old history". At 
this criticai juncture the (ethno)national interest was paramount, so there could be no 
distinction between those "more or less patriotic', for "safeguarding our unity is our 
highest duty to our country". After stressing that the Greek-Cypriots were not 
maximalist in their aims but limited themselves to "the minimum but very important 
target: The reunification of our country and our people", Papadopoulos gravely 
concluded that this was not achieved with the Annan Plan. The final version of the 
Plan served Turkish interests well, but not those of Greek-Cypriots. As a result of the 
provisions of the Plan, TRNC would gain legitimacy by becoming a "component state" 
of the fédération; the Turkish-Cypriot Citizens would become "legal Citizens of the EU"; 
the settlers would stay; Turkey would remain a guarantor and maintain troops on the 
island, thereby securing a basis for the control and domination of Cyprus. At the same 
time, economie viability would become questionable, the Greek-Cypriots would get to 
Shoulder most of the restoration and compensation bürden, and their "standard of 
living, built with so many sacrifices" would be put in jeopardy. Human rights would not 
be served - since not all refugees would return, and there would remain "restrictions 
on movement, settlement, the right to acquire property [and] the exercise of politicai 
rights". Furthermore, whereas Turkish gains were to be achieved right away, the few 
Greek-Cypriot gains were to extend over différent spans of time. Meanwhile, the 
Cyprus Republic was to dissolve "24 hours after the referenda", so the Greek-Cypriots 
had no way of ensuring that the deal would be fulfilled. 
Papadopoulos also discussed the alternative: What would happen if the "sovereign 
people reject the Pian by their vote"? The Ves' campaign had argued that in such a 
case Cyprus would remain dîvïded, as there would be no more efforts at resolving the 
problem, and the Greek-Cypriots would be internationally isolated. But such 
arguments ignored the fact that Cyprus would stili join the EU, which would "Upgrade 
and shield politically the Republic of Cyprus": Why then "abolish the Republic of 
Cyprus [...] our internationally recognized state exactly at the very moment it 
strengthens its politicai weight, with its accession to the European Union?" 
Papadopoulos also warned that saying 'ves' to a federai state which would collapse as 
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a resuit of its non-viability ("functional difficulties, complicated procédures and 
dangerous ambiguities"), would lead with "mathematical accuracy" to "what we ail 
[meaning, obviously, the Greek-Cypriots] want to avoid: partition through the 
international récognition of the constituent states". After this grave analysis, 
Papadopoulosconcluded wïth-a much quoted statement: -
Taking up my duties [as President] I was given an internationale recognized 
state. I am not going to give back a 'community', without a say internationally, 
and in search of a guardian. 
Rnally, having argued that the overall conséquences of a 'yes' were "heavier and more 
onerous", Papadopoulos called upon his "countrymen" to "say a resounding NO" and 
reject the Annan Plan in the upcoming referendum. 
The two parties of the politicai centre predictably took a stand against the Plan. The 
question remaining was what would be the choices of the two larger parties of the 
Right and Left. From the side of AKEL, given its long hîstory of anti-nationalism, good 
relations with the Turkish-Cypriots, and persistent pro-solution stand, the expectatîon 
was that it would advise for a "Yes" vote. Indeed the original décision of the 
leadership of the party was for a cautious 'Yes'; but the party apparently had to face 
strong internai voices of dissent, supporting the rejection of the Plan, and threatening 
to leave the party in case it took a positive public stand. Party cohésion was historically 
of paramount importance to the communists, on which they had to dépend to weather 
survival in a country which belonged to the Western camp, and in which the Right 
enjoyed unassailed prédominance since the beginning of modem politics. AKEL had 
also to consider that a 'yes' vote would mean the immediate break of its partnership 
with DIKO and an exit from the government in which, for the first time in its history, a 
substantial number of ministerial posts were held by AKEL members. In the end, it 
opted for the peculiar stand of asking the UN Secretary-General to postpone the 
referendum for a few months, so that improvements on some of the provisions of the 
Plan (especially as regards security issues) could be effected, after which it would 
support the Pian. Otherwise, in case no postponement and improvements were 
agreed upon, the party advised for a lukewarm 'No' vote.86 
The only large party which was to officially support a 'Yes' vote was DISY. To a large 
extent, this reflected the party founder's (Clerides) previous commitment to steer 
towards a solution, but also the strong backing of the Pian by DISY leader, N. 
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Anastasiades. In the post-Helsinki period the latter had become an outspoken pro­
solution advocate, and had thrown his full weight behind the Annan Plan. 8 7 
Unsurprisingly, considering the split power base of the party between modérâtes and 
hard-line nationalists, after heated debates and the final verdict for a "Yes", DISY 
fragmented into two: A small but significant splinter group officially left DISY and 
created a new party (which after the referendum united with the hard-line, pro-unitary 
state, New Horizons, to form the European Party - Euro.Co). On the day of the 
referendum, exit polis showed that even from the members of DISY who had chosen 
not to leave the party, the majority voted against the advice of their leadership.88 
Let us now return to the question of why such a large majority of Greek-Cypriots voted 
against the Annan Plan. Most explanatory attempts have stressed the determïning 
influence of Papadopoulos' stand and of the impact of the vehement 'No' campaign. In 
such explanations the 'No' supporters are considered to be the nationalists and the 
'Yes' supporters the anti-nationalists (or non-nationalists). The first camp is portrayed 
as the 'bad' side and the second as the 'good' side. The masses of the people who 
voted 'No' are thereby seen as the largely passive receivers of nationalst messages, 
who were brainwashed by the hard-liners' propaganda and rejected a solution which 
would have ushered Cyprus into a post-nationalist âge. There are, of course, the 
precise opposite accounts which portray the Annan Plan as the outcome of foreign 
(especially British and American) machinations or conspiracies, the 'No' camp as the 
patriots who tried to save Cyprus, and the 'Yes' camp as the small minority 'sold' to 
outside interests. 
This analysis will maintain the more dispassionate explanatory approach it has followed 
so far, which tries to steer away from normative judgements of nationalisai, and which 
seeks to understand how national phenomena are socially constructed, and how they 
then themselves contribute to the construction of the social world. Rather than seeing 
nationalism as a particular (good or bad) politicai strategy, we rather share Billig's view 
that nationalism constitutes "the condition for conventional stratégies, whatever the 
politics";89 for ultimately both nationalist and anti-nationalist approaches root their 
appeals in the national interest.90 
In understanding the results of the referendum we should start from the observation 
that the pre-referendum poils revealed largely negative attitudes long before the' 
officiai announcements of the President and the politicai parties were made. Our 
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explanation should also be in a position to account for the fact that dissenting voices in 
AKEL were so strong as to reverse the original 'Yes' stand of the leadership; for why 
DISY's décision for a 'Yes' caused the split of the party into two, and why most of its 
remaining supporters still voted 'No' in their majority, despite their leadership's wishes. 
It thus becomes clear that it was not so much the leaders who influenced the crowds, 
as the crowds' attitudes which forced the leaders into adopting a "No" position. There 
was obviously a dialectic between the two, as the people were listening to the public 
debates on developments regarding the negotiations and forming their attitudes 
accordingly.91 But rather than seeing Papadopoulos as manipulating the masses, or as 
possessing a spécial 'charisma', or spécial 'traits', we may adopt the standpoint of 
récent analyses of leadership which view the leader as exemplifying a group's social 
identity, as the "ingroup prototype".92 Papadopoulos apparently expressed the common 
denominator of intra-group views, of what the Greek-Cypriots thought, felt or feared 
during that particular period, and under those particular circumstances. It is no 
wonder that Papadopoulos' popularity soared in that period, and that for months, and 
even years, after the référendum he achieved ratings in opinion poils which only a real 
ethnarch, above and beyond political parties, could have achieved. What thus explains 
Papadopoulos' appeal at the time is that he came to embody, to represent, and to 
express the fact that the Greek-Cypriots had after ail become a cohesive imaginary 
community. Not as Greeks, not as Cypriots, but as Greek-Cypriots. A new national 
compromise had been quietly and unobtrusively established - which went almost 
unnoticed, until the référendum forced the realization to the surface. 
This is a good point to return to our main perspective of social transformation and 
national closure, to pursue this basic insight/argument - that despite the différences 
between the Greek-Cypriots, what gradually evolved within the community was a 
strong attachment to the independent state, which unwanted and despised by many 
earlier on, became the unarticulated new national compromise and the new sacred 
canopy identifiée! with the very survival of the Greek-Cypriots - who proved highly 
skeptical and unwilling of letting it go, in favour of a fédéral régime whose future 
seemed uncertain and insecure. 
Wimmer's "dimensions of closure" may help in rouriding up the discussion. Consider 
first légal closure and the consolidation of feelings that the Greek-Cypriots constitute a 
légal community of nationally defined citizens, distinct from outsiders. We have seen 
how the Greek-controlled Cyprus Republic managed, after 1963 and also after 1974, to 
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maintain legitimacy as the ìnternationaJly recognized state representing ali Cypriots -
even though Turkish-Cyprìots had long ago left the common bi-communal house. A 
year after the invasion the Turkish-Cypriots declared the Turkish Federated State of 
Cyprus, and in 1983 they unilaterale declared their own autonomous state, TRNC, 
which received no international récognition, besides that of Turkey. These moves of 
the Turkish-Cypriots at forming their own state met with the ferocious résistance of the 
Greek-Cypriots, who refused to acknowledge the legitimacy of the TRNC and its 
borders (we earlier saw the example of how, at the citizens' level, the women marches 
contested both of the latter). Since undoing the realities on the ground was diffìcult, 
Greek-Cypriots used every means and every forum to deprive their opponents of 
international récognition. The efforts of one side to gain récognition, and of the other 
to prevent it, resulted in a tierce semiotic warfare (constituting the continuation of 
pol i ta by other means, to adapt Cari von Clausewitz's famous adage) which has been 
raging unceasingly ever since. As Constantinou and Papadakis put it: 
This has extended to almost any imaginable activîty of an international nature, 
from trade to the landing of civilian company planes in the north, from sports 
meetings to académie conférences, including meetings or events devoid of any 
explicit politicai content.93 
To avoid giving récognition to the "pirate state"94 the Greek-Cypriots put any 
références to TRNC and its institutions in quotation marks, or (especially in orai 
speech) use the prefìx "pseudo" (often taken to great extremes as in pseudo-president, 
pseudo-major, pseudo-universities, pseudo-courts, and so on). Since preventing the 
seceding state from acquiring legitimacy is tantamount to protecting the survival of 
their own state, engaging in the discourse of non-recognition amounts to a Greek-
Cypriofs "patriotic duty" - very much like defending one's country in times of war.95 
The overall result is that even though the Greek-Cypriot side does not officially 
recognize TRNC and its territorial borders, the reality of its présence and the war of 
(non)recognition policies has aided the strengthening of mental borders and the 
fostering of 'we'- 'they' feelings, pushing the two communities further apart. At the 
same time, it has heightened Greek-Cypriot feelings of constituting a distinct "legal 
association" in opposition to the Turkish-Cypriots, despite the officiai Greek-Cypriot 
discourse that ali Cypriots constitute one people. 
Interestingly, after the Turkish-Cypriot regime was almost forced by pressures from its 
own citizens to partially open the borders in 2003, the Greek-Cypriot government was 
hésitant as to how to handle the new situation, fearing again the possibility of giving 
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indirect "récognition" to the illegitimate TRNC: Initially, it discouraged Citizens from 
crossing across the divide, and eventually it gave its blessings with great hésitation. 
Many Greek-Cypriots, including most politicians, have still not crossed to the other 
side, fearing of being accused that they are not patriotic enough96 - whîch effectively 
demonstrates how mental borders are often stronger than territorial ones. At the 
same time, hundreds of Turkish-Cypriots, in the knowledge that the Republic would 
soon be enterîng the European Union, started applying to the Greek-Cypriot authorities 
for the Republic's passports and ID cards - in order to thereby secure EU citizenship. 
These developments constituted an indirect acknowledgement by Turkish-Cypriot 
Citizens, of the legitimacy of the Greek-Cypriot state, as against their own. 
Let us now turn to politicai closure to consider how it was effected in the post 74 era. 
In the previous chapter we saw how during the first years of Independence politicai 
parties (except AKEL) were non-existent, and even after they did eventually emerge, 
after 1968, they were linked to para-state military organizations, and/or they wére 
overshadowed by Makarios. It was only after 1974, and especially after Makarios' 
death in 1977, that démocratie party polìtics was gradually established. Initially, parties 
were quite unsure of themselves, and tried to use the state to consolidate their power; 
many Citizens did not feel free enough to criticize the government and were stili quite 
alienated from the state, which they felt to be associated to the party in power and its 
loyal followers, and not to every citizen. One's politicai affiliation (judged often from 
the newspaper he read or his company of friends) often determined whether he or his 
children could get a job in the government, or a desired promotion, a good posting in 
the army - and so on. But by the early twenty-fìrst Century there were enough 
changes in government for democracy to be deeply entrenched so that ali could feel a 
part of it: Even the allegedly "extreme" Right of Clerìdes had managed to exercise 
power for ten whole years and had, thereby, managed to shed a large part of the 74 
stigma (in 2008, it was AKEL's turn to power, completing the cycle of normalization of 
démocratie politicai lìfe, so hènceforth no one would feel excluded from the system). 
Not only was politics normalized, but the Republic grew less and less reliant on Greece 
and Greek governments. Obviously, Greece is still held in high regard as the national 
centre. Back in the period immediately after 74, Karamanlis had instituted the 
principle "Cyprus décides and Greece assists";97 and even though Papandreou, who 
sueeeeded him, did interfere more openly in Cypriot politicai affaire, this was mostly in 
the sense of pushing the Cypriot governments to go in the directions he preferred, 
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rather than plotting behind their back or subverting them, as had happened in the 
1963-1974 period; in this period, the officiai principle governing relations between the 
two countries became that of "co-decision making" [synapophasfzomeri].98 When 
Simitis got into power the relationship between the two countries became onë of active 
Greek counsel and support, than of pushing or imposing policy préférences. By the 
time of the April 2004 referendum, the Cypriots were largely emancipated from 
mainland Greece patronage: Despite the fact that 3 out of the 4 parliamentary parties 
(Nea Democratia, PASOK, Synaspismos) were in favour of accepting the Annan Plan, in 
Cyprus, 6 out of the 8 parties feit free enough to reject it." 
Similar developments impacted on military closure. Greece has obviously remained 
important to the Greek-Cyprîots, as their main ally in defence matters, the Joint 
Defence Doctrine being perhaps the best example of how the two countries tried to 
deal with this issue - as if it was a military part between two separate, sovereign, and 
self-respecting countries, while it was also transparent that the part entailed protection 
by the "motherland" to a weaker kin state, creating a certain dependence by the latter 
on the former.100 At the same time, one should note the conscious Steps taken by the 
Greek-Cypriots to gradually increase their autonomy from Greece, to the extent 
possible, as regards this domain. One of the ways this was achieved was through the 
so-called "Cypriotization" of the National Guard, in other words, the graduai 
replacement of the hundreds of middle- and high-ranking Greek mainland officers in 
the National Guard, with Greek-Cypriots. It is true that the chief commander still has 
to be from the Greek mainland (usually a retired General from the Greek armed 
forces), but overall dependence on the Greek military has substantially decreased -
which, incidentale, means a much smaller influence on the young men undergoing 
their military service in the National Guard. Finally, and perhaps most importante, as 
Cyprus' progression towards membership to the European Union, supported by Greece, 
became more confirmed, the need for military defence started losing in importance, 
since the EU is a "security community" which avails res members with multiple means 
of defence - and certainly not only, or primarily, military. Indeed one of the main 
reasons Greek-Cypriots have been strong supporters of the idea of joining the 
European Union, all along, was their perception of enhanced multifold security within 
the EU. 1 0 1 Unlike other, larger and stronger states, for the Greek-Cypriots, joining the 
EU did not présent any dilemmas of losing their sovereignty - rather the contrary, they 
feit that this would be the first time they could really enjoy the sovereignty which 
statehood usually confers. Paradoxically, (as we have seen in Papadopoulos' address), 
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this sensé of security which imminent accession to the EU was expected to bring, 
constituted one of the factors which made the Greek-Cypriots feel more comfortable 
with saying "No" to the Annan Plan, against EU wishes! 
Let us finally turn to welfare closure, and the contribution of social security in 
strengthening the Cyprus Republîc as a community of solidarity. As Pashiardes points 
out, back in 1960 the Republîc had inherited an underdeveloped colonial economy from 
the British, with only a rudimentary social welfare system.102 As we saw earlier on, the 
first years of independence (1960-1974) were characterized by sustained economie 
growth and development, which made possible the graduai introduction of social 
security provisions (the Church and family remaining important alternative providers), 
but the process came to a dramatic hait with the 1974_disaster. After the invasion, 
priorities revolved around meeting the basic survival needs of the displaced and 
reactivating the dislocated economy.103 But, henceforth, welfare policies evolved 
rapidly, along with the rejuvenated economy. By 1980, a comprehensive social 
insurance scheme was introduced and there was good progress towards the provision 
of various services such as free public éducation, medicai care and income security.104 
In fact, if we use Pierson's criterion - of social expenditure reaching over 3% of the 
GNP as the "national indicator" for a country to be considered a welfare state - then 
this was accomplished by the Cyprus Republic in 1981.105 Since the v80s welfare 
provisions have been moving towards universalization and further expansion.106 Even 
though the family and other communal institutions, such as the Church, stili play a 
supplementär/ rôle to the state, Citizens are increasingly expecting the latter to be the 
main welfare provider. Ttiereby, the Greek-Cypriot community has been Consolidated 
into a community of real, material solidarity, "a hyper-extended family where 
everybody cares for the well-being of everybody else". 1 0 7 
In recent décades, the above process of closure was accompanied by a parallel, 
graduai hardening of the rules concerning entering and settìing in the Republic. As the 
numbers of foreign workers seeking job opportunities, created with the booming 
economy and the rising standard of affluence, increased, the rules defining who may 
enter, work and settle in the Republic have grown harder and harder. Close control 
over who enters the territory thus became more important with the parallel growth of 
the welfare state, precisely because of the need to differentiate between those eligible, 
or not, for the various welfare benefits. This further strengthened the sense of 
solidarity between co-nationals, provided by the Republic. 
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We have thus briefly traced the process whereby social integration and closure have 
intensified in the décades after 1974. Trie process involved a "restructuring of the 
basic mechanisms of integration and exclusion": More specifically, the mechanisms of 
legai, politicai, military and welfare inclusion, previously organized on the basis of 
weaker or more diverse criteria of belonging, were re-adjusted to the "principle of 
national membership".108 Each move towards more integration strengthened 
identification with the Cyprus Republic as an imagined - but also real - community of 
solidarity. Rather than causing a change in this trend, the Hellenocentrists' ten-year 
stay in power, has contributed to their incorporation and enhanced loyalty and 
identification with Cyprus and with the Cypriot state. But, mostly as a conséquence of 
the contest of the two rival variants of nationalism, a new synthesis (or, to use 
Wimmer again, a new national compromise) was reached: On the one hand, Greek 
culture and Greek identity as a strong component of Greek-Cypriot dual identity, have 
been re-asserted - this has been the Cyprocentrists' compromise; on the other, the 
Greek-Cypriot state as a worthy end in itself, autonomous from Greece, has gained a 
new respect - this has been the Hellenocentrists' compromise. Effectively, the overall 
resuit is the confirmation of the independence and self-sufficiency of a "second Greek 
state": This is the new national compromise which allows a stronger unity among 
Greek-Cypriots - but which, at the same time, makes the incorporation of Turkish-
Cypriots more difficult. Paradoxically, thèse changes translate into a stress on Cypriot 
identity which brackets away the "Greek" component on/y because it is taken for 
granted. Hence, even though the numbers of Greek-Cypriots feeling only or mostly 
Cypriot seem to be growing, this does not necessarily mean ethno-nationalism is fading 
away - and this explains why the desire for incorporating the Turkish-Cypriots into a 
new power-sharing regime is actually weakening. 
Indeed, a comparison of national identifications between 2000 and 2006 shows that 
even in this short period, there was a further increase in the numbers of those 
stressing the Cypriot component of their identities: 
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^ 3 ES 
MORE CYPRIOT THAN E OU AU. Y CYPRIOT 
GREEK AND GREEK 
MORE GREEK THAN 
CYPRIOT 
CANNOT DECIDE 
2000 n n 
Cypriot 46.8 54.2 
More Cypriot than Greek 9.9 7.9 
Equally Cypriot and Greek 35.4 31.8 
More Greek than Cypriot 2.5 2.2 
Greek 4.5 2.9 
Cannot decide 0.8 0.9 
Figure and Table 6.6: National identity of Greek-Cypriots in 2000 and 2006. 
Interestingly, the larger increase is of those who identified with the category "Cypriot" 
only (from 47% in 2000 to 54% in 2006). Also significant is the further réduction of 
those feeling only "Greek" (from the already low 4.5% to the even lower 2.9%). 
Let us now turn to the great issue of Cyprus - the Cyprus Problem and its resolution, 
and of how the two communities feel towards co-habitation. To be sure, it is a fact 
that very few Greek-Cypriots would stili wish for union with Greece. Let us compare 
how the numbers of those opting for such an outcome have dramatically declined over 
the years. In 1965, Stanley Kyriakides carried out a survey among the Greek-Cypriots 
and, among other matters, inquired as to what they considered as "the most realistic 
solution" to the Cyprus Problem. At the time, approximately 41% indicated 
Independence, 18% Enosis, and 31% self-determination.109 When the question 
changed to what they "ideally" considered as "the most justifiable" solution, 
percentages changed to 30% for Independence, 53% for Enosis and 16% for self-
determination.110 Thus enosis was by far what the majority stili preferred - even only 
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as an ideal. Thirty-fìve years later (2000), when we inquired as to what solution 
respondents would have preferred had the Turkish invasion not taken place, a large 
majority of 78% indicated Independence and 16% Enosis. Since our question more or 
less corresponded to an "ideal" situation, it is obvious that Enosis was down from 53% 
in 1965 to only 16% in 2006.111 
Back in the mid-'ôOs, it appeared that enosis was more favoured by rural (61%) than 
urban (42.5%) dwellers, and by those more educated (60% college graduâtes, as 
against the 53% mean from other educational catégories). In 2000, there was no 
significant variation between rural and urban dwellers, and only a small over-
representation of university graduâtes (18% compared to the mean 16%). The 
characteristic which exhibited impressive différences was party affiliation: Whereas a 
large proportion of DISY respondents chose Enosis (36%) over Independence (59%), 
only 3% of AKEL which exhibited impressive différences respondents, 6% of EDEK, and 
8.5% of DIKO showed a préférence for Enosis (as against 95%, 91% and 84%, 
respectively, who vouched for Independence).112 
INDEPENDENT STATE UNION WITH GREECE CANNOT DECIDE 
|BAKEL BEDEK ODIKO BDISY I 
• • • • * > ) Independent state Union with Greece Cannot decide 
AKEL 95.1 
EDEK 59.3 35.9 4.9 
DIKO 83.7 8.5 7.8 
DISY 90.7 5.6 3.7 
Figure and Table 6.7: Type of solution to the Cyprus Problem by party affiliation 
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When préférence for enosis was correlateci with national identity we found similar large 
différences, so that those considering themselves "Greek" or "More Greek than Cypriot" 
opted for Enosis by 56% and 67%, respectively, and those feeling "Cypriot" or "More 
Cypriot than Greek" by only 5% and 6%, respectively. 
100% 
INDEPENDENT STATE UNION WITH GREECE CANNOT DECIDE 
ICYPRIOT DMORE CYPRIOT DTHE SAME «MORE GREEK BGREEK 
• • ^ • R o / o ) Cypriot More Cypriot The sa m e More Greek Greek 
Independent state 91.0 92.5 70.7 29.6 41.7 
Union with Greece 5.2 5.7 23.0 66.7 56.3 
Ca n not decide 3.8 1.9 6.3 3.7 2.1 
Figure and Table 6.8: Préférable settlement in case there was no Turkish occupation by 
collective identity. 
But does rejection of the age-old dream of enosis and a préférence for Independence 
mean that the Greek-Cypriots are ready to take the next step, to move towards 
fédération? Before addressing this question directly, we had to deal with a preliminary 
concern, namely that understanding how a future federai system would work is not 
easy, especially for people who have grown up in a unitary politicai system, like 
Cypriots. It would be difficult to comprehend how self-rule can be combined with 
shared-rule - how the centre can, in some matters, have a say in what happens in the 
constituent parts, and yet the latter to be largely free to take their own décisions in 
many other matters. It would be even more difficult for ordinary Citizens to 
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understand the differences between federations and confederations, how the United 
States, Swiss and Belgian models work, and so on. In order to ensure that these 
complexities did not interfere with our results (so that respondents would be choosing 
options without understanding their meaning, simply because their party took a certain 
stand), we began our survey with the simple question of the type of relationship 
respondents would like to have with the Turkish-Cypriots - whether they wished to live 
"as separately as possible", as "together/near as possible", or somewhere in-between. 
The fìndings of the first survey, in 2000, were extremely interesting: 
S E P A R A T E L Y T O G E T H E R N E I T H E R S E P A R A T E L Y N O R T O G E T H E R 
[ • C Y P R I O T O M O R E C Y P R I O T O T H E S A M E D M O R E G R E E K B G R E E K 
Cypriot More Cypriot The sa me More Greek Greek 
Separately 22.6 19.8 22.3 33.3 35.4 
Together 34.2 23.6 22.3 14.8 14.6 
Neither separately 
nor together 
43.2 56.6 55.4 51.9 50.0 
Figure and Table 6.9: Desirable relationship with the Turkish-Cypriots 
Two conclusions transpire from the above: First, that those who feel "Cypriot" (only or 
mostly) are much more ready to live in dose integration with Turkish-Cypriots (58%), 
whereas those who feel (only or mostly) "Greek" prefer to be as separate as possible 
to the other community (69%) - indeed, the reverse symmetry in replies is quite 
impressive! Yet, considering that Greek-Cypriots have been arguing all along that there 
is little that separates them from the Turkish-Cypriots, one would expect that the 
choice of living separately would have had few adherents - and yet it received equal 
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Support to Irving closely together. The second, even more signifìcant, observation is 
how the majority said they wish to be somewhere in-between, not to be too far or too 
near to the other community. Choosing the in-between option indicates an uncertainty 
as to how to relate to the Other, whether to shift to complete distance or to doser 
integration. Again, considering that ever since 1974 the officiai Greek-Cypriot positions 
have revolved around the re-union and re-integration of the island, the respondents' 
Nn-between' préférence is surprising. Unless they saw the 'in-between' option as 
precisely what fédérations are ali about: Federalism has, after ali, been described as 
"the constitutional combination of self-rule and shared-rule", or as "keeping together 
by staying apart", as "autonomy with unity", and so on. Is this what respondents were 
hinting at? Not necessarily: There could have been other reasons why Greek-Cypriots 
were not so keen of integrating "as closely together as possible" with Turkish-Cypriots. 
An important due came from questions concerning the prévalent stereotypes of the 
ethnie Other. When respondents were asked to evaluate their own and the other 
community on the basis of ten features, half of which were positive and half negative, 
these were the rankings which emerged: 
Evaluations of Evaluations of 
Turkish-Cypriots Greek-Cypriots 
1 Lazy Hospitable 
2 Backward Civilized 
3 Dirty Honourable 
Intelligent 
4 Shifty (deceitful) 
5 Barbarous Honest 
6 Hospitable Shifty 
7 Honourable Lazy 
8 Honest Dirty 
9 Intelligent Backward 
10 Cultured Barbarous 
Figure 6.10: Ranking of Greek-Cypriot stereotypes re. Turkish- and Greek- Cypriots. 
What is striking is that the first five adjectives Greek-Cypriots chose to characterize 
Turkish-Cypriots are ali negative, whereas the respective characterizations of their own 
co-nationals are ali positive113. 
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But what, if any, is the signifìcance of thèse stereotypes to our overall arguments? 
Early views of stereotypes saw them as exaggerated beliefs about particular catégories 
or groups of people (for example, "black people are lazy"), which many saw as 
embodying "a kernel of truth". The cause of stereotypes was regarded to be individuai 
mîsinformation, irrational judgment or even psychopathological préjudice.114 The social 
Cognition perspective saw stereotypes not as pathological Symptoms but as normal 
features of individuate' cognitive processes, deriving from the need to impose order in 
a chaotic world, through classification and categorization.115 Social identity theory 
shifted attention from individuai views or attitudes to inter-group dynamics and 
comparative judgments ("they are x because they are différent to us who are y"). 1 1 6 
More recent sociologica! analyses have shifted explanation even further, to emphasize 
the historical, cultural and ideological dimensions of stereotypes. Hence, they are now 
seen as éléments of broad cultural practices and processes which carry with them 
specific ideological values and beliefs.117 It follows that stereotypes regarding Turkish-
Cypriots should not be seen as necessarily relating to actual characteristics Turkish-
Cypriots may have, nor to mistaken, misinformed or pathological views of individuai 
Greek-Cypriot beholders. They should rather be seen to relate to widespread and 
generally accepted préjudices that have become "common-sense" views among Greek-
Cypriots, as a resuit of the historical development of ethno-nationalist ideas and 
idéologies, as outlined in this thesis.118 National stereotypes turn cultural 
characteristics into natural, fìxed, or "fossilized" givens, and remain fairly stable over 
long periods of time. One of their main functions is to secure social closure, to 
maintain the boundaries between 'us' and 'them', to counterpose Greek-Cypriot 
superiority to Turkish-Cypriot inferiority, Greek-Cypriot modernity to Turkish-Cypriot 
backwardness, and so on. Each of the two différent cultures is seen to be "singular, 
unified and integrated", and this obscures intra-communal différences among 
individuals or groups, as well as inter-communal links and similaritîes.119 
But how widespread are negative stereotypes regarding Turkish-Cypriots? Could it be 
that thèse negative stereotypes are held only by some Greek-Cypriots, those with the 
'harder' nationalist views? The data disconfirm such an assumption. When we 
examined how the rankings were made by the différent sub-categories of Greek-
Cypriots (for instance, by politicai party, national identity), there was an impressive 
consistency as to the negative évaluations of Turkish-Cypriots, the only différence 
being the precise order of the negative stereotypes and the intensity with whîch thèse 
were assigned. Figure 6.11 shows how the views of individuals with a différent (a) 
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party political affiliation and/or (b) national identity, varied; in ail cases, the 'peak' of 
the curves indicates concurrence on the prédominance of négative traits, whereas the 
lowest points of the curves indicate consensus on the lack of thèse more positive traits 
among Turkish-Cypriots. 
25% 
BACKWARD INTELLIGENT BARBAROOS 
• A K E L EDEK •DIKO •DISY 
AKEL 
Honest 6.6 7.1 3.4 2.8 4.6 
Lazy 17.8 16.2 18.9 19.4 18.5 
Honourable 5.5 5.8 2.3 2.8 3.9 
Dirty 15.2 14.3 18.6 15.3 15.7 
Hospitable 10.5 9.7 7.7 5.7 8.0 
Shifty 12.2 13.6 15.1 15.2 13.9 
Civilized 1.8 1.9 1.1 1.7 1.7 
Backward 17.0 18.8 19.7 19.6 18.6 
Intelligent 3.7 5.2 3.4 2.9 3.4 
Barbarous 9.7 7.1 9.7 14.7 11.6 
Figure and Table 6.11: Stéréotypes of Turkish-Cypriots by party affiliation 
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25% 
HOMO m/m i BACKWARD INTELLIGENT BARBAROOS 
CYPRIOT MORE CYPRIOT 'THE SAME " MORE GREEK 1 •GREEKj 
Cypriot More Cypriot The same More Greek Greek 
1 Honest 4.9 3.0 5.2 0.0 5.1 
1 Lazy 1 18.9 18.1 16.9 22.7 18.4 
1 Honourable 4.2 3.7 4.7 1.3 3.7 
Dirty 16.7 15.6 14.3 18.7 14.0 
1 Hospitable 8.3 8.5 7.8 4.0 6.6 
Shifty 13.5 15.6 14.3 14.7 14.7 
Gvilized 1.9 3.0 1.6 0.0 2.9 
Backward 17.2 20.0 19.9 22.7 17.6 
Intelligent 2.9 3.0 4.7 1.3 2.9 
Barbarous 11.4 9.6 10.7 14.7 14.0 
Figure and Table 6.12: Stereotypes of Turkish-Cypriots by collective identity 
What thus transpires is how dose the views of the different sub-categories of Greek-
Cypriots are when it comes to negative evaluations or stereotypes of Turkish-Cypriots. 
Equally impressive is how their views are again very dose when they concern positive 
evaluations or stereotypes of themselves - their own imagined Community. 
Having noted thèse observations, the ground is now more ready to examine Greek-
Cypriot attitudes towards fédération. When, in 2000, we asked our sample more 
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specificala about their preferred politicai regime for a solution, the responses were as 
follows: 
100% Y 
9 0 % - * 
8 0 % - S 
U N I T A R Y S T A T E F E D E R A T I O N C O N F E D E R A T I O N T W O S E P A R A T E S T A T E S C A N N O T D E C I D E 
[ • C Y P R I O T D M O R E C Y P R I O T O T H E S A M E B M O R E G R E E K « G R E E K I 
Cypriot More Cypriot | The sartie More G reek Greek 
Unitary state 45.6 60.4 51.1 46.8 46.8 
Fédération 24.4 17.0 28.8 27.7 27.7 
Confédération 2.4 3.8 2.4 0.0 0.0 
Two separate states 14.2 4.7 7.9 14.9 14.9 
Cannot decide 13.4 14.2 9.8 10.6 10.6 
Figure and Table 6.13: Type of solution to the Cyprus Problem by collective identity 
(2000) 
Despite the Greek-Cypriot officiai backing of a fédéral solution to the Cyprus Problem, 
the majority of citizens expressed a strong préférence for a unitary state. A fédéral 
régime was only the second-best solution, chosen by approximately half the numbers 
of those opting for a unitary state. This applies across the spectrum of national 
identity, political affiliation, or other characteristics. This was how Greek-Cypriots felt 
in the year 2000 - the very year that the U.N. Secretary-General submitted his first 
thoughts on the resolution of the Cyprus Problem.120 
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In 2006, two years after the Greek-Cypriots rejected the Annan Plan, we re-visited the 
issue of preferred politicai regime. The fìndings are counterposed to those of 2000 for 
the sake of easier comparisons: 
• C Y P R I O T D M O R E C Y P R I O T O T H E S A M E B M O R E G R E E K B G R E E K 
Unitary state 2000 
Cypriot 
45,6 
More Cypriot The sa me 
60,4 51,1 
More Greek 
37,0 
Greek 
46,8 
2006 18,1 26,1 26,0 38,5 62,5 
Federation 2000 24,4 17,0 28,8 33,3 27,7 
2006 18.8 21,7 18,8 7,7 0,0 
Confederation 2000 2,4 3,8 2,4 0,0 0,0 
2006 3,9 2,2 6,1 0,0 6,3 
Two separate 
states 
2000 14,2 4,7 7,9 18,5 14,9 
2006 17,8 10,9 17,7 7,7 12,5 
Cannot 
decide 
2000 13,4 14,2 9,8 11,1 10,6 
2006 41,4 39,1 31,5 46,2 18,8 
Figure and Table 6.14: Type of solution to the Cyprus problem by collective identity: 
2000 compared with 2006. 
The emerging pattern is certainly more diverse and uncertain. The first preference 
among the various options was still the unitary state (down from mean support of 50% 
in 2000, to 27% in 2006), but now it was chosen primarily by those feeling more 
'Greek', whereas all others seemed more hesitant. Support for federation had similarly 
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dropped across the board (from 25% in 2000, to 13% in 2006), but primarily for the 
Hellenocentrists. But the response for which the majority of Greek-Cypriots opted for 
was the "don't know"/"cannot decide" one (up from 12% in 2000, to 40% in 2006) -
indicating that respondents were obviously unhappy and/or unclear about all options. 
This pattern of uncertainty and indécision obviously relates to what happened after the 
2004 referendum: Whereas the Greek-Cypriots were hoping that joining the European 
Union would strengthen their bargaining position, they soon found out that things did 
not unfold as they expected, for their Vesounding No' had a boomerang effect, 
alienating the UN, the European Union, and the international community more 
generally, who now became more sympathetic to the Turkish-Cypriots and Turkey 
(seen to have tried hard for a solution, unlike the Greek-Cypriots). In fact, a few 
months after accession (December 2004), the EU decided to open up accession 
negotiations with Turkey (a country the Greek-Cypriots held responsible for their 
plight, and for consistently violating human rights and démocratie principles - thus 
unworthy of being an EU member state). The tragic irony was that, despite how they 
felt, they realized that even though they were now members of the EU, they did not 
have the power to stop/veto the disputed décision. Yet, disappointment with the turn 
of things after the referendum and accession did not mean they regreted their 
negative vote for the Annan Plan: In fact, as our survey reveals, préférence for 
federation as a solution dropped drastically between 2000 and 2006. What Greek-
Cypriots came to be convinced of was that Papadopoulos' handling of the 'No' vote had 
alienated the international community; furthermore, the view gradually prevailed that 
Papadopoulos was not Willing to try hard enough to regain the trust of Turkish-
Cypriots, so that new efforts for a solution would start. Meanwhile, the Turkish-
Cypriots had started construction works on land which had so far been left untouched, 
to return to Greek-Cypriots after a solution. The European Union and other Western 
powers started pushing for "ending Turkish-Cypriots' isolation". AH thèse negative 
developments switched support away from Papadopoulos. In the Presidential élections 
of 2008, Demetris Christofias, leader of AKEL, managed to come to power after a 
campaign which stressed his modération, his acceptability to the international 
community, but primarily his better relationship with the Turkish-Cypriots with whom a 
solution had to be re-negotiated. But for Christofias' positions to appear more 
mairistream, he had to adopt an even harder stand as regards the solution to the 
Cyprus Problem: Whereas at the time of the referendum, AKEL's position was that with 
some minor amendments, especially on security issues, it would accept the Annan 
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Plan, it now considérée! the Plan as just a basis for future negotiations, which could not 
be ignored, but which had to be fundamentally altered before the Greek-Cypriots could 
accept it. Such a position was a good enough compromise to win the consent of 
enough Greek-Cypriots to bring Christofìas to power: But the issue remained as to 
whether this could be the basis of gaining the Turkish-Cypriots' consent, so as to lead 
to a new bi-communal national compromise.121 
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Chapter 7 Conclusion: A post-national future? 
This thesis has aimed to make a contribution to the study of Greek-Cypriot nationalism 
through tracing its genesis, the main stages of its diachronic development, and the 
ensuing identifications with nation and state. In this concluding section, an attempt 
will be made to draw the major threads of the historical narrative together, and carry 
on to consider the implications of the main findings as regards the future of 
nationalism in Cyprus, as well as of the prospects of success in the forging of a 
common federai national state, in the new context provided by membership in the 
European Union. 
The growth of ethno-nationalism and social closure along ethnie Unes 
Let us start by highlighting the main landmarks in the trajectory of Greek-Cypriot 
nationalism, noting how the présent thesis differs from previous 'mainstream', as well 
as Yeformist' accounts.1 In the early part of the historical analysis, we saw that the 
Greek nation and nationalism cannot be traced back to ancient times, as primordialists 
and nationalists routinely assume. But Greek culture, with local adaptations, and a 
"Cypriote Greek identity"2 did develop, serving as Connecting links to the rest of the 
Greek cultural world. Düring Byzantine and Medieval times, Orthodox Christianity 
became anothèr sträng cultural élément of Cypriot identity, and the Orthodox Church 
grew as an important, autonomous institution around which the locals rallied, and 
through which they differentiated themselves as against their European rulers (Franks 
and Venetians). Although proto-nationalism seems to have been a feature of the last 
years of the Byzantine Empire, it had little impact in Cyprus; yet a definite concern with 
Greek culture and the local dialect did seem to characterize the Orthodox elite, along 
with an attachment to the Orthodox religion and Church. Orthodoxy was certainly the 
main source of identification of the lower classes as against their Latin/European 
masters, whose exploitative feudal rule they detested, to the extent that they 
considered the coming of the Ottomans as a form of libération. 
Mainstream Greek-Cypriot historiography présents Ottoman aile as Cyprus' "dark 
âges", characterized by enslavement, exploitation and oppression. Turkish-Cypriot 
officiai historiography portrays this period as one of relative peace and prosperity, 
marked by the regime's toleration, which "enabled the Muslim Turkish and Christian 
communities to live in harmony and equality together".3 In our account, we 
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differentiated between the various stages of Ottoman rule, the valiance of the empire 
in the différent stages, and the conséquences on its subjects. Early Ottoman rule 
brought an initial improvement in the lot of the peasant masses, as regards economie 
conditions and the abolition of feudal serfdom; even more important was the new 
prominence the Orthodox Church acquired, which gradually managed to amass great 
wealth, and to assume a vital administrative and politicai role, as the représentative of 
the Orthodox Christians of the island, protecting the surplus-yielding peasants from the 
rapacity of locai Muslim governors and officiais. But the Ottoman conquest of Cyprus 
carne towards the end of the empire's golden era of ascent: The onset of its decline 
was associated with the end of further expansion, leading to the decay of the timar 
system and the shift to a market economy, which led to mounting pressures on the 
peasants - and, henee, to the increasing importance of the Cypriot Church. Parallel to 
these developments was the rise of the Greek Balkan Orthodox merchants, who were 
to become catalysts in the formation of national states in south-east Europe. The 
merchants played a key role in the spread of Greek diaspora communities (paroikies) 
ali over Europe, where the Greeks carne into contact with Western ideas. 
Religious Orthodox consciousness was to gradually evolve into Greek ethnie 
consciousness due to a number of reasons - such as the use of Greek by the Church, 
the early development of Greek printing in Europe, the establishment of Greek by the 
Balkan merchants as the main Balkan language of commerce and culture, and the 
adoption of secular Enlightenment ideas by the Greek or Grecophone Orthodox 
merchants and logioi; these ideas were to form the basis of libération plans in Ottoman 
controlied lands. 4 The Ottoman central authorities tried to forestali subversive 
developments through a number of reforms and the cultivation of Ottomanism as an 
over-laying identity, linking the religious communities comprising the empire into a 
modem multi-national state. But this effort at forging a new social compromise failed 
because the millets were already being transformed along ethnie lines. Mainstream 
historiography portrays the Orthodox Church as the depository of national identity and 
culture and, henee, the stalwart of nationalist initiatives; in fact, the Orthodox Church 
hierarchy, being closely connected to the Ottoman ruling establishment, showed 
préférence for a transformed Ottoman empire under Greek hegemony (a resurrected 
Byzantium), rather than the formation of nation-states, which were associated with 
secular ideas. The création of the Greek state and its related organisations (such as 
the various literary associations), were to give a boost to the spread of nationalist 
ideas - in the context of the Megali Idea irredentist ideology. Furthermore, the 
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création of the Greek national church was to put religion in the service of the nation-
state, and national ideas would no longer seem to antagonize religious ones,5 removing 
a further hurdle from nation building. In Cyprus, there was little revolutionary agitation 
but, during the nineteenth Century, religious consciousness was steadily being 
transformed into ethnie consciousness; the key carriers of nationalst ideas were 
Cypriot and Greek merchants and logioi, who were a part of, or closely connected with, 
the paroikies and Greece. 
By the time the British arrived in Cyprus, ethnie feelings and ideas were already in 
place. Contrary to extreme modernist positions, which portray Greek-Cypriot 
nationalism as an export of the Greek state, or as a product of British colonial polïcies, 
the nationally inspired world-view had already taken root and played a determining 
role, acting "as switchmen in defining the pathways along which the dynamics of 
[material and ideal] ¡nterests",6 relating to nationalism, were to move. The British 
viewed Cypriot society as "plural", in Furnival's sensé of being already "deeply divided" 
along ethno-communal lines; they furthered the politieization of ethnicity by 
institutionalizing communal représentation in the Legislative Council, as well as in other 
représentative bodies, including the Boards of Education. Their attempt to foster an 
overarching identity, which would contribute to the doser unity between the two 
communities, came too late and offered too little, as it became obvious that it was not 
really meant to serve the local people but British imperialist objectives instead (to 
check the rising tide of Greek-Cypriot nationalism, and foster loyalty to the empire). 
The communist party's internationalism constituted one of the few attempts to 
question enosis and to push for cross-ethnîc coopération in fighting imperialîsm and 
capîtalism, but the nationalist "desire" {pothos) was well entrenched by this time (mid-
1920/s, late 1930's), and the communists too weak to make an impact. The successor 
party, AKEL, in the post-WWII period, maintained the aim of bi-communal coopération, 
but adopted enosism, which placed it in the mainstream of'Greek Cypriot politics but 
was to, ultimately, limit its influence wîthin the Turkish Cypriot community. Yet the 
Leffs more strategie and instrumentalist stand as regards enosis, its stress on the need 
for unity of ail Cypriot people (laos), as against the externat oppressor, and its concern 
with economie, social and civic issues, were to differentiate its own version of 
nationalism from that of the Right and the ethnarchy (a more conservative, ethnie 
version). The alignment of the Church with the Right, the British handling of the 
Diaskeptiki, and the Leffs own weaknesses were to tilt the balance of power in the 
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Right's favour; the monopolization of the armed anti-colonial struggle by the Right was 
to further marginalize the Left The similar exclusion of the Turklsh Cypriots and the 
British resort to renewed divide-and-rule policies, as well as their involving Turkey in 
Cyprus' affairs, were to turn ethnie différences into deep inter-communal division and 
conflict, which led to independence as a way-out solution. 
The 1959 Zürich-London agreements did not constitute a real social compromise 
between the two communities - they were mostly an unwanted compromise into which 
the Greek-Cypriots were pushed so as to avoid a worse evil (namely, double self-
determination, leading to partition). But almost none of the ingrédients required for a 
consociational regime were there, so the bi-communal arrangement collapsed three 
years after it was put together. After flirting with enosis again for four years (1964-
68), and ascertaining the high costs involved in its implementation, Makarios turned to 
the policy of the feasibie - aimed at consolidating independence, while eliminating or 
minimizing the powers of the Turkish Cypriots (turning them from equal partners in the 
1960 consociational state, to a minority community within a majoritarian démocratie 
regime). But this new social compromise needed the consent of both the Greek 
Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots, as well as that of other 'interested parties'. As we 
have seen, the insistence of a group of Greek Cypriots on enosis and their resort to 
violent means, in collusion with the Greek "national centre", was to lead to the coup -
and the latter was to encourage, in turn, Turkey's military intervention. 
After the 1974 debacle, the enosis dream had to be buried for good and there was a 
"turn to Cyprus" - to whatever united the Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots and could, thus, 
re-unite the country. But Turkish-Cypriots were unwilling to return to a meanwhile 
(since 1964) Hellenized Republic of Cyprus. The ascendance of Cyprocentrism, the 
impasse of negotiations towards a solution, renewed relations with a now démocratie 
and more nationally assertive Greece, and the impact of globalization, would lead to 
the rise of neo-nationalîsm and the return of the Right, now stressing hellenic culture 
and identity as 'means of résistance', as well as the importance of Greece as the only 
real guarantor of the security of the Greek-Cypriots. Meanwhile, a new national 
compromise based on federalist principles proved impossible to achieve: The Turkish-
Cypriots were keen on retaining as much autonomy as possible, so their version of a 
solution was more of a confédération, the loose union of two equal and sovereign 
communities; the Greek-Cypriots argued instead for a fédération with a strong central 
government, which would concede a measure of autonomy to the constituent states 
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but would also ensure the unifying rôle of the federai state, averting the risk of 
sécession and partition. Intra-group différences within each community made a 
possible compromise even harder to reach, the staunen nationalists on both sides 
rejecting power-sharing arrangements and pressing instead for alternatives in which 
their own community would maintain the upper hand (hard-line Greek-Cypriots 
pushing for a majorîtarian unitary state with minority rights for Turkish-Cypriots; and 
hard-line Turkish-Cypriots pushing for two separate, equal and sovereign states). 
Yet there was a différence as to how the two communities were developing internally, 
brought to the surface by the 2004 referendum. On the Greek-Cypriot side, a new 
social compromise had been gradually forged around the mono-communal Republic of 
Cyprus. Although commanding few loyalties prior to 1974, the Republic had its own 
dead heroes in the 74 clashes during the coup and the invasion; it had played a key 
rôle in the reconstruction of the country and had managed to retain international 
politicai récognition; the economy thrived and the standard of living came to 
approximate that of the most advanced states of the West; welfare provisions were 
improving, Converting the Republic into a real community of solidarity; the politicai 
domain had grown to be independent of outside patrons and influence, politicai parties 
had matured and now represented ali shades of opinion, and state power changed 
hands regularly and peacefully. The only problem related to military closure, since 
Turkey's might forced the Republic to be dépendent on Greece's support to enhance its 
defensive capabilities - but the imminent accession to the European Union was to solve 
this problem too, since it would make Cyprus part of a much stronger 'security 
community', affording multiple types of protection to its members. The Greek-Cypriots 
proved unwilling to sacrifice all this for a federai scheme which seemed to risk a return 
to uncertainty and which, in case of failure, would have left them 'homeless'. On the 
Turkish-Cypriot side, a similar social compromise had not developed around their 
"state" (TRNC had not managed to gain international récognition, and its economy, 
safety and politicai life depended heavily on Turkey). These considérations go a long 
way in accounting for the differing responses of the two communities in the 2004 
referendum. 
Identifying with State and/or Nation: A cross-country comparison 
In the introductory chapter we noted a constant tension between nation and state in 
the constitution of modem national states and, subsequently, we saw how this tension 
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affected the formation of Greek-Cypriot national identities. How does the Cypriot case 
compare with other countries characterized by a similar tension between nation and 
state, leading to the formation of dual identities? To undertake such a comparison, we 
would need to be aware of the basic socio-historical background of each country, for, 
as Stuart Hall underlines: "Cultural identities corne from somewhere, they have 
histories. But like everything which is historical, they undergo constant transformation. 
Far from being eternally fixed in some essentialised past, they are subject to the 
continuous 'play' of history, culture and power".7 
The Greek-Cypriot case can be compared with other dual-identity countries, such as 
Scotland, Wales, Catalonia and Éuscadi, using data from various surveys that have 
utilized the Moreno scale as their basis. In each case, différent processes of social 
closure and national compromise have led to unique "routes" to national state 
formation and have had a formative influence in the construction of natjonal identities. 
rscot-a 
m m S O M 1 (M) 
1. Scottish/Welsh/English/ 
Catalan /Basque/Greek (x) 
23 13 8 20 31 5 
2. More x than British/ Spanish / 
Cypriot 
38 29 16 16 14 3 
3. Equally x and British/ Spanish/ 
Cypriot 
27 26 46 35 33 35 
4. More British/Spanish/Cypriot 
than x 
4 10 15 5 8 10 
5. British/Spanish/Cypriot 4 5 9 23 14 47 
Table 7.1:8 National identity in Scotland, Wales, England, Catalonia, Éuscadi and 
Cyprus. 
Consider first the case of Britain: As Linda Coley's work demonstrates Britain was 
formed through the union of England, Scotland and Wales, national identity being 
forged through wars against France and Catholic Europe.9 Britishness "sat lightly" on 
top of the constituent nations, which maintained various degrees of autonomy, 
depending on their relative strength at the time of joining. The Scots were an integral 
part of British imperial expansion, and the early modernization of their economy 
enabled them to reap the benefìts of the large international market established by the 
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empire. The Act of Union preserved the institutions of Kirk (Scottish Church), 
education, and the legal system, which contributed to the maintenance of a distinct 
Scottish identity. From the 1960's onwards, the impact from the decline of empire, 
including the economic crisis and large-scale unemployment, led to a loss of faith in 
British institutions. After the discovery of North Sea oil in the mid-'60s, the nationalist 
demand for greater autonomy gained new momentum. These socio-historie 
developments account for the increasing identification of the Scots with Scotland, as 
against Britain (see table 7.1). 
Whereas Scotland joined the Union at a time of relative strength (following its 
successful wars of independence against England), which put it in a position to better 
negotiate the terms of incorporation,10 Wales was conquered by England early on and 
could not, therefore, push for much autonomy - henee, its more mild assertion of 
national identity. England, as the strongest nation, identified more closely with the 
'centre' and thus had no reason to develop a sepárate identity to Britain - which 
accounts for the lack of English nationalism and of a strong sense of "Englishness".11 
It is interesting that a very large percentage of respondents (46% in the table above) 
identified with the option "Equally English and British", obviously because for them 
Britishness already incorporates Englishness, so that they do not feel a contradiction 
between the two parts of their identity (as Scots and Welshmen seem to do). 
The case of Spain in equally illuminating. Catalonia had a long history of autonomy 
and enjoyed its own political institutions, law and culture, until the early eighteenth 
century, when it was forcefully integrated within Spain.12 As part of the Spanish 
empire, it initially benefited from the unión, but with the crumbling of the ¡mperium, 
dissatisfaction set in. Despite incorporation, Catalonia managed to build a strong 
economy and, by the nineteenth century, it transformed itself into an industrial society, 
much like other advanced Western European countries, while the rest of Spain (except 
the Basque country) remained poor and underdeveloped. Discontent also related to 
the weak representaron of the Catalán élite in the central state. But its strong culture 
helped Catalonia to both survive and to maintain non-violent pressure for autonomy, 
until its demands were heeded with the foundation of the Second Republic. These 
early successes may explain its "more relaxed contemporary stance" as regards issues 
of national identity.13 
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The incorporation of Euskadî was not as successful: Basque culture was highly 
fragmented, and this resulted in cultural assimilation by the centre. In a sensé, 
nationalist violence acted as the necessary 'cernent', in place of the non-exîstent 
common identity; state repression further bolstered the sensé of unity. More recently, 
autonomy concessions have ameliorated tensions, but the weakness of Euskadi's 
culture tends to encourage sporadic outbursts of violence by extremists, as an 
alternative means of achieving nationalist cohésion.14 Thîs background explains its 
weaker identification with the centre, and the stronger identification with local culture, 
than the case of Catalonia. Finally, in both Euscadi and Catalonia, high immigration 
rates may partly explain why substantial minorities in both seem to view themselves as 
"Spanish" (rather than as Basques or Catalans) - as compared to the respective low 
percentages in the U.K. who view themselves as solely or primarily British. 
The case of Cyprus is, in many ways, the opposite of the previous cases considered. 
The coming of modernity found Cyprus a colony of the British empire - and not a part 
of the ruling nation. Greek national identity kept growîng in strength throughout 
British rule; but unlike Catalonia and Scotland, where the strong culture was used as 
the means of résistance in pressing for autonomy, rendering the resort to violence 
unnecessary, in Cyprus, Greek culture became the basis of the irredentist movement 
for enosis._ British polîcies, Greek-Cypriot internal divisions, and the existence of 
another ethno-national community wîth antagoniste goals, ail played a role in the 
Greek-Cypriots' eventual resort to violence, which led to the 1960 consociatîonal 
Republic of Cyprus. After the 1963 events, Greek-Cyphots found themselves in charge 
of the now mono-communal Republic, so feelings of identity with the state and Cyprus 
started gaining ground; the Greek staged coup and Turkish invasion of 74 brought the 
death of enosis, so identifications with the nation lost further ground, as against the 
strengthening of a Cypriot identity. In many ways the case of Cyprus resembles more 
that of England, where there is low identification with the (English) nation, and a 
strong identification with the centre/state, simply because the English dominate the 
state - or the state bears a vivid English impress. Similarly, Greek-Cypriots nowadays 
identity more strongly with the Republic because they have its total control. One may 
speculate that if in the future they were once again to share a federai state with the 
Turkish-Cypriots, Greek national identity would regain strength. 
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Nationalem, federallsm and the European Union 
The perspective of social closure utilized In this study has proven fruitful in examining 
the diachronic development of nationalism and national-state formation in Cyprus. Can 
it tell us anything useful about the future - and especially of the prospects of a federal 
solution to the Cyprus Problem, within the context of the European Union? 
Students of federalism have pointed out a number of conditions, contributing to the 
success of federai arrangements. These include, among others: A homogeneous 
population (sharing a common culture or nationality); a multiple balance of powers 
(the smaller the number of partners, the more difficult co-habitation becomes, bi-
polarity being the worse possible scenario); the existence of cross-cutting cleavages; 
the présence of a unifying over-arching identity, or loyalty to the whole, beyond 
commitment to the constituent parts; common interests (such as fìnancial, or 
defensive) for binding the parts together; common external threats; availability of the 
necessary resources to cover increased costs (catering for the duplication of services 
at the federai and constituent levéis); and the existence of a "federai culture" or 
"federai spirit", based on a tradition of tolérance, self-restraint and co-operation, which 
is necessary for counterbalancîng other more negative features (such as ethnie 
heterogeneity).15 Many of these factors are the same as those cited as prerequisites of 
successful consociational régimes, which have been examined in chapter five, where 
we noted their near total absence in Cyprus, leading to the collapse of the 1960 
consociational partnership. Most, if not all, of these pre-conditions are still absent in 
contemporary Cyprus, and it seems there is little the Cypriots can do - the population 
is heterogeneous; bi-polarity is a fact; cleavages are cumulative rather than cross-
cutting; there are no common external threats; Cypriotness as an over-arching identity 
is quite feeble; and the 'federai spirit' is hardly présent. 
One approach for improving the chances of success of a federai regime in Cyprus is to 
advócate the adoption of some of the features of other successful fédérations, in the 
hope that these would help overeóme difficulties with a solution in Cyprus. As noted in 
chapter six, this was the logie behind some of the main provisions of the Annan Plan, 
which were based on the Swiss model: Switzerland was judged to be a good example 
of the application of federai and consociational principies, building on the "grand 
coalition" of the French, German and Italian elite, and their impecable inter-ethnic 
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coopération (involving, for instance, a rotating presidency, and minority vetoes, which 
the Annan Plan adopted). 
The problem, however, is that the Swiss (con)federation cannot serve as a good model 
for Cyprus precisely because it is not based on ethnie or national différences, as many 
seem to belieye. Wimmer16 proposes that this is because in the early, formative stage 
of the development of the Swiss national state (in the late seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries), civil society, for various historical reasons, grew impressively strong, 
allowing pre-state politicai élites to mobilize politicai support, without having to resort 
to their ethnie constituencies. Civil society organizations were nationally constituted, 
since they included members from the various cantons, religions and languages; they 
consciously rotated their meeting places in différent parts of the country every year, 
and most rotated their presidency, so as to stress their national status. A strong 
ideology of Helvetism developed, which was distinctly republican, underlining equality 
before the law, citizenship and patriotism. Membership in the nation was not defined 
according to linguistic or ethnie criteria, but on the basis of belonging to a progressive 
community which was fighting against reactionary feudal enemies surrounding the 
country. Hence, trans-ethnic élites developed deep bonds and, when they came to 
found the modem national state, in 1848, they did not have to rely on their ethno-
linguistic communities for support, but on nationally organized politicai movements 
whose organizational backbones were the various civil society associations. Hence, 
cleavages never crystallized along ethnie or language bonds but around other criteria, 
such as religion (which set religious citizens against secular ones, Catholics against 
Protestants, and so on). Movements based on ethno-linguistic commonalities with 
Germany, France or Italy never arose. 
Nowadays, there are stili no Swiss politicai parties or associations based on ethnie 
criteria, there is no représentation of ethno-linguistic groups in government, and no 
public events at the federai level are linked to any particular ethnie community. Ethno-
linguistic groups are politieized at the cantonal level, at which, however, they are not 
seen so much as 'national' groups but as "culturally thick, historically inévitable and 
durable entities".17 Wimmer thus concludes that "it would be a serious misreading of 
the Swiss expérience if we looked for a compromise between French-, Italian- and 
German-speaking élites, such as seen by the theory of consociational democracy that 
describe[s] the Swiss model as a cartel of ethnically defined élites".18 It is obvious that 
the Swiss case shares little with Cyprus, where the networks of civil society 
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associations were organized on an ethnie basis since the early stages of modernity 
(late Ottoman/early British colonial rule). As we have seen, ethnicity was the basis for 
ail kinds of associational bonds - webs of friendship, reading clubs, unions, and, later 
on, politicai organizations or parties. 
Many Greek-Cypriots have argued that perhaps the American model of fédération 
should be utilized, because it is the most 'advanced' such system, accommodating 
diverse natîonalities, while maintaining a strong central government. Yet, once again, 
it is doubtful whether this model has much to compare with, or much to offer to, 
Cyprus, since, as 0 ' Leary points out, ethno-national concerns have little to do with 
American federalism.19 To document this point, it would be useful to utilize Kymlicka's 
distinction between two types of pluralism, leading to two distinct types of fédération, 
each with différent possibilities of success.20 The first type he calls "polyethnic" 
pluralism, which involves régimes in which the origin of the various ethnie communities 
was migration (for instance, the USA and Australia). In thèse cases, the migrants 
joined the receiving countries mostly as individuals, and expected to succeed as such -
thus, their respective ethnie communities amounted to loose cultural entities. 
Fédérations hosting such migrant communities do not take ethnicity to be an important 
factor in determining the nature of the regime. In fact, in America, the planners of the 
fédération went out of their way so as not to link any of the component states with 
ethnicity: Hence, if in a certain région a non-Anglophone migrant community had 
larger numbers than local Anglophones, the borders were changed accordingly, or 
efforts were expended to increase the numbers of Anglophones, so that in no state 
would a migrant ethnie community constitute a majority.21 Obviously, polyethnic 
federai Systems have little to teach us about handling ethnie différence. 
The second type, "multinational" pluralism, involves régimes in which the various 
ethnie communities were co-habiting together for long, as separate, autonomous 
entities, before the formation of the modem national-state (for instance, Belgium and 
Canada): In such cases, choosing a federai regime expressly aimed to accommodate 
the various ethno-national communities, allowing them to maintaîn their separate 
existence - hence, this type of regime is premised on a direct link between federai 
provisions and the existence of ethnie communities. It is this latter type of 
multinational fédération which is, therefore, the one from which a country such as 
Cyprus could learn. Yet, even in thèse few cases, the link between federalism and 
ethnicity does not seem to be an easy one. Firstly, because fédérations based on 
292 
multinational cohabitation have to live with the contradictory objectives of the 
partners: In Canada, for instance, most Anglo-Canadians prefer a strong central 
government, while French-Canadians prefer as loose a federation as possible; this is 
because the two sides have a different view of what federation is all about - one side 
seems to view it as an agreement between two regions, or two culturally different 
partners, whereas the other as an agreement between different peoples. A second 
problem relates to what Kymlicka calls the "paradox of success":22 It is obvious that 
the more a federal regime tries to reduce the autonomy of a constituent ethnic 
community, the more the feelings of frustration grow ("we did not succeed in Y 
objective because the other community is discriminating against us"), enhancing 
support for secession. But, paradoxically, even where federal co-habitation, based on 
communal autonomy, succeeds, the feeling of difference is strengthened ("we 
succeeded because we stuck together"), encouraging support for even more 
autonomy, or for confederation. 
Parekh reaches a similar, even more pessimistic conclusion:23 He proposes that the 
attempt to contain strongly autonomous national communities, within a looser, wider 
political community, is fraught with problems. Since the citizens feel a stronger loyalty 
to the national communities, than to the centre, the latter cannot effectively pursue 
long-term common goals, or resolve the "inevitable conflicts" between the constituent 
communities. At the same time, the very existence and activities of the centre (such 
as shared economic development, and common educational standards) tend to erode 
the autonomy and cultural distinctiveness of the constituent communities, inevitably 
lending to tensions - which the center will have little power to control. Hence, strongly 
bonded nations cannot co-exist in larger units. "One must therefore either accept the 
inherent logic of nationalism and allow each nation its own state [leading to the 
creation of largely homogeneous nation-states], or dispense with nationalism 
altogether" - which would involve a "loosening up" of the constituent national 
communities (through their developing over-arching loyalties to the centre), so that 
they would effectively "stop being nations", in order to become "open cultural groups" 
instead.24 
But how can one "dispense with nationalism altogether'? And how easy is it for 
national communities to "stop being nations" as Parekh admonishes? Taking the 
Greek-Cypriot ethno-national community as a case in point, this thesis has 
demonstrated how its genesis and growth involved long and laborious processes of 
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construction - and not ex nihilo creation and swift maturation. Acknowledging that 
social reality is constructed, does not imply a belief that it can be easily changed at 
will.25 The hegemonic ethno-nationalist paradigm furnishes Greek-Cypriots with ways 
of seeing, structures of feeling and structures of action, which are deeply ingrained 
into their biographies, and from which they draw meaning in making sense of the 
social world.26 This is not to 'naturalize' the nationalist view of the world (which we 
have shown to be the creation of culture and history), and to assign it inevitability. It 
is, rather, to underline its durability. Membership of a national community "entails the 
acquisition of pervasive and powerful ways of structuring, experiencing and acting in 
one's surroundings", as well as "the internalization of a largely taken-for-granted view 
of a 'commonsense world', which informs many of one's practices and strategies".27 
National-states and existing configurations of power tend to reproduce the hegemonic 
nationalist view of the world. It is true that social actors are capable of reflection and 
of producing new ideas and interpretations, which may bring about social change; and 
that national communities provide a context which is not only constraining but also 
enabling. Yet, given the weight of history, of traditional institutions, and of the 
nationalist discourse, dramatic changes in national matters are not easy to come by. It 
is only at 'critical junctures' or in times of crisis28 that previously taken for granted 
views of the world become the object of reflection, debate, and questioning. Greek-
Cypriot society has undergone such a crisis in 1974, and we have seen that this 
experience led to quite a radical re-interpretation of the Cypriots' relation to nation and 
state.29 The aftermath of joining the European Union without a solution to the Cyprus 
Problem has produced a new crisis and new criticisms of deeply entrenched views on 
national matters, and especially on sharing power with the Turkish-Cypriots. Can the 
European Union play a role in helping Cypriots transcend ethno-national views of the 
world, and build a post-national future? 
As we have already noted, Greek-Cypriots entertained high hopes that joining the 
European Union would solve the Cyprus Problem, primarily because they would now be 
more empowered in demanding Turkey's compliance with norms of international 
justice, as well as with specific UN decisions, in terminating the occupation of northern 
Cyprus.30 Even though this proved an unjustified expectation, many still maintain 
hopes that membership of the European Union may hold promise for a future solution, 
only in more indirect and complex ways.31 
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What is certainly true is that the European Union can provide both a good model and 
an appropriate context for facilitating plural co-existence in Cyprus. Membership may 
counterbalance many of the absent factors conducive to the success of federai 
régimes. For instance, with EU membership, the problem of bi-polarity (or augmented 
bi-polarity, once the 'mother7 countries are taken into account) may be attenuated, 
since the Union adds new parties to the confìict, thereby reducing system rigidity and 
continuous stalemates, creating something akin to a multiple balance of powers. The 
European Union also provides an additional level of identification, a new over-arching 
identlty over and above existing ethno-national identities, which would certainly 
enhance "we-feelings" among ail Cypriots. This does not mean ethno-national 
identities would simply wither away, but that the simultaneous existence of various 
levels of identity may further the idea of multiple identities and loyalties.32 
The EU itself draws on federai principles of politicai Organization:33 It is a supra­
national union of states with a long hîstory of independence, which have been working 
towards. "ever doser union", in order to achieve a number of shared objectives, 
without sacrificing their sovereignty in the process. The EU also draws on principles of 
consociational democracy,34 since it is comprised of a number of national states, 
governed through a "grand coalition" of national élites. Plural cohabitation rests on 
provisions for a mutuai veto system, exercised in delicate national matters; 
proportionality in politicai représentation; national autonomy on various culturally 
significant issues (such as éducation); and the overall combination of the principles of 
self-determination with those of co-determination. 
Since a common national identity is lacking, what holds the Union together are the 
shared core principles of liberal democracy, respect for human and civil rights, as well 
as common politicai norms, values and expectations (including those of consensus 
politics, peaceful resolution of conflicts, and multi-cultural coopération). These shared 
characteristics constitute the European Union as a démocratie "imagïned security 
community",35 in which member states may trust each other and hold "dependable 
expectations"36 that their différences will be resolved in amicable ways. Adler points 
out that such communities have at their disposai various types of power, through 
which they can exercise influence - including sheer power, ideological power, the 
power to set agendas and, perhaps, primarily, the power of setting the "underlying 
rules of the game, to define what constitutes acceptable play and to be able to get 
other actors to commit to thèse rules because they are now part of their self-
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understanding":37 This "most subtle and most effective form of power"38 allows the EU 
to elicit agreement or compliance with the principles of liberal democracy, which 
govern politicai practice within the Union, not so much through pressure or force, but 
through encouraging member states to adopt a new self-understanding and self-
definition, which considère thèse principles as constitutive of their very identity. 
Many react against the use of thèse powers by the EU, in ensuring the compliance of 
aspiring entrants or new members with EU wishes or décisions, and consider them as 
part of a new Western hégémonie project, underpinned by globalization, and of the 
West's attempt to undermine the cultural résistance of new member nations. But, as 
Barnett and Adler argue, the European Union project entails "hegemony by invitation", 
since aspiring entrants "nave demonstrated a greater interest in entering into the West 
than the West in admitting them".39 
On the other hand, the fact that the Greek-Cypriots themselves were the ones to knock 
on Europe's door does not mean they would be Willing to accept ail and any EU 
initiatives. We have seen how Greek-Cypriots have already rejected the Annan Plan, 
despite EU pressures; but we have also seen (in the previous section of the conclusion) 
that many key provisions of the Annan Plan may not have been suitable for Cyprus -
Swiss civic world-views and identities are very différent to corresponding ethno-
nationalist Cypriot ones. At the same time, we have noted (in chapter six) that EU 
principles and norms have already been impacting on Greek-Cypriot self-definitîons -
the transformation of DISY ïs perhaps a good example of the EU influence. Yet the 
fact that identities and loyalties can change does not mean they are easily and 
infinitely malléable. Membership of the EU cannot help the Cypriots to "transcend" the 
nation-state (as Parekh would wish), for the Union itself is not "a project [for] replacing 
the nation/state".40 If a solution is to be found in Cyprus, it cannot be but a loose form 
of federai union between the two ethno-national communities, which will surely 
maintain their existing identities and loyalties. The Cypriots are condemned to live in a 
permanent state of unstable equilibrium. The example and context of the European 
Union will not remove all the risks involved in such plural cohabitation, but it can 
certainly make the experiment easier. The EU itself constitutes proof that such 
expérimentation may not only be a source of problems, but of innovation and 
creativity. 
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Appendix 1: Methodology of the surveys 
The thesis utilizes a part of the résulte of two surveys coordinated by the author, in 
2000 and 2006. The surveys were carried out for wider purposes but the author had 
the opportunity of incorporating a number of questions relevant to the thesis. 
The first survey, "Understanding Bicommunal Perceptions and Attitudes: A Survey on 
Political and National Perceptions", was carried out on behalf of the Peace Center and 
was sponsored by UNOPS. The Greek-Cypriot part of the survey1 was conducted in the 
summer of 2000 and was based on a random sample of 1073 individuals, aged 18+, 
stratified according to district, urban/rural area of résidence, âge, and gender (in 
proportion to the size of the population for each of thèse classifications).2 This sample 
size gîves a confidence interval of 95% and a sampling error of +/- 3,0% (based on 
the population census of 1992). 
The survey was conducted by personal interviews, using a universal "closed" 
questionnaire, as well as an "open" questionnaire for a sub-sample of approximately 
one out of every ten respondents (a total of 150 questionnaires were actually 
completed). 
The second survey was part of the well-known world-wîde investigation of socio-
cultural and political change - the World Values Survey (WVS). The Fifth Wave (2005-
2006) of the WVS involved 99 countries, and Cyprus was included for the first time. It 
was carried out in mid 2006 and covered a sample of 900 Greek-Cypriots,3 aged 18 to 
75 years old, stratified according to the same characteristics as the 2000 survey (that 
is, district, âge, and gender). The sample size gave a 95% confidence internai and a 
sampling error of +/- 3.3%. 
The interviews for both surveys were carried out by experienced research associâtes of 
the Research Center of Intercollege/University of Nicosia, which went through spécial 
training by the author. Detailed directions along with relevant area maps were given 
to every researcher. Checks and vérification concerning the completion of the 
interviews were conducted by the coordinating team for 6-8% of the sample (through 
phone calls for confirmation, made to randomly selected individuals who took part in 
the surveys). 
Qualified personnel with expérience in data inputting processed the completed 
questionnaires. AH the quantitative data gathered were analyzed statistically, using the 
Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS). Subsequently, descriptive statistics were 
used to summarize the data, either numerically or graphically; basic numerical 
descriptors, like the mean and standard déviation were used, as well as cross 
tabulation analysis for comparing the résulte of two or more différent questions in a 
tabular format. This kind of analysis ensures a better 
understanding between two or more différent démographie attributes, related 
questions, or dépendent items. Cross tab analysis allows vïewing a grid of response 
totals for any two or more items, scale, multiple choice, and démographie question 
types; it also enables the researcher to quickly see a complète layout of the 
relationship between two or more survey questions and includes resuite that 
specifically highlight signîficant relationships between the items that have been 
analyzed. Furthermore, means comparison analysis was used, in order to examine the 
mean différence in subgroups. 
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Graphical summarizations include varîous kinds of charte and graphs. In addition, 
inferential statistics was used to model patterns in the data, accounting for 
randomness and drawing inferences about the larger population. 
In conducting the above surveys, the researchers were aware of, and complied with, 
the gênerai ethical principles regarding what is considered proper and improper. 
Important considérations included the following: 
(a) Voluntary participation of the respondents: Individuals were asked to 
participate after they were informed of the objectives of the surveys. 
(b) Anonymity and confidentially - ensurîng that the respondent's name would in 
no way be identifiée! or used in any way agaînst their intereste. 
(c) Not deceiving respondents in any way, and letting them know of the identity of 
the researchers as well as of the real purposes of the study. 
(d) Spécial attention was paid not to endanger participante in any way, including 
exposing them to physîcal or mental stress. 
(e) Not invading the privacy of participante. 
298 
Appendix 2: Party vote related to father's vote 
AKEL EDEK DIKO DISY 
Politicai Party Percentage (%) 
AKEL 84.0 
EDEK 45.8 
DIKO 69.4 
DISY 80.6 
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Appendix 3: Criteria used in voting politicai parties 
4 0 % 
3 5 % - ' 
3 0 % - < 
2 5 % - * 
2 0 % 
15% 
1 0 % - ' 
BETTER PRE-ELECTION 
PROGRAM 
BETTER SERVES MY 
INTERESTS 
HAS A BETTER LEADER HAS A BETTER POLICY ON 
THE CYPRIOT PROBLEM 
IAKEL • EDEK BDIKO BDISY 
Better pre- l ias a better policy 
election serves my better about the Cypriot tradition 
Politicai Party program interests leader problem 
WWm 1 % 
AKEL 
4.9 19.7 5.6 13.8 6.3 
2 N D 4.6 12.2 11.1 14.8 7.0 
EDEK 
,SI 2.0 6.1 14.3 27.6 1.0 
2 N D 10.2 9.2 14.3 12.2 3.1 
DIKO I i 8 1 i 2.1 10.9 6.3 25.1 6.7 
5.9 9.6 10.9 17.2 5.4 
DISY 
, w 3.5 10.8 8.8 17.8 9.5 
2 N D 5.5 9.1 12.2 15.1 7.7 
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Appendix 4: The salience of the Left-Right and of the Nation-State axes 
In the developed West, the most important political cleavage throughout most of the 
twentieth century was that between Right and Left. Broadly speaking this related to 
the issue of ownership and/or control of the means of production and the distribution 
of income; it therefore implied that the two main ideologies rested on different social 
bases so that the working class identified with the Left and the middle and upper 
classes with the Right. In terms of policy choices the Left focused predominantly on 
social justice, translated into more state regulation and control of the economy 
(leading in the extreme to calls for the nationalization of important industries) aiming 
towards income redistribution; the Right stood for freedom of choice and enterprise, 
and consequently for limited state intervention. Ideological differences were not 
confined to different views on the economy but extended to all fields of life: The Left, 
for instance, saw most social problems as ultimately connected to the system of 
production and the associated social structures and relationships, so that radical 
change could only come about through the re-structuring of the economy and society. 
Since the '60s the above realities and ideologies have been changing, leading to the 
increasing questioning of the wisdom of more state intervention and control. The Left-
Right distinction is still alive, but it has acquired new meanings which vary from place 
to place, according to the local context and history.1 Furthermore, analysts propose 
that new axes of cleavage have become relevant on the basis of structural 
transformations in western societies. Inglehart, for instance, has been documenting a 
long-term transition from political cleavages based on class conflict and a focus on 
material advancement, to new cleavages relating to cultural issues and concerns with 
the quality of life - amounting to a shift from materialist to post-materialist values. 
More relevant to our purposes, Anthony Smith theorizes another set of differences 
based on the nation-state dichotomy, but he does not attempt to apply his insight to 
empirical cases, using social scientific methods of investigation, so as to.document.his- -
analytical insights. The case of Cyprus is perhaps an ideal one for examining the 
relation between political ideologies and national identities. The Cyprus Republic was 
marked by the incongruence of state and nation, resulting in respective identifications 
which were at odds with each other. This legacy still lingers on and influences 
contemporary collective identities. We could thus propose that the Cypriot socio­
political terrain cannot be comprehended by resorting to the traditional Left and Right 
dichotomy as a way of refering to sociopolitical ideologies, practices, and orientations, 
depicted as positions on an imaginary one-dimensional axis or continuum.2 A better 
understanding may be reached by utilizing a second pair of polarities representing 
loyalty to nation (Hellenocentrism/ethnic nationalism) and loyalty to state 
(Cyprocentrism/territorial-state nationalism). If we depict this as an imaginary vertical 
axis that intersects the previous horizontal one, we end up with a two-dimensional grid 
that more accurately represents the field of forces previously analyzed (see Fig. 1.1). 
This two-dimensional grid allows us to demonstrate that political parties and individuals 
may be characterized by multiple loyalties and identities. AKEL and EDEK, for instance, 
may both be left-wing parties, but AKEL tends to put more stress on the state than the 
nation in contrast to EDEK's positions. Thus, we would expect a large majority of AKEL 
supporters to fall within the third quadrant and only a few in the fourth, and EDEK to 
have a smaller number of supporters than AKEL in the third quadrant. Similarly, DISVs 
supporters would be divided (not necessarily equally) between the first and second 
quadrants, and so on. 3 
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Loyalty to Nation 
(Ethnie Nationalism) 
IV 
Left 
III II 
Right 
Loyalty to State 
(Civic Nationalism) 
Figure A.4.1: Loyalty to Nation and/or State 
In our surveys we tried to gauge the significance of the various cleavages in the case 
of Cyprus, by using Ingleharfs approach: The results seem to demonstrate that the 
traditional socio-economic distinctions between Left and Right are still relevant (even if 
to a decreasing extent), but the nation-state distinctions have gradually acquired 
greater comparative salience. In order to ascertain the significance and weight of the 
Left-Right division, we asked respondents to place themselves along a ten-point scale, 
consisting of items associated with left to right ideological positions. The specific 
question was: 
"How would you place your views on this scale? 1 means you agrée completely 
with the statement on the left, 5 means you agrée completely with the statement 
on the right, or you can choose any number in between". 
Agrée Completely Agrée Completely 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 Private ownership of business and industry 
should be increased 
Government ownership of business and 
industry should be increased 
2 Compétition is good. It encourages people to 
work harder and take initiatives 
Compétition is bad. It encourages people to 
think selfishly of their own interests 
3 When one has opportunities of getting rich one 
tries harder. The government should increase 
such opportunities 
4 Individuais have responsibility to care for life's 
basic needs (e.g. medicai care) 
5 When one has worked hard In his life, then he 
will succeed 
Inequality between rich and poor is unjust 
The government should aim at decreasing 
inequalities through various measures (e.g. 
taxation) 
The state is responsible to care for life's 
basic needs (eg. medicai care) 
Success is usually not the outeome of hard 
work - but of luck and connections 
6 For some people to become rich others must 
become poor 
Wealth can increase so there's enough for 
everyone 
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The results, when classified according respondents' (a) party affiliation and (b) self-
identification as adhering to a Left or Right ideology, are shown in figures A.4.2 and 
A.4.3 below: 
25 3 0 
QUESTION 
| « A K E L B E D E K D D I K O » D I S Y ] 
Figure A.4.2: Responses on socio-economic issues, according to party affiliation 
|aLEFT O C E N T E R - L E F T D C E N T E R • C E N T E R - R I G H T « R I G H T ! 
Figure A.4.3: Responses on socio-economic issues, according to ideological self-
identification 
A similar approach was used for ascertaining the significance and weight of the Nation-
State cleavage; we asked respondents to place themselves along a ten-point scale 
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comprised of items associated, in the case of Cyprus, with loyalty to Nation 
(Hellenocentrism) and loyalty to State (Cyprocentrism). The question asked was: 
"How do you place your views on this scale? 1 means you agrée completely with 
the statement on the left, 10 means you agrée completely with the statement on 
the right, or you can choose any number in between". 
Agrée Completely Agrée Completely 
1 Cyprus is Greek Cyprus belongs to ail Cypriots no matter their 
nationality 
2 Nationalism is a good thing; it underlines Nationalism is a bad thing; it underlines 
everything which unités us as Greeks (eg everything which séparâtes us from others, 
common history) and fosters love of everything and especially Turkish-Cypriots, and fosters 
Greek hatred and fanaticism 
3 We must put the national interest above ail We must put social progress above ail 
4 The use of the Greek flag expresses and The use of the Greek flag undermines our 
strengthens our national feelings state's integrity and sends wrong messages to 
the Turkish-Cypriots 
5 Our éducation must be Hellenocentric Our éducation must have Cyprus as its focus 
After classifying the results according to party affiliation and self-placement on the 
Left-Right ideological axis, the results were as follows: 
1 2 3 4 5 
QUESTION 
IBAKEL DEDEK ODtKO B O I S Y | 
Figure A.4.4: Responses on national issues, according to party affiliation (2000) 
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Q U E S T I O N 
| • L E F T • C E N T E R - L E F T • C E N T E R • C E N T E R - R I G H T B R I G H T | 
Figure A.4.5: Responses on national issues, according to ideological self-identification 
(2000) 
What transpires from the two sets of data is that the distinctions between the different 
political parties in Cyprus are comparatively clearer/larger as regards national rather 
than socio-economic issues: 
POLITICAL 
PARTY 
SOCIO-ECONOMIC 
ISSUES 
(MEAN) 
NATIONAL 
ISSUES 
(MEAN) 
AKEL 3.19 3.70 
EDEK 3.31 3.11 
DIKO 3.10 3.08 
DISY 3.14 2.30 
Difference 
between two 
extreme partiesj 
0.21 1.40 
When we repeated the same questions six years later (2006),4 the above results were 
confirmed, once again - i.e. differences between the followers of the various political 
parties were more significant as regards national issues than as regards socio­
economic ones; in both cases however, there was a decrease in these differences over 
the six-year period: 
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1 2 3 4 5 6 
Q U E S T I O N 
| B A K E L O E D E K D D I K O B P I S Y ] 
Figurę A.4.6: Responses on socio-economic issues, according to ideological self-
identification (2006) 
2 3 4 5 
Q U E S T I O N 
[ • A K E L B E D E K D D I K O • D I S Y 7 ] 
Figure A.4.7: Responses on national issues, according to party affiliation (2006) 
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POLITICAL SOCIO-ECONOMIC ISSUES 
PARTY (MEAN) 
NATIONAL ISSUES 
(MEAN) 
AKEL 3.06 3.61 
EDEK 3.00 3.35 
DIKO 2.97 2.94 
DISY 2.92 2.57 
Difference 
between two 
extreme parties 
0.14 1.04 
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Notes to introduction 
1
 As will become obvious from the study, the usual term 'nation-state' does not fit the case of Cyprus, 
where the two communities feel they belong to two other nations (the Greek and Turkish ones). The term 
'national state' is defined as "a state legitimated by the principles of nationalism, whose members possess 
a measure of [overall] unity and integration (but not of cultural homogeneity)": Smith 2001, p 17. 
Anthony Smith uses the word national instead of overall, but this may be problematic in cases such as 
Cyprus, where the members of the national state do not feel they are/constitute a nation. Besides, the 
strength of the term 'national state' is that it is open enough to allow the inclusion of both nation-states 
and multi-national states - Cyprus being a special case of the latter (a bi-national state). In any case, as 
Smith observes: "By making national unity and integration a variable, such a definition avoids the 
problem of 'national incongruence'— the fact that the boundaries of nations and the boundaries of states in 
so many parts of the world fail to correspond" (ibid). 
2
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nations as "categories of practice", which should not be used as "categories of analysis" (Brubaker 1996, 
pp 14-17). 
3
 Wimmer 2002. 
"Oommen 1997, p. 16. 
5Castells 1998, p. 51. 
6
 This is the title of a book by Xydis (1973). 
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 Aloysius 1998, p. 12. 
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modern form of unequal or differential power-realization in one's own culture, i.e. homogenization of 
power within" (the latter meaning the "even distribution of power and recognition of equality of socio­
political status among members, at least in principle"). Together, the two movements of power over 
culture "constitute the social change or transition to nation, demanded and affirmed by nationalism as an 
ideology" (ibid., p. 16). As we will see in chapter 4, in Cyprus, the internal cleavages within the 
hierarchical, pre-modern society, which became politicized with British rule, were equally, if not more, 
responsible than the contradiction between Greek-Cypriots and the British, for the outcome of the 
nationalist movement and the failure of a more integrated national state to emerge. 
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that modern (nineteenth century) Greeks were not the 'real' (biological) descendents of ancient Greeks, 
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industriaiization in the respective areas (Kedourie 1994, p. 143). 
5 0Tsoucalas 1977, pp. 136-146 
5 1
 Bryant 2004, pp. 129-155. But see Loizos 1974, pp 37-38 for an alternative view. 
5 2
 Ozkirimli 2000, p. 146. 
5 3
 Anderson 1991, pp. 35-36. 
5 4
 Ibid. 1983, p. 44. 
"ibid. , p. 43. 
5 6
 Ibid 1991, pp. 42-44. 
5 7
 Kellas 1991, p. 48. Greenfeld adds that nationalism did not emerge at a time of religious decline, but 
quite the contrary, at the time of the Reformation, during which religion was rejuvenated. Religion 
actually aided nationalism to become established; even in later stages when nationalism would replace 
religion as the primary passion of people, religion was pften not dismissed but rather incorporated as part 
of the national consciousness of a country. (Greenfeld 1993: pp 48-52) 
5 8
 Chatterjee 1996, p. 216. 
5 9
 Ibid., p. 216. 
6 0
 Ibid., pp. 217-218. 
61 Ibid. 
Anthony Smith spécifies the aims of ethno-symbolism as to "uncover the symbolic legacy of ethnie 
identities for particular nations", as well as to demonstrate "how modem nationalisms and nations 
rediscover and reinterpret the symbols, myths, memories, values and traditions of their ethno-histories, as 
they face the problems of modernity": Smith 1998, p. 224. 
6 3
 Smith 1986, p. 17. Before modem nationalism there was " a more long-lived and ancient 
ethnocentrism". 
6 4
 Smith 2001, p. 12. 
6 5
 Accordingly, an ethnie is defined as "a named human community connected to a homeland, possessing 
common myths of ancestry, shared memories, one or more éléments of shared culture, and a measure of 
solidarity, at least among the élites". On the other hand, a nation is "a named human community 
occupying a homeland, and having common myths and a shared history, a common public culture, a 
single economy and common rights and duties for ail its members" (Smith 2001, p. 13). Elsewhere, 
however (e.g. Smith 2001, p. 12), he adds that a nation must have an "over-arching" common identity and 
a desire for "some degree of self-determination" or "autonomy": Such supplementary comments were 
used to elaborate/clarify terms in table 1.0. 
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6 6
 Ibid., pp. 12-13. 
6 7
 Smith 1991, p. 29; 1998 pp. 191-192. 
6 8
 Ethnies themselves are the products of more loose ethnie groupings such as ethnie catégories or ethnie 
networks. Ethnie networks resuit after the "appearance of généalogies", that is "kinship myths of ethnie 
origin and descent" handed down to new générations orally or in written chronicles and epic poetry. The 
stronger thèse memories are, the stronger the ties and sentiments of members become, turning them into 
dense ethnie networks (Smith 2001, p. 108). 
6 9
 Smith maintains that it is extremely difficult to permanently impair the sensé of cultural continuity and 
common ethnicity of the community. 
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 Smith 1986, p. 89. 
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 Smith 1991, pp. 52-53. 
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 Ibid., p. 55. 
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 Ibid., p. 63. 
76 Ibid., p. 64. 
7 7
 Ibid., pp. 64-65. 
7 8
 Ibid., p. 14. 
79 Ibid. ,p5I,73. 
8 0
 Ibid., pp. 79-84. These, Smith proposes, are based on the 'civic-territoriaP and _the_'ethn_iç-_ 
gênealogical' models ôf thé nation. 
8 1
 See the criticisms of O' Leary, Symmons-Symonolewicz, Breuilly, and Calhoun, in Ozkirimli, pp. 183-
186. 
8 2
 Calhoun 1997, pp. 49-50. 
8 3
 In the Weberian tradition 'social closure' is seen "as the process by which social collectivities seek to 
maximîze rewards by restricting access to resources and opportunités to a limited circle of eligibles. This 
entails the singling out of certain social or physical attributes as the justificatory basis of exclusion". 
(Weber 1968, pp. 43-46; Parkin, pp. 44-45). Neo-Weberian accounts include those of John Rex (1986, 
1996) and Frank Parkin (1979), whose work focuses mostly on the micro-sociology of ethnicity, as well 
as those of Randall Collins (1986, 1999) and Michael Mann (1988, 2001), who focus on macro-
sociological aspects of ethnie relations and nationalism. The most récent and promising work for nation 
and nationalism is that of Andreas Wimmer (2002). 
8 4
 Wimmer 2002, pp. 26-34. Social closure is seen as the exclusion of those not feit to belong, the 
drawing of a dividing line between the familiär and the foreign. Social closure thus refers to the 
formation of classes, sub-cultures, ethnie groups and so on: Ibid, p. 33. 
8 5
 The concept of habitus was first developed by Bourdieu (1992, ch. 3). 
8 6
 Bourdieu 1992, pp. 72-79. • 
8 7
 Wimmer 2002, pp. 33-34. 
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 I have borrowed the term 'axial principle' from Daniel Bell's 'The Coming of Post Industrial Society' 
(1974). 
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 Wimmer 2002, p. 55. 
9 2
 Ibid., pp. 9, 64-66. 
9 3
 Or, as Barthes would put it, "naturalized" - mis-portrayed as a seemingly predetermined and inevitable 
fact of nature. 
9 4
 Billig 1995. 
9 5
 Wimmer 2002, p. 60. 
9 6
 Ibid., pp 61-62. 
9 7
 Ibid., p. 64. 
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 Also, it allows the increasing sophistication of government techniques, which ultimately make control 
of people easier (e.g. census data). 
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 Wimmer 2002, p. 66. 
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 Wimmer, pp. 70-79. 
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 Calhoun 1997, p. 25. 
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 Ozkirimli 2000, p. 228. 
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 Ibid., p. 230. 
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 Hall 1997, pp. 26-33. 
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Notes to chapter 2 
1
 For Karageorghis (1999, pp. 20-21), the "coming of the Mycenaeans" explains the "paradox" of Cyprus 
for over 3,000 years drawing closer to Greece, while being surrounded by ancient Orientai civilizations. 
For Alastos (1976, xiii), "the persistence of the Cypriots in their customs, beliefs and national attachment 
despite the many violent storms [...] gives to Cypriot history an unbroken continuity". For Kyrris (1985, 
p. 13) "the beginning of Cypriot history is identical [sic] with the first traces of the Greek population of 
Cyprus in the late Bronze Age.. ." Similarly, Maier (1968, p. 17) traces the roots of the Cyprus conflict 
back to the coming of the Greeks (and presumably of the formation of Greek national identity). 
2
 See discussion on Smith in chapter 1. 
3
 These seem to have been transitory bands of hunter-gatherers, who had crossed over from Anatolia or 
Syria, looking for a possible land to colonize. Authorities date the first traces of life on the island around 
8800-8500 BC - the Mesolithic (Middle Stone Age) period. 
4
 This is the Neolithic (New Stone Age) period. The 6 m millennium BC Neolithic Khirokitia Settlements 
(5800-4900 BC), demonstrate features of an agricultural village culture (Karageorghis 1982, pp. 9-30). 
Magic or primitive religion and the vénération of the dead was a feature of the Neolithic culture. In the 
next, Chalcolithic, stage there was an apparent turn to the vénération of life, through the worship of a 
divinity of fertility (Kyrris 1985, pp. 27-36). 
5
 This isolation probably accounts for the fact that Cyprus, in those times, remained behind in 
development, as compared to the surrounding région of the Near East. 
6
 For the Chalcolithic Age in Cyprus see Karageorghis op. cit.; for the Bronze Age see Karageorghis 
1990. The Bronze Age arrived rather late in Cyprus, compared to developments in the nearby 
Mesopotamian civilization. 
7
 Why didn't Cyprus give birth to a civilization equal in brilliance to Minoan Crete, since it had ail 
necessary prerequisites - contact with Egypt (which had a stimulating effect on the Cretans), copper_ 
deposits, strong trade connections in the E. Mediterranean~-'and'so on._The~questiòn was actually raised 
in 1909 by Sir Arthur Evans: Subséquent research was to provide the reply that the reason was that 
Cyprus at that crucial period feil under foreign domination - of the Hyksos empire ("a military people 
[whose] rule everywhere [was] associated with a decline of culture"; Cyprus* civilization began to rise 
again after their overthrow - Alastos 1976, pp. 23-24). Other authors stress the importance of the rivalry 
between Eastem and Western Cypriots, for the control of the copper mines and arable land (Kyrris 1985, 
pp. 42-45). 
8
 The Cypro-Minoan script was not Greek (which, at the time, was not even known in Crete). Despite 
archaeological findings of the existence of this script, it stili remains undeciphered. 
9 M a i e r l 9 6 8 , p . 26. 
1 0
 This destruction was probably the result of an earthquake. At the same time bands of raiders, known as 
the "Sea Peoples" threw into chaos the Eastern Mediterranean, bringing about the collapse of the 
"Ancient World". Iakovides (1995) proposes that the disruption of sea communications and trade on 
which the Achaean economy depended, was the main reason for the collapse of Mycenaean civilization 
and the conséquent waves of migrations to the Aegean islands, M. Asia and Cyprus. 
1 1
 Düring the same period there were also waves of refugees from the M. East (Syria, Palestine), who 
were forced to leave their lands after the ravages and seulement of the Sea People in these areas. Thus 
Oriental influences were also to persist, along with the Hellenic influence accentuated through 
Mycenaean colonists. 
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3 1
 Ibid., pp. 205-220; Hall 2000, pp. 34-66. 
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Karageorghis 1981, p. 20; see also Coldstream 1999, p 47-50. One of the factors which facilitated the 
Mycenaean hegemony on the island was their technological superiority in metalwork and especially 
weapons (Kyrris 1985, p. 66). 
1 3
 Kyrris 1985, pp 44-77; Karageorghis 1999, p. 46; 
1 4
 Karageorghis 1981, p. 20. 
1 5
 Thus Oriental influences were also to persist, along with the Hellenic influence accentuated through 
Mycenaean colonists. 
1 6
 Coldstream op. cit., pp. 47-59. 
1 7
 Maier 1968, p. 31. 
1 8
 Ibid, p. 34. 
1 9
 There are wide-ranging controversies on the time of establishment, and nature, of the Cypriot city 
kingdoms. David Rupp proposes that they were established (or re-established) in the course of the later 
8 t h century BC, much the same time as the city communities {polis) of Greece were probably appearing. 
Anthony Snodgrass suggests that they were rather established earlier on in the 12 t h and 11 t h centuries BC, 
with the coming of the Mycenaeans, who imported (and adapted to local realities) their system of 
"warlike monarchies", with the king "performing a leading religious role as well as his political one". 
Meanwhile in Greece this type of Achaean kingdom was disappearing, to re-appear in the 8 t h century in a 
new form as city-democracies. Such an origin presumably accounts for the despotic nature of Cypriot 
kingdoms - though Snodgrass stresses that initially they were of a "more modest" form than the 
"grandiose absolutism that seems to have prevailed in later Cyprus" (Snodgrass 1995, pp. 103-110). 
Interestingly this account re-links Cypriot city-kingdoms more to ancient Greece than to the Orient 
(contra Maier 1968 and 1985, who sees the despotic element of the city kingdoms as rooted in oriental 
traditions). 
2 0
 Hill Vol. I, pp. 112-122; Phoenicia itself had been under growing Greek influence (Maier op. cit., p. 
42). 
2 1
 Evidence for these contacts was the "growing influence of Ionian forms and styles on Cypriot art in the 
sixth century BC" (Boatswain 2005, p. 18). 
2 2
 Herodotus VIII, p. 68, quoted in Maier op. cit., p. 40. 
2 3
 In fact Greece removed Cyprus from Persian control three times, within 30 years - but control kept 
reverting back to the Persians. 
2 4
 Maier 1968, p. 46. 
2 5
 Kyrris 1985, pp. 124-125. 
2 6
 Hill I, pp. 199-204. Furthermore, an indigenous institution, the 'Koinon Kyprion* (the 
Confederacy/League of the Cypriots) attempted to unite the cities in the deification of the ruler - a form 
of worship introduced in this period. 
2 7
 Such as Spyridakis (1974), Kyrris (1985), Georgiades (1995), Hadjidemetriou (2002) 
2 8
 See Smith 1991, p. 8: ..." we can speak of a Greek cultural and ethnic community but not of an ancient 
Greek nation"; see also Smith 1994, pp 21-46; 
2 9
 Ibid., see also J. Hall 2002, pp 30-55; Smith 1991 pp 8-9,47-48. 
3 0
 Hall 2002, pp 56-89,226-228. 
3 2
 Hall 2002, p. 228. 
3 3
 Smith 1991, p. 47. 
3 4
 Hall 2002, pp. 125-134. 
35 Ibid., pp. 154-168. 
3 6
 The Olympic Games gave an early push in the 6 t h century for an "aggregative" self-definition, based on 
alliance building between regional ruling families; the Persian Wars in the 4 t h century shifted to an 
"oppositional" emphasis, of the civilized in-group V s the barbarian out-group (Greeks V s Persians). 
3 7
 Smith 1994, pp. 13-18. 
3 8
 Ibid., pp. 62-63. 
3 9
 Several Greek cities betrayed the common cause for money. Even in the case of cities which did join 
the struggle against the Persians, the motives were often short-term goals, such as security or commercial 
gain vis-á-vis neighbours. 
4 0
 Eventually Athens managed to outmaneuver the Spartans, consolidating its hegemony through the 
Peace of Kallias. The stereotypes of civilized, free Hellenes as against lavish, barbarian Persians is found 
in Aeschylos' "Persians". 
4 1
 King of Salamis island, in Greece. 
4 2
 After Kerynia, near Aigion. 
4 3
 Also gave his name to the peninsula of Acamas. 
"Alastos 1976, p. 28. 
4 5
 This more unified regime was known as the "Kingdom of Alasia" and supposedly its_"king was equal 
to all the great kingsof the Near East" (Kyrris 1985, p. 13)7 The Cypriof kings seem to have possessed 
more powers than their equivalents in Greece - and this could have been due to oriental influences (more 
despotic systems prevailed in the Orient), but also to the Mycenaean model (which was similarly more 
"centralist-despotic" in nature), imported with the Greek colonization of the island. Furthermore private 
property and immunity, elements of the Mycenaean system (but not of the oriental one), were also 
characteristic of the Cypriot kingdoms. 
46 Cypria is probably a post-Homeric epic poem, which uses the Ionic dialect. 
4 7
 Kyrris 1985, p. 96; Coldstream 1999, p 59. Hill seems to disagree, but yet concedes that various poems 
or hymns were recited at contests, prior to the reciting of the Iliad (Hill Vol I, p. 92). 
4 8 Alastos 1976, p. 43. 
4 9
 Smith 1986, p 39. 
5 0
 Consider material culture, frequently used as strong and indisputable evidence in support of the thesis. 
Jonathan Hall rightly cautions us against the ease of making spurious connections (Hall 2002, pp 104-
111). Cultural products cannot be measured by external and formalistic morphological or stylistic 
features, without considering the meaning producers or consumers attach to them. Adopting a style does 
not necessarily mean adopting an identity - much as contemporary artists who adopt an American, say, 
style of painting, or music, may not necessarily feel they "are" American, but rather that they have simply 
accepted a particular cultural influence - either because they liked it, or because they acknowledged its 
supremacy or hegemony and so on. Why would Cypriots in ancient times feel that their artistic expression 
implied a way of being? 
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V 
Similar arguments could be made against the assumption that the adoption of the Greek language implied 
adoption of a Greek identity. We already saw that there was no singular identity to begin with. In the 
same way there was no single Greek language, but many différent dialects, associated with the various 
ethno-linguistic groups we noted earlier on; in fact Greek-Cypriot "Greek" is one more such dialect, with 
strong common roots, but also with significant différences to the other Greek dialects. 
Furthermore, especially in the early stages, the influences on Cypriot culture were not only, or primarily, 
from Greece but from other countries of the région, or of the Orient more generally: Yet archaeologists 
do not talk of an Orientalization of Cypriot culture, when referring to periods of an accentuated Oriental 
impact. Perhaps a better way of describing developments, which would avoid essenti al izations (such as 
Hellenization or Orientalization), would be to simply stress that Cypriots were accepting, modifying, or 
rejecting continuously from among the many influences they were exposed to (Hall 2000, pp 170-181). 
5 1
 Maier 1985, pp 32-39. 
5 2
 Ibid p. 32. Maier suggests that the process whereby factoids become established have to do with the 
methods or habits of work of scientific communities: For instance, "linguistically, words or particles 
indicating the hypothetical character of a statement are dropped one by one in a process of constant 
répétition. The subjective is exchanged for the indicative", and eventually the factoid appears in an 
unqualified sentence, as a fact. Another aspect relates to the indispensable, to research, attitude of a 
"certain amount of implicit trust in the results of other scholars' research" (Ibid p. 32). 
5 3
 See above, this chapter. 
5 4
 Kyrris 1985, p.14, pp 116-121; Gjerstad (1948, pp 484-485) - quoted in Maier 1985, p. 32 
5 5
 Zannetos 1997 [1910], Vol. I, p 291. 
5 6
 Maier 1985, pp 38-39. 
5 7
 Ibid., p.39. 
5 8
 Kyrris 1985, p. 112. 
5 9 Boatswain2005,p. 20. 
6 0
 Plutarch, text provided in Zannettos 1997, Vol. I, p. 254. 
6 1
 The examples could carry on, for the whole of the ancient era. Consider the attitude of the Cypriot 
kings towards Alexander. The emphasis of most historical accounts is on the eagerness of the Cypriot 
kings to join Alexander's forces (Maier 1968, p.46, claims the Cypriots "spontaneously" joined 
Alexander; Karageorghis 1981, p. 27, that they did it because they "considered him their brother", and so 
on). In fact a careful reading of the historical sources shows that the Cypriot kings, stili vassals of Persia, 
initially were a part of the latter's defensive naval forces (at the siege of Militos, where in the end a naval 
battle was avoided), and only switched sides when Alexander won the decisive battle of Issos (333 BC) -
various sources are quoted in Zannettos op. cit., pp 329-336. Again the issues involved seem to have 
been strategie considérations and prédictions of the future turn of developments, rather than ethnie or 
national "brotherly" connections between the Cypriot and Greek kings. 
6 2
 Zannettos 1997, Vol. I, p. 254. 
6 3
 Ibid., p. 254. 
6 4
 Ibid., p. 246. 
6 5
 Ibid., p. 325. 
6 6
 Or similarly, it is not surprising that Evagoras (on the proddirig of Kononas, from Sparta ) assisted the 
Persians financially, to raise a fleet which (with Kononas' direction) won over Sparta, destroying the 
latter's prédominance within the Greek world - to the benefit of her contestor, Athens (which Evagoras 
favoured). This, warns Zannettos, was detrimental to the Greeks in general and should not have 
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happened: But for the ancient Greek and Cypriote the dilemma was not there, since ail that mattered was 
the city they favoured - the nation simply did not exist for them, and thus there was no moral issue in 
cooperating with the enemies (of the presumed nation). 
6 7
 One could add that even the citizens' loyalty to the city-states was not based so much on ethnie feelings 
- as on a civic bond, much like a social contract. That is why Kononas, for instance, didn't find it 
difficult to switch sides from Sparta to Persia, to seek revenge on the former when it did not render him 
the respect he felt he deserved. 
6 8
 Givenl991. 
6 9
 Ibid.,p. 188. 
7 0
 Ibid., p. 189. 
7 1
 Ibid., p. 193,190. 
7 2
 Ibid., p. 190. The basic thrust of thèse changes related to a shift "from symbols to rhetoric". 
7 3
 Hall 2000, p. 65. Hall, however, dates the early stages of ethnicity much earlier than Given, seeing it to 
be in place back in the eighth century, when the earlier Greek texts appear. 
7 4
 As Zannettos wrongly implies (ibid p.326), when he proposes that Alexander forged together a "strong 
state" [isxiron kratos]. It many ways Alexander's empire was comprised of Hellenistic state-like entities, 
and in many of thèse the Hellènes and Hellenized subjects constituted a dominant élément. Yet the basis 
of their unity was not their real or felt descent, but rather their cultural unity - as Isokrates was to clarify 
("Hellènes are called those with Greek éducation - paideia - and not those of the same descent"). 
7 5
 Michaelides 1999, p. 119. 
7 6
 Ibid., p. 119. 
7 7
 Maier 1968, p. 53. 
7 8
 With the exception of Justinian. 
7 9
 See Runciman 1999, p. 136. The rise in the number of bishops of the Christian Church of Cyprus over 
the years is telling: In 325 AD there were only 3 bishops, by 344 AD the number had risen to 12, and by 
400 AD to 15 (Papageorghiou 1981, p. 35; Runciman 1999, p. 137). One should also note, however, that 
many ancient/pagan retigious practices stili prevailed in the countryside, and were gradually transformed 
and incorporated into the Christian culture (e.g. the worship of Aphrodite was banned, but rites in her 
honour survived - and were transformed into Christian cérémonies for St Mary). 
8 0
 The most important being St Barnabas, considered as the founder of the Cypriot church. Other saints 
included St Spyridon, St Hilarión and St Epiphanios (Runciman 1999, p. 137). 
8 1
 Ibid., p. 138. 
8 2
 Papageorghiou 1981, pp. 35-36; 
8 3
 Runciman 1999, p. 138. 
8 4
 Since the early days of the Christian Church, the central sees of Christendom were located in the "three 
capitals of the Mediterranean world, Rome, Alexandria and Antioch": Runciman 1961, p. 109 
8 5
 Independence was confirmed by a Synod requested by emperor Zeno and summoned by the Patriarch 
of Constantinople. Apparently emperor Zeno was positive to the idea of autocephaly for the Cyprus 
church, as part of a "deliberate restructuring of the balance of power of the Byzantine state" and church: 
In Syria the Monophysites were "gaining alarming strength", whereas the Cyprus church was 
Chalcedonian - and the emperor possibly wished to strengthen the latter (Theodoulou 2005, pp 12-14). 
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The autocephaly of the Cypriot Church would be confirmed once again in the 691 AD Ecumenic Synod 
(Papageorghiou 1981, pp. 38). The privilèges bestowed on the Archbishop included those of carrying a 
scepter (rather than a staff), signing his name in purple (normally a sole right of the emperor), and 
wearing a purple cloak. Ali these are stili enjoyed by the Cypriot Archbishops up to our days. 
8 6
 It seems that the garrison and most of the settlers were withdrawn three décades later, in 681 AD (see 
Papageorghiou op. cit., p. 43). Yet after the Byzantine-Arab agreement on the neutralization of Cyprus 
(688 AD), Moslems were reported to be stili living on the island, next to the Christians. In the first 
decade of the IO* Century Imerios is reported to have "butchered all Moslems living [on the island]" 
(Papageorghiou op. cit., p. 45). Again, after the final victories of Nicephoros Phocas (965 AD) against 
the Arabs, "many Moslems" are reported to have emigrated and others to have converted to Christianity 
(see Runciman 1999, pp. 154-160). Obviously the numbers of Moslems kept dwindling, but some must 
have survived until Ottoman times, when their numbers were to increase more substantially and 
permanently. 
8 7
 Runciman 1999, pp. 147-156. 
8 8
 Ibid.,pp 156-166 
8 9Purcell 1969, pp 144-177 
9 0
 See Hill 1972, Stavrianos 2002 and Runciman 1999, for the late Byzantine period and its problems 
9 1
 Karambelias 2006, pp 17-23 
9 2
 Ibid., pp 101-119 
9 3
 Edbury 1994, p. 17. 
9 4
 At that time there were masses of dispossessed in Syria and Palestine, including many "idle kings" who 
had lost their fiefs after the conquests of Saladin (after 1187 AD), (Alastos 1976, p. 157; Edbury 1994, 
pp. 16-18). 
9 5
 Alastos op. cit., p. 158 
9 6
 Edbury 1994, p. 19. 
9 7
 Ibid., p. 22: It must be added that the continuous influx of settlers from the West (including knights, 
clergy and merchants) "were eventually to transform the originai predominanti y French-speaking ruling 
class into a more heterogeneous cosmopolitan group" representing most régions of Western Europe 
98 
A king from the Lusignan dynasty presided over the High Court (Haute Cour), a body comprised of ali 
the barons, which was the highest authority in all matters (legislative, judicial and executive). There was 
a "precarious balance" of power between king and Assembly, as the latter's "décisions, though binding on 
the king, had to be made after it had been called into session by the king and presided over by him". 
There was also a Lower Court (Cour des Bourgeois) for matters relevant to other non-noble Latins. 
For an extensive debate on the nature of feudalism see Paul Sweezy et al, 1978. A written Constitution, 
the Assizes of Jerusalem, utilized by the Lusignan regime in running Cyprus' affairs, is often seen as 
setting out an archetypical feudal State. 
1 0 0
 Exchanging a slave for an animal was abolished only in 1493, by Venice, atter which exchange was 
limited to other slaves: Alastos 1976, p. 160. 
1 0 1
 Ibid., p. 160-163 
1 0 2
 The name derives from the Byzantine coin known as hyperperon: They had to pay an annual tax of 
fifteen heperpere. 
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3
 Alastos 1976, pp 164-167, 186-202. In 1218 the Republic of Genoa was granted special trading 
privilèges and the right of jurisdiction to its citizens living in Cyprus (who could not be tried by local 
courts except for criminal cases). They were also given land in the main towns to build houses, offices 
and shops - which effectively tumed their areas into small "Genoese territories". In 1306 the same 
privilèges were given to the Venetians. Thereby the two Italian Republics, "antagoniste naval and 
commercial powers, at loggerheads at home, established their little rival states within [...] Cyprus". (Ibid., 
p. 164). 
1 0 4
 Hadjidemetriou 2002, p. 202 
1 0 5
 He cites the cases of a nobleman with "a pack of more than fïve hundred hounds, and for each pair of 
hounds he has a man to guard them, bathe, shampoo and keep them clipped"; another with a dozen 
falconers, and others with léopards for hunting the local wild rams (mouflons). Hunting expéditions 
lasted for weeks and involved caravans of pack animais carrying provisions, servants attending, and 
hawks, dogs and léopards for assisting with the hunting. Von Sudheim was particularly impressed with 
Famagusta, the "richest of ail cities and its citizens the richest of men" - where even the harlots were 
exceptionally rich, "some possessing more than 100,000 florins" (Alastos 1976, pp. 166-167). 
1 0 6
 Hill Vol II, pp. 6-7. 
1 0 7
 First they needed to confer legitimacy upon their kingdom (the Orthodox Church was considered 
schismatic in the West, thus its blessing would not bestow the required status to the locally crowned 
kings). Then they had to cater for the religious needs of the settlers. Equally they needed a 
counterbalance to the Orthodox Church which remained the only institution around which the natives 
rallied once the Byzantine governors and elite fled, after the conquest. 
1 0 8
 Which also benefited from incomes received as rents or tithes from royal and noble estâtes (whereas 
the Orthodox Church lost its entitlement to the collection of taxes) 
1 0 9
 The Orthodox bishops were put under the jurisdiction of their Latin counterparts and their number was 
reduced from fourteen to four; they were to reside in remote localities in the countryside, the revenues of 
their sees would go to the Latin Church, and new ordinations were to have the Latin bishops' approvai. 
Furthermore, the Orthodox clergy were to pay homage to the Latins "like vassals to their lord". 
1 1 0
 Interestingly addressing the letter to "both Romans and Syrians". The name "Romans" was the one 
used at the time for the Orthodox Cypriots and not Hellenes/Greeks. It is interesting to note that 
Orthodox Syrians were living in Cyprus at the time, in large enough numbers to be addressed separately. 
1 1 1
 Alastos 1976, p. 181. Although the Latins were bent on controlling the Orthodox Church, they were at 
the same time aware of their minority status on the island, and on their economie dependency on the 
Orthodox peasants, thus they avoided pushing things to extremes, so as not to cause migration or open 
rébellion. The most violent incident relates to the case of thirteen Orthodox monks who refused to yield 
on doctrinal matters and were jailed and subsequently put to a cruel death. The thirteen monks were 
dragged by horses, then burned and their unconsumed remains mixed with those of animais and re-burned 
- apparently in an effort not to leave behind bones which could be tumed into sacred relies by the faithful: 
That this story has entered folklore as symbolic of the violence exercised by the Latins on the Orthodox 
clergy, testifies to the importance of religion and the Church at the time and the perceived threat felt by 
the locáis. 
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 Perhaps they compared Cyprus with the situation in the Latin Kingdom of Jérusalem, where the 
Orthodox community proved very "co-operative" and had received a more lenient treatment in return (the 
church kept its lands, paid no tithes and had no numerical restrictions on those ordained). The différence 
of course, was that the Orthodox community of Jérusalem was a "religious minority, long habituated to 
Muslim rule", and to compromise, so the coming of the Latins was just a change of masters, perhaps to 
the better. Coureas 1997, pp. 274-280. 
1 1 3
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themselves) 
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 "The church of the Greeks of the kingdom of Cyprus [...] should not in future be expected to have an 
archbishop of its own nation": Acta Alexander rv, 96, quoted in Coureas 1997, p. 300. Note the use of 
the term "Greeks", by the Latins, when the Orthodox used "Romans". Also, the term 'nation* to refer to 
the Orthodox Cypriot Christians. 
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 Ibid., pp. 90-91. 
1 2 0
 Alastos 1976, p. 184. 
1 2 1
 Kyrris 1985, p. 228. 
1 2 2
 Ibid., pp. 229-231. 
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 Karambelias 2006, pp 189-190. Plethon's new regime would encourage local industries, protected by 
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the land they cultivated. Ibid pp.189-190. 
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 Ibid., p. 39. 
1 3 0
 Yet with time Hellene would become synonymous with Roman: Xydis 1968, p. 18. 
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with the fall of the empire. 
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1 4 4
 Hill op. cit., p. 1097; Kyrris 1985, p. 242. 
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 One of the most interesting such examples were the "common liturgies and processions recorded since 
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Christi and Saint Mark" (Kyrris 1985, p 248) 
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 Hill notes that had the Lusignan ruling class have a stronger assimilative power, such as that 
characterizing the Norman conquerors of England, a new stronger ethnie breed - "a Cypriot nation" -
might have been the resuit. But the Cypriots resisted the foreign occupation, so that the gradually 
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the 16* Century, and a few French words in the local dialect. Hill op. cit., p. 755 
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Notes to chapter 3 
For a detailed analysis of the history of the Ottoman Empire see Stavrianos 2002, pp. 33-213; 
Inalcik 1995, pp. 17- 98; and Quataert 2005, pp. 13-74. 
2
 Papageorghiou 2004, p. 10. By way of comparison, England in those times had a population 
of approximately 5 million. 
3
 Stavrianos 2002, p. 124. 
4
 Ibid., pp 215-513; Lewis 2002, pp. 37-357. 
5
 Inalcik 1995, p. 80. It seems that the economic decline in Cyprus started even before the Ottoman era, 
largely as a resuit of the discovery of new sea routes around the hom of Africa, resulting in the 
decreased economic significance of the Mediterranean - see Jenness 1962, pp 44-45. 
6
 Inalcik 1995, p. 82. The same author explains the difficulties of the Cyprus expédition and the 
subséquent changes in the military balance of power in the area. 
7
 The new type of battleship of the Dutch and the English was much more powerful than the Ottoman 
galeras; the increased taxation necessary for financing the changeover was to add to the financial strains 
of the Empire: "in actual fact the Empire had surpassed the limits dictated by its material capabilities" 
(Inalcik op. cit., p 84). 
8
 Quataert 2005, p. 37. 
9
 Stavrianos 2002, p. 136. 
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 In 1566 and 1569; see Kyrris 1976 pp. 2 4 7 - 2 4 8 . 
1 1
 G. Diedo in Cobham 1908, p. 92. The Venetians began worrying about the possibility of an uprising of 
the locals: When a small movement against them did start off in one of the villages (Lefkara), they 
quickly put it down, killing some 400 men, so as to stop it spreading to the rest of the island. Even when 
it came to the defence of the capital, the mass of the peasants proved unwilling to "come to Nicosia to 
fight under the orders of the Venetians whom they hated" (Hadjidemetriou 2002, p. 261). So the 
Venetians had to utilize mostly city résidents in the battles. It is interesting how even in the hour of 
crisis the tensions between the Venetian masters and the Orthodox natives was manifest: during the siege, 
the Latins made a vow to build a church dedicated to the Holy Virgin, whose protection they sought. The 
natives, however, refused to contribute because the church that was going to be built would be Catholic 
(ibid. p 263). In a crucial instance of the attack, a Latin bishop urged all Christians to join their strength 
and "resist the fury of the barbarians, who sought [...] to profane their altars, trample down their religion 
and turn their churches into foul dens of a false faith" (Cobham op. cit., p. 95). 
1 2
 Calepio, head of the Cypriot Dominicans. and eye witness of the battles, gives a vivd description of 
the violence and pain involved: everywhere was "heard nothing but the ceaseless wailing of poor 
women parted from their husbands, the shrieks of children torn from their mothers' arms. the sighs of the 
wretched fathers which mounted to the very heavens, the cries of maidens and lads who saw themselves 
separated from their parents [...]. Any man or woman who resisted was killed. The victors kept cutting off 
the heads of old women [...] split open the heads of men already surrendered. Did a prisoner try to escape 
he was caught up and his legs cut off Churches were desecrated, altarsstripped, sacred pictures burnt, tombs 
opened, and those who took refuge in the Churches slain"... (Cobham op. cit., p. 140) 
1 3
 The most quoted incident used to demonstrate the savage brutality of the Ottomans being the 
flaying alive of the Venetian commander Marc Antony Bragadino; but the city's surrender did 
actually save it from total destruction. 
1 4
 Alastos 1976, p. 194. 
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1 5
 Karambelias 2006, pp 101-103. Karambelias quotes the Latin conquest, Nikitas Choniatis, who writes 
of a three day orgy of lootings, killings, rapes, kidnappings and so on; comparing these with the 
Saracenean conquest of Jerusalem, Choniates notes that the latter's behaviour was more humane, and they 
did not touch the Christian women nor did they desecrated the religious sites of the Christians - unlike the 
Latins' treatment of their co-religionists in Constantinople. 
1 6
 Stavrianos 2002, p. 60. 
1 7
 Inalcik 1969, p. 120. 
1 8
 Ibid., p. 121. 
1 9
 Appointed officials (assisted by locals of the lower classes, but also by some Frankish and Venetian 
nobles who survived and showed readiness to collaborate) went from village to village, collecting 
information on the households and livestock, the extent of lands and its fertility and the crops 
produced in the past three years — and estimated the average annual income: this information was 
recorded in account books; they also counted the tax-paying, male population (ibid, p. 123; 
Hadjidemetriou 2002, p. 273). 
2 0
 Grillo 1998, pp. 76-81. 
2 1
 The original Arabic term meaning 'cattle at pasture' - the peasant subjects of the Sultan: Gibb and 
Bowen 2005, pp 309, 370; Grillo op. cit., p. 78. 
2 2
 Grillo op.cit., pp. 76-81. 
2 3
 From the Arab word "dimma", contract; dimmis were thus people protected by compact: Grillo 
op.cit. p. 79. 
2 4
 Marx, Selected Correspondence p. 81, quoted in Anderson 1974, p. 365 fn 7. 
2 5
 Gibb and Bowen 2005, pp. 84-106. 
2 6
 The main category of state (miri) land was the timar, which was divided in various sub­
categories. The size of the plot determined the obligation of the holder (e.g. for every 3,000 aspers, 
the timariot had to provide an additional horseman). Holders of high military offices and higher-
ranking government officials received bigger plots, and the grand Vizir the biggest (Gazioglu 
1990, p. 128; Quataert 2005, p. 29) 
2 7
 Anderson 1974, p. 368. 
2 8
 Ibid., p. 369. 
2 9
 Ibid. Furthermore, timar-hotders depended on the dues paid to them by the peasant cultivators of their 
timars, so they had an obvious interest in the prosperity of the producers: The amounts paid were fixed 
by the Porte and not by the timariots, so as to prevent arbitrary determination by the latter. 
3 0
 Stavrianos 2002, p. 100. 
3 1
 Mouzelis 1978, p. 4. This absolute authority is what Weber called "Sultanism": "Where domination is 
primarily traditional, even though it is exercised by virtue of the ruler's personal autonomy, it will be 
called patrimonial authority; where it operates primarily on the basis of discretion, it will be called 
Sultanism". In practice, of course, no Sultan operated in a completely arbitrary manner, but had to take 
into consideration custom-bound norms and institutions . Weber noted this, but stressed the Sultan's 
ultimate power of discretion: "Sometimes it appears that Sultanism is completely unrestrained by 
tradition, but this is never in fact the case. The non-traditional element is not, however, rationalized in 
impersonal terms, but consists only in an extreme development of the ruler's discretion. It is this which 
distinguishes it from every form of rational authority". Economy and Society, I, p. 232. *But see Quataert 
p. 321 for a different reading. 
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3 2
 The overall impact was very favourable to the peasants. As Anderson notes, during the 151hand 16th 
centuries, "the peasantry found itself delivered from increasing servile dégradation and seigniorial 
exploitation under its Christian rulers, and transferred to a social condition that was paradoxically in most 
respects milder and freer than anywhere else in Eastern Europe at the time": Anderson 1974, p. 371. 
3 3
 Kyrris 1985, p. 253. A lump sum had to be paid initially, amounting to 1/10-1/3 of their annual 
produce; plus a yearly rent amounting to 45%-67% in kìnd. This reduced the status of ownership of land 
to that of perpetual lease and usufruct. Indeed Ottoman Land Law (Artide 8(i)) provided that the "land of 
a village or town" was to be divided into "separate plots [...] granted to each inhabitant and a title-deed 
[...] given to each owner showing his right of possession". An owner by title-deed could transfer his land, 
after officiai permission, to someone else - either for a fixed price or as a gift (to his heirs or others). 
(Gazioglu 1990, p. 125) 
3 4
 Inalcik 1969, p. 74. 
3 5
 Kyrris 1985, p. 253; this was not so in earlier times: Inalcik links this relative freedom to 
population growth in the 16 , h Century, so that "the laws against who left the land became less 
stringent, encouraging the flow of population from the villages to the towns" (Inalcik 1995, p. 111). 
When, however, they left timar lands uncultivated, in moving elsewhere, they were obliged to pay 
an annual fixed penalty fee. In case, however, the reaya's absence went unnoticed, or the sipahi was 
evaded, for 15 years, no penalty fee was thereafter necessary, and he became a legal resident in the new 
place he moved to (Jennings 1993,p. 120). 
3 6
 Inalcik 1969, pp. 125-136; Gazioglu op.cit., pp. 175-186. 
3 7
 Braudel 1978, p 663 (Vol II); Jennings p. 241. This class was the parici, "who made up over 80% of 
the island's population", and whose status was virtually that of slaves (Jennings op.cit., p. 240) 
3 8
 Jennings, pp. 115-121. 
3 9
 Ibid., p. 132. 
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4 2
 Similarly the testimony of two non-Muslim eyewitnesses against Muslims was not accepted as sure 
proof, as was the case with Muslims. 
4 3
 Jennings op. cit., p. 133. 
4 4
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4 5
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4 6
 The term mulet derives from milla, which in the Koran stood for religion; when used with the definite 
article, "the religion", it meant Islam. In Ottoman Turkish milla/millet meant "religious community"; in 
modem Turkish (and Persian) it has come to mean 'nation' (Grillo op. cit., p. 87). 
4 7
 Stavrianos 2002, p. 104. As vizir the Patriarch enjoyed privilèges and récognition due to Ottoman 
officiais - for instance, he could ride a horse, something which other Christians were not allowed to do. 
4 8
 Runciman 1988, pp 168-169. 
4 9
 Sharing a written scripture, a holy word of révélation. This special tax was originally a land tax, then 
turned into a head tax, and finally into a military exemption tax (harac-cizye). Karpat 1982, p. 148. 
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 On the millet system see Karpat 1973, pp. 31-40. 
5 1
 Respectively the use of Greek proved a serious hurdle for non-Greek speakers. For instance, in the 
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Balkans "the replacement of Slavonic by Greek in the churches rriade the service incompréhensible to 
most faithful, excluded Slav-speakers from high church offices, and made résistance to the Ottomans 
more diffïcult". That is why Slav historians of Ottoman Balkans, speak about the "double yoke" of their 
countries - "the political-economic of the Ottomans, and the religious-linguistic of the Greeks": Sugar 
1969, p. 30. 
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 Ibid., p. 30. 
5 3
 Karpat 1982, p. 37. 
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 Karpat 1973, p. 13. 
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 Karpat 1973, p. 38. 
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 According to Quataert, before this time the term millet was used to refer to "Muslims within the 
empire and Christians outside it": Quataert 2005, p. 176. 
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 Findleyl980, p. 21. 
6 2
 Braude 1982, p. 74. 
6 3
 Grillo 1998, p 88. Ursinus points out that although the term 'millet' in the fifteenth Century referred 
to Muslims only, by the seventeenth Century it had "become an accepted dement in the administrative 
language of the central bureaucracy to indicate the non-Muslim religious communities of the Ottoman 
Empire" - quoted in Grillo op. cit., p. 88. 
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 Kyprianou 2001, p. 455. 
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 Inalcik 1995, pp. 82-83. 
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 Michael 2005, pp 37-38; Inalcik 1969, p 121. 
7 3
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 Ibid., pp 116-117. Michael notes as a further reason for approaching the West a certain acceptance of 
the Catholic doctrine by some Cypriot high prelates. Kyrris reminds us that some of the latter were of 
Latin extraction and maintained close relationships with other Latins in the West. 
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 Michael 2005, pp. 103-111. 
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76 Ibid., p 105. 
7 7
 Michael op. cit., p. 108. Of course the prelates were to some extend expected to play such a rôle from 
the start, and to some extent they did play it. But the fact that very often Ottoman décisions were 
repeated demonstrates the need for a principle to be re-affirmed possibly because it had been 
forgotten through lime, or submerged under new developments. Usually, as well, répétition of a 
principle entailed its clarification or its strengthening - as it did in the case under considération. 
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 Michael op. cit., pp 85-91; Jennings op. cit., pp 69-106. 
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8 6
 Together with the lands of the Evkaf and of the chiftliks, ail large estâtes "amounted to 23.3% of 
total agricultural land in 1844". Sant Cassia 1986, p 10. 
8 7
 The term para meant money, here obviously implying "the peasant's last penny". 
8 8
 Cobham 1908, p. 449. 
8 9
 Sant Cassia 1986, p. 11. 
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9 5
 Ibid., p. 59. 
% I b i d p.,pp 129-130. 
9 7
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 Stoianovich 1960. 
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 By the end of the eighteenth century strong groups of Greek and Armenian merchants in 
Constantinople did manage to convince the Sultan to extend to Ottoman subjects the benefïts of reduced 
tariffs - while increasing the latter for Western merchants (Hasiotis 2005, p. 52). 
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 Obversely this had disastrous politicai effects for the Moslem merchants who had dominated trade in 
the area ever since Constantinople passed to the Ottomans 
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bishops or influence the choice of Patriarch. Overall Greek economie power translated into greater 
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 Attracted here by the pro-Orthodox policies of Peter the Great and especially, subsequently, of 
Catherine II. 
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and lent money frequently" (Jennings 1993, p. 388). It is significant that sipahis were not so involved 
with trade, an indication of the lower status attached to the latter. 
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 In later years ànd in areas where the Cypriot Orthodox communities grew more numerous, they were 
to gradually set up their own coffeeshops and even churches, although schools were to continue to be 
mostly common with Greeks from, what came to be known as, the 'mainland'. 
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 Initially most of the teachers were clergy but increasingly secular logioi were used (Hassiotis 2001, pp 
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monk he promoted was his relative. Incidentally the incident demonstrates the impressive power of the 
Patriarch (even against as high an Ottoman high ranking offïcer as the grand Vezir), and the considérable 
autonomy of the Church in running its own affairs. What it does not demonstrate, contra Kyrris, is a 
préférence for a co-national than a non-national, since such distinctions were still not important; in this 
particular case the significant criterion was knowledge of the Greek language, which was the language of 
the liturgy which is at the heart of Orthodoxy. 
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printing office dates back to 1627 (S. Xydis, in Sugar 1969, p. 212). 
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 The first Bulgarian book was printed only in 1810 (Pundeff, in Sugar 1969 p. 93). 
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 Jews and Armenians were also printing books since the sixteenth century, but since the first could not 
influence Orthodox Christians, and the position of. the Armenians rendered them marginal to 
developments, Greek was effectively the language to influence other ethnicities (Tsoukalas 1977, p. 36) 
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 Since women remained in the background, serving their families, they did not have to follow social 
trends, and thus generally remained unilingual, contributing in this way to the préservation of the ethnie 
identity of their group of origin (Stoianovich op. cit., p. 290). 
1 3 5
 Following the Ottoman conquest of Serbia in 1459, the Serbian Patriarchate was put to an end; it was, 
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Moldavia (1819-21), who was initiated imo the Philiki Etairia and was active in the politics of 
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 The existence of the paroikìes became a pole of attraction for young people in the Ottoman occupied 
territories since there where hardly any opportunities for studies in their lands. In Cyprus for instance, 
Richard Pockoke, a visitor to Cyprus, in 1738, reported that young people who worked during the day had 
the chance of attending monasteries in the evening so as to learn how to read and sign psalms from the 
liturgy: Philippou 2000, p. 42. The paroikìes provided a supporting environment for those who joined 
them for studies. 
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 In the case of Cypriot logioi, we find a small number who not only studied in cities where there were 
diaspora communities, but even taught at locai schools or universities themselves; some published works 
influenced by the spirit of the times. An early example was Iason Denores who studied at the University 
of Padua in the last years of Venetian rule, returned to Cyprus but left again right after the Ottoman 
occupation, ending up teaching at the same university and publishing studies on ancient phìlosophers (an 
introduction to Cicero's Philosophy and an introduction to Aristotle's Rhetoric). Another interesting case 
is that of Ilarion Kigalas (1624-1681), born in Nicosia to a father who was apriest and also a notary to the 
Archbishopric. He attended the Greek Gymnasium in Rome and subsequently became the head of a 
secondary school founded by a man from Verroia, in Thessaly, Greece. A few years after he "toured the 
East, founding schools", including one in Kefallinia (1663). Three years later he was appointed by the 
Patriarch of Constantinople as director of ali Greek Orthodox school teachers (exarchos ton apantaxou 
didaskalon ) apparently a post much like a Minister of Education of the times. Finally he returned to 
Cyprus where he became Archbishop in 1674, and died of an illness three years after. What is interesting 
in Kigalas' case is the implied unity of the Greek Orthodox imagined community of the time, that made it 
possible for a Cypriot to be head of a school founded by a man from Thessaly, and then tour Greek 
speaking lands to establish schools there. Equally interesting is the Patriarchate's concern with education 
and with his decisión to appoint someone to oversee the work of teachers; and yet progress in these 
difficult years was not easily forthcoming. For details on the above and other Cypriots who studied in 
Europe during Ottoman rule, see Philippou 2000. 
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 Other logioi included Ianos Laskaris (late IS* century) who worked on publishing the works of Greek 
classics; Demetris Chalcocondylis who taught Greek language and philosophy in the University of Padua; 
Constantinos Laskaris who wrote the first Greek language grammar and so on: See Koumarianou 2006, 
vol.8,pp 145-148. 
1 4 5
 Incidentally, this meant that Greece would progress into the Neohellenic Enlightenment phase, without 
first gaining from the experience of a full fletched Renaissance. 
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 Kitromilides 1994,1 pp 52-57, IV pp 669-671, X pp. 77-78. 
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 Kitromilides 1994, XI p. 152. 
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 See Kitromilides 1994, IV pp. 667-676 for details on Balkan Hellenized logioi, such as Iosippos 
Mosiodax. 
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 Though Kyprianou is not always successful in this, Philippou's judgement that Kyprianou's work is 
rendered almost worthless of historical valué is too extreme (Philippou 2000, p. 114); see Kitromilides 
1999, pp. 118-122 for a much more positive and balanced assessment. 
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 ..."na evdokimisoun is mimisin ton axiomimiton katorthomaton ton Endoxon, opou is autin tin Patrida 
sou inthisan kai thi aftin eprospathisan": Kyprianou 2001, p. xiv. 
1 5 1
 Kyprianou pp 12-13. Some comparisons of how Greece and the Greek world were imagined, would 
be of interest. An early attempi by Meletios Mitros in his "Old and New Geography" (Palea kai Nea 
Geographia) (1728) utilized ancient geographers' (e.g. Stravon's) accounts of Greece, and ended up 
excluding Thrace and the east Aegean and the Ionians (which his sources linked to Minor Asia); Cyprus 
was similarly excluded. The Philippides brothers published their Modernis Geography (Neoteriki 
Geographia) in 1791 ; utilizing criteria of religión, languages and demography they distinguished between 
the European and Asiatic Greek world and included Cyprus in the latter. Finally in Fereos' "Map of 
Greece" (Xarta Ellados), a historical delineation of ancient Greece and its colonies is used, plus elements 
from other historical periods, such as Byzantine Greece, as well as the new 'colonies' of Greece 
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associated with the Phanariotes' présence in the Balkans (e.g. Moldavia): Fereos was attempting to 
diachronically integrate the pre-national Greek space, depicting the areas in which the Greek Orthodox in 
Ottoman controlled lands predominated. Cyprus is not included. Yet in the 1881 reprint of the "Xarta", 
Cyprus is included. Indeed in his New Poîiiicaî Administration (Nea Politiki Dioikisi) Fereos defines 
Greeks as "the people, descendants of Greeks who [now] live in Roumeli, Minor Asia, the Mediterranean 
Islands" and other Ottoman occupied lands where Greeks were a majority. 
1 5 2
 Kyprianou p.75. 
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 Ibid.,p.75. 
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 Ibid., p.76; see also p.61, p.92. 
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 Ibid, p.496. Elsewhere (p. viii and p. 590) he refers to the ancient Greeks as those "named Gods" 
(onomasthenton Theon). 
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 See for example his treatment of the Greek gênerai Kimon, whom he présents as interested only in the 
libération of the Greek-ruled cities of Cyprus, and not of Cyprus as a whole (pp 113-115). Or his account 
of Evagoras, whom he does not associate with Greekness or any particular love of Greece (pp 115-119). 
Finally his treatment of Helen Palaiologa from Moreas, as a Roman, boni to a Roman father and with 
Roman characteristics (pp 308), which he does not relate to the Hellènes in any way. 
1 5 7
 Ibid, pp. 25,35. 
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 Ibid, p. 99. 
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 Ibid, p.100. 
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 Ibid., XIV. 
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 From the report of the police director of Budapest J. Fr. Von Pucher, quoted in Myaris, p. 6. 
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 Fereos' text followed the more radical 1793 version of the French Constitution. 
Stoianovich, p. 308. Moreover, the insurrectionist plans were revealed to the Austrian authorities by a 
Greek merchant from Trieste. 
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 Kitromilides 1999, p. 459; Stoianovich op. cit., p. 308. 
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 Papageorghiou 2004, pp. 84-90. 
1 6 6
 Freemansory's origins go back to the medieval guilds of masons (builders), especially of cathedral 
churches. It grew to great strength in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Its teachings focus on the 
great moral principles, charity and obédience to the laws of a country. Since in many countries, 
especially Catholic, their membership included many anticlericalists and free thinkers, Masonic societies 
came to be associated with national libération movements. 
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 Protopsalti 1971, p. 11; Campbell and Sherrard 1968, p. 60. 
1 6 8
 Protopsaltis, p.101 fn3. Archbishop Kyprianos has no connection to the 'historian' Archimandrite 
Kyprianos, (author of Chronological History of Cyprus). 
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 Hadjidemetriou op. cit., p. 306. 
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 Ibid., p. 306. Nicolaos put the family commercial company in the service of the Philike through 
facilitating the trave! of European Phillellenes to Greece. 
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 Hadjidemetriou 2002, p. 307. 
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1 7 2
 Peristiani 2000, pp 779 - 781, 783. Other sources hold that the meeting took place in Marseilles (thus 
the document is referred to either as the Rome or the Marseilles Manifesto). Hill 1952, pp. 136-137; 
Koumoulides, pp. 78-80. 
1 7 3
 Samaras 1999, p.9. Historical data indicate that approximately 1,000 Cypriots took part in the Greek 
revolution - a very high number considering the small size of Cyprus, the pre-modem economy, means of 
transport and communication, low levels of secularization - and ali other indices associated with the rise 
of national ideas and awareness. Pollis underplays the significance of this fact, alleging that the Cypriots 
who took part in the Greek War of Independence "were few and seemed to be 'mercenaries' rather than 
national ists", and that their motives ranged from "profit, adventure, glory and perhaps occasionally 
commitment to Greek nationalism". Pollis 1976 pp 51, 58. 
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 S. Papageorghiou 2004, pp. 79-83. 
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 Kordatos 1973; Papageorghion 2004. 
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 Kitromilides 1994, XII. pp. 8-10. 
1 7 7
 Campbell and Sherrard 1968, p. 65. 
1 7 8
 Michael 2005, pp 230-240. Michael re-interprets and revises previous mainstream views which took it 
for granted that the Archbishop was in support of Philike's views and objectives (see, for instance 
Koumoulides op. cit., pp 41-42; Hill 1952, p. 124, Protopsalti 1971 ; Papageorghiou 1977. 
1 7 9
 Michael 2005, pp. 226-230. 
ISO The founding document is provided in Persianis and Polyviou 1992, pp. 91-92. 
1 8 1
 Katsiaounis 1996, p. 18; Michael 2005, pp 232-234. In the same circular he wams the bishop of 
Kition to be especially cautious of freemasonry, obviously because Larnaka, his diocèse, hosted most 
merchants - among the ranks of which masonry was more populär. Apparently the denunciation of 
freemasonry in Cyprus was "the most fierce throughout the Greek world", which denotes the more 
conservative stance of the local Church but also that freemasonry in Cyprus was enough of a threat to 
cause the Church to react so violently (Katsiaounis op. cit). 
1 8 2
 Officiai Greek historiography has assumed that he was made part of thèse plans and that he only 
promised financial help because Greece was too far and Turkey too close to Cyprus - see note 177 
above. 
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 Kyrris 1985, p. 279; Luke 1989 pp 128-133; Dionysiou 2006, pp. 454-456. 
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 Attalides 1979, p. 25. 
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 The letter is provided in Dionysiou 2006, p. 461.. 
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 Ibid., p. 463. 
1 8 7
 The causes of the uprisings seem to have been primarily related to economie considérations and 
especially a new increase in taxation. The contribution of the ethnie dimension, to the extent that there 
was any, must have been very small; in the case òf the Theseas uprising, for instance, both Christian and 
Muslim peasants were involved, thus the ethnie factor could not have been significant; furthermore, the 
grudges of the protestors were partly directed against the Orthodox Church and its perceived role in 
taxation. It is important to note that the Archbishop clearly condemned Theseas' "pro-national ideas", 
indicating that the Church leadership was either negatively disposed towards nationalist doctrines, or 
simply careful for fear of the Ottomans (Katsiaounis 1996, p. 20; see also Georgis 1995, pp. 183-185). 
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As part of the Tanzimat reforms there was an effort to ban the tax farming system but, as elsewhere in 
the Empire, little was accomplished in conséquence of fierce reactions (in Cyprus such reactions came 
primarily from Christian landowners acting as tax farmers!). 
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Stavrianos 2002, pp. 381-392; 
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 Many "causes" facilitated this shift, starting from "internai" ones, such as the type of économie 
development and the character of the social structure, the distribution of power between the various classes 
and groups, the social conflicts and alignment of interests and so on; but equally important was the 
influence of "external" factors, such as the European powers and their policies, especially as regards the 
future of the "Sick Man of Europe" - i.e. the Ottoman empire and its graduai dismemberment. 
191 Kitromilides 1994, XII pp. 10-14. 
1 9 2
 Quoted in Clogg 1992, p. 47. Interestingly Kolettis himself was a "Hellenized Vlach", who shortly 
afterwards was to become Prime-Minister of Greece. 
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 Put differently the vision entailed a take-over of the ailing Ottoman Empire by the Greeks - its most 
dynamic élément at the time. 
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 Kitromilides 1994, XI pp. 160-170. 
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 Ibid., p. 170. 
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 For instance, at the inauguration of the Greek embassy and the first raising of the Greek flag, there was 
such jubilation by the Cypriots that the Ottoman authorities were upset; the Greek consul noted how it 
proved impossible for him to "control the passion and excitement" of the local "co-nationals" 
(omogenois, of the same genos), who "unfortunately exposed themselves, damaging their best interest" 
(Report of the first Greek consul in Cyprus, D. Margaritis, to the Foreign Ministry of Greece, cited in 
Georgis 1995, p. 167). Indeed, the Greek Prime Minister Ioannis Kolettis found the formai célébration of 
the inauguration needless and asked the consul to be cautious with Ottoman feelings in future (see Belia 
1969, p. 246). 
1 9 7
 The General Assembly was presided by the Archbishop, and had as members the bishops, the elders 
and other lay représentatives; the Town Committees were composed of the Bishop and six laymen: 
Persianis 1978, pp. 73-74. Some authors propose that the system was modelled on the Second National 
Assembly of Greece, which met in 1823 and introduced the norms of indirect democracy. Persianis 2006 
p. 133. Anagnostopoulou (2003) links it to the Tanzimat Reforms. 
1 9 8
 Characteristically, while in 1839 there were only 10 Greek schools, by 1878 the number went up to 76. 
Kitromilides proposes that the traditional policy of toleration toward the religions of the Book, reinforced 
by the reformist spirit of Tanzimat era, allowed the space for nationalist ideas to be cultivated through 
éducation and cultural institutions (such as the public reading rooms): Kitromilides 1990, p. 9. 
1 9 9
 Kitromilides 1994, XI pp. 177. The Patriarch was executed by the Ottomans not because he consented 
or encouraged the Revolution, but because he had not managed to contain it, as was his duty. 
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 Katsiaounis 1996, p. 18. 
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 Ibid. 
Quoted in Katsiaounis 1996, p. 18. Hence, contrary to mainstream aecounts, Archbishop Kyprianos 
was hanged on 9 July 1821, not because he instigated nationalist ideas, following a nationalist cause. It 
rather seems he was trying to keep a distance from radical or subversive (to Ottoman authority) actions; 
he was rather the unfortunate victim of the governor's jealousy, as a conséquence of the Church's rising 
prominence and power. 
2 0 3
 Ibid., pp. 18-19. 
2 0 4
 Ibid., p. 20. 
2 0 5
 Greece in 1833, Romania in 1865, Bulgaria in 1865, and Albania in 1932. 
2 0 6
 Quoted in Kitromilides 1994, XI pp 181-182. 
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Ibid., pp. 183-184. Kitromilides translates the term phyleticism, in the text, to racism, but I have 
retained the original Greek term judging that racism has other connotations. 
2 0 8
 Katsiaounis 1996, pp. 15-17. 
2 0 9
 Limassol had no actual consuls but consular agents instead, who were mostly local Cypriots, with no 
roots or connections to Europe. There were also a large number of résidents who required Greek 
nationality. These groups formed the "nucleous of nationalist sentiment", both in the town of Limassol 
and the wider district (Katsiaounis 1996, p. 41). 
2 1 0
 The town also hosted the Ionian consulate since 1801, which represented the interests of the locai 
Ionians, most of whom distinguished themselves as merchants. Finally it hosted most other consulates of 
the various European countries. 
2 1 1
 Thus known as the Kitiakon Zitima, the problem of Kition: For détails on the significance of this issue 
for socio-political developments, and as a precursor to the Archbishopric Issue which was to follow with 
the dawn of the twentieth Century (1900-1910), see Michael 2005, pp 286-294, and Anagnostopoulou 
2003, pp. 366-368. 
2 1 2
 Katsiaounis 1996, p. 52. 
2 1 3
 Quoted in Katsiaounis op. cit., p.51. 
5
 Ibid. 
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Notes to chapter 4 
I
 Bruce Hall 1999, p. 215. The peak of empire expansion was reached in the years after WWI, "when it 
covered a fifth of the world's land surface and incorporated a quarter of the world's people": Kumar 
2003, p. 235. 
2 Wight l946 , p. 61. 
3 Ibid.,pp 28-65. 
4
 Grillo 1998, pp 98, 117. Grillo notes that in this aspect European colonial powers foreshadowed 
modem nation-states. 
5Demetriadou 1998, p. 6. 
6
 See the complilation on Rokkan's work provided by P. Flora et al (ed.) 1999, especially 47-49, 290-292, 
307-312 and 334-339. Rokkan proposes that cleavages are tension-ridden divisions, which give rise to 
"especially strong and long-term conflicts, rooted in social structure", which "tend to polarize the politics 
of any given system". Cleavages emerged at "criticai junctures", or periods of radicai change in the 
development of politicai Systems. Bartolini (2000, pp 15-25) suggests that we should see a cleavage not 
as a descriptive concept, of a concrete reality, but as a link between social structure and politicai order. A 
cleavage has three dimensions: (a) a social constituency (the empirical referent, defined in socio-
structural terms - e.g. the workers); (b) an organisational network (of institutions, such as politicai 
parties), which develop as part of a cleavage; (c) a normative or cultural dimension (constituting a set of 
values, beliefs, identities and the group consiousness of members involved ). Thus, a cleavage is a diving 
line in a polity, combining ali three above aspects. 
7
 Obviously the two processes fed imo each other and it is this interplay between the two which can help 
us better understand developments in this period. The two processes will be separated for analytical 
purposes and the clarity of the présentation, but the complexity of social reality must always be borne in 
mind. 
8
 The text of Wolseley's proclamation is cited in Zannettos 1977, pp 43-44. The proclamation was made 
in Larnaka, where Wolseley had arrived by boat, on July 22, 1878. 
9
 Meanwhile Wolseley visited Famagusta (July 24), Limassol (July 25); in Nicosia (July 30) he was 
greeted by the Archbishop as officiai leader of the Christian community. 
1 0
 The Turkish Cypriot représentative gave a separate speech. 
I I
 Other versions of the events have the Archbishop deliver the first speech in Larnaka; again some 
versions include, as part of the welcoming address of the Greek Cypriot représentative, a stronger and 
specific référence to enosis, which spelled out that the Greek population: 
"accept the change of Government inasmuch as we trust that England will help Cyprus, as it dìd the 
Ionian Islands, to be united with Mother Greece, with which it is naturally connected" (Hill IV, p. 
297). 
A lot of controversy has revolved around which are the actual historical "facts": Obviously a more 
'nationalisa reading would assume the Archbishop as ethnarch to be the one involved in this first and 
symbolically significant encounter with the colonizer, and would furthermore expect the ethnarch to have 
spelled out very clearly that the 'consent* of the Greek Cypriots to the new rulers, was given only 
temporarily and provisionally, on the understanding that soon the island would be handed over to Greece. 
Katsiaounis has argued that the contested quote was in fact 'invented' by the nationalist members of the 
Legislative Council in 1903 (Katsiaounis 1996, p. 27). The controversy also has to do with the dating of 
nationalism, as against national awareness, in Cyprus, and thus the periodisation involved - which 
obviously relates to the validity of différent theoretical perspectives accounting for national phenomena. 
The fact is that strong statements specifically referring to enosis do seem to have been made by other 
Greek Cypriot représentatives in the other towns (such as in Limassol). But at this stage such requests 
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were certainly not so intensely made, as subsequently, when nationalism became the more widespread 
orthodoxy for the Greek Cypriots. 
1 2
 The text is cited in Zannettos 1977, pp 46-47. Demetriadou 1998, pp 46-52, includes much material 
which clarifies who said what, and provides a balanced explanation of the errors made and the rationales 
involved in the various accounts. 
1 3
 Kitromilides 1994, XII pp. 17-18. 
1 4
 Demetriadou 1998, p. 52. 
1 5
 For servicing the 1855 Crimean War Loan. 
1 6
 "In the old empire every colonial legislature was représentative, and aspired to the condition of the 
British constitution; in the new empire, where the colonies startjed] from less exalted premises, and 
[could not] claim the full rights of Englishmen, it [was] représentative government itself that [was] the 
general goal, and every colonial legislature aspire[d] to an elected majority." Wight 1946, pp. 72-73. Of 
course in the old empire settled colonies would not be governed or taxed - or pay a tribute for that matter, 
without the agreement of a représentative assembly (Ibid., p. 26). 
1 7
 Holland and Markides 2006, p. 163. 
1 8
 Demetriadou op. cit., pp. 78-104. 
1 9
 Ibid., pp. 19-28. 
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 Scott-Stevenson 1880, p. 300. 
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 Cavendish 1992, p. 49. 
2 2
 Ibid., p. 55. 
2 3
 Salisbury to Biddulph, 4 July 1879, F0421/32, quoted in Holland and Markides 2006, p.166. 
2 4
 Ibid. Greek sources clarify that the request was to make Greek one of the officiai languages. 
2 5
 Wolseley to Salisbury No. 20 Jan 13,1879. SA. GS/1, quoted in Demetriadou p. 58. 
2 6
 Wolseley to Layard, Aug 1, 1878, BLM, Add. MSS 39021: 149, quoted in Demetriadou op.cit. p. 58. 
2 7
 Ibid., p. 59. 
2 8
 Ibid., p. 63. 
2 9
 Gladstone 1880, pp. 288-9. 
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 Orr 1918,p. 163. 
3 1
 On the early debates on the "Greekness" of Cyprus, see Emilianides 1992. 
3 2
 Asmussen 2006, p. 172. 
3 3
 Furnival 1948, pp. 304-308. 
3 4
 Wight 1946, p. 89. 
3 5
 Ibid p. 88. India followed in 1909, Ceylon in 1910, Kenya in 1923, the Straits Settlements in 1924, and 
Fiji in 1929. 
3 6
 Henry Hall (1937). The Colonial Office, London: Longmans, p. 245, quoted in Barham 1982, p. 48 
335 
3 7
 Kimberley to Biddulph. Oct 27, 1881 PRO. CO. 883/2, quoted in Demetriadou 1998, p. 133. 
Interestingly the Colonial Office secrétariat objected not so much for the représentation of the Turkish 
Cypriots but for the possibility that the majority votes of the Greek Cypriots would be sending to the 
Council members who would be strongly anti-British! 
3 8
 Demetriadou op. cit., p. 128. Actually in 1881 the Greek members resigned as a form of passive 
résistance to protest the way the Council functioned. 
3 9
 It is worth noting that Cyprus was the second country where représentative government in the new 
empire was tried; it was firstly established in the Leeward Islands (1871), subsequently in Cyprus, and 
thirdly in Malta (1887): Wight 19746, p. 77. 
4 0
 In 1906 the term for "non-Moslem" changed to "Christian", after strong pressures from the Greek 
Cypriots 
4 1
 As Georghallides recognizes, despite its limitations, the "establishment of a Legislative Council in 
which there was a majority of locally elected members with the right [...] to enact the annual budget and 
ail laws [...] was the simple most important reform which Britain introduced to effectively put Cyprus in 
an intermediate position between the colonies of British seulement and the African and Asian ones, where 
such powers would never have been given so soon after a British occupation": Georghallidesl988 [1979], 
pp 13-14. 
4 2
 Adamantia Pollis, for instance, has argued thus: "...the British took apolitical religious différences in 
Cyprus between Muslims and Eastern Orthodox and through indirect rule politicized them and 
transformed them into nationality groups". (Pollis 1979 p. 52). But in fact, as Nevzat argues, electoral 
politics on a communal basis had already been introduced in Cyprus after the Tanzimat reforms, and 
politicai représentation had already been along communal Unes. Furthermore the "British maintained 
much of the administrative institutional framework of the Ottomans, only gradually remoulding certain 
éléments"... Admittedly such divisions were not as highly politicized at the commencement of British 
rule compared to when they departed, but even their heightened politicization in the intermediate years 
cannot be solely attributed to British machinations". Nevzat 2005, pp. 112-114. 
4 3
 Report of Donoughmore Commission, quoted in Wight 1946, p. 90. 
4 4
 Rajasingham-Senanayake D. (1999), p. 115. 
4 5
 Great Britain, Public Record Office, C.O. 67/259, August 15, 1935, quoted in Barham 1982, p. 86. 
4 6
 Ibid., p. 87. 
4 7
 Ibid., p. 87. 
4 8
 Storrs 1939, p. 488. 
4 9
 "As if the handicaps of the Turkish Tribute and Greek nationalism were insufficient for a small, 
impoverished and highly-strung population, the Liberal Government had decided in 1882 to establish a 
Constitution on the basis of communal représentation": Ibid., p. 489. 
5 0
 For détails on the development of municipal administration see Shanis. 
5 1
 Indeed Greek Cypriot historical reports on municipal élections through history, présents this one case 
as an example of Greek Cypriot disunity and certainly a "national disgrâce". Papapolyviou 2003, pp 10-
13; 2008. 
5 2
 Markides 2001, p.13. 
5 3
 Ibid.,p.l3. 
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Ibid p. 15. In 1957 Turkish-Cypriots demanded a géographie area to come under their control; June '57 
Turkish-Cypriot municipal councilors resigned en masse from ali 5 major towns. 
" Markides 2001, p. 8. 
5 6
 Ibid., p. 6. 
5 7
 Theodoulou p. 53. A number of prelates did so join the Council - as for instance Bishops Kyprianos, 
Kyrillos and Nicodemos, all of Kition, as well as the Abbot of Kykkos Gerasimos. 
5 8
 Letter of Archbishop Sofronios (December 1894), cited in Hackett p. 264. 
5 9
 Theodoulou 2005, p. 51. 
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 Katsiaounis 1996, p. 77. 
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 Barham 1982, p. 95. 
6 2
 Persianis 1978, p. 49. 
6 3
 Governor of Cyprus to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 15 June 1933, C067/249/14 p. 125, quoted 
in Persianis 1978, p. 83. 
6 4
 Georgallides 1985, pp. 73-74. 
6 5
 See next section. 
^Given 1991, p. 15. 
6 7
 Ibid., p. 186. For a fuller élaboration of Given's position on the Eteocypriots see Given 1998; but see 
also the counter position of Petit (1999). 
6 8
 G. Hill 1972, vol. I, p. 94: "Obviously in the face of such a fact, attempts which have been made and 
will doubtless continue to be made, to prove that the Cypriots were pure Greeks, must be futile". 
6 9
 Ibid.,p.l6. 
7 0
 Storrs, in Georgallides 1985, p. 78. 
7 1
 Such was the reaction against the British attempt at questioning the Greek Cypriots' Greek culture and 
identity that many were weary of simply using the local Greek Cypriot dialect as a form of expression. 
Poetry written in the local dialect was thus turned down from Publishing, with the rationale that 
"historical reasons" dictated the use of (mainland) standard Greek - lest it served the efforts of the British 
to présent Greek Cypriots as a "spécial/unique nationality", with their own language, literature, traditions 
and so on. See Pavlou 2005, pp 317-333. 
7 2
 This was A. Sakkelarios' Cypriot Matters (Ta Kypriaka) (1855-1868). Back in 1841 the German 
scholar Wilhelm Engel had published a monograph on Cyprus (Kypros. Eine Monographie), in which he 
traced the origin of the Cypriots back to the Phoenician colonists, whom he considered the earlier settlers 
to leave their cultural mark on the island. Most subséquent studies, until the end of the nineteenth 
Century, adopted similar views, including the idea that the Phoenicians were an important influence on the 
whole early Greek civilization. In 1868 a Greek Cypriot theologian-come-prelate, Ieronymos 
Myriantheas, was the first local to argue the case for the Greek origins of the Cypriots (Peri ton Archaion 
Kyprion, Athens 1868); apparently 500 copies of his study sent to Cyprus were intercepted by the 
Ottoman authorities and burned. By the end of the ninenteenth Century, archaeologists and linguists 
would increasingly adopt the view that the Greeks were the earlier dominant culture on the island. 
7 3
 Kitromilides 1994, XII p 23; in fact the very first book written on Cyprus by a Greek after the Greek 
Revolution and the formation of the Greek state, was authored by the first consul of Greece in Cyprus D. 
Margaritis ("A dissertation on Cyprus, containing diverse information, constitutional, geographica! etc", 
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published in Athens in 1849); although Margaritis calls the Cypriots "omoethneis" (of the same 
ethnicity/nationality), the text itself does not try to trace any organie or historical connection between the 
Greek Cypriots and Greek mainland Greeks - as others would do, a few décades after. 
7 4
 Louka 1974: iß' [Intro, p.12]. Fallmerayer had the chance to witness the games Greek Cypriot children 
played, to attend a wedding and the wedding feast, and to visit the humble dwellings of shepherds and 
farmers: He got to listen to sounds, puzzles, proverbs and myths; in all cases he had to admit the 
continuity with ancient Greek customs and traditions. 
7 5
 As Herzfeld points out, Loukas is here making more advanced Claims than his Greek mainland 
counterparts, whose favourite metaphor was of Greece "resurrected" - as if it was meanwhüe dead. 
Loukas' metaphor implies ancient Greece had always been alive in Greek lands, such as Cyprus - and 
simply needed to be rediscovered by contemporaries: Herzfeld 1986, p. 95. 
76 Quoted in Katsiaounis 1996, p. 52. 
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 Ibid., pp. 181-182. 
7 8
 Kitromilides 1994, XIII pp. 4-14. 
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 The first was founded in 1869 and the second in 1861: Persianis 2006, p. 44. In December 1871 the 
latter asked for détails regarding schools in Cyprus (year of foundation, curriculum, textbook catalogue, 
teaching staff, resources and administration), so as to determine whether and how it could support them 
financially. 
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 Kitromilides 1994, XIII, p. 8. 
8 2
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8 3
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 E. Belia 1969, pp. 253 -254,248. 
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 Katsiaounis op. cit., p. 28. 
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 Persianis 1978, p. 56, f n 68. 
8 9
 Düring Ottoman years the Greek consul would circuiate newspapers from Greece to the various cultural 
clubs, but also to the houses of prominent primates or teachers, where groups of notables would gather to 
read and discuss the news together: Philippou 2000, p. 307. For more information on Constantinides and 
the first newspapers in Cyprus see Sofokleous 2007. 
90 See Sofokleous 1995,1998,2006, Vols I (1878-1890), II (1890-1900), and III (1900-1914). 
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 For instance, in 1872-73 there were 28 subscribers to the periodical 'Mentor', of Smyrna - among 
which the Cypriot Archbishop. Cypriot logioi published various works in Constantinople, Egypt, Sparta 
and others: Papaleontiou 2001, pp. 12-13. 
9 2
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January 1899, aiming to form a Pancyprian Politicai Committee: Zannettos 1977, III pp 53-54. These 
Cypriot organizations in Greece exerted considérable influence in Cyprus throughout its modem history -
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l 0 s
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pp 23-27). 
1 3 0
 This observation is also made by Constantinides 1995, p. 35, who, however, carries on completely 
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Year 
1923 
1924 
1926 
1927 
1929 
1932 
1938 
1949 
1952 
1956 
1961 
135 
Source: Christodoulou 1992, p.75. 
Bartolini 2000, pp. 502-522. 
Numbers Employed 
in Minerais and Mining 
605 
1,151 
1,207 
4,355 
6,098 
1,690 
9,200 
5,330 
6,585 
6,660 
5,300 
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initially defined itself as the organ of the 'Cyprus Workers' Party' (December 1922), then of the 'Cyprus 
Workers' and Peasants' Party' (June 1923), next of the 'Cyprus Workers' Party (Communist)' 
(November 1923), and finally of the 'Communist Party' (January 1924). Christodoulou 1992, pp. 251-
252. 
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joined forces wïth another small group, led by a Greek Cypriot (O Yiavopoulos), who studied medicine in 
Greece, where he had become a member of the newly found Communist Party of Greece. In 1925 the 
British expelled Yiavopoulos from Cyprus and K Christodoulides (Skeleas) became the head of the new 
party. In 1926 Ch Vatiliotis (Vatis), a Cypriot communist with considérable expérience in communist 
parties in Alexandria, Bulgaria and Greece (where currently residing), came to assist the young KKK and 
fili the gap left by Yiavopoulos. He was instrumental in organizing the Ist Pancyprian Congress of KKK, 
on 14 August 1926 - considered to be the officiai birth-day of the Cypriot communist left (Protopapas, 
2002, p. 34). For the early days of the Communist Party, see also Lefkis (1984) and Adams (1971). 
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subsequently AKEL, continued to underline the importance of international solidarity with the Turkish 
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Anorthotikon Komma Ergazomenou Laou (Progressive Party of the Working People); Sofocleous 
2003, pp. 215-220. See also Richter 2003, pp. 99-119. 
Even though AKEL was to take a stand on broader "national issues" from inception (see text above), 
it did not take a stand on Enosis itself. According to a report by two of its leading members (F Ioannou 
and A Ziartides) this was because of: firstly, the deeply held anti-Enosis feelings of the "communist 
wing" at the founding meeting; and second, because the "libéral petit-bourgeois" wing did not feel the 
existing conditions were conducive to an open struggle for national-libération (being that the unfree laws 
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on politicai parties were still formally in force, and there was uncertainty as to the stand the colonial 
authorities would take if a radical platform as regards Enosis was taken); quoted in Protopapas 2002, p. 
38 fh. 
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developments, or were even hostile towards the Allies' cause, due mostly to the economie problems of 
the island, the restriction of politicai freedoms, and the attitude of the British towards Enosis. Subséquent 
to Italy's attack against Greece (October 1940), however, most Greek Cypriots, especially the 
nationalists, changed their attitude, and passionately rallied for the allied cause, joining the British army 
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1 7 0
 The number of trade unions increased dramatically during this period. 
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times. 
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 Katsiaounis 2002, pp. 413-495. 
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 Fantis 2005, pp. 465-466, pp. 835-838. 
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 Katsiaounis 2002, pp. 490-495. The next step in this all-out confrontation came through economie 
warfare: The extreme nationalists called on ail "nationally-minded" Greek Cypriots to stop employing 
left wing workers, not to advertise in leftist newspapers, not to attend cinemas and theatre-halls owned by 
communists, and similar; after some initial hésitation, the Left decided to return the fire, asking its 
supporters to buy only from leftists: "not even a penny from the hand of a laikos to the pocket of a 
reactionary": See interview of A. Fantis in Peristianis 2004. 
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 Kitromilides 1994, XII pp. 24-30. 
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 Katsis 2005, pp. 47-54, 81-83. In a stränge way this may have been one of the main reasons why 
AKEL managed to survive and maintain its strength ever since. The case of the Greek Communist Party 
provides an interesting comparison; KKE attempted to gain hegemony through a military contest against 
the established forces of the Right, assisted by the British. Since with Yalta's agreement Greece feil in 
the Western sphère of influence, Stalin gave little assistance to KKE - which eventually was defeated and 
crushed never returning to the prominence it enjoyed prior to the civil war. 
1 9 2
 Protopapas 2002, pp. 96-147; Katsis 2005, pp. 84-96. 
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Thus we read of the early KKK (October 1923), organizing the workers and peasants, and entering 
Ayia Napa church in Limassol en masse, carrying their red banners and flags (see Sofocleous 2003, pp. 
85-87). Even more so AKEL, instead of promoting atheism, upheld an alternative version of Christianity, 
emphasising the communist practice of the early Christian church and Christ as a social revolutionary, 
who combined a message of brotherly love with an interest in the lot of the poor and of the suffering. 
1 9 4
 With the signing of the Agreements for independence, the objective became the "completion of 
independence" for Cyprus, since AKEL saw the seulement as largely imposed by outside (imperialist) 
powers, serving their own interests rather than the real interests of the people of Cyprus. 
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 Sofocleous 2003, pp. 497-498; Protopapas 2002, pp. 134-138. For the wider context of the impact of 
the Comintern on local communist parties, see Claudin 1975. 
1 9 6
 The Right would accuse the Left of anti-hellenism and of using terrorist tactics against the employers 
and the right-wing unions. And the Left would accuse the Right of collusion with the colonial and local 
establishment, for its violent anti-workerist methods (such as strike-breaking) and similar. 
1 9 7
 Indeed, until today, a Greek Cypriot's choice of coffee or beer, often betrays his/her politicai 
affiliation. 
1 9 8
 When in 1954 the young, new Archbishop Makarius (in the face of the British hardeníng their 
approach, while simultaneously renewing their proposais for a Constitution), dared to suggest that he was 
prepared to consider a temporary Constitution as a transitory measure towards Self-determination/Enosis, 
AKEL would promptly accuse him of a sell-out. See Faustmann 2001, in James Ker-Lindsay/Oliver 
Richmond (eds.), pp. 3-49. 
1 9 9
 In the UN the British used Turkey to balance Greek claims. After neutralizing UN involvement it 
officially involved Ankara in the Cyprus dispute by inviting her, along with Greece, to the 1955 London 
tripartite conférence, which gave her the opportunity to shift from the position of accused to that of 
disinterested mediator between two conflicting parties. 
2 0 0
 National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters. For the escalating antagonism between Left and Right, 
which led to the EOKA struggle, see Katsis 2005, pp. 96-106. 
2 0 1
 National Front for the Liberation of Cyprus. The full text of the first proclamation of EMAK is given 
in Servas 1985 (Appendix D). 
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 Nevzat 2005, p. 102. 
2 0 3
 Ibid., pp. 73-75,141-152. 
2 0 4
 Yennaris 2000, pp. 114-131. 
2 0 5
 In various communications, Grivas was very clear on his intentions: "Communists must [...] be hit, 
humiliated, so as not to be in a position of promoting themselves in the politicai or military fields [...] 
Communists are our enemies whether we like it or not. It is imperative thaï we eliminate them as a 
politicai entity, so as not to be a force to be reckoned with, capable with its décisions to influence the 
national issue"... (see Papageorghiou 1984, and Papafotis 1996, for documentation of such circulars). In 
his memoirs Grivas adds: "Today the Communists [...] are politically organized and act with system, 
whereas we are asleep [...] I regret to repeat one more time, that we will win the military struggle and 
lose on the politicai front, whereas communism will take advantage of our blood" Grivas 1961, pp. 274-
275. 
EOKA killed in total fifteen leftists considered as traitors: Fantis 1995, pp. 365-381. In some cases the 
manner of exécution was extraordinarily hideous. One such case was that of Savas Menikou, who was 
arrested by masked EOKA men, who rang the bells of the village church, gathering a crowd which went 
on to stone Menikou to death - much like the early Christian martyrs: A Panayiotou 1999, pp. 575-576. 
2 0 7
 This fostered the growth of Turkish-Cypriot organizations; after the TMT wave of terror in 1958, the 
membership of Turkish-Cypriot trade unions increased from 1,137 to 4,829: Attalides 1979, p.49 
2 0 8
 Katsis 2002, p. 40. 
2 0 9
 If we turn to social security, the input of the colonial state was insignificant until after WWII, when the 
British introduced systematic development and the first rudiments of a welfare pian (along the lines of 
Beveridgean principies). But most social needs were met at the community level, through the support 
system of the traditional family and the Church. Thus again there was little encouragement towards the 
development of mechanisms of solidarity on a national basis. 
2 1 0
 The distinction between a symbolically simple "boundary", as the community's "public face", and a 
symbolically complex boundary, as the object of internai discourse is made by Anthony Cohen, 1998. 
Cohen, however, jumps from the level of the whole community, to the level of individuáis, ignoring the 
in-between levéis - of classes, blocks or other groups, which may constitute themselves as alternative- or 
sub- cultures, with their own unique discourses. 
2UIbid.,p. 115. 
2 1 2
 The full array of différent party and allied organisations of each side, was only the basis for further 
differentiation. Each camp had its own rituals, commémorations and Symbols. Each built on a range of 
formai activities (congresses, rallies, gatherings, lectures, athletic and cultural events), but even more so 
on informal filial interaction (within family and kin, coffeeshops and so on). The two levéis cross-linked 
through the fostering of social networking and moral obligations. (For instance, becoming the best man at 
the wedding of a comrade at work, or the godfather of a friend's child, led to the enhancement of in-
group loyalties and bonding.) In all these ways abstract idéologies or dogmas became embedded in 
collective discourse and action, being thereby rendered as more concrete social realities. 
2 1 3
 Attalides 1979, pp. 114-116. 
2 1 4
 Since cultures are symbolic constructions, and symbols have no inhérent meaning, the antithesis 
between cultures is therefore contingent and relational - henee their content may change while the form 
still persistí: Cohen op. cil., pp. 71-77. 
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5 9
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6 0
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6 1
 Attalides 1979, pp. 74-77. 
6 2
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6 3
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6 4
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6 5
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6 9
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 Papadakis 1993. 
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7 3
 Billig 1991. 
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 The ambivalence in feelings resulting from using the Cypriot dialect in informai situations (e.g. at 
home) and the Standard Demotic in more formai situations (e.g. at school) is noted by Edvokas 1989 and 
Attalides 1979. 
7 5
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who endorsed it). On the Turkish-Cypriot side the result was the reverse: 64% accepted and only 35.1 
rejected the Plan. Source: Republic of Cyprus Press and Information Office. 
7 6
 Presidency Conclusions: Helsinki European Council, 10-11 December 1999. 
7 7Yakinthou 2007, p. 128. 
7 8
 Peristianis 1998, pp. 34-35. 
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see also summary by PRIO. 
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8 2
 Anastasiou 2006, pp. 213-215. 
8 3
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8 4
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8 5
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8 8
 Christophorou 2005. 
8 9
 Billig 1995, p. 99. 
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 Reicher and Hopkins p. 54. 
9 1
 It is true that tili the last few weeks, even those favouring the Pian were careful in expressing their 
outright public support, so as to contribute towards sending a uniform message to outsiders that the 
Greek-Cypriots in toto expected improvements in the Plan - thereby helping the efforts of the President. 
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9 7
 Christodoulou 1996, p. 269. 
9 8
 Ibid., p. 362. 
9 9
 Whereas on the Turkish-Cypriot side, Turkey tried to actively influence the course of events, and gave 
its full support to the Pian - which obviousty affected to some extent the ascend of Talat to power and 
how Turkish-Cypriots voted in the referendum. Demetriou and Vlachos, 2007. 
100 On the Joint Defense Doctrine, see Christodoulou 1999 Vol. II, pp. 363-367. 
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 Pashiardes 2003, p. 18. 
, 0 3 Shiekeris 2008, p. 4. 
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 Ibid, p. 15. 
1 0 5
 Pierson 1995, p. 107. 
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1 1 0
 As the author noted, once the question invited choice of an "ideal' solution, more than half of those 
who previously opted for self-determination now opted for Enosis. 
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Notes for conclusion 
1
 'Mainstream'accounts include Alastos (1976), Kyrris (1985) and Georgiades (1995). 'Reformist' 
accounts include Pollis (1973, 1979), Kizilyurek (1990, 1999) and Hitchens (1989). 
I
 Iacovou 2006, p. 58. 
3
 Gazioglu 1990, flap-cover introduction. 
4
 Men of letters/scholars, usually supported by the merchants 
5 Roudometof2001,p. 235. 
6
 M. Weber, quoted by Wimmer 2002, p. 35. The metaphor applies mostly to Greek Cypriots, whose elite 
did have a national world-view by this time. 
7
 Hall 1990, p. 225. 
8
 Sources: For Britain - Heath et al 1997, British General Election Cross-Section Survey; for Spain -
Moreno (1995); for Cyprus - Peristianis et al 2000, Understanding Bicommunal Perceptions and 
Attitudes: A Survey on Politicai and National Perceptions, and Peristianis et al 2006, World Values 
Survey-Cyprus Data. 
9
 Colley 1992. 
1 0
 Which enabled Scotland to maintain the autonomy of key institutions such as the church and the legal 
and educational system. 
I I
 Kumar 2003 ; see especially chapters 1, 7 and 8. 
1 2
 Whereupon Catalan institutions and liberties were abolished, the Catalan language forbidden, and 
Spanish made the officiai language. 
1 3
 Conversi 1997; Brown 1998. 
1 4
 Pi-Sunyer 1985; Diez-Medrano 1995. 
1 5
 See among others Franck 1966; Elazar 1987; Hicks 1978 
1 6
 Wimmer op.cit. pp. 241-249. 
1 7
 Ibid., pp. 247-248, fn 22. 
1 8
 Ibid., p. 247. 
l 9 O'Leary2004 , p. 163. 
2 0 Kymlickal995 ,pp. 11-26; Kymlicka 1998, pp. 113-119. 
2 1
 Ibid. 1995, pp. 28-29. 
2 2
 Ibid. 1998, pp. 139-141. 
2 3
 Parekh 1999, p. 307. 
2 4
 Ibid., p. 30. 
2 5
 Hacking 1999. 
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Kamer 2007, pp. 27-35. 
2 7
 Ibid., p. 25. 
2 8
 For 'criticai junctures' see the work of Rokkan, referred to in chapter four of this thesis; for the 
importance of crises in effecting social change see Bourdieu 1977, pp. 168-169. 
2 9
 As Turkish-Cypriot society did in 2004. 
3 0
 Diez 2002 discusses several versions of the expected "catalystic effect" membership in the EU was 
expected to have: for instance, the "carrot catalyst" version stresses that the Turkish-Cypiots would be 
attracted by the benefits of EU membership; the "stick catalyst" version stresses increased pressures on 
Turkey, also aspiring for EU membership; the "subversion catalyst" version stresses pressure on the 
Greek-Cypriots for concessions: Diez 2002, pp. 144-146. 
3 1
 See, for instance, Peristianis 1998. 
3 2
 There are, of course, many other ways in which the EU can contribute towards the sustenance of a 
viable solution. Tocci, for instance, stresses that many fears, which have traditionally prevented a possible 
solution, could be ameliorated within the context of the European Union. To take one example, sécession, 
the greatest fear of the Greek-Cypriots, may lose its sting within the EU, since the Turkish-Cypriot state 
which would be the resuit of sécession "would have to renegotiate the terms of its accession to the Union, 
with ali the costs and problems that it would involve"; and if such a state remained within the EU, "the 
same freedoms would be granted to Greek-Cypriots as fellow EU nationals": Tocci 2004, p. 154. 
3 3
 Denton 1993. 
3 4
 Tsinisizelis 1996; Denton 1993. 
3 5
 For the origin of the concept of "security communities" see Adler and Bamett 1998, pp. 6-9. See also. 
Adler 1997. 
3 6
 Adler and Bamett 1998, p. 34 
3 7
 Bamett and Adler 1998, p. 424 
3 8
 Ibid. 
3 9
 Ibid., pp. 424-425 
4 0
 Waeverl998,p. 94. 
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Notes for Appendix 1 
1
 The Turkish-Cypriot part of the survey covered 1048 individuáis; since the thesis concentrâtes on the 
Greek-Cypriots, this methodology outline will not go into further détails on the Turkish-Cypriot survey 
and results. 
2
 The sampling procedure was as follows: Each of the five districts was sub-divided into two strata, urban 
and rural (except for Famagusta, where there is no urban area), and from the resulting nine strata a 
number of individuáis proportionate to the real population demographics (according to area of residence, 
age and gender) was determined. 
3
 For WVS purposes, a number of only 600 Greek-Cypriots were required, but another 300 were added so 
as to improve the accuracy of the présent study. The survey also covered 500 Turkish-Cypriots. 
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Notes for Appendix 4 
1
 Giddens, A. (1994) Beyond Lefì and Right. London: Polity Press and Blackwell Publishers. 
2
 Blundell, J and Gosschalk, B. (1997) Beyond Left and Right: The New Politics of Britain. London: The 
Institute of Economie Affaire. 
3
 Inglehart, R. (1997) Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economie and Politicai Change in 
43 Societies. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
4
 Two différent scales were used (scale 1-5 for 2000 and scale 1-10 for 2006), so for comparison reasons 
we had to adjust the 2006 scale to be similar with the 2000 scale. 
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